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Abstract 
 
The theme of ‘business in conflict’ has become a ‘hot topic’ and the subject of many 
academic and policy publications. The trend in this literature is to conclude that 
‘corporations have (or should have) obligations under international human rights and 
humanitarian law’ and that ‘corporations must be held to account’ through law, for 
example for ‘complicity in international crimes’. 
 
With this thesis, I aim to present a counterpoint to this literature. Employing dialectics 
as methodology and a theoretical frame based on Pashukanis’ commodity form theory 
of law, I investigate the progeny and role of law as sine qua non of capitalism. I 
establish that capitalism’s main motor, the corporation, was developed as a legal 
concept to congeal relations of production and minimise risk-exposure of the 
capitalists. Moreover, the corporation served as an instrument of imperialism and the 
global dissemination of capitalist law. Post WWII international criminal law (ICL) was 
developed ostensibly as an accountability mechanism. I show that it was used, contrary 
to early indications, to conceal rather than address the economic causes and imperialist 
nature of the war, so as to enable the continuation or rehabilitation of trade relations. 
ICL has been institutionalized over subsequent years and has continued to immunize 
economic actors from prosecution, including in the ICTR and ICTY. Yet, ICL’s strong 
appeal has led ‘cause lawyers’ to seek corporate accountability in ICL, largely 
unsuccessfully. Combined with (legalized) ‘corporate social responsibility’, ‘corporate 
accountability’ discourse risks becoming an instrument of legitimization for the liberal 
capitalist enterprise. Especially, including the corporation as a subject of ICL would 
complete its reification and ideological identity as a political citizen exercising 
legitimate authority within ‘global governance’. In conclusion, while emancipation 
from corporate violence cannot be achieved through law, its promise lies in counter-
systemic activism and, with that, human emancipation.  
   4 
For my parents 
 
The law locks up the man or woman 
Who steals a goose from off the common, 
But leaves the greater villain loose 
Who steals the common from under the goose. 
 
(15th Century English rhyme, anonymous) 
 
Acknowledgments 
On the long journey with this thesis I have sought out and encountered many 
fascinating, inspiring and stimulating people from all walks of life: academics of every 
type including lawyers, anthropologists, sociologists and historians, judges, 
prosecutors and defenders, trade union activists, parliamentarians of all colours and 
nationalities, squatters and anarchists, ex-detainees and prisoners of war, generals and 
footsoldiers, refuseniks and resistance fighters, company directors and private military 
contractors, middle management and civil service bureaucrats, cause lawyers and City 
types (and those that are both). I am grateful to all of them. In particular, 
 
To those fighting for a better world each in their own particularly heroic and inspiring 
way (in order of appearance): Anne Paq, Ward Ferdinandusse, Lymor Goldstein, 
Munir Nusseibeh, Mahmoud Abu Rahma, Yehuda Shaul, Liesbeth Zegveld, Francesca 
Marotta, Richard Goldstone and Jonathan Pollak. 
 
And to those colleagues and friends who continue to be an every day inspiration: my 
(patient!) supervisors Catherine Redgwell, Riz Mokal and Iris Chiu, dear friends and 
allies Vivian, Sara and Anne, Liza, Amber, Rachel, Mohammed, Simon, Smadar, 
Sarah K and Antonia; and in Berlin: Kamil & Sarah, Benedikt, Tsafrir, Joel, Anna, 
Üner and their crew, in London and beyond, Alex & Suzanne, Agnes, Arthur and Arif, 
Holly & Ben, Miri & Indrajit, Ben H., Frank “Abu Leo” and most recently David. 
 
My Diakonia colleagues, especially Wa’el and Aida, at Al-Quds, Radi “Shweijia”, 
Nagham “the Clinic changed my life” and Fady, and my new colleagues at City 
University especially Chris Ryan, Riccardo Montana, and Ioannis Kalpouzos. 
 
Scholars and friends who played an important role in shaping my thinking, Jason 
Beckett, Akbar Rasulov, Jörg Kammerhoffer, Aeyal Gross, China Miéville, Robert 
Knox and Hannah Franzki. 
 
Gracious hosts, Mudar Qassis at the Institute of Law, Birzeit University, Muhammed 
Shelaldeh (who offered to find me a husband so that I would stay) at the Palestinian 
School of Law, Al-Quds University, Assaf Likhovski at the CEGLA Center, and 
Ronen Shamir in the Sociology Department at Tel Aviv University and Danny Evron 
and Yuval Shany at the Miverva Center for Human Rights at Hebrew University, 
Florian Jeßberger and Jochen Bung at Das Franz-von-Liszt-Institut for International 
Criminal Law, Humboldt University, Berlin. 
 
And finally, and above all, Jasmijn, Marijn, Eva, Kobus, Brom, Kees en Annet.  
   5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 3 
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................... 4 
List of abbreviations ..................................................................................................... 9 
Chapter 1 Introduction “Das Kapital, das immer dahinter steckt” ....................... 12 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 12 
1.1 “Global corporate rule is here” and the liberal approach ..................................... 12 
1.2 Counterpoint: The Question ................................................................................. 14 
2 Theoretical framework ................................................................................................. 16 
2.1 The commodity form theory of law – a brief outline ........................................... 18 
2.2 The form and violence of law: property (and sovereignty) as ‘mine-not-yours’ . 20 
3 “Developing the form on the basis of the fundamental form” .................................. 21 
3.1 Law: Inter-polity law and proto-law ..................................................................... 21 
3.2 Global classes ....................................................................................................... 22 
3.3 Conflict, violence, imperialism, structural violence ............................................. 23 
3.4 The commodity form theory and corporations ..................................................... 24 
3.5 The commodity form theory and (international) criminal law ............................. 24 
4 Beyond ‘nebulous left functionalism’: Further considerations on Marxism & law
 25 
4.1 Law ‘congealing capitalism’: Determination, overdetermination and totality ..... 25 
4.2 Lawyers congealing capitalism: Who constructs the structure? ........................... 27 
4.3 Law’s emancipatory potential queried .................................................................. 29 
5 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 30 
6 Thesis structure– the long and short story arcs and themes ..................................... 32 
7 Impact: And the point is to change it? ........................................................................ 34 
8 Future research ............................................................................................................. 35 
9 A note on references and language .............................................................................. 35 
10 Law ............................................................................................................................... 35 
Chapter 2A: The roots, development and context of the legal concept of the 
corporation: The making of a structure of irresponsibility .................................... 36 
1 Introduction to A and B ............................................................................................... 36 
2 Introduction to A: The ‘back story’ of the legal concept of the business company 38 
3 Epistemology ................................................................................................................. 40 
3.1 Writing the history out of the corporation ............................................................ 40 
3.2 Theory and the ‘big idea’ of company law ........................................................... 42 
3.3 Writing the history back into the corporation ....................................................... 44 
4 The creation of market society ..................................................................................... 46 
4.1 The legal personality of commercial polities ........................................................ 47 
4.2 Primitive accumulation and the creation of the working class ............................. 54 
4.3 Calculable law, risk accounting and “accountability” .......................................... 55 
5 From the Joint Stock Corporation to the MNC ......................................................... 58 
5.1 Merchant Adventurers, Inc. .................................................................................. 58 
5.2 Bubble Aftermath: Effects on company law development ................................... 62 
5.3 1844: The first modern Companies Act ................................................................ 64 
5.4 Another look at separate personality .................................................................... 66 
5.5 The finishing touch: Salomon ............................................................................... 69 
5.6 The multinational corporate group ....................................................................... 71 
6 Conclusion of Part A ..................................................................................................... 72 
Chapter 2B: The Corporation and the Political Economy of International Law . 75 
1 Introduction to Part B: The Corporation and capitalism in IL ............................... 75 
1.1 Epistemology: Sources in international law/history of international law ............. 77 
1.2 Towards International Law ................................................................................... 78 
   6 
1.3 The commodity form theory in international law ................................................. 81 
2 Corporations, law and capitalism ................................................................................ 84 
2.1 Grotius: ‘Father of international law’ and corporate counsel to the Dutch East 
India Company .................................................................................................................. 85 
2.2 Concurrent development: corporations, states and colonialism ........................... 88 
2.3 The 19th C. Trade Corporations preparing the ground for states in the Western 
image 91 
2.4 The Corporate Scramble for Africa ...................................................................... 92 
2.5 The Congo Corporation and the State Form ......................................................... 96 
2.6 The Berlin Conference: Legalising corporate imperialism .................................. 98 
3 Corporations in IL in the twentieth century .............................................................. 99 
3.1 Concession agreements and unequal sovereigns ................................................ 101 
3.2 ILIP and internationalisation .............................................................................. 103 
3.3 BIT Arbitration: The silent revolution? .............................................................. 104 
3.4 Corporations in the PCIJ and ICJ ....................................................................... 105 
3.5 Island of Palmas Arbitration vs Reparations for Injuries: International legal 
personality revisited ........................................................................................................ 109 
4 Class law and class struggle in IL .............................................................................. 113 
5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 115 
Chapter 3: Capitalism’s Victors’ Justice?: The economics of WWII, the Allies’ 
trials of the German industrialists and their treatment of the Japanese zaibatsu
 ..................................................................................................................................... 119 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 119 
2 Part A: Germany ......................................................................................................... 122 
2.1 Sources ................................................................................................................ 123 
3 From War to Trials: Why ‘Nuremberg’ ................................................................... 125 
4 The US occupation and economic reform of Germany ........................................... 130 
5 Nuremberg: Political demands translated into law ................................................. 131 
5.1 The Trial at Nuremberg ...................................................................................... 132 
5.2 The Indictment .................................................................................................... 135 
5.3 The IMT Judgment ............................................................................................. 137 
6 The Turnaround: From Germany is our Problem to Germany is our Business .. 139 
7 The trials of the industrialists: From morality play to théâtre de l’absurde .......... 142 
7.1 The Trials of the Industrialists at the US military tribunal at Nuremberg .......... 143 
8 Industrialists in other zonal trials ............................................................................. 164 
8.1 Industrialists in the British zonal trials ............................................................... 164 
8.2 Industrialists in the French zonal trials ............................................................... 167 
8.3 Industrialists in the Soviet zonal trials ................................................................ 169 
9 Aftermath: The warm bosom of the Western powers ............................................. 172 
9.1 The Churchill and McCloy Clemencies, McCarthyism and the rebuilding of West 
Germany .......................................................................................................................... 173 
Chapter 3B: The Tokyo International Military Tribunal, or, How the East was 
Won ............................................................................................................................. 175 
1 Part B: Japan ............................................................................................................... 175 
1.1 Sources ................................................................................................................ 176 
2 Why Tokyo? ................................................................................................................ 179 
3 The US Occupation and economic reform of Japan ................................................ 182 
4 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East ............................................ 184 
4.1 Missing in Action ............................................................................................... 190 
4.2 Other trials of Japanese war crimes in the Far East ............................................ 198 
5 Economic occupation policy: zaibatsu dissolution and the ‘reverse course’ ......... 205 
5.1 Zaibatsu dissolution and other reforms ............................................................... 205 
5.2 Reverse course .................................................................................................... 207 
6 Conclusion to 3A and 3B: Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice ......................................... 208 
   7 
Chapter 4A: The (Re-)Making of ICL: Lawyers congealing capitalism ............. 211 
1 Introduction to A, B and C ......................................................................................... 211 
2 Introduction to A: Constructing ICL’s foundational narrative ............................. 213 
2.1 Against all atrocities: A distinction based on morality ....................................... 214 
2.2 Optimists and Skeptics: A distinction based on enforcement mechanisms ........ 215 
2.3 German positivists: A distinction based on doctrine .......................................... 217 
2.4 No distinction: The catch-all ‘omnibus’ approach ............................................. 219 
3 These approaches as the ideological building blocks of ICL .................................. 221 
4 An alternative foundational narrative for ICL ........................................................ 224 
5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 229 
Chapter 4B “No soul to damn and no body to kick”? Attribution, perpetration and 
mens rea in business .................................................................................................. 230 
1 Introduction to B ......................................................................................................... 230 
1.1 “No soul to damn and no body to kick”? Attribution, perpetration and mens rea in 
business ........................................................................................................................... 231 
1.2 Co-perpetration and Joint Criminal Enterprise ................................................... 233 
1.3 ‘Complicity’, Aiding & Abetting ....................................................................... 234 
1.4 Command responsibility ..................................................................................... 236 
1.5 Perpetration through an organization? ................................................................ 237 
2 Conclusion: So many (wo)men, so many modes ...................................................... 238 
1 Introduction to C ......................................................................................................... 240 
2 The ‘new ICL’ and re-opening the debate on collective liability ............................ 242 
3 “De-Individualising ICL”: Towards legal person liability? .................................... 244 
3.1 The ICC negotiations on legal persons ............................................................... 244 
3.2 Legal person liability for business in ICL: The ‘progress view’ ........................ 247 
3.3 Legal person liability: The systems view ........................................................... 250 
4 Conclusion to C ........................................................................................................... 252 
5 Conclusion to A, B and C: Who let the Dogmatisierung out? ................................ 252 
Chapter 5: Contemporary Schreibtischtäter: Drinking the poison chalice? ...... 255 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 255 
1.1 The Balkans and the ICTY ................................................................................. 257 
1.2 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ...................................................... 260 
1.3 Special Court for Sierra Leone ........................................................................... 270 
2 The ICC ........................................................................................................................ 271 
2.1 The Democratic Republic of Congo ................................................................... 272 
2.2 Kenya .................................................................................................................. 272 
3 Alternative ways of dealing with business in conflict .............................................. 273 
3.1 The UNSC Embargoes, sanctions and fact-finding missions ............................. 273 
4 ICL on the domestic level ........................................................................................... 275 
4.1 Van Anraat and Kouwenhoven, the exception and the rule ............................... 276 
4.2 Van Anraat .......................................................................................................... 277 
4.3 Kouwenhoven ..................................................................................................... 278 
5 Host state cases ............................................................................................................ 279 
6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 281 
Chapter 6: “The fifty-year campaign for total corporate liberation” .................. 286 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 286 
2 Corporate social responsibility: Company law and the ‘last maginot line of 
capitalism’ .......................................................................................................................... 288 
3 Cause lawyering .......................................................................................................... 292 
3.1 Cause lawyering problematized .......................................................................... 295 
4 Legalising CSR and Corporate ICL problematized .................................................. 296 
4.1 Compliance and class ......................................................................................... 297 
4.2 Enforcement and imperialism ............................................................................. 299 
4.3 Settlements and Selling Rights: A Market for Responsibility ............................ 301 
   8 
4.4 Corporate Power and Legitimacy ....................................................................... 303 
5 Conclusion: The dark side of ‘corporate accountability’ ........................................ 304 
6 Consciousness-building and The Seed of the New ................................................... 306 
Conclusion: The structural and empirical impossibility of using ICL to restrain 
business in conflict ..................................................................................................... 309 
1 Theory and method ..................................................................................................... 309 
2 Roots, development and context ................................................................................ 310 
3 Business, conflict and ICL meet ................................................................................ 312 
4 Remaking ICL: removing business(wo)men and inserting legal persons as subjects
 312 
5 On not drinking the poisoned chalice ........................................................................ 313 
6 “The 50 year campaign for total corporate liberation” .......................................... 314 
Appendix A ................................................................................................................ 316 
Appendix B ................................................................................................................ 317 
Appendix C ................................................................................................................ 321 
Appendix D ................................................................................................................ 322 
Appendix E ................................................................................................................ 323 
Appendix F ................................................................................................................. 326 
Appendix G ................................................................................................................ 327 
BIBLIOGRAPHY BY TYPE OF SOURCE ........................................................... 344 
ALPHABETICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................... 387 	   	  
   9 
List of abbreviations 
 
AFPS    Association France Palestine Solidarite 
AIA   Association Internationale Africaine 
ATCA   Alien Tort Claims Act 
ATS   Alien Tort Statute 
BACAR   Banque Continentale Africaine au Rwanda 
BASF   Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik 
BIT   Bilateral investment treaty 
C   Century 
CAT   Convention Against Torture 
CCL   Control Council Law 
CCR    Centre for Constitutional Rights 
CEO    Chief Executive Officer 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency 
CIL   Customary International Law 
CL   Criminal law 
CNN    Central News Network 
Co   Company 
Corp   Corporation 
DEICo   Dutch East India Company 
DEST   Deutsche Erd- und Steinwerke 
DLH   Dalhoff, Larsen and Horneman 
DRC    Democratic Republic of Congo 
ECCHR   European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 
EDO   Earl Dodge Osborn 
EU    European Union 
FBI   Federal Bureau of Investigations 
FDI   Foreign direct investment 
FDN    Fond Defense National 
FEC   Far Eastern Commission  
FEC   Far Eastern Committee 
FRG   Federal Republic of Germany 
FRUS   Foreign Relations of the US 
FYR   Former Yugoslav Republic 
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GCC    Global Capitalist Class 
GDR   German Democratic Republic 
GWC    Global Working Class 
HGW   Hermann-Göring-Werks 
HRW    Human Rights Watch 
ICC    International Criminal Court 
ICJ    International Court of Justice 
ICL    International criminal law 
ICSID   International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
ICTR    International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY   International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
IG   Industriegesellschaft 
IHL   International humanitarian law 
IHRL   International human rights law 
IL    International law 
   10 
ILC   International Law Commission 
ILIP   International law of investment protection 
ILP   International legal personality 
IMF    International Monetary Fund 
IMT    International Military Tribunal 
IMTFE  International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
JAG   Judge Advocate General 
JCE    Joint Criminal Enterprise 
JCS   Joint Chiefs of Staff  
JSC   Joint Stock Corporation 
LoC   Library of Congress 
Ltd   Limited 
MaNGO   Market-oriented non-governmental organisation 
MNC    Multi-national corporation  
MP   Member of Parliament 
MPEPIL  Max Planck Encyclopaedia of International Law 
MRND  National Republican Movement for Democracy and 
Development (French: Mouvement républicain national pour la 
démocratie et le développement) 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement 
NATO   North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NGO   Non-governmental organisation 
NIEO   New International Economic Order 
NMT   Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OMGUS   Office of the Military Government of the US 
OSI    Open Society Institute 
OTC   Oriental Timber Company 
PCA    Permanent Court of Arbitration 
PCIJ    Permanent Court of International Justice 
PoW   Prisoner of War 
RAID   Rights & Accountability in Development 
Res   Resolution 
RTLM   Radio Télévision Libre Mille Collins 
RUF    Revolutionary United Front 
SCAP    Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces 
SCSL    Special Court for Sierra Leone 
SD   Sicherheitsdienst 
SMT   Soviet Military Tribunals 
SS   Schutzstaffel 
SWNCC   State War Navy Coordinating Committee 
TNC    Transnational corporation 
TRC    Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
TVPA   Torture Victims Protection Act 
UK    United Kingdom 
UN    United Nations 
UNCITRAL  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
UNCLOS   United National Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNGA   United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
US    United States 
   11 
USD    United States Dollar 
USSR   Union of Socialist Soviet Republics  
VOC   Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie 
WB World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) 
WCCLR  United Nations War Crimes Commission 
WTO   World Trade Organisation  
WVHA  Wirtschaft und Verwaltungshauptamt 
WWI   First World War  
WWII   Second World War
   12 
Chapter 1 Introduction “Das Kapital, das immer dahinter steckt”1 
	  
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 12 
1.1 “Global corporate rule is here” and the liberal approach ..................................... 12 
1.2 Counterpoint: The Question ..................................................................................... 14 
2 Theoretical framework ......................................................................................... 16 
2.1 The commodity form theory of law – a brief outline .............................................. 18 
2.2 The form and violence of law: property (and sovereignty) as ‘mine-not-yours’ . 20 
3 “Developing the form on the basis of the fundamental form” .......................... 21 
3.1 Law: Inter-polity law and proto-law ........................................................................ 21 
3.2 Global classes ............................................................................................................. 22 
3.3 Conflict, violence, imperialism, structural violence ............................................... 23 
3.4 The commodity form theory and corporations ....................................................... 24 
3.5 The commodity form theory and (international) criminal law ............................. 24 
4 Beyond ‘nebulous left functionalism’: Further considerations on Marxism & 
law…. ............................................................................................................................ 25 
4.1 Law ‘congealing capitalism’: Determination, overdetermination and totality .... 25 
4.2 Lawyers congealing capitalism: Who constructs the structure? ........................... 27 
4.3 Law’s emancipatory potential queried .................................................................... 29 
5 Methodology .......................................................................................................... 30 
6 Thesis structure– the long and short story arcs and themes ............................ 32 
7 Impact: And the point is to change it? ................................................................ 34 
8 Future research ..................................................................................................... 35 
9 A note on references and language ...................................................................... 35 






1.1 “Global corporate rule is here” and the liberal approach 
 
It seems customary to start a text in the now rather voluminous literature on ‘business 
and human rights’ broadly conceived, with the statement, that ‘global corporate rule is 
                                                
1 Literally, “the capital that is always behind it”. I owe this phrase to Fabian Schellhaas, who used it in 
his March 2010 presentation in Prof. Werle’s Doktorandenseminar at the Humboldt University of 
Berlin. 
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here’.2 Bakan, author of The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and 
Power, opens as follows: 
Today, corporations govern our lives. They determine what we eat, what we 
watch, what we wear, where we work, and what we do. We are inescapably 
surrounded by their culture, iconography, and ideology. And, like the church 
and the monarch in other times, they posture as infallible and omnipotent, 
glorifying themselves in imposing buildings and elaborate displays. 
Increasingly, corporations dictate the decisions of their supposed overseers in 
government and control domains of society once firmly embedded in the public 
sphere. The corporation’s rise to dominance is one of the remarkable events of 
modern history…3 
 
Moreover, Shamir tells us:  
Multinational corporations (MNCs) dominate the global economy, accounting 
for two-thirds of global trade in goods and services. Of the one hundred largest 
world economies, fifty-one are corporations. The top two hundred corporations 
generate 27.5 percent of the world gross domestic product and their combined 
annual revenues are greater than those of the 182 states that contain 80 
percent of the world population. The combined sales of four of the largest 
corporations in the world exceed the gross domestic product of Africa.4 
 
Such a text will then commonly proceed with a descriptive section, outlining, for 
example, that 141 corporations were implicated in the Congolese genocide,5 or that 
Shell was behind the killing of Ogoni Valley human rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa,6 or 
more broadly, that (Western) multinationals (a result of recent globalization) are 
involved in conflicts around the world, variously causing, financing, or more generally 
profiting from them, while becoming directly or indirectly implicated in the human 
rights violations and international crimes that inevitably seem to occur in such 
conflicts.7 It then analyses whether corporations (usually seen only from the aspect of 
                                                
2 E.g. Shamir (2005) 92. 
3 Bakan (2004) 5. For another version of this introduction, see Muchlinski (2007) 3, Zerk (2006) 7-14; 
Hertz (2001) 8-9; for book-length contemplations of the issue, see, Vernon (1971); Korten (2001); Klein 
(2001); Barnet (1974). 
4 Shamir (2005) 92. Also, Sornarajah (2010) 239. 
5 Stewart (2010). 
6 E.g. Zerk (2006) 23. 
7 E.g. Stephens (2005). 
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the legal person, sometimes also including the individuals ‘inside’) have obligations in 
international law, and then, based on the answer to that question, proceeding in one of 
a number of directions. If it is found that yes, corporations have obligations under 
international law and consequently could be considered liable for violations, the next 
move is to propose that they be brought before the courts in their home states (usually 
it is admitted host states would be in a weak position to do so), and/or that the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) statute be amended in order to include legal 
persons in its jurisdiction.8 If the conclusion is that international law does not 
(normally it is phrased as ‘not yet’) ‘recognise’ corporations’ obligations in 
international humanitarian law (“IHL”) and international human rights law (“IHRL”) 
then it is proposed that a new treaty be drafted clearly outlining such obligations, or, it 
is claimed that the many ‘soft law’ corporate social responsibility mechanisms that 
exist can adequately ‘fill the accountability gap’ and thus ‘end corporate impunity.’9 
Sometimes these texts then make mention of ‘successes’ in which corporations paid 
out millions to hundreds of thousands of victims in settlement of civil compensation 
claims under the US Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) for violations of international 
law.10 Almost invariably they do not refer to individual liability of corporate actors. 
The conclusion is always the same: “Corporations must be held accountable!”11 One of 
the more common calls in recent years is for the use of international criminal law to 
restrain business in conflict, and it is on this possibility that I focus here.12 
 
1.2 Counterpoint: The Question 
This thesis is my counterpoint to this story. What I am interested in is the paradox, the 
existence of which is generally acknowledged by authors writing on this topic,13 
phrased by Sornorajah as:  
[t]he need for regulation of this private power through the instrumentality of 
international law is a necessary fact which has not been adequately addressed, 
                                                
8 E.g. Burchard (2010); Clapham (2008); Stoitchikova (2010). 
9 Zerk (2006) 299; and see generally, UN Legalising CSR Report, Ruggie (2009) Report, Ruggie (2011) 
Report. 
10 E.g. Stephens (2005); Shamir (2004). 
11 Zerk (2006), Cernic (2010), Baars (2007). 
12 E.g. Burchard (2010); Clapham (2008); Stoitchikova (2010). 
13 Bakan (2005), Hertz (2001); Zerk (2006) 299ff.; generally, Glasbeek (2002), Pearce (1990) 430; 436. 
   15 
largely because the existence of such power itself ensures that no control is 
brought about.14  
 
My first question is about the nature of this paradox. What is the relation between law 
and the private power of (multinational) corporations? What are corporations, in law 
and in reality?15 I query the assumption of many legal scholars: is it even possible to 
use ICL to hold business to account for their (harmful) involvement in conflict? I 
answer this using the commodity form theory of law. With this theory, it becomes 
obvious quite quickly that controlling business through law is not possible, or possible 
at most to a very limited degree, and why this is so. This is a question of structural 
determination. Then, using the ‘business in conflict’ context, I investigate how this 
paradox manifests, by asking two interrelated questions. First, why have the proposed 
‘legal solutions’ to the problem of ‘corporate impunity’ either not been realised, or, if 
realised, why do they not ‘work’ to punish and eradicate harmful business involvement 
in conflict? This is a question I seek to answer by examining historical and 
contemporary examples of business in conflict and attempts to hold business(wo)men 
and companies to account. The second question is, if it is obvious to Sornorajah and 
authors like him why no adequate legal control exists, why does he still demand it? 
This is a question of epistemology and ideology: the role of lawyers (consciously or 
otherwise) in structuring and supporting (‘congealing’) capitalism. Finally, I raise the 
question, if restraining business involvement in conflict through the use of ICL is 
impossible, what is to be done?16 
 
The context of this set of questions is a time when, despite indications that we should 
have learnt our lesson from recent financial crises, “[r]eports of the death of the 
Washington Consensus have been greatly exaggerated.”17 It is also a time of renewed 
popular anti-capitalist resistance, most visibly in the global ‘Occupy’ movement.18 As 
such, it would seem an auspicious moment to investigate the issue of corporate excess 
                                                
14 Sornarajah (2010) 240. 
15 In Ch. 2A I will argue that the legal concept of the corporation is an abstraction of a certain form of 
social organization. 
16 “What is to be done?” is the classic phrase attributed to V.I. Lenin, which emphasizes the need to turn 
theory into praxis in Marxist thought. I pose the question here but offer only limited examples of what 
others are attempting to do in relation to the issue in Ch. 6. 
17 E.g Rasulov (2010), and Sornarajah (2010) 77 (who speaks of a ‘retreat of liberalism’). 
18 See, e.g. http://www.occupytogether.org/ . 
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and to propose a radically different (at least within the legal literature) perspective on 
the issue.19  
 
I focus on corporations, precisely because of this allegation that ‘corporate rule is 
here’, and because corporations are said to be capable of greater harm than many other 
players. In particular, these statements intrigue me because of the seeming 
contradiction between the abstract nature of ‘the corporation’ and its real world effect. 
I focus on conflict (below I explore the meaning of conflict) and ICL because many of 
the authors on business and human rights/business in conflict (and general ICL 
authors) are proposing corporate ICL as a solution to the problem,20 and also, because 
ICL has in the past been used against business(wo)men involved in conflict (esp. Ch. 
3A and 3B below). The discussion, although limited to this narrow area, should be of 
value in the broader context of business regulation, and more generally the role of law 
in capitalism also.21 
 
2 Theoretical framework 
 
In order to answer the set of questions outlined above, I use a Marxist theoretical 
framework (Section 2.2-2.4), and method (Section 5).  
 
Hugh Collins, the acrid but astute critic of Marxist approaches to law, explains it thus: 
[whereas t]he typical legal theory dispensed in law schools presents 
descriptions of law, analysis of legal concepts, and inquires into the demands 
of justice, based upon assumptions about the legitimate authority of the power 
which is exercised through the institutions of a modern legal system… Marxism 
is bent upon the overthrow of the existing apparatus of domination, [and thus] 
its objectives in the study of law differ markedly.”… “The principal aim of 
Marxist jurisprudence is to criticise the centrepiece of liberal political 
philosophy, the ideal called the Rule of Law. …By exposing the structures of 
                                                
19 Other recent new Marxist voices in legal scholarship include: Knox (2008); Knox (2009); Miéville 
(2009); Rasulov (2008); Rasulov (2010).   
20 E.g. Burchard (2010); Clapham (2008); Stoitchikova (2010). 
21 On the role of law to regulate ‘the economic’ generally, see Baars (2011) Appendix G. 
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domination and subverting the beliefs and values which sustain them, Marxists 
seek to pave the way towards a revolutionary social transformation.22 
 
‘Exposing the structures of domination and subverting the beliefs and values which 
sustain them’, accurately describes the aim of this thesis. More specifically, I seek to 
achieve this task as phrased by Chris Arthur:  
The task … is that of tracing … both the relationships that are expressed in the 
legal superstructure and those that it ideologically spirits away.23 
 
The claim that adequate regulation does not exist (or is not enforced), because 
corporate power prevents it, points us to ‘structures of domination’ mentioned by 
Collins above. Sornorajah’s demand for legal controls may be caused by ‘the beliefs 
and values which sustain them’ mentioned in the same quote. Marxist theory would 
seem thus an appropriate framework to help answer my questions, to investigate who it 
is who is dominating, and through what structures, and what the role of those 
structures is in the domination. Moreover, since I am focussing on business in conflict, 
and international criminal law, I will look at the role of law in expressing, affecting, 
abstracting, shifting and spiriting away the relationship, between those who in criminal 
law terminology would be known as the ‘perpetrator’ and the ‘victim’. Through law, 
this relationship becomes one between legal persons, and one of the focal points of this 
thesis is what happens to the human relationship when it is ‘legalised’, especially, 
when the legal person becomes a reified corporate person.  
 
Proposing a radical new approach requires going to the root of the problem.24 The first 
point for discussion in this thesis, then, is the nature of capitalist law, which I treat in 
this Chapter. Not many legal texts question the notion that law is inevitable, and 
good,25 nor deal with the question where the form of law came from (as opposed to, 
where law’s content: particular legal norms, or all legal norms, came from), how and 
why it was created or why law specifically was selected as opposed to other forms of 
social organisation.26 The commodity form theory of law, the Marxist legal theory as 
                                                
22 Collins (1982) 1. I have reversed the order of Collins’ sentences here, he starts his text with “The 
principal aim…” 
23 Arthur (1978) 31. 
24 Radix is Latin for root. 
25 Fox (1993). 
26 E.g. Miéville (2005) 59-60. 
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propounded by Evgeny Pashukanis and elaborated in particular in the area of 
international law by China Miéville, provides a clear, and persuasive, explanation of 
where law comes from and why it (was) developed. 
 
2.1 The commodity form theory of law – a brief outline 
In his Law and Marxism: A General Theory, Pashukanis outlines the commodity form 
theory of law which holds that law (the legal system) came about as a result of the 
class struggle between the feudal lords and their subjects, and was fundamental in the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism, from privilege to law, and, as Maine had said 
it prior to Marx, from status to contract.27 The emergence of law is explained by the 
emergence of capitalism, and vice versa. This is the starting point of the commodity 
form theory of law.  
 
Pashukanis explains that the juridical element in the regulation of human conduct 
enters where the isolation and opposition of interests begins. This is “tie[d] closely to 
the emergence of the commodity form in mediating material exchanges”28 as described 
by Marx in Capital I.29 At this point man comes to be seen as a legal subject, having 
legal personality, the bearer of rights as opposed to customary privileges and duties.  
Thus, the logic of the commodity form is the logic of the legal form.30 
 
In Between Equal Rights, Miéville elaborates that, while in commodity exchange, each 
commodity must be the private property of its owner, freely given in return for the 
other at a rate determined by their exchange value, each agent in the exchange must be 
first a property owner and second, formally equal to the other agent(s).31 Whereas 
previously, the formally unequal individuals implied by the hierarchical command 
relations of feudalism (and other prior forms of social organisation) engaged in unfree 
transactions, in the transition (from feudalism) to capitalism another specific form of 
social regulation became necessary, to formalise the method of settlement without 
                                                
27 Maine (1861) Ch.V. Maine of course had a different normative appreciation for this transition, shown 
in his “old law fixed a man’s social position irreversibly at his birth, modern law allows him to create it 
for himself by convention” (Ch.IX); Miéville (2005) 285. 
28 Arthur (1978) 13. 
29 Marx (1976) 163ff. 
30 Arthur (1978) 13. 
31 Miéville (2005) 78. Miéville has applied his theoretical approach in Miéville (2008) and (2009). 
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affecting either party’s formally equal status. “That form is law.”32 “The owners of 
commodities were of course proprietors even before they acknowledged one another as 
such, but in a different, organic, non-legal sense.”33  
 
The change occurs gradually, imperceptibly at the time of the growth of the urban 
middle class, of land enclosures, of technological development enabling the production 
of a surplus to be taken to market. In Pashukanis’ words, “only the development of the 
market creates the possibility of – and the necessity for – transforming the person 
appropriating things by his labour (or by robbery) into a legal owner. There is no 
clearly defined borderline between these two phases. The ‘natural’ changes into the 
juridical imperceptibly, just as armed robbery blends quite directly with trade.”34 Then, 
“[o]nly when bourgeois relations are fully developed does law become abstract in 
character. Every person becomes man in the abstract, all labour becomes socially 
useful labour in the abstract, every subject becomes an abstract legal subject. At the 
same time, the norm takes on the logically perfected form of abstract universal law.”35 
Accompanying the development of the economy based on the commodity and on 
money, human relations become legal relations, all property is transformed into 
moveable property, including labour power.36 The cash nexus is introduced into all 
relationships, including relationships of responsibility.37 
 
While legal forms regulate relationships between autonomous legal subjects, the 
subject is the ‘cell form’ of the legal system, a basic element of which is contestation 
(struggle over property). In Ch.2A I describe the becoming of legal subjects of 
collectivities (polities, corporations, etc.), and later, individuals, in the atomisation 
process of modernity.  
 
Finally, for law, the fundamental question arises, why the machinery of state coercion 
is created in the form of an impersonal apparatus of public power, separate from 
                                                
32 Miéville (2005) 79 (emphasis in original). 
33 Pashukanis (1978) 121. See also Cohen (2000) 217ff, who explains the relationship prior to law as 
one of power. 
34 Pashukanis (1978) 124. 
35 Pashukanis (1978) 120. 
36 Pashukanis (1978) 40; Marx (1976) 125ff. 
37 Pashukanis (1978) 40. On the concept of cash nexus, see Caudwell (1905) 69: “cash nexus which 
replaces all other social ties, so that society seems held together, not by mutual love or tenderness or 
obligation, but simply by profit.” 
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society.38 Pashukanis argues, that, although the emergence of the state was enabled by 
law, it was not necessary.39 It was not necessary because of the coercion inherent in the 
form of law itself (see below). Miéville attaches great significance to this point for the 
“lawness” of international law, which exists without an overarching authority.40 On the 
usefulness of the state for law, nonetheless, “…coercion cannot appear [in a society 
based on commodity production] in undisguised form as a simple act of expediency. It 
has to appear rather as coercion emanating from an abstract collective person, 
exercised not in the interest of the individual from whom it emanates – for every 
person in commodity-producing society is egoistic- but in the interest of all parties to 
legal transactions. The power of one person over another is brought to bear in reality as 
the force of law, that is to say as the force of an objective, impartial norm.”41 This is 
the power, the violence, and the legitimacy of law.  
 
2.2 The form and violence of law: property (and sovereignty) as ‘mine-not-yours’ 
A crucial point in this brief exposition of the commodity form theory of law is that of 
the fundamental nature of property ownership as a legal right. In Between Equal 
Rights, Miéville explains, “[f]or the commodity form itself, dispute, coercion and 
violence are inherently implied. The notion of ‘mine’ necessary to ownership and 
commodity exchange is only meaningful inasmuch as it is ‘mine-not-yours’. The fact 
that something is ‘mine’ necessarily defines it in opposition to a counterclaim, whether 
or not that counterclaim is in fact made. Disputation, and hence the legal form itself, 
lurks at the heart of the most peaceful private property relation.”42 And thus, 
“[s]uperordinate and abstract coercion is contingent to the legal form itself.”43 The 
contestation over property ownership also positions property ownership as the norm (a 
Grundnorm in a manner of speaking44) at the basis of other norms45 of law as a system 
of rules, institutions, processes and practices. This aspect is key in this thesis, and will 
be returned to especially in Ch.6. 
 
                                                
38 Pashukanis (1978) 139. 
39 Pashukanis (1978) 139: “The state authority introduces clarity and stability into the structure of law, 
but does not create the premises for it, which are rooted in the material relations of production.” 
40 Miéville (2005) 124-131. 
41 Pashukanis (1978) 143-4. 
42 Miéville (2005) 95 (fn.99, emphasis in the original); 96-97. 
43 Miéville (2005) 288. 
44 If not precisely in the manner used by Kelsen in, e.g. Kelsen (2008). 
45 Cf. Hohfeld (1913-14) 21-3. 
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3  “Developing the form on the basis of the fundamental form” 
 
Without departing from the main tenets of the commodity form theory of law, I adjust 
a number of Miéville’s parameters to better fit some aspects of Marxist theory and the 
questions I seek to answer. These relate to my use of a notion of ‘law’ rather than his 
differentiation between national/international law (3.1); the concept of global classes 
in preference of Miéville’s emphasis on the international state-system (3.2), and my 
foregrounding of imperialist economic violence (3.3) perpetrated and participated in 
by the various types of members of the global capitalist class rather than inter-state war 
per se. In 3.4 and 3.5 I sketch the application of the commodity form theory to my two 
focal points: ICL and the corporation. 
 
3.1 Law: Inter-polity law and proto-law 
According to Pashukanis: “[t]he development of international law as a system was 
evoked not by the requirements of the state, but by the necessary conditions for 
commercial relations between those tribes which were not under a single sphere of 
authority.”46 In other words, “(proto-) international law predates domestic law”.47 
Miéville picks up this point and adds that this “has nothing to do with any putative 
ontological primacy of the international sphere: it is, rather, because law is thrown up 
by and necessary to a systematic commodity exchange relationship, and it was 
between organised but disparate groups without such overarching authorities rather 
than between individuals that such relationships sprang.”48 Of course it would be more 
accurately described as ‘inter-polity law’. Miéville omits one thing, namely that it is 
also inaccurate to speak of domestic law at this point, or of a concept of the domestic 
beyond the tribal community.49 While this adjustment does not fundamentally alter 
Miéville’s point about the lack of overarching authority at law’s origin, rather an 
additional point can be made about the common root of international and domestic law 
– one did not predate the other, in fact, both share the same root, as ‘law’ 
                                                
46 Pashukanis (1978) 89. As Weber puts it, “the oldest commerce is an exchange relation between alien 
tribes.” Weber (1982) 195-8. 
47 Miéville (2004) 289. 
48 Miéville (2004) 289. 
49 In that states with centralised authority in the modern sense did not emerge until at least 1648, and one 
cannot speak before this point about separate realms of ‘national’ (or domestic) and ‘international’ law 
in any meaningful way. Cf. Teschke (2009). 
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undifferentiated, predating the state system.50 At this point law/the legal form was not 
universalised: “[t]he law only held where and when commodity exchange was likely to 
occur.”51 In this thesis I emphasise the common root and form of domestic and 
international law. A second point for the purposes of this thesis can also be made, 
namely that in the transitional period law’s first persons, the formally equal legal 
persons between whom the transaction enabled by law took place, were polities, and 
thus collectivities. As will become clear below, this point is obvious when seen in its 
historical context, if not through today’s liberal individualist spectacles. In Ch. 2A I 
discuss the transition from tribal and familial collectivities governed by moral and 
kinship ties to individual and ‘artificial’ separate legal persons for corporations 
governed by legal rules, focusing specifically on the reasons for this development. 
 
3.2 Global classes 
My main departure from Miéville (closely connected to the above) is my emphasis on 
the global nature of the class system at the helm of which we find mainly (but by no 
means exclusively) members of the Western elites – active both in business and 
governance, who have at their disposal law, be it international or domestic, or the more 
vague notion we now call ‘global governance’.52 Pashukanis writes on international 
law (“IL”): “Bourgeois see international law as a function of some ideal cultural 
community which mutually connects individual states. But they do not see that this 
community reflects (conditionally and relatively, of course) the common interest of the 
commanding and ruling classes of different states which have identical class 
structures.”53 Contra Pashukanis’ hint at global class society at the basis of IL, Miéville 
takes a (liberal) statist perspective on IL, viewing states as the ‘atom’, the 
‘fundamental contending agents’ of IL.54 My view is that we are not only dealing with 
similar class structures in different states, but that those classes (or rather, members of 
the same class) are also connected globally, by virtue of mutual/identical interest 
globally and often also actually as members of global business communities and other 
class networks.55 
                                                
50 Cf. Neff (2010) 6-7. 
51 Miéville (2005) pp128 ff. 
52 Baars (2011) 429. The notion of global class is the subject of debate, see, e.g. Anievas (2008). 
53 Pashukanis (2005) 324. 
54 Miéville (2005) 173. 
55 Global business communities: Moses (2008) 7; governance elites: Shamir (2010); Krisch (2009). On 
the notion of global class, see also Chimni (2011); Rasulov (2008); Sklair (1997).  
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If we accept with Pashukanis that the State was a ‘convenient’ but not a necessary 
result of capitalist law,56 then we can begin to envisage a ‘pluralist’ Marxist 
perspective where states are not the atom of IL, but instead, where individuals and 
corporations and states and other ‘legal persons’ compete on a predominantly57 
transnational (global) plane.58 Miéville (following Pashukanis) argues that the 
overarching and abstract coercion that the state represents on the domestic plane takes 
the form of interdependence under the conditions of balance of power59- which is a 
somewhat outdated, realist international relations perspective.60 Instead, a pluralist 
perspective, or even an individualist perspective better fits with Miéville’s assessment 
of the origin of law: “The development of law as a system came about as a result of the 
commercial requirements of disparate groups (tribes, polities) that existed before the 
state system and thus before any overarching enforcing authority existed. Ius gentium 
was the prototype of the legal superstructure in its pure form.”61 I elaborate on this 
development, and global class, in Ch.2.  
 
3.3 Conflict, violence, imperialism, structural violence 
Miéville argues that violence and coercion are inherent in the commodity relationship 
itself (as in the ‘mine-not-yours’ illustration above): in international law, “self-help – 
the coercive violence of the legal subjects [states] themselves – regulates the legal 
relation.”62 Yet Miéville himself makes the classic liberal mistake of placing war at the 
centre of IL, which (as explained above) he conceives as a statist system. In line with 
my view of a ‘pluralist’ global class society I include the myriad other forms of 
coercion found in today’s global capitalism, and shift the focus from physical violence 
(war) to structural violence.63 Structural violence is the opposite of human 
emancipation.64 It is exploitation in Marx’s sense of the extraction of surplus value 
from a workforce with no choice but to subject itself to the wage labour system, the 
                                                
56 Miéville (2005) 124. 
57 The state still carries important functions, not least its judicial arm. 
58 For a similar critique of Miéville’s emphasis on states as the main actors in IL, see Knox (2009), esp. 
418-423. 
59 Miéville (2005) 129. 
60 E.g. Krasner (1999) 43ff. 
61 Miéville (2005) 130. 
62 Miéville (2005) 133. 
63 For a similar perspective, see Knox (2009), 423-425. 
64 Marx (2000) 54. 
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unfreedom inherent the structural determination. It does at times take the form of 
war/physical violence but much more commonly, it is the everyday economic 
violence, encroachment and unfreedom the global proletariat, the wretched of the 
earth,65 endure.  
 
Relatedly, Miéville agrees with Pashukanis that “the better part of international law’s 
norms refer to warfare.”66 This may have been the case in Pashukanis’ time, but is no 
longer so. Much is ‘international economic law’, including also examples of 
internationalised law in the form of agreements between the various global enterprises 
and between international organisations and ‘developing’ states, such as loan 
agreements.67 Even if we do agree with Pashukanis that the real historical content of 
international law is the struggle between capitalist states, and with Miéville that that 
content is an ongoing and remorseless struggle for control over the resources of 
capitalism, that will often as part of that capitalist (‘economic’) competitive process 
spill into political violence,” we must take that ‘remorseless struggle’ and its inherent 
structural violence as a starting point rather than resulting instances of political 
violence.68  
 
3.4 The commodity form theory and corporations 
The commodity form theory of law allows us to explain and understand the process of 
development (the abstraction) of the legal concept of the corporation out of earlier 
forms of social organisation, as well as the way in which relationships of responsibility 
are expressed, abstracted, and shifted by means of company law. I argue in this thesis 
that such relations of responsibility (in the non-legal sense) are profoundly affected by 
the creation of the corporation as a separate person in law, in more than one way, 
which I explain in Ch.2 and illustrate in Chs.3 and 4. 
 
3.5 The commodity form theory and (international) criminal law 
When all relationships are legalised and members of society become atomised 
individuals in competition with one another, the violation of certain rights constitutes a 
                                                
65 The International; Fanon (1963). 
66 Miéville (2005) 136 (citing Pashukanis (2005) 322). 
67 See, e.g. Qureshi (2011). 
68 Miéville (2005) 139 emphasis in the original. 
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crime. Criminal law transforms an issue of society at large (certain problems caused by 
the prevailing mode of production) to an issue (deviancy) of an individual, for which 
the individual may expect to ‘pay’ in time or money.69 The introduction of the 
corporate legal person into criminal law further changes the relationship between the 
wrongdoer and the person(s) affected by the ‘crime’ – I elaborate on this in Chs.4 and 
6. Criminal law has a special ideological ‘weight’, and, according to Pashukanis, 
“[c]riminal law is the sphere in which legal relations attain their maximum intensity 
and, as such, [it] was the dominant bourgeois form of regulation.” Criminal law has 
this function also when it is not (intended to be) enforced, or only on certain persons 
and not on others (Chs.3, 5, 6). 
 
4 Beyond ‘nebulous left functionalism’: Further considerations on Marxism & 
law 
 
Some further attention must be paid to key concepts in Marxist theory and how these 
affect an analysis of the thesis topic. Marx and Engels themselves never made law a 
direct object of their inquiry, although they treat it with varying degrees of depth in 
their works.70 The Communist Manifesto is a natural starting point on certain key ideas 
that inform this thesis, in particular class struggle. Further, in Capital Volume I (Part 
VIII) Marx elaborates on primitive accumulation and the repressive use of law in the 
transition to capitalism. Other texts by Marx of relevance to this thesis, are On the 
Jewish Question (for the concept of ‘human emancipation’ which is contrasted with 
‘legal emancipation’ (below Ch.6 S.6) and Critique of the Gotha Programme (on the 
notion of compromise and ‘tinkering on the surface’).71 Finally, the German Ideology 
offers an impetus toward the critique of the ideological function of law.72 Below, I add 
considerations of determination and totality (4.1), the structure vs agency question 
(4.2), and law’s emancipatory potential (4.3). 
 
4.1 Law ‘congealing capitalism’: Determination, overdetermination and totality 
Rasulov explains that  
                                                
69 Pashukanis (1978) 177. 
70 Cain (1979) 62.  
71 Marx (2000) 46-64; 610-616. 
72 Marx (2000) 175-206. 
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the development of a consistently Marxist approach to international legal 
studies must begin… with the production of a general systematic account 
explaining the basic interrelationship between the historical patterns 
structuring the global division of labour (and the corresponding extraction of 
surplus value) and the corresponding institutional forms of the international 
legal order – in particular, with a view to establishing the latter’s causative 
contribution to the burgeoning contradiction between the immanent logic of the 
global productive forces and the corresponding system of the global relations 
of production.73 
 
The form and content of law are determined by the mode of production. Law ‘congeals 
capitalism’. Some scholars, for example Marks, consider that economic factors, among 
a range of other factors, set limits on, and restrict the ways in which law may 
develop.74 Others, including Rasulov, consider this determination strictly: “the terms 
on which other social factors [such as race, gender etc.] overdetermine the effects of 
class struggle are themselves determined, in the last instance, by the logic of class 
struggle.”75 In other words, everything (all social phenomena) can ultimately be 
explained in economic terms. As I will show below (Chapter 2), Pashukanis’ General 
Theory also conforms to this latter point of view, and I employ this here also.  
 
If ‘everything’ is determined by economic base of society, then it follows that 
everything is interrelated. Global capitalism has “create[d] a world in its image.”76 
According to Ollman: “Capitalism… stands out from earlier class societies in the 
degree to which it has integrated all major (and, increasingly, most minor) life 
functions in a single organic system dominated by the law of value and the 
accompanying power of money but also in the degree to which it hides and seeks to 
deny this singular achievement.”77 In Marxism the concept of totality “refer[s] to the 
actuality that phenomena in the world are interrelated, and hence can only be properly 
understood when viewed as elements within larger social systems, including the 
system of global capitalism.”78 For an example of a very specific interpretation of the 
                                                
73 Rasulov (2011) at 257.  
74 Marks (2008) 3. 
75 Rasulov (2011) at 261 (emphasis added). 
76 Communist Manifesto 47.  
77 Ollman (2003) 3. 
78 Marks (2007) 15. 
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concept of totality, in chapter 2B, I cite the work of Wilson, who uses Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s Marxist-inspired “world systems theory”.79  
 
I am interested in the dialectical relationship between the material world in which 
certain intellectual concepts arise, in this case in the sphere of law and business in 
conflict, how these ideas are translated into legal academic discourse and abstract legal 
concepts and then, sets of processes, rules, and institutions, that in turn affect material 
reality. One step in that process is the abstraction performed by lawyers and the fitting 
in of the abstract concepts into a set of ideas which come to have some internal 
coherence, a legal system with a (measure of) internal logic of itself80 - visible at least 
to lawyers – and outwardly creating the illusion of objectivity, autonomy.81 As I try to 
show, scholars describing, representing, interpreting and abstracting the world tend to 
seek (or give) internal coherence in/to a narrative, which in itself reflects the ‘totality’ 
of material reality more or less accurately, at any given point in time, and which affect 
material reality when such narratives influence, or are transformed into, legal 
decisions/rules. This is the dialectical process of law(yers) congealing capitalism. 
 
4.2 Lawyers congealing capitalism: Who constructs the structure?  
Marx’ methodology of historical materialism takes the “base” of the material reality of 
economic relations to determine the “superstructure”, which includes the political and 
legal superstructure.82 The content of ideas such as law, religion and culture are 
determined by (or representations of) economic reality (the base), which is determined 
by the ownership of the means of production, and evolves as a result of a dialectical 
relationships between the two opposites: “all history is the history of class struggle”.83 
Putting it schematically, while according to Pashukanis/Miéville the legal form itself 
belongs to the base,84 the content of norms is supplied by the superstructure, and the 
evolutionary dialectic between base and superstructure (between material reality and 
ideas) is what causes change (progress) in society.85 Where, then, is the individual in 
                                                
79 Wilson (2008) xi-xiv. 
80 Generally, Kennedy (1987). 
81 Pashukanis (1978) 93. 
82 Marx (2000) 425 and see, generally Cohen (2000); Rasulov (2011) 261, Marks (2008) 2-3, Ireland 
(2002) 126. 
83 Communist Manifesto 40. 
84 Miéville (2005) 88, 96; Pashukanis (1978) 93. 
85 In Grundrisse Marx refines the base-superstructure metaphor: Marx (2000) 106-7.  
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this, what is ‘our’ agency?86 Engels said, “Men make their histories themselves, only in 
given surroundings which condition it and on the basis of actual relations already 
existing, among which the economic relations, however much they may be influenced 
by the other political and ideological ones, are still ultimately the decisive ones, 
forming the red thread which runs through them and alone leads to understanding.”87 
Man can move only within the parameters of given economic structures. Marks warns 
legal scholars, who are generally “attentive to the ‘false necessity’ that treats social 
reality as naturally arising, rather that historically constructed”,88 not to fall into the 
trap of “‘false contingency’ … according to which injustices appear random, 
accidental and arbitrary.”89 She speaks of ‘planned misery’90 in the way that I will 
discuss ‘planned impunity’ in Marxist terms. What appears to be the key question, 
thus, is, “who constructs the structure?” 
 
Marx emphasised that current class structure of society, and indeed the economic 
structure of feudal society, was not simply a result of ‘luck of the draw’ as to who was 
born a prince and who a pauper, nor was it because some worked hard and others were 
lazy. In the chapters in Capital on primitive accumulation, Marx describes the active, 
deliberate construction of class society,91 which was also harrowingly described by 
E.P. Thompson in his The Making of the English Working Class.92 Since in the 
commodity form theory of law, law is an integral part (a sine qua non) of the economic 
structure of capitalist society, the ‘constructors’ of law must be part of my inquiry. 
There is no structure without agency.93 The dialectic between the individual agency of 
the jurist, academic author, lawmaker (lawyers, broadly understood) and the structure 
of law and economic relations is where capitalism is constituted. As noted above, 
lawyers, through law, congeal capitalism.  
 
While Miéville quotes Milliband’s argument that judges make law that accommodates 
the interests of the class they themselves generally belong too, he continues to argue 
                                                
86 Generally, Callinicos (2004); specifically, Thompson (1963). 
87 Engels’ Letter to Borgius. 
88 Marks (2008) 15. 
89 Marks (2008) 15. 
90 Marks (2011) 57-78. 
91 Marx (1976) 871ff. 
92 Thompson (1963). 
93 On the structure versus agency debate generally, see Callinicos (2009). 
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that on the international level this is not the case.94 My argument throughout this thesis 
is that this is the case, that international law is made by the pluralist conglomerate of 
global administrators (bureaucrats, oligarchs, global capitalist class, global Hofmafia 
(Allott95), the global judicial cocktail party (Slaughter96), global handmaidens 
(Alston97) or global invisible college (Schachter98)) as members of a particular class, 
the global capitalist class. In my upcoming chapters I pay particular attention to the 
personalities behind the content of law, in order precisely to elucidate the dialectic 
between their agency and the structure (including their class membership). 
 
As Ollman has pointed out, those few who benefit from capitalism use a “mixture of 
force and guile to order the lives and thinking of the great majority who would benefit 
most from radical change.”99 Susan Marks has described and analysed the various 
different interpretations of the concept of ideology.100 The interpretation she 
encourages critical international lawyers to use, is: “the role of ideas and rhetorical 
processes in the legitimation of ruling power.”101 I will focus in particular on the 
ideological function of law both in supporting and legitimating structures in society. 
 
4.3 Law’s emancipatory potential queried 
Two final points on law and Marxist theory of relevance to this thesis warrant 
elaboration in this section. They are, the question of law’s emancipatory potential,102 
and the prospect for law in post-capitalist society. As Marx famously held, “all history 
is the history of class struggle” – progress in society is the result of the struggle 
between classes over their opposing interests. What utility is law in the struggle of the 
working class (including, specifically, those affected by the involvement of business in 
conflict) against the powerful corporations, and/or the individuals business(wo)men at 
their core? Miéville states, “[g]iven the widespread though mistaken belief that law is 
counterposed to power and war, the desire for a rule of law is not surprising. Its 
                                                
94 Miéville (2005) 121, quoting Miliband (1969) 124-6. 
95 Allott (2002) 380-398. 
96 Slaughter (2005) 96. 
97 Alston (1997) 453. 
98 Schachter (1977) 217. 
99 Ollman (2003) 11. 
100 Marks (2000) 8-10, and see also 18-25. 
101 Marks (2008) 7. 
102 See further, Baars (2012) in progress. 
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extension is held to be an emancipatory project, internationally and domestically.”103 
Yet, since law, in the commodity form theory of law is an inherently capitalist 
instrument (qua form, regardless even of content) based and built on the Grundnorm 
of private property ownership and inhering between formally equal legal subjects, it 
cannot but serve the interests of capital and reflect the underlying economic relations. 
As Marx said, “[r]ight cannot be higher than the economic structure of society.”104 
Legal struggle can at times yield progressive results (Ch3A, Ch5, Ch6), but, on law’s 
emancipatory potential, we can generalise Arthur’s statement,  
No amount of reformist factory legislation can overcome the basic 
presupposition of the law: that a property freely alienated belongs to the 
purchaser, and hence that the living labour of the worker becomes, through 
exchange, available for exploitation by capital.105  
 
As a corollary to this, it can be said that law’s form is not an empty vessel into which 
we can pour any content.106 Because of law’s form, moreover, there is no possibility of 




It could be said that by adopting the commodity form theory of law, the question of 
this thesis would be answered very quickly. If law is a tool to perpetuate class rule, 
then of course the application of ICL will not counter business involvement in 
imperialist wars and other situations of exploitation and abuse, if such is economically 
rational. However, the story does not end here. In order to understand the current 
situation (‘corporate impunity’ for involvement in conflict, and lawyers demanding 
corporations be held to account in ICL, in vain), we need to understand how the story 
arose and developed and how it fits into the larger context of which it is a part.108 If we 
see the ‘corporate impunity’ and lawyers’ call as ideas, we must examine what they 
reflect, and how they may look different from different perspectives (e.g. from the 
capitalists’, or from the workers’/’victims’’), what its internal contradictions are, etc. 
                                                
103 Miéville (2005) 315. 
104 Marx (2000) 615 (Critique of the Gotha Programme). 
105 Arthur (1978) 31. 
106 Arthur (1978) 29. 
107 Cf. e.g. Stuchka (1988) 180. 
108 Ollman (2003) 13. 
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The broader context of these ideas is the mechanisms and methods with which law is 
used to achieve class ends, how law and legal institutions reflect this, how economic 
relations are produced and reproduced through or with law, and what lawyers’ role is 
in this.  
 
As inspiration and guidance for the dialectical method I use Bertell Ollman’s Dance of 
the Dialectic.109 Ollman describes Marxist dialectics as “a way of thinking that brings 
into focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world.”110 
Replacing common notions of ‘thing’ with notions of ‘process’ and ‘relation’ allows 
us to understand how processes have developed up to the ‘now’ point, and how they 
may continue to develop into the future, as well as how they relate to other processes. 
As such, it takes us away from considering that things just ‘are’ (this perception is an 
effect of ideology111) and points us towards processes of continual change. It moreover 
allows us to discern our role in shaping the past, as well as realise our power to affect 
the development into the future.112 The ‘seed of the future’ is present in the 
contradictions in the current situation – and I identify and emphasise these throughout 
the thesis. 
 
In this thesis I aim to deduce the workings of capitalism and law not from the meaning 
of Marxist or other concepts or theories, but (after having examined the system in 
broad terms in this Chapter) from material reality both now and historically, using a 
wide variety of sources.113 In Ch. 2 onwards, then, I ‘rise from the abstract to the 
concrete’, or ‘from the general to the specific’.114 Of Ollman’s ‘dance of the dialectic’, 
I undertake the first three steps: (1) analyse (look for connections in the capitalist 
present), (2) historicise (look for the preconditions of the most important of these 
connections in the past, and (3) visionise (project major social contradictions forward 
from the past, to their resolution and beyond in the future), while leaving (4) organise 
(look for preconditions of such a future in the present and use them to develop your 
political strategy) to life outside this thesis.115 
 
                                                
109 Ollman (2003). 
110 Ollman (2003) 12. 
111 Ollman (2003) 14. 
112 Ollman (2003) 20. 
113 Ollman (2003) 19. 
114 Marx (2000) 385-393 (Grundrisse - Introduction). 
115 Ollman (2003) 169 (includes illustration). 
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6 Thesis structure– the long and short story arcs and themes 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. I have divided the some of the chapters into A 
and B (and in one case C) sections which each contain part of a story, in order to show 
and emphasise the dialectical interrelation between (and interpenetration of) the two 
(and three) sides.  
 
Having in Ch. 1 examined the system of law and capitalism within which the thesis 
question is located, in Chapter 2A I start at the root of the issue of ‘corporate 
involvement in conflict’, with the question what is a corporation and when, how and 
why was it first developed? I track the development of the legal construct of ‘the 
corporation’ (the corporate form) by the capitalist class to be one of the main vehicles 
for accumulation in the transition to capitalism. I argue here that in order for it to fulfil 
that function, the capitalist class developed this legal structure as a ‘structure of 
irresponsibility’, a separate, reified legal person that enables business(wo)men to be 
shielded from liabilities of different kinds.  
 
In Chapter 2B I investigate the role of the corporation in the development and spread 
of IL, in particular as a tool for colonialisation and the creation of modern states: in the 
early 20thC we see the division of IL into public (political/humanitarian) and private 
(economic) spheres as an ideological device for the protection and furtherance of 
capitalist interests. I also look at the ideological role and effect of functional 
fragmentation of IL, and show how this conceals the inconsistency of the status of 
corporations as legal persons in some areas of law (related to investment protection), 
but not in others (related to responsibility). There is clearly a contradiction between the 
corporation’s personality (reification) on the ‘economic’ side of IL, and its invisibility 
on the ‘humanitarian’ side. Here I comment on how this contradiction is causing 
change, in scholarly conceptualisations of ‘global pluralism’ and ‘global governance’, 
and potentially the demise of this divide. 
 
Then in 3A I pause at the post WWII moment of ‘Nuremberg’ and the attempts to hold 
cartel directors to account for ‘corporate imperialism’ and the development and 
application of international criminal law in the face of competing interests of public 
and private (economic) nature at the subsequent trials. In 3B I describe the clash of 
ideologies at the Tokyo Tribunal where economic interests prevailed: the US 
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occupation leadership decided not to try ‘corporate imperialists’ but instead to 
implement wholesale economic reform in Japan. The (desired) effect of Nuremberg 
and Tokyo has been the creation of a specific narrative of (the causes of) WWII, 
excluding the economic causes and actors – and, effectively, through this excluding 
economic actors from the scope of ICL. 
 
ICL lay dormant (at least in terms of application) during the Cold War but post-1989 it 
was rediscovered and to some extent reimagined and re-written. In Ch. 4A I describe 
and evaluate the conscious creation (mostly by academic lawyers) of the tool of 
international criminal law post Cold War, liberal and legalist ICL discourses which 
figure ICL as the completion of the international law enterprise, and a liberal 
saviour.  I contrast this with Pashukanis’ comments on the commodified visceral 
element of criminal law. Then in Ch. 4B I examine lawyers’ work in abstracting 
relationships of responsibility in the development of ICL’s ‘modes of participation’ 
and ‘degrees of liability’ – which – I argue - make ICL eminently applicable to 
business. In 4C I investigate ICL’s internal contradictions on individuality/collectivity 
and the putative liability of the corporation as a ‘legal person’ proposed by academic 
lawyers and others.  
 
The almost complete non-application of ICL to business in conflict (even in situations 
where businesspersons/companies were clearly implicated) betrays the ‘capitalist 
logic’ of IL, I argue in Ch. 5, where we see that as in Nuremberg and Tokyo, ICL is 
used to create narratives that exclude the economic causes of conflict, to shield 
particular actors, and to form a ‘distraction’ for the implementation of far-reaching 
economic (liberalising) reforms.  
 
In response to the perceived ‘corporate impunity’ however (Ch. 6), ‘cause-lawyers’ 
and human rights activist have tried to hold businesses to account through strategic 
litigation, and failed (but causing a corporate legitimacy backlash AND while 
legitimising IL by retaining a commitment). In Ch. 6 I also discuss the corporate 
response to the backlash: the creation of ‘corporate social responsibility’ which is 
‘privatised law’ fitting into the current neoliberal global governance set-up (corporate 
rule as the completion of capitalism). However, anti-capitalist resistance 
outside/against the structures of law has also seen a recent increase. 
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7 Impact: And the point is to change it? 
 
Famously, Marx said, in the 11th Thesis on Feuerbach: “Philosophers have interpreted 
the world in various ways, but the point is to change it.”116 Aside from the academic 
purpose of the work, with this thesis, I have one specific practical aim.  
 
In this thesis I examine both legal scholarship and legal practice. The examination of 
practice is inspired by the work of practising lawyers I have met over the years and 
also my own time in practice. Michael Sfard, one of the best-known anti-occupation 
lawyers working in the Israeli court system has expressed the need for academic 
reflection on cause lawyering practice, and in particular, how such practice may form 
the oxygen/lifeblood of the system of oppression it is seeking to overturn. He argues 
that practising lawyers’ ethics prevent them from turning away individual clients 
whose lives might be marginally improved through litigation, in favour of the 
‘collective struggle’ (which may be helped by, say, boycotting the courts).117 The onus 
of finding the answers, he argues, is on legal academics.  Legal academics in his view 
have the obligation to rise above the perspective of individual cases and provide 
practitioners with a better understanding of how human rights litigation in mass abuse 
cases works to sustain the system. “By uncovering the truth about the limited success 
of human rights victims in a given legal system, and by pointing to the processes that 
transform these limited successes into regime-empowering tools, academic debate is 
likely to weaken these tools. Since at least some of the perils listed [in his article] are 
vested in the image-creating force which … opposition grants the regime, revealing 
them may diffuse their sting. This can only be done by academics. And they have 
failed to do so for all too long.”118 Sfard and practitioners like him are not helped by 
the fact that almost all of academia, especially in the human rights field (and in the 
“business and human rights” field) is unwaveringly “pro-human rights”, and without 
Sfard’s sobering (demystifying) practice experience adhere to the romantic notion of 
HR and ICL as the liberal saviour, and more broadly, of law being generally, or even 
potentially, a good thing.119 Engels exhorts us to ‘take off our law-glasses’, to set aside 
                                                
116 Marx (2000) 173. The central hall of the Humboldt University in Berlin (Marx’ alma mater) still 
prominently displays this statement, apparently much to the chagrin of the current board of the 
university, who cannot take it down as the hall in its entirety was declared a ‘listed building’ before the 
end of the GDR. This, they cannot change. 
117 Sfard (2009) 49. 
118 Sfard (2009) 49. 
119 Fox (1983). 
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our juristische Weltanschauung,120 and to cease seeking solutions to world problems in 
law, against our better knowledge.121 It is my aim to show how a ‘materialist’ approach 
to business and HR can offer a critical analytical ‘real world’ perspective, that I hope 
responds in some small way to Sfard’s critique.122 
 
8 Future research 
 
This project has already spawned further research to be published separately: an in-
depth treatment of the Nuremberg cases relying on primary sources, some of which 
have not been treated in the literature before (in progress), a shorter piece on 
Nuremberg’s role in consolidating US economic hegemony over Europe 
(forthcoming),123 and articles on the commodity form theory and the regulation of the 
economic (Appendix G), and law’s emancipatory potential and cause-lawyering (in 
progress).124  
 
9 A note on references and language 
 
For ease of reference I have used short form references and included both an 
alphabetical bibliography and a bibliography organised by type of source. All 




Higgins has said, “[c]hanging economic contexts and changing political perceptions 
condition legal answers.”125 Law is dynamic, constantly changing, adapting as material 
conditions change. What is “law” at any given point in time is impossible to pin down. 
With this caveat, I can state that I have endeavoured to describe legal processes, 
relations and events up to and as at November 2011. 
                                                
120 Lit. juridical world-view (Beirne (1977) 199). 
121 Kropotkin (undated, unpaginated). 
122 Further, Ollman (2003) 20. 
123 A publication based on the symposium ‘Untold Stories: Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials’ held 
Melbourne Law School 14-16 October 2010 is forthcoming with OUP (2012) and will include a paper I 
presented based on the research underlying Chapters 3A and 3B, entitled “Capitalism’s Victor’s 
Justice? The hidden story of the prosecution of industrialists post-WWII and subsequently”.  
124 Estermann (2012). 
125 Higgins (1999) 87. 
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Chapter 2A: The roots, development and context of the legal concept of the 
corporation: The making of a structure of irresponsibility 
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1 Introduction to A and B 
 
In this Chapter I describe and analyse the roots and the development of the concept of 
the company in domestic law and its ‘reification’, on the one hand (Part A), and the 
place of the company in international law, on the other (Part B). What I will show is, 
on the one hand, how the formal legal concept of the company was developed during 
the transition to capitalism around the same time as the modern state form to replace 
relations of kinship and trust with ones of contract, partly to ensure acquisition, and 
then stability of ownership of the means of production and to enable the extraction of 
surplus value. As a corollary to this, through what Weber calls ‘calculable law’, 
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responsibility becomes a commodified concept capable of being expressed in terms of 
value (and therefore of being exchanged). On the other hand, the formal legal concept 
of the corporation with separate legal personality was reified in law (and in the public 
imagination), in order to externalise as much as possible the individual as a legally 
relevant agent in a specific context, to externalise individual responsibility by hiving 
off risk and displacing potential liability, and to render ‘accountable’ and exchangeable 
that which is not externalised. This construction makes the corporation capitalism’s 
main motor.126 The corporate form enables, and even (through its profit mandate) 
demands ‘irresponsible’ behaviour where such leads to profit maximisation, which is 
the ‘imperialism at the heart of the corporate form’.127 The specific characteristics of 
the corporation were each developed as a result of specific historical circumstances 
and in order to facilitate the advent of bourgeois capitalism. In the historical examples 
described in this chapter, I show that also in instances where the corporate form does 
not (perfectly) achieve the displacement of risk, political leaderships and the judiciary 
as members of the same class generally assist in the protection of capital. Moreover, 
the current explicitly pro-capital body of scholarly and instructive work in company 
law aids the legitimisation and consolidation of the status quo. As discussed in Part B, 
the corporation was a main vehicle for spreading capitalism and capitalist IL around 
the world, as a vehicle of colonisation, and later as a vehicle of concealed ‘neo-
colonialism.’ Both are manifestations of the imperialism inherent in the corporate 
form. The development of IL consistently follows the logic of capitalism and through 
it, corporate interests are protected, at times through obscuring corporations’ violent 
past (and present), through instigating a public/private divide in IL, and thus walling 
off the corporate domain and through creating sui generis regimes such as 
‘international law of investment protection’ and mechanisms such as investment 
arbitration.  
 
International law, especially in the past 60 years, has been said to be moving towards 
‘individualisation’, both in the fields of rights and responsibilities, in particular in the 
creation of international human rights and humanitarian law, and its corollary 
international criminal law.128 This needs to be seen in a context of an accompanying 
                                                
126 Glasbeek (2010) 249. 
127 I use the term imperialism more broadly here than the commonly used Marxist understanding of 
imperialism as a specific phase of capitalism, but, with Miéville, as a “defining structural elements of 
actually-existing capitalism” which is manifested in myriad ways and forms (Miéville (2005) 273).  
128 E.g. McCorquodale (2010) 284. 
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trend (to some extent perhaps more of an ideological or epistemological mood) 
towards the “neo-medievalism” of global governance129 (where the GCC acts through 
both state and corporation as normative agent130) and more generally the critique of 
hegemony/imperialism.131 At the same time, the explicit logic of capitalism has made 
room for an outspoken discourse of ‘humanitarianism’.132 In the conclusion of this 
chapter I discuss the obvious conflict this creates in the conceptualisation of the 
(multinational) corporation in international law, and point at the opportunities this 
creates. There is an inherent tension between the corporation as a subject of IL and the 
trend to individualisation in IL, in other words, the dialectic between the form of 
international law, its subjects (states, corporations, individuals?), and its content. The 
underlying question – and a ‘red thread’ through this thesis - is whether the content of 
law which, as I argue, follows the logic of capitalism, is capable of adopting 
‘humanitarian’ or perhaps anti-capitalist logic (the question of ‘law’s emancipatory 
potential’) – and if not, what we are to make of the apparently, outwardly humanitarian 
content of some IL.133 
 
2 Introduction to A: The ‘back story’ of the legal concept of the business 
company 
 
It is said is that the corporation, in its various, comparable legal forms, has become the 
predominant medium for ‘doing business’ worldwide. According to Farrar: 
 
The company, incorporated under the successive Companies Acts, is a 
dominant institution in our society, all the more so with the retreat in recent 
decades of the government-owned or public sector of the economy from a 
number of areas in which it previously had been a monopoly or near-monopoly 
provider of services or, less often, of goods.134 
 
                                                
129 E.g. Krisch (2009) 16; Paulus (2001) 727. 
130 E.g. Sklair (1997). 
131 E.g. Byers (2003); Anghie (2007). 
132 E.g. Meron (2006). 
133 The next logical question would be how the ‘humanitarian’ goals are to be achieved, if not through 
law. I will offer some examples/attempts in this regard in the final chapter of this thesis. 
134 Davies (2003) 1 (first sentence of the book). 
   39 
The company has become the most popular legal vehicle for business, in comparison 
with various forms of partnership (the more recent including the LLP which 
approximates the corporate form).135  This is the case in the UK, but also in the rest of 
the world. The multi- or transnational enterprise, or global corporate group, is “perhaps 
the most talked about form of business association in the contemporary ‘globalising’ 
world and economy.”136 In this chapter, I examine where the corporate form came 
from and how each of its key elements was developed in its specific historical context.  
 
As Dewey noted on one particular key aspect of the corporate form in his article The 
Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, the controversies surrounding 
corporate legal personality:  
and [its] introduction into legal theory and actual legal relations, express[es] 
struggles and movements of immense social import, economic and political. 
…To answer this question [how legal doctrine and external factors relate] is to 
engage in a survey of the conflict of church and empire in the middle ages; the 
conflict of rising national states with the medieval Roman empire; the struggle 
between dynastic and popular representative forms of government; the conflict 
between feudal institutions, ecclesiastic and agrarian, and the economic needs 
produced by the industrial revolution and the development of national 
territorial states; the conflict of the “proletariat” with the employing and 
capitalist class; the struggle between nationalism and internationalism, or 
trans-national relations, to mention only a few outstanding movements.137 
 
Thus, in this Chapter I will seek discover which particular struggles took place 
resulting in the concept of the corporation, focussing in particular on the question of 
responsibility. As will become clear, the history of the corporation is part of the 
western/European history of social organisation, and the development of modern 
capitalism more generally.  I will show how the idea of corporate personality came 
about partly as a papal ‘mystification’ and partly as a result of the organisation of the 
nascent urban middle classes into guilds and boroughs which still shared reward and 
responsibility but which were able to leverage their collective weight against feudal 
                                                
135 Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000. Before 1789 partnerships were the main form of business 
association in England (Getzler (2006) 16). 
136 Muchlinski (2007) 3. 
137 Dewey (1926) 664 (footnote omitted). 
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lords and kings. I discuss how these commercial organisations then give rise to 
partnerships and the early trading companies served as a precursor to the abdication of 
responsibility to the company per se. In the transition to capitalism then the capitalists-
to-be appropriated the means of production and simultaneously created the now 
landless poor as the workforce for its factories. Development of the corporate form in 
the industrial revolution reflects the unabated dynamic of synergy and competition 
between state and capital until it reaches its modern form in Salomon and the 
contemporary multinational corporate group.  
 
As I show in Section 3 below, mainstream scholarship and critical scholarship alike, 
does not generally put “[c]apital’s seemingly natural and eternal forms” to question.138 
In order to understand what the effect of this silence is on our ability to respond to 
questions of responsibility in general and the question of liability and business 
involvement in conflict in particular, it behoves to start here. 
 
3 Epistemology  
 
3.1 Writing the history out of the corporation 
UK company law textbooks, which are also used for teaching law undergraduates in 
other parts of the world,139 expend increasingly little time on the history of the concept 
of the corporation.140 Gower and Davies’ Sixth edition (1997) contained two chapters 
on the history of company law in the introductory section to the volume, because, as 
Davies stated:  
this book is concerned with modern company law, but there are some branches 
of modern English Law which cannot be properly understood without reference 
to their historical background, and company law is one of them; indeed, of all 
branches of law it is perhaps the one least readily understood except in 
relation to its historical development, a somewhat extended account of which is 
therefore essential.141  
                                                
138 Ireland (1987) 163.  
139 For example, outside the UK they are used in Israel. 
140 Dignam (2009) (one page, 8-9), Pennington (2001) (no history); Morse (2005) (has two and a half 
pages on the development of company law on pp. 4-6); Hicks (2008); Davies (2003) and (2008), Farrar 
(1998); Hannigan (2003) (no history); French (2009) (some history).  
141 Gower (1997) 18 (footnote omitted). 
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Nevertheless, the Seventh Edition of 2003, omits the two historical chapters in favour 
of a “more functional introduction”,142 congruent with most of the UK, but also 
continental European143 and North American144 textbooks on company law. Societal 
context is also not a favourite topic of scholars writing on company law – company 
law is generally taught from the “inside” – from the point of view of the corporation, 
its structure, mechanics, its directors, and its shareholders.145 Company regulation is 
usually discussed in terms of expediency from the point of view of the business 
enterprise, and, more generally, the market. Kraakman et al. describe the majority 
view: “the appropriate role of corporate law is simply to assure that the corporation 
serves the best interests of its shareholders or, more specifically, to maximise financial 
returns to shareholders or, more specifically still, to maximise the current market prize 
of corporate shares.”146 This is because,  
the maximization of shareholder returns is in general, the best means by which 
corporate law can serve the broader goal of advancing overall social welfare. 
In general, creditors, workers, and customers will consent to deal with a 
corporation only if they expect themselves to be better off as a result.147  
 
This view is the modern incarnation of Adam Smith’s famous aphorism “[i]t is not 
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to 
their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but 
of their advantages.”148 The role of company law in capitalism is expressed in the 
                                                
142 Davies (2003) vi. 
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opening line of Pettet’s, “[a]t the heart of the UK capitalist system, the free market 
economy, lies company law”.149 
 
3.2 Theory and the ‘big idea’ of company law 
There is only a limited body of legal theoretical scholarship on the corporation.150 Such 
a lack leads authors such as Lowry to suggest “a certain flexibility of mind [is] needed 
to deal with the legal creation of corporate personality.”151 While remaining 
unexplained, it has now become a natural accepted part of our existing system, and 
“[t]here are few topics which seem more thoroughly theoretical … [and which have 
been] declared by the courts to be the basis of their decisions and upon which rights in 
valuable property have been determined and enormous sums of money distributed.”152  
 
The modest body of company law theory is predominantly aimed at ‘problem solving’. 
The first, ‘hegemonic’, category, is that of ‘contractarians’ – law and economics 
scholars who are closely allied to economic theorists of the firm and concerned with 
reducing the transaction cost of law while optimising such economic benefits as it may 
deliver.153 A second body of theory is concerned with improving the firm in terms of 
organisational efficiency,154 and mainly focuses on corporate governance.155 A minority 
of theorists, sociologists and socio-legal scholars, is concerned with the company’s 
organisational nature and dynamics,156 and includes studies of ‘corporate crime’ (e.g. 
Wells157) (below and Ch.4). Finally there is the company ‘stakeholder’ debate, which 
allows consideration of factors and constituencies outside the corporation per se.158 
What connects all these diverse groups of scholars is that they all accept the inevitable 
                                                
149 Lowry (2009) 3. 
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existence of corporations in their current legal form.159 This includes the ‘big idea of 
company law’, the company’s separate legal personality.160 
 
The exact nature in law of the legal person once did “arouse[..] the excited attention of 
all who have discussed legal theories and of not a few who have professed a profound 
disinclination to such discussion…”,161 but is no longer the subject of theoretical 
debate.  Nevertheless, and although few contemporary authors make this explicit, 
different understandings of the nature of corporate personality do affect black-letter 
accounts of company law.162 For example, French adopts an ‘artificial entity’ theory of 
corporate personality, which holds that incorporation creates an artificial separate 
person, produced by human artifice but treated in law as real.163 This perspective is 
related to the individualist approach to business involvement in crime, which I discuss 
in Ch.4.  
 
The ‘real entity’ theorists, on the other hand (associated with von Gierke and presently, 
e.g. with Teubner164), consider the corporation as an entity something qualitatively 
different from an aggregation of individuals. This perspective underlies ‘system 
criminality’ arguments like those made by Nollkaemper (Ch.4). Finally the pragmatic 
‘concession theorists’ regard as entities those who have been accorded separate 
personality by Statute, or registration – where the exact content of that personality 
depends on policy considerations.165 This category corresponds to pragmatic 
approaches to legal person liability (e.g. Van den Herik, below Ch.4). Contractarians 
(by far the largest group) regard the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’, emphasise freedom 
of contract (here, the freedom to carry on business activities without state interference) 
and deny the existence of, or ignore, separate personality.166 This, the dominant theory, 
seems least amenable to the idea of corporate crime, and comes closest to the idea that 
                                                
159 It is not always possible to distinguish between the various strands, for example, there are the “law & 
economics” approaches of Roscoe Pound and others, the socio-legal approaches of Wheeler et al, and 
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relations of responsibility are subsumed by ‘risk transactions’ – which I return to 
below and in Chs.4 and 6. 
 
Critical legal scholars are generally silent on company law.167 This position is 
confirmed by Ireland, who, querying why such scholars leave unanswered the 
‘perplexing questions’ raised by company law, considers this particularly surprising 
considering that the corporation is a major site of relations of domination and 
subordination.168 Stanley suggests this may be because 
company law may be of such importance within the C.L.S. agenda of critique 
that no scholar has yet dared to venture into the mire which constitutes the 
legitimation system of the capitalist mode of production, the underpinning 
mechanism for the reproduction of capitalist society.169  
 
23 years after Stanley wrote this, the critical silence remains as perplexing, despite a 
relatively lively literature on corporate crime/crimes of the powerful (see Ch.4).170  
 
3.3 Writing the history back into the corporation 
The lack of inquiry into the origins and nature of company law has helped to 
‘normalise’ (and legitimise or at least neutralise) this area of law,171 and (viz. Gower’s 
omission of historical chapters, supra) could be connected to the claim of capitalism’s 
end of history.172 It seems apt therefore for critical scholars of company law, to 
advocate the need for a ‘turn to history’ comparable to that currently underway in 
international law (see below, Ch.2B S.1.1).173  
 
So it is in their footsteps I tread, (as an “explorer[...] into a region where sign-posts are 
too few”174), in reconstructing the story of the corporation for the purpose of my thesis 
                                                
167 But see, e.g. Ireland (2008), Hadden (1977), Stanley (1988), De Vroey (1975). Thus far feminist legal 
critique of corporate law has been inchoate most - the (as yet unchallenged) conclusion of Lahey (1985). 
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168 Ireland (1987) 149.  
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170 E.g. Whyte (2009). 
171 On ‘normalisation’ as an ideological strategy, see Marks (2000) 19. 
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from the Western canon,175 I concentrate on UK company law because (arguably) 
“corporate law evolved from centuries of English law & was incorporated wholesale 
into US law” & thus “prevails today”.176 I supplement the summary accounts found in 
Davies,177 and Farrar178 with specialist works (Dubois179 and Hunt180), and works of 
general legal history from the early 20th C (Holdsworth,181 Pollock & Maitland182). 
Standard texts on English legal history yield little material on company law (Baker183). 
The main continental authors I rely on are Savigny184 and Gierke,185 whose ideas are 
said to have influenced Anglo-Saxon legal development significantly,186 while the 
work of Harris,187 who is besides Ireland188 the only contemporary specialist in 
company law history, provides an instructive comparative perspective. Beyond this, 
economic history189 and Weber’s sociological works including, especially, “General 
Economic History”190 are of use.191  
 
While uncovering the history of company law it also becomes evident that the 
legitimacy of the corporate form at has at various times in history been questioned, 
even by the ‘father of the free market’, Adam Smith himself (see below at S.4.1). 
‘Backlashes’ against the corporation occurred at very specific points in history, namely 
                                                
175 Outside of the metropole, e.g. Islamic jurists “to meet a need of their arena” (at 202) developed the 
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the mid- to end 19th C192, the 1920/30s193 the 1970s194 and in recent years.195 These 
were periods of profound economic change (crisis) - I discuss this further below and in 
Ch. 6. 
 
As I work through this chapter – it will become clear that the history of the company is 
also closely linked with what we now (in legal scholarship) look at mainly through the 
lens of international law: the history of colonialism, and also of the slave trade, and of 
course with the advent of global capitalism generally, and in particular the coincidence 
and potential relations between war, capitalism and corporations, in other words: the 
political economy of international law. I develop the international law angle more fully 
in Part B. 
 
4 The creation of market society  
 
As noted in Ch. 1, law universalised in the period of transition from feudalism to 
capitalism.196 In this period, capitalism, instances of which had existed in some shape 
or form in many eras, came to penetrate the provision of everyday wants, and labour 
power was commodified.197 The universalisation of law was thus not an isolated 
movement, but one that came as an integral part of greater societal changes in the 
transition to capitalism. Capitalism did not just mean the introduction of the market in 
the economic sphere, it meant the creation of the market society.198 This is a society 
organised according to the rules of the market imperative.199 In Marx’s own words, the 
transition to capitalism came about as a result of a combination of specific historical 
circumstances,200 a change in the present factors. These were, technology, mental 
conceptions, relation to nature, the nature and manner of production, social relations 
(including division of labour, gender relations), how daily life was led (reproduction), 
                                                
192 E.g. Cook (1891): “[p]lutocracy has appeared in a new guise, a new coat of mail – the corporation. 
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193 E.g. Wormser (1931). 
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199 Woods (2002) 36. 
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institutional arrangements including law and the state.201 Key among the latter, I argue 
here, is the development out of earlier forms of communal organisation of the 
corporate legal form (4.1.1-2). This I discuss here together with an example of 
‘creative’ use of the corporate form (4.1.3), the concept of ‘accountability’ in law 
(4.2), and the process of ‘primitive accumulation’ and the creation of the working class 
(4.3). 
 
4.1 The legal personality of commercial polities 
The roots of the legal personality of the corporation lies in the medieval polities 
(Ch.1.3.1) into which communal life in the second half of the Middle Ages was 
organised: amongst others, “townships and manors, hundreds and counties, franchises 
of various kinds and boroughs, and all over is the community of the whole realm.”202 
Law was created to deal with this, but only in a “peculiarly untheoretical and practical 
manner,”203 while these communities were seen as “part of the natural order of things” 
in a society organised around the needs of communal agriculture and other feudal 
forms of cooperation, without a strong overarching central (national) authority.204 
Holdsworth describes how “their doings, like the doings of individuals, were ordered 
as seemed to the judges and statesmen of this period reasonable and efficient.”205 The 
thirteenth century forms a midway point between “the undiluted communalism of the 
earliest period [early Middle Ages] and the bureaucratic ideas of the [20C].”206 The 
pronouncements of judges and statesmen would in Pashukanis’ scheme be ‘proto-law’: 
these polities were constituted as legal subjects only when and for as long as they 
engaged in commodity exchange with other polities.  What we can see in examining 
these polities’ self-organising more closely, is how they became increasingly self-
conscious about the wider utility of their collective identity and the possibility to 
leverage this nascent collective ‘personhood’, 
 
The foundation of the modern corporation was partly organic (below) and partly 
mystical/ideological. According to Dewey, Pope Innocent IV promoted the “fiction 
theory” of corporate personality to preserve the great political power the Papal Empire 
                                                
201 David Harvey Lecture, Berkeley, 22 October 2010 – http://davidharvey.org/ . 
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was enjoying in the 12th/13th Century.207 According to this theory, ecclesiastical 
chapters as corporate bodies could not be excommunicated, or be guilty of a delict.208 
Put simply, and as known by “all English lawyers”209, the corporation has “no body to 
kick and no soul to damn”.210 Pollock agrees that “the idea of the Church as the 
mystical body of Christ has had an important influence on the growth of the law of 
corporations; it did much towards fashioning for us the anthropomorphic picture of the 
many members in one body.”211 At the same time, it cements the idea that societas 
delinquere non potest – a society cannot commit a crime (even if it can shoulder 
liability for the acts or omissions of its employees or officers collectively) an idea that 
would persist until the 20thC (see Ch.4). Thus, in its earliest mystical conception, we 
see the employment of the corporate concept on the one hand for the personification of 
(a certain type of) power, and on the other, for the organisation of responsibility. 
 
Other types of corporation in the 12th to 14th Centuries included “counties, boroughs, 
hundreds, townships, manors, merchant gilds, trading gilds, chantries, deans and 
chapters, monasteries of various kinds, the universities, and the societies of lawyers 
which were developed into the Inns of Court.”212 In this section I look at boroughs and 
guilds, which became the organisational units playing a key role in the rise of the 
capitalist class – at least partly because of their ability to ‘act as one person’. 
4.1.1 The Borough 
Once the papally promoted idea of the personae fictae had become accepted in canon 
law, it started to be applied to the common law bodies such as the boroughs and 
guilds.213 Out of these, the borough stood out with greater distinctness from its 
individual members.214  
 
A thirteenth century borough was a chartered community - some were self-proclaimed, 
and some confirmed by royal charter.215 The qualification ‘borough’ was both a result 
and a source of privilege, such as being free from the control of a sheriff. “The external 
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test in the past has been the separate appearance of the borough community before the 
justices … in the future it will be its separate representation in Parliament.”216 The 
borough’s trading privileges, such as the freedom of toll throughout England – toll 
being the main source of income for a borough,217 made the position of ‘burgess’ (or a 
borough elder) a valuable one. Risk in the borough was compensated by opportunity: 
while the burgesses of a borough could be liable in the court of a foreign borough for 
the debt of their fellow burgesses, conversely, many boroughs gave the burgess the 
right to share in bargains made by fellow burgesses.218 Here we see the start of a form 
of organised sharing of commercial risk and gain. Internal decision-making in the 
borough was organised to enable the most efficient use of the borough’s privileges, 
and a seal was used to express communal consent. The borough was quickly “coming 
to be a more active, more self-conscious unit than the ordinary community …not yet 
regarded as a corporate body- as an artificial person, separate from its members; but … 
on the high road to the attainment of that status.”219  The burghers were becoming 
aware of the potential benefit that a(n evolved) corporate form might bring them, the 
economic power they could wield, and were on their way to evolving into the 




Guilds sprung up within the heterogeneous borough as forms of group organisation 
around a specific economic activity.221 Guilds could be roughly divided into merchant 
guilds and trade (or craft) guilds.222 Some of these were foreign traders with a 
permanent post in a city, for example the German ‘Hansards’ in London.223 The 
purpose of the trade guild was to restrict the practice of a particular skilled trade or the 
sale of a particular product (line) to a group with strict membership criteria.224 
Merchant guilds (which were listed in Select Charters of Trading Companies, e.g. 
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English Merchants in Prussia (1390), Haevre Merchants, etc.225) exploited the royal 
grant of a trading monopoly in a particular commodity or the exploration (seeking 
commercial opportunity) in a particular area, or later, along a specific trade route. 
Once these merchant guilds took on a more permanent form e.g. as commenda and 
later regulated companies (below S.5), with permanent accounting rather than 
accounting on the basis of single journeys/traders, these also came to be perceived as 
‘legal persons’ with a unique existence despite an ever-changing set of members. 
According to Cooke, the guilds were a necessary precursor to a capitalist economy, as  
the effect of this [institution of the ‘Guild’] was necessarily to increase the 
wealth and power of the most efficient members. Through the craft guild and 
the trading company, associations of merchants were able to throw off local 
public control. The result of this was eventually to make the whole country one 
economic unit and to lead to national economic policies.226  
 
At the same time the guilds had an interest in state regulation through official 
recognition by means of a “concession” because this prevented non-official 
organisations – i.e. organisations without an express grant from the Crown from 
rivalling their power.227 Such organisations were viewed and treated as “conjurations” 
and conspiracies.228 At the base of the “concession” lies the idea that the group granted 
the privilege of incorporation served a public purpose. This requirement, however, 
declined, according to Farrar, “due to a number of factors –… the increase of trade and 
manufacture and the growth of overseas trade, originally as privateering expeditions. 
This is the beginning of the rise of capitalistic enterprise”229 – a publicly chartered 
body with a private purpose. 
 
Pollock observes that at times guilds of knights or merchants aspired (and presumably 
occasionally succeeded) to ‘boss’ the town.230 While the borough was an institution 
weighed down with various civic and administrative obligations, the new guild’s 
almost purely economic objective gave the merchant and trading classes a more agile 
construct through which to translate their economic power into political power. The 
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borough had to serve the interests of many, while the guild served a specific narrow 
class in first instance. Here we see how increasingly purely economic enterprises 
compete effectively with more burdensome public bodies for power and influence. 
 
4.1.3 Illustration on the corporation and responsibility 
 
According to Baker, “this was the period in which the distinctions between bodies 
politic and natural persons, and between corporations and their individual heads and 
members, began to receive full examination by the courts.”231 Even so, the courts in 
this period did not come to any firm conclusions, perhaps because “it would have been 
such a large task to define the qualities of a corporation that it would have taken an 
entire vacation”.232 This left space for imaginative use of the corporate concept. 
 
All the same, Edward Coke, J.’s description of the corporation in the Case of Sutton’s 
Hospital (1612)233 has come to be cited in the textbooks as ‘the cornerstone of 
company law’234:  
And it is great reason that an Hospital in expectancy or intendment, or 
nomination, shall be sufficient to support the name of an Incorporation, when 
the Corporation itself is onely in abstracto, and resteth onely in intendment and 
consideration of the Law; for a Corporation aggregate of many is invisible, 
immortal, & resteth only in intendment and consideration of the Law; and 
therefore … They may not commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor 
excommunicate, for they have no souls, neither can they appear in person, but 
… A Corporation aggregate of many cannot do fealty, for an invisible body 
cannot be in person, nor can swear, … it is not subject to imbecilities, or death 
of the natural, body, and divers other cases.235  
 
Textbooks generally do not mention the facts of the case. Sutton, a businessman and 
money-lender and reportedly at the time of his death “the richest commoner of 
England”,236 had purported to establish a hospital and school (on the grounds of the 
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defunct London Charterhouse). Would-be heirs of Sutton (Sutton Jr. and Law) 
challenged his legacy on the basis that although Sutton had had a licence from the 
King to establish a hospital and a school for the poor, he had not yet done so.  
 
What Sutton did do, however, was to create the Hospital as a charity, and to sell the 
school grounds and the future hospital to the charity’s Board of Governors. Coke lists 
the governors established in the charter of the charity, who include not only Coke 
himself but most of the members of the King’s Bench.237 Sutton Jr. argued that, since 
the actual hospital did not exist, the charity had not been properly incorporated and 
was merely ‘utopical and mathematical’. As such, it was argued, the charity did not 
have legal personality and hence no capacity to own property and the transaction was 
void.238 
 
The transaction was however considered valid by the bench, which decided that in 
accepting the transfer they and the remainder of the Board had not acted in their 
‘political’, but in their private capacity.239 Moreover, it was held that a corporation 
could be something that existed only in law, and not in material reality.240 What we see 
here, then, is an early example of the attempt at defining and then using the incorporate 
person as a pure abstraction for speculative gain and the evasion of ‘liability’ (here: the 
‘liability’ towards natural heirs) – with the explicit and almost farcical cooperation of 
the court and many other leading figures in the ruling class. What we also see, on 
another level and in another time, is the concealing/ideological function of ‘positivist’ 
teaching as the case is routinely taught without its little-known facts. 
 
4.1.4 Conclusions on the incorporate person  
 
Despite the clumsy descriptions given by the court in Sutton’s case, it was immediately 
clear to the legal and business audience that certain powers, capacities and liabilities 
affecting natural persons ‘obviously’ did not apply to corporate persons, while others, 
such as a power to own property, to contract, to sue and be sued, liability on contract, 
for wrongs done as the owner of property, were ‘obviously’ included.241 
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The Sutton’s case example illustrates that law was going to be developed not on the 
basis of higher principles or policies, but on the basis of commercial expediency on a 
case-by-case basis. As the potential of the corporation ‘as we know it’ was realised, 
merchant classes were quick to take up the construct and use it to their advantage, and 
the courts had to deal with the difficult questions on an ad hoc, responsive basis. The 
most difficult questions, those relating to liabilities, were not answered in a clear 
systematic manner in advance of the problems of liability arising. Indeed, “the broad 
way in which the law was laid down indicate[d] a line of thought which will long tend 
to restrict the delictual capacity of corporations” and “it is clear that the law on this 
subject was being constructed rather by considerations of expedience, than by any 
attempt to work out logically deductions drawn from the nature of corporate 
personality.”242 The expedience in question was the expedience of business, of 
capitalism. There is already a sense of the corporation becoming a creature with its 
own will, not subject to public control. In Pollock’s words, “[t]he corporation vanishes 
as we pursue it.”243 
 
This flexible arrangement suited the bourgeoisie, who were becoming increasingly 
proactive in employing the economic power encapsulated in the legal construct of the 
corporation in their personal and class interest. This is precisely what worried the 
theorist of royal absolutism Thomas Hobbes. According to Webb, “[b]etween the 
Reformation and the French revolution in western Europe corporate bodies connoted 
privilege and political inequality, and Hobbes spoke for his age when he compared 
them to ‘worms in the entrails of natural man’.”244 Hobbes was a critic of the concept 
of the corporation, insofar as it challenged the power or authority of the absolute ruler 
of the Commonwealth – which he seemed to consider inevitable based on the nature of 
the corporation – its presence intrinsically does not serve the ‘common good’. The 
corporation, he feared, would ultimately compete for power with the Crown, eating 
away at its rule. 
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4.2 Primitive accumulation and the creation of the working class 
In addition to creating the legal constructs through which to organise and optimise 
one’s business affairs, a key stage for the development of market society was on the 
one hand, the accumulation of the means of production by one part of society and the 
simultaneous creation of the working class out of the other. The former occurred 
according to what Marx calls ‘primitive accumulation’ which reflects the idea that the 
difference in wealth in today’s society (as in Marx’s society of the 19thC) did not come 
about simply put because one part of the population was diligent and frugal, and the 
other ‘lazy rascals’, but, rather as a result of “conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, 
in short, force”.245 The future ‘owners of the means of production’ managed to acquire 
their wealth by physically divorcing the producer from the means of production,246 
while the working class was created as a result of this process. Starting in the late 15th 
C. a ‘massive land grab’ occurred (caused mainly by the rise in wool prices and the 
lords’ desire to turn arable land into sheep walks247) in which the feudal lords managed 
to appropriate vast tracts of common (and, post-Reformation also Church) land, 
thereby turning themselves into ‘landed gentry’, while razing cottages and sometimes 
whole villages.248 First this occurred ‘without the slightest regard to legal etiquette’, 
but once - post ‘Glorious Revolution’249 - the landed gentry had gained control of 
Parliament, it was ‘legalised’ through the Inclosure Acts.250 “[T]he advance made by 
the eighteenth century shows itself in this, that the law itself now becomes the 
instrument by which the people’s land is stolen…”251 At other times still the 
appropriation of the means of production in the form of land in this instance was 
accompanied by heavy use of force, for example during the ‘Highland Clearances’ in 
Scotland.252 Such manorial farmers as remained created agricultural enterprises and 
sold their surplus produce at market.253 “The same people who had rebelled against 
property had no choice but to approve it the next day as they met in the market as 
                                                
245 Marx (1976) 874. The process “operates two transformations, whereby the social means of 
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247 Marx (1982) 878-9. 
248 Generally, Marx (1982) 877-895. 
249 The so-called ‘Glorious Revolution’ “brought into power, along with William of Orange, the landed 
and capitalist profit-grubbers.” Marx (1982) 844. 
250 Marx (1982) 884. 
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independent producers.”254 Simultaneously the urbanization of the dispossessed, now 
landless classes fed into the creation of a newly wealth urban middle class who were 
able to exploit their labour in industrial and craft production by creating factories.255 
While landed wealth controlled Parliament, in the transitional period it began to invest 
in colonial ventures and later also industry when it became clear that the commercial 
class started to gain position.256 Industry gained its workforce partly through the 
forcible ‘recruitment’ of the poor from cottages and workhouses - including children 
particularly in the cloth industry in the North of England.257 The poor were forced into 
the factories by means of repressive law e.g. by criminalising vagrancy but also by 
laws prohibiting proletarians from rearing cattle or provide in their own subsistence in 
some other way.258 Capitalism depends on ‘free’ labour: “persons must be present who 
are not only legally in the position, but are also economically compelled, to sell their 
labor.”259 The development of the institutions of capitalism, law, the state and the 
business enterprise, formed an essential ingredient in the transition, alongside 
technological change and the cultural and ideological aspects of capitalism.260  
 
4.3 Calculable law, risk accounting and “accountability” 
Finally, to Marx’ account of the transition to capitalism, Weber adds: 
In the last resort the factor which produced capitalism is the rational 
permanent enterprise, rational accounting, rational technology and rational 
law, but again, not these alone. Necessary complementary factors were the 
rational spirit, the rationalization of the conduct of life in general, and a 
rationalistic economic ethic.261  
Weber’s writing is a rich source on the role of law in society, compared to Marx’.262 
This is not to say that Marx considered law unimportant, but that he did not elaborate 
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on this a great deal, leaving it to others, such as Pashukanis and indeed Weber to fill 
the gaps.263 
 
Weber’s concept of rational accounting enables us to understand the relation between 
law, business and responsibility. For capitalism to function, accountability was 
needed, meaning that an entrepreneur had to be able to predict and calculate every 
element of his business, including opportunity and risk, and including the cost of 
averting such risk. Double-entry bookkeeping enabled accountability, and the ability to 
see (and to some extent influence) which profits or losses could be ascribed to whom. 
Weber explains how rational commerce (i.e. capitalist exchange) was the field where 
‘quantitative reckoning’ first appeared. While business was carried out by family 
firms, as a “closed family affair”, “accountability was … unnecessary”264 but in the 
transition to capitalism it became essential. Family, community and eventually also 
individual property became separated from the property of the business.  
 
Capitalism also required law to be ‘accountable’ – the development of what Weber 
calls ‘calculable law’: “The capitalistic form of industrial organization, if it is to 
operate rationally, must be able to depend on calculable adjudication and 
administration.”265 As time progressed business becomes less and less dependent or 
based on personal/social relations and when capitalism matures the legal, commodified 
relationship takes its place, in particular, or more prominently so, in business. It is only 
then that we can meaningfully speak of formal legal relations.266 From an arrangement 
based on blood and trust, we gradually move to a formal legal relationship called a 
“Trust” (or indeed a Partnership or Corporation). The corporation becomes an ‘amoral 
calculator’267 and the corporate construct allows/forces its human operators to be the 
same. This is the specific instance of the broader notion of the introduction of the cash 
nexus into all human relationships.268 The genealogy of the notion of accountability (in 
the sense used by the ‘business in conflict’ authors discussed in Ch.1) in this 
accountability in a literal sense lies at the heart of the ‘commodified responsibility’ 
conclusion I draw in Ch.6.  
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Examples of partnership constructs that began to be used (e.g. by guilds) at the time 
when rational accounting was introduced, were the commenda and the societas. These 
are mentioned in the literature as the forerunners of the company as we now know it. 
The commenda was generally a cross between a partnership and a loan and involved 
one person (the commendator) advancing money to a trader on the basis that he would 
receive a return which varied with the profits – originally for one specific transaction 
such as a particular shipping voyage.269 The lender shared in the profit but was liable 
only to the extent of his/her share paid into the partnership. It was on this type of 
arrangement that the later merchant adventurers and colonial enterprises would 
initially be based. The concept spread through Europe – from the Italian City States up 
to Antwerp and then London - as part of the generally accepted ‘law merchant’.270  
 
The societas was a more permanent form of partnership, “each partner being an agent 
of the others and liable to the full extent of his private fortune for partnership debts.” 
Partners invested capital and labour based on ability and shared profits based on needs 
and custom.271  
 
According to Holdsworth, “it was through the commenda that the idea of a society in 
which the capitalist could invest and limit his liability came into the commercial law of 
Europe.”272 During the transition form feudalism to capitalism, this form enabled 
wealthy landowners to invest while not being involved in the day-to-day running of it. 
It formed an important way for European aristocracy to safeguard its economic 
position by channelling its capital into commerce and industry.273 Partners could be 
anonymous ‘sleeping partners’ who were spared the indignity of being seen to engage 
in business, especially so when such business failed.274 It was with this idea of risk-free 
(but potentially profitable) investment combined with the creation of a separate 
corporate form that the modern corporation was created.275  
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The transition to capitalism took place in a period of intense military conflict.276 The 
synergy between business and conflict stimulated both. This includes the legal 
development of the corporation. Weber notes, because of the risk of pirate attacks, 
single ships (each organised as a single venture in accounting terms) normally joined 
together into a ‘caravan’ and were either armed themselves or joined by an armed 
convoy.277 This then ‘by commercial necessity’ led to the formation of companies with 
a more permanent form and joint accounting structure: the joint stock corporation.278   
 
5 From the Joint Stock Corporation to the MNC 
 
5.1 Merchant Adventurers, Inc. 
In the second half of the 16th C and following, the corporate form was developed in 
practice and through the Chancery courts, which interpreted the rules on debt priority 
so as to give business the effects of separate personality, asset partitioning an limited 
liability.279 The ‘joint-stock corporation’ (“JSC”) was based on financial elements of 
the guild combined with the corporate form,280 a “concrete, profit-oriented form”,281 
that grew out of the 16th Century trading enterprises used by merchant adventurers 
(above). Their proliferation as part of the colonial enterprise (more about this in Part 
B) resulted in the formation of regulated companies, effectively extending the guild 
system into overseas trade.282 These companies were awarded Royal Charters 
providing for incorporation and the grant of a trading privilege, often a trading 
monopoly, like the trade in a certain commodity and/or on a certain trade route or from 
a certain colony. For example, in 1555 the Merchants Adventurers of England for the 
Discovery of Lands Unknown, also known as the ‘Muscovy or Russia Company’, 
were incorporated to exploit the sole right to travel to Russia or further north.283 The 
concept of ‘joint-stock’ appeared in the mid-sixteenth Century.284 Davies tracks the 
rapid development: from 1614 there was joint stock to which members could subscribe 
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varying amounts for a period of years. In 1653 a permanent joint stock was introduced 
and in 1692 individual trading on private accounts was forbidden to members.285 
Members shared profits and losses of all business activities of the corporation, as well 
as all overheads.286 From this point, the company traded as a single entity.287 
 
The legal development of the joint-stock corporation took place within the specific 
context of a small number of merchant enterprises, in a specific time.288 “[F]rom the 
mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, a mechanism was developed for raising 
money in return for shares, for dividing profits among shareholders, for transferring 
shares among members and to outsiders, and for keeping accounts of joint-stock 
concerns for long durations.”289 For the Crown, granting monopolies was a convenient 
way to raise increasing military expenditure while avoiding the parliamentary 
supervision attached to other forms of revenue such as taxation.290 In effect, “[t]he 
conduct of war by the state becomes a business operation of the possessing classes.”291 
Here we see the potential for synergy between state and corporation (a ‘military-
mercantilist complex’), rather than the competition above. War loans could potentially 
be very lucrative if the war was won, with its spoils. Other benefits for the Crown 
included using the corporations as an indirect means of foreign policy292 (see below 
under Part B S.2). 
 
5.1.1 Jobbers and bubbles at the birth of the modern corporation 
 
Opening up the share market to the public caused the next momentous phase in the 
development of company law. In 1600 the British East India Company was granted a 
monopoly of the trade with the Indies by Royal Charter.293 It was the first to combine 
incorporation, overseas trade and joint stock raised from the general public.294 
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Moreover, after the ‘bourgeois revolution’ of the English Civil War (1642-1651) and 
the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1689295 the business climate changed, monopoly 
ownership was no longer as important and in particular, the British East India 
Company, the Bank of England and the South Sea Company (known as ‘moneyed 
companies’) (re-) emerged as leaders in public finance and gained political 
importance.296 In the English revolution, a massive social and economic upheaval, the 
forces of Parliament and the City of London, representing the British capitalist class, 
mobilised popular forces to end remnants of feudal monarchical absolutism.297 
Substantial sales of Crown land led to loss of income, while the corporations had 
access to vast public pool of money through the stock market. As the Crown came to 
depend on these companies for loans, their power grew. By 1714, 39% of the public 
debt was owed to the three ‘moneyed companies’.298  
 
The key point here is that raising money from the general public also shifted (or 
devolved) the majority of the risk to them, ‘socialised’ the risk. Despite the obvious 
bubble-bursting repercussions the general public was and stayed somehow willing to 
take on this risk. This is perhaps a result of the capitalist culture that started to emerge: 
people literally bough into capitalism.  
 
5.1.2 The big bang of modern company law: When the Bubble burst 
 
The story of the South Sea Company illustrates the changing dynamic between the 
state and corporation. The British South Sea Company, a joint stock company, was 
founded in 1710 with the dual objectives of the exploitation of a monopoly of all trade 
to the Spanish colonies in South America and to relieve the government of the burden 
of national debt accrued as a result of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-
1714).299 The company took a gamble on both the outcome and cost of the war. In 
exchange the company was rewarded with solid government support for the business. 
The Bank of England, which had been was founded in return for money lent to the 
government by a group of individuals, was outbid by the South Sea Company which 
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had bribed government members.300 When rumours started circulating that the country 
might go bankrupt because of the size of the debt, the Company persuaded the 
government to convert the debt to shares in the company which were offered to the 
open market.301 This move allowed for a dramatic expansion of the national debt.302 
The converted bonds were sold riding the wave of the popularity of the share trade. 
There was we would now call ‘consumer confidence’ in the years following the war 
which ended with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. There was increased wealth, no longer 
confined to the upper classes, and an excitement about the luxury goods that could be 
acquired from foreign lands. Stocks were busily traded by stockjobbers working from 
the coffee houses on and around Exchange Alley in the City of London.303 The hype 
surrounding the South Sea shares fuelled share prices generally and led to numerous 
genuine and less genuine companies being set up. Stockjobbers set up stalls on the 
street, selling shares in companies “for importing jackasses from Spain,” “securing 
perpetual motion”, “an undertaking which would in due time be revealed”.304 With 
penny shares everyone (of the petty bourgeois or middle class) could and did invest. 
This in turn reflects a popular acceptance of (lit. ‘buy-in’ to) the ideology of 
capitalism.  
 
The South Sea shares were valued at around 100 pounds each in January 1720, and 
over 1000 pounds in December of the same year. The company apparently bribed 
ministers and persuaded the government to pass the so-called ‘Bubble Act’,305 which 
required all companies to have charters, and declared all undertakings “tending to the 
common Grievance, Prejudice and Inconvenience of His Majesty’s Subjects” illegal 
and void. 306 The Act exempted the South Sea Company (and the East India Company) 
from all its substantive restrictive provisions,307 and it ex post facto legalised certain 
departures form the debt conversion scheme made by the Company: “[this] 
demonstrates the company’s ability to manipulate Parliament at will.”308  
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The Act did nothing to stem the popularity of South Sea shares. Eventually the burst of 
the bubble came – possibly as a result of proceedings against rival companies (Farrar 
suggests these may have been instigated by South Sea309). The shares were back down 
to around 100 pounds each within days and many lost their fortune. “Everyone – 
merchants, professors, doctors, clergymen - even the Canton of Berne [had] invested in 
the company.”310 An enquiry took place and exposed a “web of deceit, bribery and 
corruption”311 which involved members of the Royal Household and Government.312 
The overwhelming public sentiment was one of a vacuum of accountability following 
the crash.313 However, instead of punishment, the South Sea directors received the 
King’s gratitude for their friendship in dealing with the government debt, and King 
George made Baronets of John Blunt and William Chapman.314  
 
There were calls for the company directors to face a “Roman style execution”, but 
instead a sum of 2 million pounds was made available for compensation.315 Some MPs 
were expelled from Parliament and MP and South Sea Director Aislabie was tried and 
found guilty of “most notorious, dangerous and infamous corruption that he had 
encouraged and promoted the dangerous and destructive execution of the South Sea 
scheme...”316 
 
5.2 Bubble Aftermath: Effects on company law development 
Many commentators describe the Bubble Act as reactionary and prohibitive legislation 
aimed at impeding the rise of the joint stock company as a form of business 
organization.317 Harris, on the other hand, argues that the South Sea Company, which 
organized the national debt conversion scheme, also instigated the Bubble Act, 
“because small bubble companies had become an annoying factor in the stock market 
                                                
309 Farrar (1998) 18, and Gower (1952). 
310 Farrar (1998) 18. 
311 South Sea Company Harvard Business School Project: http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/ssb/index.html. 
312 Davies (2003) 26. 
313 South Sea Company Harvard Business School Project. 
314 Harris (2000) 72-73. 
315 Farrar (1998) 18. 
316 Case of Aislabie (1721) and see Novak (2003) 574. 
317 Harris (2000) 60; Maitland (1936) 208; Holdsworth (1925) Vol.VIII 221. 
   63 
of 1720.”318 Indeed, the South Sea Company and a number of others were explicitly 
exempted and South Sea continued to exist for over another century.  
 
The Bubble share-craze, by advancing the links between the various financial markets 
in Western Europe, “facilitated, for the first time, the emergence of an integrated and 
efficient international financial market.”319 While the bubble had been a disaster for the 
thousands who lost their money in this first time mass-socialisation of risk, and despite 
the outcry over the lack of accountability, the public continued to assume corporate 
risk in the years and indeed centuries to follow, which is testament to the strength of 
capitalist ideology.  
 
The Bubble Act did not impede economic development nor the development of 
company law.320 After the Bubble ‘PR fiasco’ the state created some distance between 
it and business, making it difficult to obtain a Charter or Statute. The effect was that 
lawyers began to create the same effect as “joint stock” incorporation by means of 
ingenuous drafting, using amongst others the “deed of settlement” construct – a cross 
between a trust and an association and effectively granting limited liability.321 Property 
would be vested in a board of trustees, management would be delegated to a board of 
directors, although whether they could be sued remained unclear, - and “obscurity on 
this point was by no means a disadvantage from the point of view of the company”322 – 
and even “strangely enough [use of these type of companies] seems to have been 
encouraged rather than frowned upon by the Government.”323 The agents of change in 
the period following the Bubble Act were businessmen and lawyers. The latter, trained 
on the job (often in business),324 developed law in a more pragmatic ‘managerialist’ 
direction compared with other countries. Such legal scholars as there were at Oxford 
and Cambridge exclusively read Roman and Canon law. Law was further developed 
by “overworked common-law judges and Lord Chancellors [whose] agenda was 
shaped by the disputes that reached their halls.”325 Some legal texts were also written 
by retired judges, and “barristers on the margins of their profession, who aimed at 
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supplementing their legal fees”.326 There was no space for theoretical discussions on, 
for example, the nature of legal personality in the writings of those authors, who 
mainly focused on the ‘how’ of company law. Then as now, company law was directed 
by the practical concerns of entrepreneurs and their attorneys.327 An alternative 
explanation may be, that then (as indeed now) a separation between high public life 
and the world of business suited the ruling elite, and enabled it to create an ideological 
separation/distance between themselves and the exploitative goings-on that supplied 
their income. Company law in this period was made privately, for private purposes.  
 
5.3 1844: The first modern Companies Act  
The growth of the railways finally brought a push for company law reform. Railway 
companies needed to raise large amounts of capital from the public.328 The Bubble Act 
was eventually repealed in 1825,329 and the first “modern companies act”, The Joint 
Stock Companies Act 1844,330 was enacted – properly adopting the deed of settlements 
company and endowing it with the “qualities and incidents” of corporations, except 
limited liability.331 Significantly, the company’s profit mandate was included in the 
statutory definition of the company.332 According to Farrar, “[t]he effect of this 
legislation was to shift from the privilege of incorporation by Royal or Statutory grant 
to the right of incorporation provided the statutory conditions were fulfilled.”333 
Incorporation could then be achieved upon registration with the newly established 
Registrar of Companies. This shift was indicative of a shift in the balance of power in 
society from crown to the bourgeoisie-dominated Parliament, and thus their private 
economic interests. The public/private conceptual divide stems from this period and 
when for the first time corporations could be formed without any explicit state 
interference, a private sphere was created into which corporations shifted.334 “[This] 
conceptual innovation… lay at the core of the longer term revolution.”335  
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Contracting for limited liability became ‘cumbrous and expensive’ with such large 
corporations.336 Despite the difficulties inherent in attempting to sue a fluctuating body 
of members and the even greater difficulties of levying execution - which made the 
personal liability of the members largely illusory,337 the fact that a debt of £10 could 
land one in debtors’ prison was a strong incentive to try to limit (shift) one’s 
exposure.338 Any lingering insecurity over whether contractual limited liability would 
stand up in court was taken away in 1852 in Hallett v Dowdall.339 Subsequently it was 
provided for in the 1855 Limited Liability Act,340 which, according to Gower, was 
passed with “almost indecent haste”.341 As limited liability had already been introduced 
by statute in the US and France, the Board of Trade promoted the measure to “help 
vitalise British business” and stop ‘British’ companies from incorporating abroad.342  
 
The 1855 Act contained safeguards, such as the requirement that a company must have 
at least 25 members and a minimum subscribed capital, which were “brushed aside in 
the name of laissez-faire”343 in the 1856 Joint Stock Companies Act344 and shortly 
followed the Companies Act of 1862345, which was dubbed the “Magna Carta of 
cooperative enterprise”.346 Many industrial enterprises took the opportunity to 
incorporate under this act.347 The modern corporation had been born. 
 
From Wilhelm we learn that in France and Germany the run-up to the ‘modern 
corporation’ had been similar to the UK, even down to the popular demand for share 
ownership in the first half of the 1800s, leading to the establishment of bogus 
companies - in France for example there was a joint stock company “pour le marriage 
de l’Amérique et de l’Afrique”.348 In France the main companies legislation was 
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introduced in 1856, and in Germany the Allgemeine Deutsche Handelsgesetzbuch of 
1868 regulated joint stock companies and the “Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien”.349 
As such, the legal developments in these countries mirrored those in the UK, while the 
development of capitalism had followed broadly similar paths there, too.350 
 
Harris points out that the corporation as it came to exist in law in the mid-19C has not 
changed fundamentally since. All the key characteristics were in place. 
 
5.4 Another look at separate personality 
Of the key company characteristics that ‘solidified’ at this time it is necessary to pause 
once again at the concept of legal personality. When, with the joint stock company and 
later the modern corporation, share ownership is deliberately spread out over the 
general public, the risk of the economic activity of the corporation is externalized, and 
it becomes in ‘everyone’s’ interest that the company does well, and that, e.g. economic 
policies adopted by the government favour business. According to Marx: “Capital, 
which is inherently based on a social mode of production and presupposes a social 
concentration of means of production and labour-power, now receives the form of 
social capital (capital of directly associated individuals) in contrast to private capital, 
and its enterprises appear as social enterprises as opposed to private ones. This is the 
abolition of capital as private property within the confines of the capitalist mode of 
production itself.”351 Taking this understanding it is possible to vindicate Pashukanis: 
“It is now the capitalist project which must use wage-labour to accumulate, as opposed 
to the individual capitalist. A necessary corollary of this was the development of the 
juridical form to allow for a corporate body to be the owner of a commodity and 
therefore retain legal personality. This was not a ‘new’ legal form but a development 
of the legal form Pashukanis outlines on the basis of that form itself.”352 
 
Ireland et al. argue, “it is the emergence of the joint stock company share as a new 
form of fictitious capital that underlies the doctrine of separate personality and, 
therefore, the basic conceptual structure of contemporary company law.”353 This 
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change is reflected in the definition of the company which moved from “persons 
form[ing] themselves into an incorporated company” in 1856, to “persons form[ing] an 
incorporated company” in 1862.354 The company had then become, and stayed since 
then, something “external” to its members, a separate legal person.355 What caused the 
momentous change in the 1850s/60s, according to Ireland et al, was “the changing 
economic and legal nature of the joint stock company share. The share became 
property, “realty” in its own right, as opposed to a mere claim based on a contractual 
relationship.”356 
 
Explaining the change in Marxist terms, it is pointed out that “such transformations 
can only take place under certain historical conditions – conditions in which labour 
power has become a commodity.” Ireland et al. use the Marxist distinction between 
money capitalist (who invest) and industrial capitalists (who utilise the funds). 
“Interest represents a relationship between the two capitalists and, as such, necessarily 
entails antagonism between them as they contest the division of surplus value.”357 Yet, 
common drive to maximise surplus value extraction is stronger than (and intensified 
by) this competition.  
 
Marx describes the process of reification of money capital as, “[the thing] which 
embodies … the social relationship… acquire[s] a fictitious life and independent 
existence”.358 Thus, “the conception of capital as a self-reproducing and self-expanding 
value, lasting and growing eternally by virtue of its innate properties, is thereby 
established.”359 
 
What enabled this development to occur was the development of a secondary market 
for these company shares. According to Ireland, the UK railway system’s development 
in the early 19C led to the popularisation and proliferation of shares available and 
readily traded.360 With this “a gulf emerged between companies and their shareholders 
and between shareholders and their shares.”361 Companies owned the industrial capital 
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356 Ireland (1987) 153 (emphasis added). 
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and shareholders the “fictitious” share capital which they could sell at will without 
affecting the size of the industrial capital. Ireland states that at this point, the company 
became a singular entity, separate from shareholders, “emptied of people”.362 “Both the 
company and the share had been reified”.363 What the description of this process of 
course highlights is the centrality of law as “one of the primary social practices 
through which actual relationships embodying class power [are] created and 
articulated.”364 Through law, “[c]apitalist social relations come to be reified and 
depersonalised; that is, that class relations under developed capitalism cease to be 
personal but come, to a significant extent, to be embodied in things, some of which - 
like the joint stock company share – are constituted in law as autonomous forms of 
property.”365 This is the process that Marx calls “commodity fetishism”.366 Linked to 
this is the congealing of the corporate purpose of profit extraction in the 1844 Act: the 
legitimation of the narrow profit mandate, economic-rational decision making to the 
exclusion of moral considerations. In the words of Stanley: 
Capitalist societal relations are expressed in the reflection of the alienated 
individual to the mode of production. Thus the legitimisation of the mode of 
production through regulation of the corporate form bears witness to the 
legality of the process of alienation. Law is both constituted by capitalist social 
relations and constitutive of them. Central to this process of creation, 
articulation and reproduction of class relationships is the idea of alienation 
which is clearly seen in law through the process of the legitimisation of both 
the corporate entity and the relationship of the individual to that entity through 
the mode of production.367  
 
The relationship of the individual worker, the person affected by the activities of the 
corporation, the ‘victim’ becomes a relationship with the corporation, no longer with 
the individuals inside it, the corporation has been lifted up above them, or, emptied of 
them. The relationship between ‘outsider’ and the corporation becomes one of 
exchange, as formal legal equals. Below (Ch.6) I examine how this affects the 
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relationship of responsibility between the corporation and those affected by its 
operations.  
 
5.5 The finishing touch: Salomon 
The 1897 case of Salomon v A. Salomon & Co. Ltd.368 put the new company law to the 
test. The question facing the House of Lords and the lower courts before them was 
whether to “interpret the law literally or whether to consider more its presumed spirit 
and intention.”369 The court came down firmly on the side of the former, allowing an 
abstraction from material reality not seen since the Case of Sutton’s Hospital. While 
limited liability had ostensibly been created in order to stimulate arms-length 
investment in business ventures where investors had little oversight or input, Salomon 
showed how it could be used to the investor’s advantage in the opposite situation: the 
main person active in the company was able to ‘incorporate’ and thus limit his own 
liability for the consequences of his own decisions and actions. At the time of Salomon 
incorporation required seven shareholders, and the decision confirmed that this could 
be one active, controlling shareholder and six nominal participants.370 The House of 
Lords understood that in the case of Salomon, the six other shareholders besides Mr. 
Salomon were mere “dummies” … “[b]ut when once it is conceded that they were 
individual members of the company distinct from Salomon, and sufficiently so to bring 
into existence in conjunction with him a validly constituted corporation, I am unable to 
see how the facts to which I have just referred can affect the legal position of the 
company, or give it rights against its members which it would not otherwise 
possess.”371 
 
Lord Halsbury in the same case comments: “…it seems to me impossible to dispute 
that once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other 
independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself, and that the 
motives of those who took part in the promotion of the company are absolutely 
irrelevant in discussing what those rights and liabilities are. … I can only find the true 
intent and meaning of the Act from the Act itself; and the Act appears to me to give a 
company a legal existence with, as I have said, rights and liabilities of its own, 
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whatever may have been the ideas or schemes of those who brought it into 
existence.”372 At this point then company law receives its current form. Protection and 
furthering of business interest is not a right, but a normalised entitlement: “[p]ersons 
are entitled to incorporate companies for the purpose of separating their business 
affairs from their personal affairs.”373 In the following chapters I will also touch on the 
effect of compartmentalising ‘business’ from ‘personal’ in the psychological, or mens 
rea sense: corporate anomie.374 The corporation ‘absorbs’ any bad faith (or worse) on 
behalf of the individual: as per Lord Halsbury in Salomon: “…the motives of those 
who took part in the promotion of the company are absolutely irrelevant in discussing 
what those rights and liabilities are.”375  
 
In 1891 Cook wrote:  
Fifty years ago wealthy men were identified with their investments, To-day, 
with a few exceptions, the great enterprises are not connected in the public 
mind with individual names. …. If corrupt and unscrupulous, the odium and 
disgrace rests upon the corporation and not upon the individual. Take it all in 
all, the corporation is as perfect and heartless a money-making machine as the 
wit of man has ever devised.376 
 
The reified corporation was complete. The development of domestic law on ‘corporate 
crime’ in the UK (and US) perfectly mirrors the process of reification, and eventually, 
anthropomorphisation, of the corporation. In the late 19th C. Judge Thurlow famously 
asked, “Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to 
be damned, and no body to be kicked?”377 When norms of crime and punishment were 
abstracted from religious, emotional sentiment and became ‘accountable’, attitudes 
began to change, most likely first for practical reasons however rather than as a result 
of academic theorising.378 In the UK, from as early as 1842 a ‘corporation aggregate’ 
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could be held criminally liable for failing to fulfil a statutory duty.379 This follows the 
joint liability of earlier forms of organization as discussed in S.4.1 above, and the logic 
that it made sense to seek financial recompense from large (here, railway) companies 
rather than indict individual employees for ‘minor’ offenses. In 1917 vicarious liability 
of a corporation (as legal person) for the acts of its employees and agents became a 
possibility in another railways case.380 In the mid-1940s the UK courts381 accepted 
corporate criminal liability for crimes requiring a ‘guilty mind’ on the basis of the 
guilty mind of a ‘controlling officer’,382 in a construction that was a decade later to be 
described in memorable terms by Lord Denning: 
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and 
nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools 
and act in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in 
the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to 
do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are 
directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the 
company, and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the 
state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such.383 
 
In Ch.3 I uncover to what extent this reification ‘holds’ in the face of accusations of 
serious crimes. From this notion, eventually the current, fully anthropomorphised 
‘corporate corporate crime’ discussed in Ch. 6 would evolve.384 In Ch.6 I also come 
back to the anthropomorphisation of the ‘good’ company through corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
5.6 The multinational corporate group 
From the Salomon decision evolved the corporate group consisting of subsidiary 
companies owned by parent companies based and operating in one or more 
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jurisdiction, each having separate legal personality. Enterprises are vertically 
integrated and constituted as multinational corporate groups containing sometimes 
hundreds of discreet corporations.385  The structure of multinational corporate groups is 
generally ‘optimized’ so as to afford maximum protection of corporate interests 
through locating assets and interests in specific (‘friendly’ or ‘conducive’) 
jurisdictions, e.g. intellectual property in The Netherlands, capital in the Bahamas, etc. 
and through creating relationships (contractual and ownership) between different parts 
of the corporate groups to efficiently distribute and protect revenue streams.386 
Production has mostly moved to the global South, while capital (and thus power and 
direction) has stayed in the North/West. The case of Adams v Cape illustrates how the 
group structure serves the interests of capital in a multinational enterprise. Cape 
Industries is a UK parent company whose subsidiaries mined asbestos in South Africa 
which was then shipped to a Texas subsidiary. Workers in Texas became sick with 
asbestosis and sued the parent company in a US court, and subsequently attempted to 
enforce the judgment in their favour through the UK Court of Appeal. The court stated 
that although the corporate group had apparently been constructed deliberately so as to 
immunise the parent company from the claims that its board members already 
expected to arise out of its trade in asbestos, it held that “the court is not free to 
disregard the principle of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd merely because it considers 
that justice so requires.”387 Thus we see how the individual ‘moral’ actors disappear 
behind the corporate construct, and the group structure is used to insulate not only the 
individuals but other companies in the group from (financial) risk through the 
particular group’s legal structure, which is optimised (amongst others) through the use 
of a technique known among corporate lawyers as ‘defensive asset partitioning’.388 In 
the following chapters I focus mainly on these transnational businesses, complex legal 
structures based on the single company operated by individuals. 
 
6 Conclusion of Part A 
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In this chapter I highlighted the development from joint shouldering of risk and reward 
by familial and other groups bound by relationships of trust pre-capitalism, to the 
introduction of ‘calculable law’ and the staged development of the modern 
corporation. Calculable law allows the business unit to base its decisions not on 
normative considerations, but on economic rationality. Responsibility becomes 
accountability. The creation of separate legal personality follows this logic: “[t]he 
most rational actualization of the idea of the legal personality of organizations consists 
in the complete separation of the legal spheres of the members from the separately 
constituted legal sphere of the organization.”389 Aside from the formal legal aspects, 
the ideological aspects of reification/anthropomorphisation, the socialisation of 
shareholding as a factor in the legitimisation of the narrow profit mandate 
(‘shareholder primacy’390), serves to render the corporation a ‘structure of 
irresponsibility’,391 which is ‘capitalism congealed’ and which serves to conceal (and 
enrich) the individual businessperson. Corporate groups form even more sophisticated 
structures that can isolate and shift, value, risk and responsibility on the global level. I 
also showed that this situation is normalised, rendered neutral, by means of court 
decisions, through the business-led development of law which stayed largely isolated 
from philosophical/ethical enquiry, and by means of current ‘positivist’ teaching of 
company law. For example, ‘limited liability’, which is actually, liability socialised 
over broader society and the natural environment, combined with profit for a limited 
group, is not generally seen as a controversial or unnatural concept. These factors 
serve to produce knowledge, policy and legal decisions and instruments, that self-
perpetuate capitalism and reproduce current socio-economic hierarchies.  
 
Moreover, as Berle and Means wrote in their 1930s classic The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property: “The corporate system has done more than evolve a norm by 
which business is carried on. Within it exists a centripetal attraction which draws 
wealth together into aggregations of constantly increasing size, at the same time 
throwing control into the hands of fewer and fewer men.”392 The corporate form, the 
company as an ‘amoral calculator’393 induces its individual operatives to make 
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‘economically rational’ amoral decisions – a form of capitalist anomie.394 This anomie 
is expressed well by Steinbeck in Grapes of Wrath, when he describes one of the many 
farmland repossessions during the Depression: 
We’re sorry. It’s not us. It’s the monster. The bank isn’t like a man. 
Yes, but the bank is only made of men. 
No, you’re wrong there – quite wrong there. The bank is something else than 
men. It happens that every man in a bank hates what the bank does, and yet the 
bank does it. The bank is something more than men, I tell you. It’s the monster. 
Men made it, but they can’t control it. 
 
In Section B, using the examples of slave labour and pillage (‘accumulation by 
dispossession’395) in three different periods in history, I will show the imperialism at 
the heart of the corporate legal form. In 1848, Marx and Engels wrote in the 
Communist Manifesto: “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products 
chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, 
settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.”396 It is to corporate activity on 
the global level, and in international law, that I turn next. 
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1 Introduction to Part B: The Corporation and capitalism in IL 
 
In this section I elaborate on the argument made in Chapter 1 (S.3) above that 
international law finds its roots in capitalism, is an essential part of it, (indeed, a sine 
qua non) and developed according to the logic of what Kingsbury has called 
‘commercial sociability’, or, the logic of capitalism.397 Again, my argument in this 
section is rooted in the commodity form theory of law, and I draw in the initial 
sections particularly on Pashukanis’ Essay on International Law398 and Miéville’s 
monograph, with the modifications outlined in Chapter 1 and here.  
 
I start with a short overview of the epistemology and sources on this topic (S.1.1). In 
Section 2 I argue that the corporation was (and is) a major factor, in the early 
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development of IL that elites (the global capitalist class) use to channel their activities, 
amongst others, in overseas trade, fighting trade wars and, importantly, as a colonising 
entity (a tool for colonisation). I comment on the significance of (international) legal 
personality of both state and corporation and the phenomenon of ‘corporate 
sovereignty.’ Then I discuss how contemporary international law on the one hand 
includes the reified corporation as a ‘participant’ in areas of ‘private’ international law 
while in ‘public’ international law it remains largely invisible.399 ‘Private’ and ‘public’ 
IL however continue to be shaped around corporate/capital’s interests, giving credence 
to the claim of a ‘global capitalist class’. This sometimes occurs visibly, for example 
through states’ espousal of corporate claims in international fora such as the ICJ 
(S.3.4)). I focus specifically on nationalisation/expropriation cases as these are most 
relevant to the ‘business in conflict’ theme - I include colonialisation (and imperialism 
more broadly) as a form of conflict and discuss the corporate scramble for Africa in 
this light. Likewise ‘decolonisation’ is a site for conflict. In addition (and amongst 
others), corporations as parties to concession agreements and under Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (“BITs”) are now able to ‘litigate’ against states on the 
international level through arbitration including at the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).400 In doing this, capitalists managed to 
lift their interests out of host state jurisdiction and into international law, and then to 
separate off certain questions of international law to the realm of ‘private international 
law’ thereby excluding or concealing ‘public’ and ‘domestic’ interests. At other times 
the corporation is a participant in a more ‘hidden’ sense, e.g. in processes of 
international law-making and in ‘soft law’ regulation which can be said to amount to a 
modern law merchant or ‘privatised law’ (on this notion see further Chapter 6). I 
comment briefly on the significance of ‘international legal personality’ (section 3.5). 
All in all, I conclude, the corporation (or rather, the global capitalist class behind the 
corporation) makes highly effective use of international law. In a final section I ask 
how the discourse of IL, and especially the logic of peace, seemingly clashes with the 
prior and enduring logic of the market yet, at the same time, serves to legitimise the IL 
enterprise and to conceal its basis in capitalist exploitation.  
 
                                                
399 I use ‘Private IL’ to mean the IL that regulates (aspects of) the ‘private sphere’, and not in the 
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400 The Centre “provides facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between 
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1.1 Epistemology: Sources in international law/history of international law 
In order to locate the corporation in the history of international law, and in 
international legal practice, again some creativity is required. The history of 
international law, like the history of company law, has been a neglected area.401 A 
renewed interest in the history of IL focuses almost exclusively on the writings of legal 
philosophers but not on IL as actually practised.402 In contemporary IL, too, few 
authors discuss the ‘why’ of the emergence of law/international law - the development 
of law is often represented as a ‘self-unfolding of ideas’ or even through a ‘teleology 
of freedom’.403 Often also law and legal concepts appear (e.g. in judicial decisions or in 
the literature) seemingly as if out of nowhere, yet are presented as ‘elementary’ and 
obvious. Thus fundamental (foundational) contradictions are obscured, for example the 
idea of statehood being both antecedent and a product of IL.404 
 
Additionally, as I argue below, in ‘public’ or general international law and history of 
international law scholarship, the political economy of international law remains 
largely concealed.405 Few authors have commented on this absence (see Section 3 
below).406 Miéville observes, “it is only through examining the changing nature of 
exchange and market relations across communities and eventually nation-states that 
the changing nature of international law can be made sense of.”407 The state was first 
conceptualised as a unit of economic activity.408 Moreover, I argue, it is also only 
through examining the changing nature of market relations and the concomitant 
development of international law that we can really understand the creation and role of 
the corporation in the political economy of international law. In general/’public’ 
international law scholarship, both doctrinal and theoretical, the corporation in any 
shape or form is almost completely absent.409 Current international law scholarship 
appears to view the corporation either as external and/or irrelevant to its field of 
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study,410 or (in what is called ‘international economic law’ or more specifically, e.g. 
‘international law of investment protection’) to treat corporations (and their bigger, 
international version, the multinational) as a self-evident and ‘natural’ fact of life.411 A 
notable example in the latter category is Peter Muchlinski’s monograph “Multinational 
Enterprises and the Law”, first published in 1995.412 In Sections 3 and 4 below I 
discuss the changing dynamics between corporations, states and other forms which 
will eventually become a manner of global governance. 
 
Marx has said, “capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood 
and dirt.”413 However, while it is clear that the transition to capitalism and capitalism 
itself was/is a ‘bloody business’ – most historical and especially legal literature has 
been cleansed of any evidence of this. This is of course not necessarily an innocent 
move. Per Miéville: “Law disguises its own brutal core.”414 As I try to show in this 
thesis as a whole, there are many indications of continuity between primitive 
accumulation in Europe (e.g. Britain’s clearances see Chapter 2A), colonial practices, 
corporate involvement in WWII (Ch.3A and 3B) and current multinationals’ practices 
in the Third World.415  
 
1.2 Towards International Law 
Neff stresses the fact that natural law writers in the pre-modern age considered the 
whole of human (and often also non-human) society “to form a single moral and 
ethical community”, and that “no body of law existed that was applicable uniquely to 
international relations as such.”416 Such universalist natural ‘law’, however, would 
more appropriately be called philosophical theory, where it only existed inside the 
heads and treatises of the scholars of the time (i.e. in the realm of ideas) without 
reflecting actually existing material reality of human relations, or, indeed having much 
impact on them.417 Seen through the prism of the commodity form theory of law, such 
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law as actually existed is pre- or proto-law at most except insofar it inhered between 
trading polities. It is from the pluralist everyday practice of city-states and other types 
of polities trading as economic units (e.g. boroughs and guilds: Ch.2A) that a ‘ius inter 
gentes’418 is eventually developed, if generally only inhering for the duration of 
specific exchanges without becoming systematised (or universalised).419 Early 
examples of law developing around inter-polity trade were the bilateral agreements for 
the protection of merchants, both on land and sea, the latter receiving the benefit of 
rules such as those in the “Consolato del Mare” which sought to govern amongst 
others the right of neutral traders in wartime.420 
 
Such ‘law merchant’ operated (in what Grewe calls the “Spanish Period”421) on a 
pragmatic basis mostly between European traders and to a more limited extent their 
Asian and African counterparts until the ‘discovery’ of America by Columbus 
profoundly changed the socio-political space. Faced with a ‘new world’, the 
Portuguese and Spanish superpowers of the time divided the known world between 
them in the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494.422 In the treaty a line (‘raya’) was drawn 
across the world between Spanish and Portuguese spheres of hegemony. This was not 
the first such line but the first global line. It was essentially “a feudal line between two 
princes”423 in a rapidly altering world. A “premodern line of division was drawn onto a 
newly (post-feudal) scientific conception of the world, for the purposes of the 
exploitative distribution of a global order between two burgeoning mercantilist 
states”424 The question arose (perhaps mainly in the minds of scholars) how to view the 
new world, which was not part of the ‘respublica Christiana’ but also not classed as 
‘enemy’. Once the Aztec gold was discovered this question became all the more 
salient. Spanish theologian and jurist Francisco de Vitoria answered it by denying the 
‘Indians’ sovereignty (as this right was reserved for Christians), but by ‘granting’ them 
‘dominion’ over their territory, a reciprocal right of ownership.425 “[T]he mere 
‘discovery’ of the Americas does not give the Spanish ownership ‘any more than if it 
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been they who had discovered us’”426 – which was clearly a rhetorical possibility only. 
Of course having ownership meant having the hypothetical capacity to trade (in this 
case specifically: to sell). In De Indes Noviter Inventis, de Vitoria concluded that the 
Spanish conquest of the native kingdoms in the New World had been ‘legal’ as the 
‘Indians’ had ‘unlawfully’ attempted to exclude Spanish traders (effectively preventing 
them from ‘buying’ Aztec treasures).427 Thus, the basis on which de Vitoria decided on 
the legality of the actions was the principle of free trade, which was at the time in the 
respublica Christiana considered a natural law as well as a religious right.428 The 
‘Indians’, through the right of dominion, had some measure of legal personality.  
 
At this point the respublica Christiana was crumbling and the “Spanish Age” of 1492-
1648 was also the period of transition to capitalism. The ‘raya’ was soon replaced by 
‘lines of amity’ which were agreed between the now up and coming French, Dutch and 
English economic powers.429 Rather than dividing the world between them, these were 
lines that demarcated a European sphere (where international law ruled), and a space 
beyond. Beyond the lines of amity, the European powers considered the world was ‘up 
for grabs’ and, through and with their trading companies, they competed with each 
other to colonise the remaining world.430 This is when the previously ‘universal’ law 
becomes a European international law – with ‘no law beyond the line’.431 
 
Eventually in 1648, Spain - in the Peace of Münster which ended the Eighty Years 
War - recognised the United Netherlands as another economic power and 
simultaneously recognised Dutch colonial possessions.432 The lines of amity became 
irrelevant as European powers came to recognise each others’ ‘title’ to the various 
parts of the rest of the world, and ‘European international law’ became universal once 
again.433 
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1.3 The commodity form theory in international law 
As discussed above (Ch.2A Section 4), in Europe around 1648 strong, centralised 
governments began to get the upper hand over the diffuse feudal power structures.434 
Provinces and city states joined, or merged into, ‘national’ unions. As per Miéville:  
[t]he legal form – the form whereby the bearers of abstract rights and 
commodities confront each [sic] – has existed in various historical 
conjunctures, but it was only with the rise of sovereign states that international 
law can be considered to have been born, and it is with the triumph of 
capitalism and its commodification of all social relations that the legal form 
universalised and became modern international law.435 
 
Thus when the bourgeoisie came to dominate the proletariat in the West and 
“organised itself into separate state-political trusts” we can properly speak of 
international law.436 When the bourgeoisie completed the process of separation of state 
from private rule the state gained subjectivity in international law,437 or ‘international 
legal personality’ (“ILP”). That the new international law was something qualitatively 
different from feudal law is exemplified by the fact that states denied the binding 
nature of pre-existing dynastic treaties (the lines of amity had been feudal agreements 
between princes).438 As indicated above, bourgeois international law operates on two 
levels. On the one hand, where (mainly) European nations compete over, and divide 
amongst themselves the rest of the world, the previously intra-class international law 
(Vitoria) replaced feudal struggles and ‘primitive accumulation’ with inter-class 
diplomatic, contractual exchange439 (post-1648 international law). In sum, 
international law comes about when polities converge into (or are submerged in) 
states, and states obtain legal personality by virtue of relating to each other as formally 
equal legal persons.  “It is during this period that the categories concomitant to that 
trade – the legal forms – begin to universalise. … As trade became global, and 
definitional to sovereign states, the international order could not but become an 
international legal order.”440 
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Both movements were mutually reinforcing:  
There can be no doubt… that the great revolutions that took place in trade in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, along with the geographical 
discoveries of that epoch, and which rapidly advanced the development of 
commercial capital, were a major moment in promoting the transition from the 
feudal to the capitalist mode of production. The sudden expansion of the world 
market, the multiplication of commodities in circulation, the competition 
among European nations for the seizure of Asiatic products and American 
treasures, the colonial system all made a fundamental contribution towards 
shattering the feudal barriers to production.441 
 
Pashukanis posits that “[t]he real historical content of international law is the struggles 
between polities/states for resources.”442 Miéville emphasises how it is the formal legal 
equality masking the material inequality between the Europeans and the non-
Europeans, that “gave [law] in service to the strong – the coloniser.”443 
 
Miéville locates colonialism in the content and also in the form of international law: 
The colonial encounter is central to the development of international law.  But 
this centrality is not reducible to the colonialism of content, the fact that 
certain legal categories were invested with Western bias, though the fleshing 
out of such historical specificities is important. Colonialism is in the very form, 
the structure of international law itself, predicated on global trade between 
inherently unequal polities, with unequal coercive violence implied in the very 
commodity form. This unequal coercion is what forces particular content into 
the legal form.444 
 
Law disguises this: “law disguises its own brutal core”.445 Succinctly: “international 
law is colonialism.”446 In this thesis I argue that as well as the historically specific 
“colonialism”, exploitation, domination and imperialism are the very form, the very 
structure of international and indeed all law. 
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As signalled above (Chapter 1, section 3.2), I consider Miéville could (or perhaps 
should) have taken his Marxist theory one step further (away from liberalism). Where 
Pashukanis remarks: “international law owes its existence to the fact that the 
bourgeoisie exercises its domination over the proletariat and over the colonial 
countries”447 one can read into this a perception of a global class structure. This of 
course follows with Marxist theory’s (or communism’s) inherently internationalist (or, 
properly, global) outlook. States, like corporations, as I showed in Chapter 2A, are 
fetishised (or reified) legal abstractions created for particular purposes and which 
nonetheless (and maybe partly consequently), come to have some ‘real world’ 
actuality. They are in their own peculiar way part of the ‘material base’. Miéville’s 
statist framing of IL however is a lapse into liberalism. For the purposes of a Marxist 
theoretical critique we need to both understand the workings and effect of the 
reification of the state and the fragmentation and bracketing of IL as a seemingly 
separate field of law, and simultaneously demystify the state, IL, and the corporation. 
 
Miéville continues his explication of the commodity form theory of international law 
by describing how the guarantee as between formally “equal states” in the absence of a 
superior authority, rests in the balance of forces.448 “The historically progressive 
generalisation of ‘equal rights’ is the generalisation of the abstract legal subject.”449 
Eventually, as Miéville surmises by quoting Marx, “between equal rights, force 
decides.”450 In his discussion on the essence of class struggle, which is to be found in 
the struggle over the working day, Marx continues after this short phrase: “Hence is it 
that in the history of capitalist production, the determination of what is a working-day, 
presents itself as the result of a struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the 
class of capitalists, and collective labour, i.e., the working-class.”451 From this 
fragment we can deduce that the ‘force’ Marx means is not necessarily physical 
violence (war) as Miéville seems to say, but, the ‘force’ of domination and exploitation 
through ownership of the means of production, the ultimate unfreedom of labour. The 
capitalist class still has at its disposal the feudal ‘power’ to coerce, but it is the 
achievement of capitalism that this is no longer (or rarely) necessary. The capitalist 
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class coerces by virtue of its ownership of the means of production, while the modern 
capitalist Rechtsstaat coerces through law backed up by the legitimate threat, or use, of 
physical and economic force. 
 
Ultimately, therefore, the real regulating factor in the world, is the economic 
imperialism of the global capitalist class, first and foremost.452 Law, laws institutions 
and law’s bureaucracy, to some extent have been developed (mostly by lawyers) to 
have their own, internal logic (coherence, rhetoric),453 but this logic follows the logic 
of economic imperialism, and is based on the commodity form. As I argue below, 
modern day economic imperialism (Ch. 1) is administered first and foremost through 
the construct of corporation, through its international ‘management committees’, the 
Bretton Woods institutions, arbitral tribunals, and legal tools such as bilateral 
investment treaties, development aid, etc, by (or at the behest of) the capital owning 
classes.454  
 
2 Corporations, law and capitalism 
 
Having set out the historical-doctrinal development of international law above, I argue 
that the creation of trading corporations is profoundly implicated in the spread/export 
(and eventual universalisation) of capitalism, the state form, and the content and 
institutions of international law. A number of situations, events and phenomena show 
the effects of this continuing development. These can roughly be divided into three 
closely interlinked categories: (1) the origin of the concept of international law, states, 
and corporations around the same time (2.1), (2) the close relationship between state 
and corporation exemplified in their concurrent development in history (Sections 2.2 
and 2.3), (3) the instrumentalisation of corporations in colonisation, accumulation and 
the spread of capitalism exemplified in the corporate scramble for Africa (2.4-6). First, 
I examine the corporate roots of IL and the early development of law around corporate 
activity including in trade wars. 
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2.1 Grotius: ‘Father of international law’ and corporate counsel to the Dutch East 
India Company 
Hugo de Groot, who was later named the “father of international law”, in his younger 
years made his mark as the legal advisor to the Dutch East India Company 
(Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or “VOC” in Dutch).455 Through Grotius’ work, 
placed in its historical context, we can gain some insight into the role of corporations 
and trade wars in the early development of international law during the period of 
mercantilism.  
 
In 1603, one of the Company’s captains, Jan van Heemskerk, had captured a loaded 
Portuguese merchant ship, the Santa Catarina. Some of the VOC’s shareholders 
objected to the capture on religious/moral grounds. Grotius was commissioned to write 
a defence of the seizure.456  The objecting (Mennonite) shareholders had threatened to 
set up a rival company in France, which would confine its activities to peaceful trading 
and other purely commercial pursuits.”457 The publication of Grotius’ De Iure Praedae 
(On the Right of Capture) was apparently pre-empted by a Dutch court order in favour 
of retaining the prize.458 
 
Also on the more immediate level, De Iure Praedae contained De Mare Liberum – 
which introduced the idea that the seas are ‘global commons’, free for all states to 
navigate with a view to exploration and plying trade.459 As such the text provided a 
justification for breaking up various (foreign) trade monopolies. Grotius viewed the 
facilitation of global trade to be the overarching purpose of IL. De Iure Belli ac Pacis 
also justifies war when fought to ward off or halt interference with trade.460 Rules had 
to be made and agreed however between the major seafaring nations about how to 
tackle piracy (which was a major obstacle to free trade), who was allowed to pass 
through and travel where, etc., and of course what the repercussions were for non-
compliance with these rules. The first Dutch-Anglo war was fought over the 
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disagreement between Grotius’ idea of Mare Liberum versus the English idea of Mare 
Clausum (closed seas), which relied on the levying of passage fees.461 In the words of 
Walter Raleigh: “Whoever rules the waves rules commerce; whoever rules commerce 
rules the wealth of the world, and consequently the world itself…”462 The English 
Navigation Acts, a series of laws aimed at protecting English trading monopolies, 
stipulated amongst others that goods could only enter English harbours on board 
English ships.463 Eventually, a compromise was agreed on, where 3-mile territorial 
waters (the reach of protection by cannon fire) was to be considered “territorial 
waters” and the remainder open seas free for trade. Some 1,000 Dutch ships were 
taken and added to the English merchant fleet.464 For their part, according to Grewe, 
the merchants were not so much interested in the big philosophical questions of mare 
liberum or mare clausum but rather, in an effective enforcement of their interests on 
the high seas.465 
 
Grotius considers states as well as other ‘human associations’ such as the Dutch East 
India Company to have rights and obligations comparable to private individuals.466 
Grotius’ conception of the legal realm therefore seems to be one without divisions 
between the domestic and the ‘international’ but instead one legal space organised 
according to the logic of commerce. Contemporary theorist Kingsbury shows an 
awareness of this: “… Grotius had developed his doctrine of the state of nature and the 
natural right to punish against the backdrop of the need to show that the Dutch East 
India Company, even if acting on its own behalf as a private actor, had the right to 
wage war against the Portuguese fleet in Southeast Asia”,467 but fails to add that 
Grotius created his broader jurisprudential theory based on (t)his particular class’ 
commercial interest. Grotius’ theory gained broad acceptance among legal scholars 
over the years, detached from this motivation, instead becoming a standalone legal-
philosophical representation.468 Additionally, Grotius’ theory and larger role as the 
‘father of IL’ is now primarily seen as ‘about war and peace’, concealing the 
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commercial imperative behind his work.469 Perhaps this should be regarded as a 
teleological reading of history, viewed from the current perspective, or fitting in the 
current dominant discourse where international law is “about” and “for” peace, 
common values of justice, human rights etc. (cosmopolitanism, constitutionalism) (see 
below, Section 5).470 
 
Indeed, according to Wilson, “[t]he defence of the VOC came to serve as a template 
for a wider re-conceptualisation of the trans-national space within which the Company 
operated.”471 Further, in 1601 Grotius was appointed the ‘national Historiographer of 
Holland’, which meant both that he was a “self-conscious producer of republican and 
patriotic texts” and that he worked in close proximity to (“in the immediate political 
orbit of” the Dutch ‘solicitor-general’ (landsadvocaat) Johan van Oldebarnevelt.472 As 
such, Grotius was able to exercise great influence not only on the development of the 
law of nations, but also domestic law: “the Text [sic] ‘translates’ the operational 
requirements of the World-Economy into the terms of Nationalist Jurisprudence.”473 
Thus we see how one individual, representative of a class and a particular company’s 
interest, managed to leave a particular mark on international and domestic law. 
 
With the perspective Grotius’ story brings in mind, it is possible to re-cast our 
understanding of the state and corporate form.  Miéville argues that for law to ‘work’ 
and a legal system to come into existence (and also for capitalism to mature), the 
creation of a state is not necessary.474 The same can be said about the corporation. 
However, and as shown in 2A, both are conducive to capitalism and both operate along 
its logic. As I discussed in Ch.2A, as the explorers wanted to undertake more 
ambitious expeditions, they sought to raise finance among a wider group of persons. It 
made sense to do so in a wider but more or less homogenous and increasingly centrally 
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regulated market/locality, where the traders could also find customers for the goods. 
As many directors of the trading companies were also active in the local and provincial 
(e.g. Dutch Republic475) administration, the centralisation of administration and 
regulation came about as a matter of rationality. Perhaps then it is possible to draw a 
parallel here with the European state form and the large trading companies on the 
domestic level from the point of view of the elites, who developed both the state and 
corporate form as conducive to the development and spread of capitalism.476 While the 
state is a remnant of feudalism/pre-capitalist absolutism477 (in the sense that the 
national boundaries were drawn around the feudal estates of lords and larger provinces 
of lords sworn to the same king), conversely the form of the state is a construct of 
capitalism/the capitalist class. In the domestic and in the international sphere there 
seems to be in the first instance great convergence between state and corporate 
interests with corporations forming an extension of states, rather than states forming a 
‘bureaucracy’ for the facilitation of the economy.478 In due course (as the ideological 
forms ‘congeal’) the state and the corporation each gain their sphere of activity and 
authority (private/public) internally and on the global level.479 In Chapter 6 I discuss 
the current status of these, now once again converging, spheres. 
 
2.2 Concurrent development: corporations, states and colonialism 
In this section I take a closer look at the interrelation between states and corporations 
as putative ‘subjects’ of the new field of international law, and the role of particular 
legal concepts such as sovereignty in the practice by states and corporations of 
colonialism. Miéville posits, “[s]overeignty is the legitimising principle by which that 
subject in modern international law - the state - faces others.”480 However, during the 
period of colonialisation it was not states facing each other as sovereigns in the space 
‘beyond the line’, it was the trading corporations that both interacted with each other 
and with non-European polities. This meant that European states were able to deal 
indirectly with the Eastern polities without being forced to recognise them as states. 
Grewe suggests that corporations were used in the colonisation process to prevent the 
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state form from spreading beyond Europe: “The most important [effect on the 
development of international law] was the dual position taken by the trading 
companies: semi-public, semi-private, which enabled the avoidance of a complete 
transfer of the European state-form, with its extensive legal consequences and its 
characteristics of sovereignty – nation, territory, borders – to the overseas colonial 
space.”481 “It was through the fact that it was the corporations and not the states 
themselves, that encountered each other, and that were considered (or at least held out 
to be) more or less independent, that a particularly elastic system of colonial 
international law was constructed.”482 Apparently, “[p]oliticians were well aware that 
the legal status of their colonial possessions was problematic. The East India 
Companies were the perfect agents to police this ‘transitional’ colonialism, because of 
their indistinct legal status.”483 The large trading corporations were the main actors (or 
tools484) in the colonisation process at least for England and the Netherlands, and they 
represented the legal and organisational form through which other colonial powers 
annexed their conquered territories to the motherland.485 Even the settlement of North 
America by the passengers of the ‘Mayflower’ took place through the use of chartered 
companies.486 
 
Wilson uses the term “Corporate Sovereignty” (his capitals) to describe the nature of 
the VOC’s operations in the context of the Dutch republican ‘corporatism’ of the 17th 
C. The French, English and Dutch companies were endowed with delegated sovereign 
rights by way of their Charters.487 Among these were for example the grant by Charles 
II to the British East India Company in 1661 of the express right to send war ships, 
personnel, and armoury for the defence of their factories and trading posts, and to 
decide over war and peace with all non-Christian peoples.488 In 1677 the right to 
coinage was added.489 Dutch and French companies had similar delegated sovereign 
rights – and the right to wage war included trade war and battles over territory with 
other European powers. Such wars, taking place ‘beyond the line’ did not affect the 
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European peace.490 The second Anglo-Dutch war mentioned above had started in 1664 
with attacks by the Royal African Company on the Dutch trading posts in Guinea but 
did not become a ‘European’ war until the following year.491 Conversely, when 
European powers were engaged in war ‘at home’ this did not necessarily affect their 
trading relationships overseas, nor did it mean their posts and territory outside Europe 
would be attacked.492 
 
There are direct parallels to be drawn here between other, contemporary instances of 
protection of trade in times of conflict (about which more below, Ch.5).493 “Business” 
and “politics” are each assigned a different, separate conceptual realm despite their 
obvious entanglement. “The close relation between a state-authorised monopoly and 
the state itself … meant that the boundaries between the company and the state were 
permeable, and the monopoly trade could be used to underpin political (state) control. 
The monopoly nature of these companies was the means by which their parent state 
retained control over its colonial possessions in an era of increasingly bounded 
sovereignty.”494 The strength of the nascent capitalist ‘military-industrial complex’ lies 
in the capitalist class’ ability to split and reunite at will, for interests at once to appear 
as political (or public) and at other times as commercial (or private) – as Dr. Jekyll or 
Mr. Hyde. It is law that enables this conjecture.495 
 
The interests of the Western traders and investors were protected further by the way 
they managed to uphold the idea that their national laws travelled with them wherever 
they went overseas.496 They managed generally to enforce the application in colonies 
of ‘Imperial law” (in the British case) and outside of a colonial context, by the 
extraterritorial application of imperial law in the trading enclaves (e.g. in China, Japan) 
– with disputes being referred to the imperial courts.497 The implication of this was that 
local rulers could not expropriate their property or pass laws that otherwise affected 
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the foreign merchants’ operations.498 As I will show below (S.3) this state of affairs is 
effectively still current. 
 
While power was the final arbiter in disputes between the European traders and their 
counterparts and ‘gunboat diplomacy’ was still the method of choice to enforce 
compliance,499 it was felt towards the end of the 19th C. that legal doctrine needed to be 
constructed to justify the use of force.500 This signals the growing ‘maturity’ of the 
‘international rule of law’ and of global capitalism, where coercion predominantly 
occurs through means other than direct use of physical violence: means including law. 
 
2.3 The 19th C. Trade Corporations preparing the ground for states in the Western 
image 
The old trading companies from the first colonisation period (16th-18th C.) continued to 
exist into the 19th C. but their independence, power and significance had long gone.501 
For example, the British Crown took over direct control of India by means of the 1773 
Regulating Act.502 Anghie surmises, “[t]he direct involvement of European states in the 
whole process of governing resulted in a shift from the vulgar language of profit to that 
of order, proper governance and humanitarianism.”503 The language of profit is hived 
off to ‘private’ IL while ‘public’ IL becomes the human face of capitalist IL. 
Koskenniemi describes the transfer of control over India differently and argues it 
occurred in order to lessen the burden on the taxpayer. For the British, “[d]uring 1815-
1870 the slogan “trade, not rule” formed the core of British overseas policy.”504 Finally 
Miéville puts it thus: “monopoly companies had outlived their usefulness as agents of 
colonialism. …India was simply too profitable to be left in the control of a company 
which was structured to treat it as a treasure-chest. By taking it over politically the 
British state helped institutionalise the separation of politics and economics associated 
with mature capitalism.”505 Moreover, “[o]stensibly aimed at checking the oppression 
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of the Company’s rule the real effect of the Act was to systematise the exploitation of 
India”.506 
 
In the 19th C. when European states did want to create new (although dependent) states 
to take over the colonised areas, they used a mostly new set of corporations to ensure 
those states took exactly the shape that they wanted (and presumably also, had exactly 
the leaders they wanted).507 According to Koskenniemi: “[t]he end of informal empire 
meant that European public institutions – in particular, European sovereignty – needed 
to be projected into colonial territory”508 Britain in the 19th C intensified what 
Koskenniemi calls ‘informal’ influence through a revival of chartered companies, and 
“[b]y the time the scramble [for Africa] was over, more than 75 percent of British 
acquisitions south of the Sahara were acquired by chartered companies.”509  
 
2.4 The Corporate Scramble for Africa 
The corporate scramble for Africa marked the start of a new phase of 
instrumentalisation of the corporate form in colonialism – the third category of mutual 
implication of international law, global capitalism and the corporation identified above 
at S.2. This instrumentalisation occurred behind an outwardly clearer separation 
between the state sphere and a vast network of private companies given wide rein to 
run the colonies. For example, in 1881 the British North Borneo Company was 
founded, in 1886 the Royal Niger Company, in 1888 the Imperial British East Africa 
Company, and in 1889 the British South Africa Company.510 The latter was run by 
Cecil Rhodes, under a charter giving him practically a free hand to administer the area 
– with his ‘irresponsible policy’ being said to have ‘almost inevitably’ led to the Boer 
War.511 
 
                                                
506 Morton (1989) quoted by Miéville (2005) 234. 
507 Grewe (1984) 546; Anghie (2007) 77-78. In South America, rather than corporations, the political act 
of recognition was employed. At the same time as Latin American colonies were gaining independence 
form Spain, the U.S. issued the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ which stated its proprietary claim on Latin American 
countries while at the same time recognising them as sovereign states (Miéville (2005) 237: “It was in 
the recognition of formally independent postcolonial states that the US’s newly modulated imperialism 
articulated itself. The same instincts can be seen in Britain…”). 
508 Koskenniemi (2001) 121. 
509 Koskenniemi (2001) 117. 
510 Grewe (1984) 548. 
511 Grewe (1984) 120. 
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Similarly, what was to become German South West Africa was acquired in 1882 by a 
tobacco merchant from Bremen, with the Zanzibar region being administered by the 
German East Africa Company and the Imperial British East Africa Company.512 Vast 
tracts of land were granted by the German government to the Deutsche 
Kolonialgesellschaft, which proceeded with a policy of settler colonialism, granting 
many German farmers and entrepreneurs generous concessions.513 German companies 
active on the ground included a railway company, the company running the ports, 
Deutsche Bank and various mining companies.514 New German settlers began to 
question whether the colony might not be better off without the ‘black problem’. One 
colonial leader is quoted as saying, “I do not concur with those…who want to see the 
Herero destroyed altogether. Apart from the fact that a people of 60,000 or 70,000 is 
not so easy to annihilate, I would consider such a move a grave mistake from an 
economic point of view. We need the Herero as cattle breeders …and especially as 
labourers. It will be quite sufficient if they are politically dead.”515 This plea was 
apparently rejected by the companies and Imperial Germany,516 which sent in General 
von Trotha, who had just suppressed the Arab rebellion in German East Africa, and 
who responded “I shall annihilate the African tribes with streams of blood and streams 
of gold.”517 After the brutal crushing of the Herero uprising by the German army, 
German military rule returned. The around 15,000 surviving Herero were placed in 
concentration camps maintained by (amongst others) the Woermann shipping 
company, where they were subjected to slave labour, rape and medical 
experimentation.518 Almost half those put to work building railways died.  
 
In 1881 Portugal founded the Mozambique-company.519 In 1900, French Equatorial 
Africa was divided up between forty French concession companies.520 These new 
                                                
512 Grewe (1984)118-120.  
513 Gewald (2009) 48. 
514 Herero 2001 Complaint. The ‘Herero genocide’ became the subject of compensation litigation in the 
US in 2001 – see further Chapter 6 below. 
515 Gewald (2009) 169, quoted in Herero 2001 Complaint para. 92. 
516 The Herero 2001 Complaint denotes the Deutsche Bank, the Terex Corporation (then Orenstein-
Koppel which built railways and ran mines) and the Woermann Line shipping and ports company 
together as the “German Colonial Enterprise”) see further Chapter 6 below. 
517 Herero 2001 Complaint 95. 
518 Herero 2001 Complaint 114-124. The German geneticist Eugene Fisher experimented on ‘mulatto’ 
offspring of German settler men and Herero women to explore his ideas about racial hygiene’ which he 
was later to teach – as Chancellor of the University of Berlin - to Joseph Mengele – 135. 
519 Grewe (1984) 548. 
520 Renton (2006) 29. This area corresponds with what is today Chad, Gabon, Central African Republic 
and the Republic of the Congo. 
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companies were a ‘different beast’ altogether from the old trading companies, as they 
did not have the right to wage war, nor a trading monopoly, and were placed under 
strict state control.521 Ahead of the Berlin Conference in 1884, German Chancellor 
Bismarck (who had inaugurated Germany’s colonial policy, actively promoting 
German colonial enterprise so as to find new markets for developing German 
industry522) expressed the demarcations of this manner of ‘corporate sovereignty’ as 
follows:  
My intention, as approved by the Emperor, is to leave the responsibility for the 
material development of a colony as well as its inauguration to the action and 
enterprise of our seafaring and trading citizens, and to proceed less on the 
system of annexing the transoceanic provinces to the German Empire than that 
of granting charters, after the form of the English Royal Charters, encouraged 
by the glorious career which the English merchants experienced in the 
foundation of the East India Company; also to leave to the persons interested 
in the colony the government of the same, only granting them European 
jurisdiction for Europeans and so much protection as we may be able to afford 
without maintaining garrisons. I think, too, that a colony of this kind should 
possess a representative of the Imperial Authority with the title of Consul or 
Resident, whose duty it would be to receive complaints, while the disputes 
which might arise out of these commercial enterprises would be decided by one 
of our Maritime or Mercantile Courts at Bremen, Hamburg, or somewhere 
else. It is not our intention to found provinces but commercial undertakings.523 
 
Bismarck recognised that in the political economy of the time there was no longer the 
possibility to isolate the company’s colonial activities from those of the state. The new 
arrangement seemed designed to reap possible benefits, while any commercial risk the 
company took remained with the company.524 This flexible approach allowed the state 
to use the company when it suited state interests, and to distance itself when it did not.  
 
The late 19th C trading company concept “effected, that also the colonial territory was 
now fundamentally divided up, organised and governed according to the principles and 
                                                
521 Grewe (1984) 548. 
522 Dawson (1973) 146-7. 
523 Dawson (1973) 150-1. 
524 Grewe (1984) 550. 
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concepts of the inter-state law that was developed in Europe.”525 In addition to this, one 
of the main means of spreading capitalism and creating states in the image of the 
modern European state, was the replacement of local laws with the laws and legal 
concepts of the colonial state and institutions under the tutelage of the imperial 
institutions. For example, Hopkins describes how notions of collective ownership of 
property which were prevalent in the colonies were replaced by European notions of 
private property, “to establish a virtuous circle of development it was necessary to 
export commercial institutions and approved property rights”526 – this foremost 
included the commodification of commons land – just as it had done in England in the 
transition to capitalism (See above, 2A).527 Conversely, Craven describes the 1918528 
decision of the Privy Council, In re Southern Rhodesia, where it was held that the 
British South African Company had the right to alienate certain land in Southern 
Rhodesia - the “absence of indigenous knowledge of the institution of private property 
… effectively allowed the extinguishment of all native title through the fact of 
settlement.”529  
 
Another way for a company to gain entry to a ‘colony’ was to buy up or refinance a 
government’s sovereign debt. This is how the Firestone company gained a 99 year 
lease over 1 million acres of Liberian land, which it transformed into a rubber 
plantation, removing villagers off their land and recruiting them as workers at 
gunpoint.530 By 1929, reportedly, some 350,000 Liberians were forcibly employed by 
Firestone, in circumstances comparable to those in Leopold’s Congo. Liberia was not a 
colony in the technical sense (having been founded by the American Colonization 
Society in 1847, but, having become indebted to the company as its sole creditor, it 
was entirely in the hands of Firestone.531 The grant of the lease had been partly 
political, and the former Liberian president noted that since Firestone had taken control 
of Liberia, border disputes promptly ceased.532 This shows that (colonial) corporations 
can at times also be instrumentalised by host states(‘s leaderships) for political ends. 
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2.5 The Congo Corporation and the State Form 
The story of the Congo shows in one example how companies became vehicles for the 
transfer of the European state form. In 1876 the Association Internationale Africaine 
(AIA) was founded at the behest of the Belgian King Leopold II, apparently motivated 
by private gain and political intrigue.533 In 1878 the International Congo Society, 
which formed the profit-seeking front for the more ‘philanthropic’ AIA. The 1884 
Berlin West Africa Conference established the International Congo Commission – 
which was later cognised as property the Congo Society of which King Leopold was 
the chair.534 The Society soon became known as the Congo Free State and was 
recognised as an independent state (to reflect the fact that it was not a colony of 
Belgium) and member of the international community by the major powers present at 
Berlin.535 Renton, Seddon and Zeilig describe the rule of Leopold in The Congo in the 
broader context of turn-of-the 19th century colonial Africa. King Leopold’s company 
took control of the rubber and ivory trades, while giving much of the land of the 
Congo to concessionary businesses who would build infrastructure and control the 
territory. These companies were granted the right to levy taxes, which meant the 
previously self-sufficient non-monetary economy had to develop to produce surplus 
and the population had to offer itself up as wage labour.536 New companies were also 
founded to exploit the mineral wealth, e.g. Union Minière du Haut Katanga (1905) 
amongst many others, mostly owned directly or indirectly by King Leopold.537 A large 
bureaucracy was set up and run by around 1500 European civil servants.538 One of the 
Congo’s richest resources proved to be rubber, called ‘red rubber’ after the brutal 
regime in which it was harvested.539 King Leopold’s corporate rule created a ‘slave 
society’, and more generally, “[u]nder direct European or American rule, forced labour 
became widespread throughout the continent, and an ‘economy of pillage’ became the 
norm.”540 Dismissing the idea that Leopold’s rule was a return to feudalism, arguing 
that the process was more complex than Lenin’s analysis that colonialism is simply 
another expression, in a grander form, of the general tendency between businesses that 
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was typical of capitalist systems,541 Renton et al. consider “the most striking feature of 
Leopold’s rule was its similarity to an older form of accumulation, simple theft.”542 We 
can see direct correspondence between the process of the forcible creation of a wage-
labour force and the expropriation of land (and other natural resources) in the Congo 
(and indeed the rest of the African continent) and ‘primitive accumulation’ in Britain 
(see Part 2A above). Moreover, direct correspondence can be seen between the 
Congolese (and Rhodesian and Liberian) examples and the corporate imperialism – 
and David Harvey has called ‘accumulation by dispossession’ - that was to come in the 
20th C. I will come back to these in the following Chapters.  
 
The Congolese population declined sharply (from around 20 million in 1891 to 8.5 
million in 1911) as a result of disease, massacre and the result of forced labour.543 The 
main ‘winners’ were King Leopold, the shareholders of his companies, and the banks. 
Many foreign mining companies, including the US companies Ryan and Guggenheim, 
bought concessions.544 The biggest company, Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, was 
part-financed by Midlands, Barings and Rothschilds.545 King Leopold was able to 
successfully hold on to his possession partly because he ‘presented himself as the 
inheritor of the liberal ideal’. However, “[b]eneath the high-flowing rhetoric, financial 
calculations were evidently being made.”546 The end of the corporate Congo was 
brought about by three factors: first, resistance and rebellions in the Congo itself,547 
second, a reform movement in Europe and the U.S. and third, commercial interests by 
rivals. Finally, there was also the ultimately unsuccessful British government effort to 
end Leopold’s regime as they considered the Congo a ‘British discovery’.548 On the 
second factor, after missionaries’ reports of the extraordinary cruelty of Leopold’s 
regime, a popular campaign started to urge Belgium to take the Congo into 
government control or to allow it to be independent (or even to transfer it to British 
rule). The campaign included Mark Twain, Arthur Conan Doyle and Joseph Conrad as 
well as black activists Booker T. Washington and others. The third factor that is said to 
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have ended Leopold’s reign was when world powers began to realise what mineral 
wealth was in the Congo, including the U.S. who apparently used Congolese uranium 
to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.549 In 1908 Belgium ‘nationalised’ the King’s private 
corporate empire, and in 1913 it opened it up to ‘free trade’. The British-Belgian 
company Union Minière stayed, recruiting (often at gunpoint) workers for its copper 
mines from the whole surrounding region (what is now Rwanda, Zambia, Uganda).550 
 
2.6 The Berlin Conference: Legalising corporate imperialism 
The Berlin West African Conference has broader significance than simply in relation 
to the Congo. It was called because in their rivalry European states began to fear for 
the validity of their agreements with non-European powers and thus the title to their 
territory, as they had concluded these ‘treaties’ and acted upon them as valid while not 
investing the ‘uncivilised’ colonised people with legal agency.551 The Europeans 
managed to safeguard their interests and make these ‘unequal treaties’ part of general 
IL by giving them a literal, positivist reading and endorsing them as valid, ignoring 
been made under duress or deceit.552 Anghie gives the example of the Wyanasa Chiefs 
the fact that most colonial territories were acquired by force, and the agreements had 
signing over “all our country…al sovereign rights…and all and every other claim 
absolutely, and without any reservation, to Her Most Gracious Majesty… and heirs 
and successors, for all time coming” cited by Lindley ‘apparently without irony’. As 
such, an instance of primitive accumulation is legalised, and an ‘agreement’ forming 
feudal proto-law is turned into ‘law’. This is how, as Miéville puts it, “law disguises its 
own brutal core.”553 The Berlin Conference (where “humanitarianism and profit-
seeking were presented in proper and judicious balance”554) had to locate the non-
European world in the international law framework somehow and passed the Berlin 
Act which regulated freedom of navigation and trade as well as the rules on the 
acquisition of new territory.555 “Effective occupation” sufficed for acquisition, and this 
could be achieved through chartering a company.556 Through Art. 35 of the Act the 
parties to establish authority in the said territories “insofar as necessary to ensure free 
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trade”.557 Protectorates were excluded from this obligation. This “allowed the British, 
for instance, to uphold their unlimited commercial empire while at the same time 
avoiding the financial and administrative burdens … [of] formal occupation.”558 Thus 
the Berlin Act systematized and legalised the scramble for Africa.559 At the same time, 
it extended the rhetoric of the civilising mission to cover (up) the economic 
motivations of colonisation: “[n]ow, because trade was the mechanism for 
advancement and progress, it was essential that trade be extended as far as possible 
into the interior of all these societies.”560 The ‘capitalising mission’ was thus re-
branded as the ‘civilising mission’. (In the upcoming chapters I show that it becomes 
rebranded as a ‘development mission’ and an ‘ICL/transitional justice mission’ – while 
forever remaining truly a ‘capitalising mission’.) The motivations underlying 
colonialism have been described as purely ‘political’ ‘economic’ or even religious, but 
‘civilisation’ in the 19th C. came to be understood as including the values (aims) of 
capitalism.561  
 
3 Corporations in IL in the twentieth century  
 
Into the 20th C. corporations continued to be used for political ends, viz. the ‘banana 
wars’ in Central and South America,562 and state governing elites continued to act as 
private property owners,563 viz. the military ‘racketeering’ Capt. Smedley Butler 
described on his 1930s lecture tour around the Unites States:  
I spent 33 years and 4 months in active service as a member of our country’s 
most agile military force- the Marine Corps. … And during that period I spent 
most of my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall 
Street and for the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism. … Thus I 
helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 
1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank 
boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central 
American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is 
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long. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown 
Brothers in 1909-12. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American 
sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras “right” for American fruit 
companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went 
its way unmolested.564  
 
While IL was to continue to allow both, it now became more urgent to construct some 
semblance of separation between the economic and political realms in IL – which in 
the early 20th C started to gain much specifically liberal humanitarian content – with 
the seed of an ICL (Ch.4A).565 By creating an ideological divide separating ‘clearly’ 
economic activities by private actors from political/public/state activities it became 
acceptable to shield the former from ‘interference’ by the latter, or, in other words, to 
let the former be ruled by the market, and the latter (ostensibly) by liberal 
humanitarian concerns.566 The conceptualisation of free trade as a value in itself 
renders this separation legitimate. 
 
The discourse of ‘positivism’ which had become dominant by the early 20th C – with 
its notion of international law as a system of rules between consenting states - also 
served to conceal the role of class and the legal vehicle of the corporation in 
international law.567 Despite earlier notions of ‘corporate sovereignty’ and effective 
corporate personality in IL preceding centuries, in the 20th C. the notion of corporate 
personality became circumscribed and contested. As non-subjects, businesspeople 
were able to wield the collective power of the corporation and construct normative 
regimes ‘below the radar’ of public IL – in particular, the regime of investment 
protection is entirely aimed at serving their specific interest, while not formally 
affecting ‘public’ law notions of statehood and sovereignty.568 The effect of positivism 
and the public/private divide is a sphere of liberty where the GCC can pursue 
(overseas) economic interests with little oversight. For example, because the discourse 
of ‘responsibility’ belongs in the ‘constitutional’/’political’ part of international law,569 
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and corporate activity in the ‘private’, an ideological hurdle must be overcome before 
one is associated with the other.  
 
In this section I illustrate how the various rhetorical processes (the public/private 
divide, the definition of key concepts in IL such as sovereignty and personality) are 
employed to support, strengthen and ‘spirit away’ (Ch.1 S.2) global class relationships. 
The ‘international law of investment protection’ (“ILIP”)570 is a key site for the 
analysis of international class law in the 20th C. Tellingly, ILIP is a misnomer because 
a majority of the (non-legal) rules of ILIP are generated by business(wo)men (and their 
lawyers and arbitrators), as members of the global capitalist class through their 
contractual relations and private and hybrid arbitration.571 This particular regime was 
developed to safeguard corporate interests in the decolonisation process and 
during/after moments of political change and conflict in the Third World outside of the 
decolonisation process. One way such interests were safeguarded was through 
adjusting the content of the principle of sovereignty (S.3.1). One effect of investment 
protection through one of its key tools, investment arbitration (S.3.2) – has been that 
corporate international legal personality is actualised and difficult to deny even by 
positivists. One way around this conundrum has been to bracket the content (or 
incidence) of corporate legal personality in IL to exclude responsibility (S.3.3). In Chs. 
4 and 6 I will show that this bracketing becomes untenable and is dismantled in a 
(counterintuitive) way favourable to the GCC.  
 
3.1 Concession agreements and unequal sovereigns 
Before the corporate colonialism of the 19th C. could move to global liberal capitalist 
statehood the ground for ‘self-determination’ and ‘decolonisation’ had to be prepared 
so as not to affect Western corporate interests in the Third World. The GCC had to 
publicly divest itself of political responsibility for the periphery while retaining its 
private material hold. Concession agreements were a main tool for this purpose – some 
being concluded in the context of mandates and trusteeships,572 others directly. 
                                                
570 According to the World Trade Organisation “foreign direct investment (FDI) occurs when an investor 
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Moreover, the physical shape of future states was made subject to these interests. For 
example, “France and Great Britain were intent on gaining control over the oil 
resources in their Middle Eastern mandates and they went so far as to redraw the 
boundaries of the mandate territories of Palestine, Mesopotamia and Syria in order to 
enable a more efficient exploitation of their oil reserves.”573 This is a striking example 
of the form of law affecting material reality. 
 
The newly decolonised states are ‘unequal sovereigns’,574 in the sense that their 
sovereignty is recognised by the metropole/GCC conditional upon (amongst others) 
continued free access to markets and natural resources.575 As such, the opportunity to 
gain statehood presents the ‘equal opportunity to be unequal’ (Ch. 2A). 
 
States and corporations from the metropole (or rather, the GCC through them) gained 
long-term control over prized natural resources in particular, by entering into 
concession agreements with the governors of colonised (or mandated, etc.) territories 
(often nationals of the colonial state or local elites in a position of loyalty to the 
colonial state).576 Through these agreements rulers would cede sovereign rights over 
vast areas of territory and/or rights over the exploitation of oil and mining products to 
foreign corporations for long periods of time.577 For example, the Aminol concession 
was granted by the Sheikh of Kuwait (then a British protectorate) in 1948 – with a 
royalty of two shillings and sixpence per barrel – for sixty years.578 Similarly, the 
Ashanti goldfields concession in Ghana was to last for 100 years.579 Many of these 
types of arrangements were made by Western companies throughout the Third 
World.580 Their length and disadvantageous terms often led to disputes, especially 
when the new states’ leaderships changed.581  
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3.2 ILIP and internationalisation 
To deal with these disputes – starting with concession agreement disputes - governing 
and business elites (the GCC) developed ILIP.582 The key to ILIP is arbitration, which 
allows the internationalisation of investment agreements, or ‘lifting’ them out of host 
state jurisdiction and into (private) IL.583 Many of these early ILIP arbitrations relate to 
newly independent governments wishing to change the concession terms with still-
present metropolitan multinationals – often to raise the royalty on resource extraction 
or to nationalise such resources and their extraction infrastructure altogether. For 
example, in the Middle East, all states in the early 1970s nationalised or abrogated 
concessions of major Western oil companies.584 ILIP arbitration increases the material 
inequality of the new ‘unequal sovereigns.’ 
 
The story of the Abu Dhabi Award illustrates this.585 This is the first, landmark 
decision where the arbitrator considered the contract between the Sheikh and the 
company to be an ‘internationalised contract’.586 As such it was to be governed not by 
Abu Dhabi law (which in any case the arbitrator Lord Asquith considered did not 
exist587) but by international principles of law. This new law of ‘investment protection’ 
bore an uncanny resemblance to English law: quoth Lord Asquith: “albeit English 
municipal law is inapplicable as such, some of its rules are in my view so firmly 
grounded in reason, as to form part of this broad jurisprudence – this ‘modern law of 
nature’.”588 Anghie comments that hereby the law of the Third World state is in effect 
selectively replaced by the law of England.589 This is effectively so, while principles of 
English law are adopted into ILIP, which obviates the Third World state’s jurisdiction. 
‘Elevating’ these concession agreements into international law also meant, that “by 
entering into such contracts, Third World states, in effect, were investing foreign 
corporations with international personality”.590 The state lost its ability to interfere 
with the activities of private parties for the benefit of its people as the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda now severely limited the ability of the state to change the terms of 
                                                
582 Sornarajah (2010) 20; Subedi (2008) 8. 
583 The tribunal in the ARAMCO Award found petroleum concessions to be governed by international 
law (ARAMCO Award 156-168). 
584 LIAMCO, Texaco etc.; Sornarajah (2010) 74.  
585 Abu Dhabi Award  
586 Abu Dhabi Award 
587 Abu Dhabi Award 241. 
588 Quoted in Anghie (2007) 229, Abu Dhabi Award 242. 
589 Anghie (2007) 229. 
590 Anghie (2007) 232 (emphasis added). 
 104 
the international agreement, and in sum, the state and the corporation were positioned 
as ‘formal legal equals’ despite material difference both in bargaining power and in 
purpose.591 
3.3 BIT Arbitration: The silent revolution? 
The internationalisation of concession agreements is carried forward in contemporary 
foreign direct investment practice. Investors’ rights are now generally explicitly 
protected under the terms of Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”), which are the 
hardened vehicle  (protective construct) provided by the home state accompanying 
most private foreign direct investment.592 As with their earlier version, the concession 
agreement, a key feature of most BITs is its arbitration clause, by which the two states 
agree that any disputes are to be resolved through arbitration. This typically includes 
those disputes between an investor and the host state. In other words, BITs enable the 
investor ride on the back of the bilateral agreement, and to stay out of the host state’s 
court.593 Rather than seeking adjudication in courts of law, disputes arising from BITs 
are generally resolved through arbitration, either at ICSID, or through an arbitrator 
appointed under the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules or similar arrangement.594 There are 
now some 3000 BITs, most of which relate to investment by Western multinationals in 
the Second and Third World.595  
 
Apart from disputes over nationalisation of investors’ assets in case of change of 
government in a host state many arbitrations deal with the question of ‘regulatory 
takings’. ‘Stabilization clauses’ in most BITs require the host state to compensate any 
loss (including usually loss of future profits) caused by a change in host state law.596 
This has a limiting (‘chilling’) effect on the host state’s ability to pass laws and take 
policy decisions it considers beneficial to its citizens – specific concerns in this context 
include environmental protection.597 With the IMF and World Bank’s drives towards 
the privatisation of e.g. public services in Third World countries the presence and 
                                                
591 On the ‘equal treatment’ see Shalakany (2000) 419. On difference and coincidence of purpose, see 
Renton et al who describe kickbacks etc. to local elites/leaders of the decolonised state (Renton et al 
(2007) 204-6).  
592 Sornarajah (2010) 329. See generally, Jannaca-Small (2010). 
593 Moses considers this the main point of arbitration. 
594 Subedi (2008) 32. 
595 See, e.g. the BIT between Germany and Afghanistan of 2005: 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_afghanistan.pdf . 
596 Aminol Case Fitzmaurice Separate Opinion fn. 7; Cameron (2010) 104.  
597 E.g. Santa Elena v Costa Rica, Metalclad, cf. Methanex; Anghie (2007) 234. See also Sornarajah 
(2010) 282-3. 
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effect of foreign corporations has only increased. Through BIT arbitration, ILIP allows 
corporations to significantly affect the ability of Third World states/communities to 
manage distribution of resources, to maintain public health, and to manage the effects 
of exploitation and deprivation.598  
 
Subedi calls the idea of allowing private corporations direct access to international law 
mechanisms to resolve disputes with states a ‘silent revolution’:599 as unequal 
sovereigns, Third World states engage with western states in BITs as formal legal 
equals and moreover with powerful multinational corporations in arbitration. It is 
‘silent’ because this state of affairs occurs (and is drawn into) the ‘private side’ of IL. 
Also, the corporation as an actor (with ILP) remains hidden in this private side of IL. 
Alvarez has called BITs ‘Bills of Rights for Foreign Investors’.600 Although BITs carry 
reciprocal rights and obligations, due to the unidirectional investment patterns, and 
through ILIP’s basic techniques they significantly benefit the corporation, and thus 
create an ‘equal opportunity to inequality’. 
 
3.4 Corporations in the PCIJ and ICJ 
Although most of ILIP falls on the private side of IL, some of the basic principles of 
ILIP were developed in the public court system.601 The Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)602 in several 
cases have dealt with corporate interests represented by states.603 Some of these related 
to concessions (Mavrommatis and Anglo-Iranian) and others to foreign investment in 
another sense. States could, and did, ‘espouse’ corporate interests in these fora, in 
particular in the area of ILIP. Aside from the need for home state espousal of a 
corporate interest, the court route was less popular mainly because the PCIJ and the 
ICJ’s jurisdiction in disputes requires host state (adverse party) consent.604 In many 
cases, also, there was reluctance on the part of home states to take questions on foreign 
                                                
598 CEPAL FDI Arbitration and Water Report 19. 
599 Subedi (2008) 32. 
600 Alvarez also calls NAFTA a ‘Bilateral Investment Treaty on Steroids’, Alvarez (1996-97) 304. 
601 See generally, Lael-Arcas (2010), Sornarajah (2010) 79-87.  
602 Which are housed in a building paid for and owned the foundation of Scottish industrialist and 
philanthropist Andrew Carnegie alongside the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Iran – United 
States Claims Tribunal, see http://www.icj-cij.org/information/index.php?p1=7 The Iran – US Claims 
Tribunal moved to its own premises in The Hague in 1982. 
603 The constituent instrument also limits jurisdiction to disputes between states: PCIJ Statute Art. 34(1). 
604 PCIJ Statute: Art. 34(1). 
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investment to the (‘public’) international fora for fear of exposing the uncertainty in 
the law and losing the flexibility afforded by arbitration once norms were ‘set’ by 
court.605 Moreover, it appears the ICJ itself preferred to defer jurisdiction and findings 
on IL to arbitration.606 
 
Nevertheless, States have at times espoused the commercial interests of their private 
citizens, including corporations, at the PICJ and later the ICJ, and the courts have set 
some of the key principles of ILIP. From the point of view of epistemology it is also 
interesting to see how most of these cases are cited in current textbooks without their 
‘back story’, in particular as many of these cases deal with issues of ‘business in 
conflict’.607 The back stories reveal class interest in these cases and the significance of 
law in corporate-state (GCC) imperialism.  
 
In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case608 and the related case Mavrommatis 
Jerusalem Concessions609 - the cases that set the precedent for state espousal of 
business interests - Greece attempted to protect the interests of a Greek610 businessman 
by means of diplomatic protection. The espousal argument is based on a collectivist 
state view: “a presumption that nationals are indispensable elements of a State’s 
territorial attributes and a wrong done to the national invariably affects the right of the 
State.”611 The case concerned a concession granted to Mavrommatis in 1914 by the 
Ottoman rulers of Palestine, which was arguably violated by the British when they 
took on the Palestine Mandate in 1920 and granted a partially conflicting concession to 
another company through the Zionist Organisation.612 The conflicting part of the 
concessions included the construction of tramways in Jerusalem. The PICJ held the 
                                                
605 Sornarajah (2010) 37. 
606 Anglo-Iranian Case 10; Sornarajah (2010) 106-7; Higgins (1999) 87. 
607 Higgins (1999). See e.g. Lowenfeld (2008). Harris quotes only three paragraphs from the decision on 
jurisdiction in the Mavrommatis Palestine case (Harris (2004) 565). 
608 Mavrommatis Palestine (1924). 
609 Mavrommatis Jerusalem (1925). 
610 An interesting point was that Mavrommatis in the concession document was described as a Turkish 
citizen. The Court did not let this stand in the way of Greece claiming diplomatic protection on his 
behalf. 
611 Okowa (2010) 477. 
612 See also, Borchard (1925) 736-7; Bishop (2005) 444ff. See also, Borchard (1925), who comments: 
“One gets the impression on reading the correspondence, that Mavrommatis had lost his ability or 
willingness to go on with the concessions and desired to bring about their expropriation against 
indemnity; that the Rutenberg company and the Palestine Administration, sensing this, preferred not to 
exercise their power of expropriation, but invited Mavrommatis to go on with his concessions, in the 
belief that he would not avail himself of the privilege.” 736-7. See also, Borchard (1925) 736-7; Bishop 
(2005) 444ff. 
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claim to be inadmissible with regard to the Jaffa concession but admissible with regard 
to the Jerusalem concession, on which it held that Mavrommatis was wrongly denied 
his concession and must be compensated.613 The main legal question on jurisdiction 
was answered thus: “It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is 
entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law… By 
taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or 
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own 
rights…”614 The case is now known as authority for what constitutes an international 
dispute.615 With the backstory in mind, we can see this case is an example of 
competition between different capitalists’ interests, while we can also observe joint 
interest between the espousing state and the industrialist. 
 
The Factory at Chorzów case616 concerned factories in (mineral-rich) Upper Silesia - 
formerly German territory part of which became Polish after the Silesian Uprisings of 
1919 and 1921 - uprisings of a Polish-speaking working class majority against a 
German-speaking elite who owned the mines and factories - many of whom moved to 
Germany ‘proper’ once part of Silesia became Polish (a class conflict diffused by a 
border adjustment).617 One of the questions before the Court was whether the property 
(land, moveable property and patents) belonged to Germany or to the German 
companies (Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.G. and the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke 
A.G.).618 The PICJ ordered restitution: full compensation to be paid to the companies 
(not to Germany). This case set the precedent for compensation,619 but its backstory is 
one of a decision on state borders in an effort to quell class conflict arising from 
accumulation by dispossession. 
 
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case of 1952 related to the property of a British company 
(later know as B.P.), which was subject to a nationalisation attempt by the Iranian 
government led by democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh. The property 
                                                
613 The difference lay in the timing of the concession vs. the terms of the Mandate and the fact that the 
Jerusalem concession had begun to be executed. 
614 Mavrommatis Palestine (1924) 12. 
615 Higgins (1999) 88. 
616 453: “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed.” Factory at Chorzów. 
617 Kamil Majchrzak (correspondence 3 Mar. 11) 
618 These became part of the IG Farben cartel (Ch. 3A below). 
619 Anglo-Iranian Oil Case. 
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had been conveyed to the company in a concession granted by the Shah of Iran in 
1933. The ICJ concluded it did not have jurisdiction because the concession was a 
contract between the Shah and the company, and not an international agreement to 
which the U.K. was a party.620 Thus the ‘public’ ICJ decided to leave the matter to 
private resolution, perversely by denying internationality in this case whereas earlier 
arbitral awards had found such agreements to be ‘internationalised’ precisely in order 
to attract jurisdiction. The following year the government in Iran was overthrown 
covertly by the CIA in “Operation Ajax”, and a new Shah was installed.621 Shah Reza 
Pahlavi commenced “a massive programme of industrialization and modernization, 
principally through soliciting private investment and long-term contracts from firms in 
the United States.”622 After the 1979 Islamic Revolution the Ayatollah Khomeini 
reversed many of the Shah’s policies, suspending contracts and expropriating property. 
After ‘Iranian students’ occupied the US Embassy in Tehran, the US froze Iranian 
bank accounts in the US. One of the results of the negotiation was the establishment of 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, at which to date thousands of US companies 
and individuals have filed claims against Iran.623 As many arbitrations relating to 
concessions and BITs between the metropole and the periphery followed the disposal 
of the original contracting (often unrepresentative) regimes one can imagine, like in 
the case of regulatory takings, that such cases have a chilling effect on political 
change. Moreover, the Anglo-Iranian arbitration illustrates the dual use by the GCC of 
law and physical force in conflict. 
 
One unsuccessful company case was Interhandel, where the claim was for the release 
(by the US) of funds belonging a company that had (it was argued, by the US) formed 
part of the IG Farben cartel (See Chapter 4 below).624 This case is generally cited for 
its findings on jurisdiction: The U.S. had sought to exclude from the ICJ’s jurisdiction 
disputes arising before 1946.625 The ICJ declared the application inadmissable on the 
                                                
620 Anglo-Iranian Oil Case. 
621 The events escalated into something of a trade war, with the Anglo-Iranian Oil co. and other major 
international oil companies denying the new National Iranian Oil Co access to markets in Europe or 
North America, filing suits to ‘repossess’ shipments of oil from Iran, and, allegedly, the RAF 
threatening to bomb Iranian vessels (Lowenfeld (2008) 519), see also Sornorajah (2010) 20, who calls 
the overthrowing of the Mossadegh, together with the Allende Government in Chile, the “more obvious 
instances in recent history of forcible, though covert, interventions to assist foreign investment.” (fn.62). 
622 Lowenfeld (2008) 542. 
623 See the tribunal’s website, at: http://www.iusct.org/english/ . 
624 Interhandel paras.26-30. For a discussion of the context and the diplomatic negotiations and the 
domestic litigation leading up to this case, see Simmonds (1961). 
625 Harris (2004) 1047-8; Evans (2003) 494. 
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basis that local remedies had not been exhausted as a domestic case was still 
pending.626 Simmonds calls the decision ‘illogical’ and a missed opportunity for the 
ICJ to assert its jurisdiction.627 At the same time, perhaps the case shows the limits of 
the ICJ’s power to enter into politically highly sensitive territory – where a decision on 
the merits would have had to examine U.S. – German military/commercial ties before 
and partially during WWII.  
 
At particular times, then, we can see the GCC’s resort to public institutions such as the 
ICJ to set formal legal principles in situations where private arbitration proved 
inadequate or inappropriate. Such resort to public institutions appears to be prevalent 
with a ‘less unequal’ adversary, and in a ‘more public’ context such as a war/conflict. 
The effect of such public state espousal of corporate interests is a measure of 
naturalisation of the corporation in IL, while conversely publicly ‘hiding’ it behind the 
state it needs to represent it. In the next section I revisit the issue of corporate 
personality in IL. 
 
3.5 Island of Palmas Arbitration vs Reparations for Injuries: International legal 
personality revisited 
Wilson argues that Grotius’ De Indis/De Iure Praedae “operate[d] to legitimate 
international personality and authority of the VOC, a ‘pre-modern institutional 
form’”628 – and that a clear relationship exists with the current debate on international 
legal personality of multinational/transnational corporations as well as the emergence 
of a ‘neo-medieval’ world order, for which ‘[m]ost important is the investiture of 
private non-state actors with Original Personality, particularly the TNC.”629 Currently, 
the nature and content of corporate ILP are in contention. 
 
Although the trading corporations had acted like ‘corporate sovereigns’ and as subjects 
of international law by entering into treaties as among the first of IL’s persons, with 
the advent of positivism the corporation as ILP went away. Nevertheless, inevitably 
the question whether other bodies besides states could have ‘international legal 
personality’ came up formally in the ICJ Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion of 
                                                
626 Interhandel 27. 
627 Simmonds (1961) 547. 
628 Wilson (2008) 128. 
629 Wilson (2008) 127. 
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1949.630 The Court adopted a circular reasoning, holding that, where international 
organisations, in order to carry out the mandate given by states in their constitutive 
documents, needed to have the capabilities that come with international legal 
personality (such as in casu the capacity to bring an international claim), they should 
be considered to have this.631 International legal personality was quite simply 
‘indispensable’ for the UN to be able to function.632 The idea of the UN as a body in 
law separate from its members is clearly comparable to the corporation’s separate legal 
personality in domestic law (Chapter 2A). Also here the ‘fetishisation’ occurred in a 
context of responsibility, this time it was the absorption by the separate legal 
personality of the loss borne by an individual/his family/his community and the right 
to claim compensation on their behalf. 
 
Some 20 years earlier, in the Island of Palmas Case at the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, sole arbitrator Max Huber commented on the nature of the acts of the 
Dutch East India Company: “[they] must in international law, be entirely assimilated 
to acts of the Netherlands State itself. From the end of the 16th until the 19th century, 
companies formed by individuals and engaged in economic pursuits (Chartered 
Companies), were invested by the state to whom they were subject with public powers 
for the acquisition and administration of colonies.”633 Since 1677 the ‘native’ states 
had been ‘connected with’ the DEICo, “which conferred upon the suzerain such 
powers as would justify his considering the vassal state as part of his territory.”634 So, 
on the one hand, the Court accepted the Company’s treaty with the ‘natives’ for the 
transfer of the Island of Palmas as valid, but on the other, it would not recognise the 
company’s (or indeed the natives’) international legal personality. 
 
Rather, I would suggest, both decisions present pragmatic choices made based on class 
interests, which reflect a desire to ‘legalise’ past corporate colonialism without 
bringing the corporation into ‘public international law’, on the one hand, and a desire 
to create an additional (potential risk-absorbing) entity besides states, on the other.  
                                                
630 Reparations for Injuries 174. 
631 Reparations for Injuries 178. 
632 Reparations for Injuries 178. In Certain Expenses, in an obiter, or perhaps even inadvertent sentence 
para. 168: “Both national and international law contemplate cases in which the body corporate or politic 
may be bound, as to third parties, by an ultra vires act of an agent.” The Court seems here to show it is 
well aware of the international legal activities and status of bodies other than states. 
633 Island of Palmas Case 858. 
634 Island of Palmas Case 867. 
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Although in international law doctrine ‘international legal personality’ means ‘being a 
subject of international law’, this in itself is not necessarily always taken to mean 
‘subject of all international law’. Many legal norms are considered in the canon to 
address only a specific type or subset of ‘legal subjects’.635 In other words, although 
the form of subjectivity is the same, the content may be interpreted quite differently 
depending on whether the subject is a state, international organisation, corporation or 
indeed an individual.636 In Chapter 4 I analyse the debate around the question whether 
the content of corporate international legal personality includes the possibility of 
liability for international crimes. 
 
The Barcelona Traction case of 1970637 relates not to corporations in conflict but is of 
interest as in this case Belgium asserted the right to exercise diplomatic protection on 
behalf of shareholders, for the ‘creeping expropriation’ of their property.638 The court 
held that shareholders have no rights independent from the company and only the 
home state of the company could claim diplomatic protection.639 This would indicate 
the reification of the corporation in international law similarly to domestic law – but 
thus far only in the economic sphere. The ICJ states, in para 38:  
All it means is that international law has had to recognize the corporate entity 
as an institution created by States in a domain essentially within their domestic 
jurisdiction. This in turn requires that, whenever legal issues arise concerning 
the rights of States with regard to the treatment of companies and 
shareholders, as to which rights international law has not established its own 
rules, it has to refer to the relevant rules of municipal law.640 
 
                                                
635 See generally, Schermers (2003) 992, and Klabbers (2003) 43. 
636 ILC Responsibility of IOs. 
637 Barcelona Traction. 
638 Barcelona Traction paras 33-35. 
639 Barcelona Traction 39, 88. The ICJ decided the BT case on the basis of the assumption that IL in this 
respect referred to the rules generally accepted by municipal legal systems in these matters. But 
concepts of corporate veil and the centralisation of all rights and duties in a single place may conflict 
with other existing rules of IL (at 5). IL allows piercing of the veil following from the principle of 
justice that requires reference to the substance and not merely to the legal form (citing Cayuga Indians 
1926). However, practice does not follow any uniform pattern, the rules vary according to the person 
behind the veil.  
640 Barcelona Traction 38.  
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This paragraph lends itself to the interpretation that the corporation must be recognised 
as a matter of fact, not as a matter of international law. Strikingly, the ICJ mentions 
rights here specifically. The ICJ developed this point in Ahmadou Diallo:  
What matters, from the point of view of international law, is to determine 
whether or not these [companies] have a legal personality independent of their 
members. Conferring independent corporate personality on a company implies 
granting it rights over its own property, rights which it alone is capable of 
protecting. As a result, only the State of nationality may exercise diplomatic 
protection on behalf of the company when its rights are injured by a wrongful 
act of another State. In determining whether a company possesses independent 
and distinct legal personality, international law looks to the rules of the 
relevant domestic law.641 
 
Again, the focus here is on rights, not ILP in general or (especially) responsibility. 
Crawford (UN Special Rapporteur responsible for the International Law Commission’s 
Articles on State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts642) describes legal personality as 
“the paradigm for of responsibility in international law”.643 Recognising that, as per the 
Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion there are other legal persons besides states, 
“it would seem unproblematic to substitute the words ‘international organization’ or 
‘international legal person’ for ‘State’ in Article 1 of the ILC Articles”.644 Yet, “it is 
doubtful whether [corporations] are in any meaningful sense ‘subjects’ of international 
law”645 and that “it is also very doubtful whether ‘multinational corporations’ are 
subjects of international law for the purpose of responsibility … From a legal point of 
view, the so-called multinational corporation is better regarded as a group of 
corporations, each created under and amenable to its own national law as well as to 
any other national legal system within which it operates.”646 Pellet (in the same 
volume) suggests that corporations have both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ personality, 
meaning they may invoke the responsibility of other subjects of international law on 
the international plane in specific circumstances (essentially in the realms of 
                                                
641 Ahmadou Diallo 61. 
642 See the ILC State Responsibility Articles: esp. Article 33(2): ‘the content of a state’s responsibility is 
‘without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue 
directly to any person or entity other than a State.’  
643 Crawford (2010) 17. 
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investment), and on the other, be held accountable for their own internationally 
wrongful acts.647 What we see here is that this area is in flux/contention. I argue in 
Ch.6 that, following Wilson’s suggestion, corporate ILP is now being ‘pursued’ by the 
GCC – even in the ‘humanitarian’ sphere, as part of a gradual move to global 
governance.648 
 
In other words, facilitated by unequal treaties (BITs), concluded in the name of states, 
business(wo)men, using the particular (ideological, technical/legal, also 
epistemological) techniques including remaining outside the purview of public 
international law, by exercising personality only in private international law, asserting 
a sui generis position requiring its own set of rules, positing formal equality, etc. 
largely managed to escape the requirements of formal law-making and adjudication, 
the ‘constitutional’ elements of public international law. Likewise these arrangements 
remained outside of the ‘liberal humanitarian impulse’ and within the capitalist free 
market mandate, and outside of the IL responsibility domain. Yet, at the same time, we 
see the corporation making some headway as an ILP on the global level. In the 
following Chapters we will see where this leads. 
 
4 Class law and class struggle in IL 
 
Above I have spoken mostly of events on the ‘private’ side of IL. On the ‘public’ side 
during the course of the 20th C the discourse of law gradually turned towards 
cosmopolitanism, constitutionalisation, the liberal humanitarian discourse. IL came to 
be seen as about, and for peace and human rights.649 This was of limited use in global 
class struggle. Apart from the earlier nationalising efforts by newly elected Third 
World leaders (e.g. Mossadegh), elements of such class struggle could be seen in the 
increasing assertiveness of newly decolonised Third World States and their allies in the 
1960s and 70s, expressed in a number of United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions and Declarations including on ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources’650 and later the attempt to establish a New International Economic Order651 
                                                
647 Pellet (2010) 7-8. Authors such as Brown Weiss have argued that non-state actors should be given 
the right to invoke state responsibility, which effectively corporations already have, in investment 
arbitration (Brown Weiss (2002) 816). 
648 Further, Baars (2011). 
649 Generally, Meron (2006). 
650 GARes 1803; GARes 2158; GARes 3171; see also generally, Schrijver (2008). 
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and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.652 While 120 of 138 General 
Assembly members supported the resolution, nearly all ‘capital exporting states’ voted 
against the Charter, abstained or did not vote.653 The Third World states’ assertion of 
ownership was the assertion of a ‘mine not yours’ nature. More precisely however, it 
could also be seen as an assertion of “the right to dispose of oneself.”654  
 
The class interest expressed in the NIEO movement was absorbed into the 
international development agenda, which can be seen as having become a cloak for 
FDI and a way of achieving competition among Third World countries for (public and 
private) development money. The term ‘development’ could be viewed as a 
euphemism for foreign direct investment, or, the global spread of capitalism and the 
corporate imperialist scramble for third world resources, land and labour.655  
 
Gathii argues that “rules of international law have hollowed out the sovereignty of 
capital-importing States when they engage in transnational commercial activity.”656 At 
the same time, Third World leaderships realise that “foreign direct investment will not 
travel south without an arbitration clause in its luggage.”657 Western MNC bargaining 
power as against the Third World state is congealed in this arbitration clause.658 World 
Bank/IMF privatisation requirements leave Third World public services in (Western) 
private hands, while host state and private policing protects FDI property and 
personnel against host state citizens. As a result, many Third World states are no 
longer able to carry out important aspects of the ‘public’ function of the state internally 
– but are penetrated by the capitalising mission through law.659  
 
Yet, on the global level institution building replicates the creation of states in the 
transition to capitalism (Ch.2A S.4). As private rule making, private provision of 
‘public’ services, even private policing and private military become normalised and 
considered legitimate, states lose much of their utility. ‘Global governance’ lifts many 
issues previously within the domestic jurisdiction of states to the international level of 
                                                                                                                                        
651 NIEO Resolution (adopted without a vote). 
652 Charter of Economic Rights (excerpt) Appendix A.  
653 UNGA CERD voting record.  
654 Craven (2007) 59. 
655 Oxfam Land Grab Report. 
656 Gathii (2010) 187. 
657 Shalakany (2000) 422. 
658 Viz. e.g. the statistic of Usman (2011) 294. 
659 Subedi (2008) 2. 
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decision-making and coordination. Authority for this international regime is provided 
by the ‘political’ bodies and rule-sets, including the UN peace, human rights and 
development sectors, and in particular also the international formal legal infrastructure 
of the ICJ, and now also international criminal law and the ICC. Yet, the liberal 
impulse expressed in ‘humanitarian’ rules and institutions is not benign or innocent: 
“[t]he language of human rights is essential to the oversimplification of the roots of 
disorder in international society at present.”660 At the same time, individuals are forced 
to become ‘rights-entrepreneurs’: in the same way that economic success is an 
individual’s own responsibility, achieving one’s ‘human rights’ becomes a matter of 
individual success or failure to negotiate on the state and supranational rights 




Having looked at the specific ways in which law is employed by global classes – in 
ways that may affect responsibility for harm caused through their involvement in 
conflict - it seems possible to discern a number of structural trends. First, the 
deployment of the ideological devices of fragmentation and the public/private divide. 
 
Wilson surmises, “the discursive separation of the private from the public as an 
autonomous legal realm effectively renders World Economy both a-political and extra-
judicial, superseding the direct regulatory and legislative capacities of the ‘public’, or 
‘political’, ‘Nation-State’.”661 Similarly Anghie, “one of the major responses of the 
West to the challenge of the Third World was to entrench neo-imperial economic 
relations in the private sphere.”662 Also, “public international law … was… used to 
further solidify the private realm and to enhance the immunity of private actors.”663 
This occurred through the espousal by states of corporate interests in courts, and 
through BITs. Positivism ‘sealed’ the artificial and deliberate split between a public 
and a private international law. Craven has shown that the public/private divide has 
particular consequences in the context of succession, which may also be seen as 
emblematic of IL in general. An “implication of [the] separation between the public 
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661 Wilson (2008) 213, see also generally, Shalakany (2003). 
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and private dimensions of succession … is that the central function of the doctrine 
seemed to be to secure the primacy of capitalist relations of production – in which the 
relationship between the West and the periphery could be understood, above all else, in 
terms of the inclusion or exclusion of those societies that had not yet established the 
conditions for capitalism.”664 Yet, securing the presence of western corporations and 
creating (unequal, yet formally equal) states in the periphery in the Western image 
remedied this situation.  
 
Sornarajah notes that “the role of [powerful corporate] actors in the international legal 
system is seldom studied due to the dominance in the field of positivist views which 
stress that states are the only relevant actors in international relations. They provide a 
convenient cloak for hiding the absence of corporate liability.”665 Also, scholars seem 
to prefer ignoring law-making by arbitrators and ‘the writings of highly qualified 
publicists’ “lest it shakes [sic] the hoary foundations on which their discipline is 
built.”666 However, it would seem likely that those scholars, arbitrators and the ‘highly 
qualified publicists’ are the very same.667 There is an element of competition/conflict 
of interest between practising lawyers, and (other) businesspersons, but ultimately the 
dynamic is that of class.  
 
At the same time, business people are also effective users of IL – even if they are at 
times ‘disowned’ by politicians. They manage to find their way into the state-only 
institutions such as the PCIJ/ICJ, to have the basic parameters of law set, (and in one 
case even “through a curious combination of circumstances”668 a specific tribunal to 
deal with (mainly) commercial interests – the Iran-United States Claim Tribunal). At 
the same time they manage to shape their rules elsewhere in more flexible 
environments - in arbitrations but also more generally through ‘business as usual’ 
namely repeat practice of major corporations, trendsetting in the field. With the 
participation of business elites in rule creation the situation has changed little from that 
of the 1920s when, according to Pashukanis, international law was constructed around 
the common interest of the ruling classes of different capitalist states: “international 
                                                
664 Craven (2007) 45. 
665 Sornarajah (2010) 6. 
666 Sornarajah (2010) 5. 
667 E.g. the ICSID docket of pending cases (as at 01 January 2012) lists, among others, V. Lowe, P.M. 
Dupuy, A. Lowenfeld, C. Tomuschat, B. Stern, and G. Abi-Saab as arbitrators: 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending  
668 See Lowenfeld (2008) 541ff. 
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law owes its existence to the fact that the bourgeoisie exercises its domination over the 
proletariat and over colonial countries.”669 
 
Fragmentation is one of the particular techniques (ideological moves) employed for 
this purpose, division between civilised and uncivilised, domestic and international, 
public and private, between old and new legal rules, and between ‘functionally 
separate’ regimes of law. Benvenisti’s summary view on fragmentation is worth 
quoting in full:  
Powerful states labor to maintain and even actively promote fragmentation 
because it enables them to preserve their dominance in an era in which 
hierarchy is increasingly viewed as illegitimate, and to opportunistically break 
the rules without seriously jeopardizing the system they have created. 
Fragmentation accomplishes this in three ways. First, by creating institutions 
along narrow, functionalist lines and restricting the scope of multilateral 
agreements, it limits the opportunities for weaker actors to build the cross-
issue coalitions that could potentially increase their bargaining power and 
influence. Second, the ambiguous boundaries and overlapping authority 
created by fragmentation dramatically increase the transaction costs that 
international legal bodies must incur in trying to reintegrate or rationalize the 
resulting legal order. Third, by suggesting the absence of design and obscuring 
the role of intentionality, fragmentation frees powerful states from having to 
assume responsibility for the shortcomings of a global legal system that they 
themselves have played the major role in creating. The result is a regulatory 
order that reflects the interests of the powerful that they alone can alter.670 
 
Instead of ‘powerful states’, I have argued here, the GCC, members of governing and 
business elites, are the relevant actors, employing law, on a capitalising mission, to 
create the global market society.  
 
Anghie has described how “international law [has] … legitimized colonial 
exploitation”671 – which, as I have argued was an important phase in the transition to 
the global market. Anghie focuses on the ‘civilising mission’ as the racist animator of 
                                                
669 Pashukanis (2005) 325.  
670 Benvenisti (2007) 1 (abstract). 
671Anghie (2007) 2. 
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colonialism. In my view, the ‘civilising mission’ functions mostly as a (post hoc672) 
ideological cloak for economically rational behaviour and is not an actual motivation 
in itself. This cloak continues to cover the ‘failure to decolonise’ or, rather, the 
continuing presence of corporate imperialism through international law. In Miéville’s 
words, “International law is a constituent part of the dynamic of modernity”.673  
 
This was explicit up to the end of the 19th C. but globalising IL required a 
‘humanitarian’ makeover. In Craven’s words: “Decolonization was a moment of 
disciplinary anxiety and introspection; a moment at which the emancipation of the 
colonized world had to be accompanied by the simultaneous emancipation of the idea 
of international law.”674 The ideological move of the ‘decolonization of international 
law’ was intended to wash the blood of past colonialism off the hands of law. Contra 
Craven I argue that this process commenced much earlier, with liberal impulses 
finding their way into international law with the advancement of so-called 
humanitarian areas of law including those on the means and methods of warfare in the 
late 19th C., with the increased visibility of the individual in IL, both of which rapidly 
progressed with the post-WWII Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.  
 
In these, we partially see the ‘public’ and ‘private’ collide, the discourse of liberalism 
and the logic of capitalism speak against one another, the individual business(wo)men 
practice ‘corporate imperialism’ but reappear out of the corporate structure, and the 
ideological play of humanitarian law turn absurd. 
                                                
672 It tends to be the lawyers and philosophers (and theologians) who seek to provide legitimisation in 
retrospect. 
673 Miéville (2005) 226 
674 Craven (2007) 6. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Telford Taylor, who was the Chief Prosecutor for the subsequent trials at Nuremberg, 
wrote in his memoirs, that  
“[t]he root circumstances which gave rise to the laws of war as we know them 
today are part of the great waves of change that swept Western civilization in 
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the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries… humanitarianism played a part in the 
development of these laws, but the prime motivations were commercial and 
military. They were, in fact, very largely the product of what Dwight 
Eisenhower, when retiring from the presidency, called the “military-industrial 
complex.”675 
 
In the previous chapter I have shown how both ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ law were 
developed to further the interests of capital, and the notion of ‘responsibility’ became 
commodified and capable of exchange. I also commented on the relationship between 
capitalism and imperialism, and on the notion of a global capitalist class, where the 
identity of military, state and commercial agents partly overlaps, and where their 
interests largely converge despite short-term clashes or competition between them. In 
this Chapter I show how the international criminal law developed by the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo tribunals was a product of the military-industrial complex, on the one hand, 
in Japan and Germany, and on the other, the military-industrial and legal-political 
complex in the United States. The criminal trials following WWII served the 
prevailing mode of production, by on the one hand allowing ‘liberal lawyers’ to 
express their individual humanitarianism and through this to construct the ideological 
‘play’ of the trials, while simultaneously creating a ‘diversion’ for far-reaching 
economic intervention.   
 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Allies expressed their consensus (e.g. 
through the measures announced in the Potsdam Agreement676) that WWII on both the 
Western and Eastern fronts had been a war for markets and resources carried out by 
what Eisenhower would later call the ‘military-industrial complex’677: a combination of 
the political and military might of the state of both Japan and Germany, and the 
resources, productive capacity and finance of the industrial giants. The means were 
matched by the motivation: the imperialist drive to expansion at the core of the 
capitalist state and corporation. In this chapter I first discuss how and why the decision 
to hold criminal trials for the prosecution of the authors of the war was taken – and 
how this was explained to relevant publics. I also discuss the US post-war economic 
policies – and investigate the relation between the trials and the economic reforms 
                                                
675 Taylor (1992) 5. 
676 Potsdam Agreement (1945) – excerpt in Appendix B. 
677 Eisenhower Address (1961). 
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implemented by the US in Japan and Germany/Europe. With the start of the Cold War 
18 months after the end of WWII, US foreign and economic policy changed 
dramatically. I show here that this change is reflected in the conduct, discourse and 
outcome of the trials, in particular in the US ‘subsequent trials’. I argue that the change 
in US attitude towards the vanquished powers, from one of punishment to one of 
rehabilitation, turned the trails from morality plays into théâtre de l’absurde, with the 
trial judges going to great length to exculpate the defendants, often not without a sense 
of irony. Most importantly, with the commencement of the Cold War, the role of 
economic actors in instigating WWII, which had once been a point of agreement 
among the Allies, became a point of sharp ideological divide. Henceforth the 
‘economic case’ as it had been called in the main international trial at Nuremberg, has 
been ignored in the Western literature and remained visible only in GDR/Soviet 
discourse. Likewise, the omission of zaibatsu leaders from the Tokyo International 
Tribunal hid the Allies’ expressed conviction that also the war on the Eastern front had 
been one of economic imperialism. 
 
The construct of the corporation as a mechanism to minimise individual exposure 
failed to protect the directors and other high officials of some of the main German 
companies after the war. The ‘progressive’ liberal move to individual responsibility for 
what were previously considered ‘state crimes’ prevented the acceptance of ‘corporate 
liability’ for the businesses involved (although the possibility was debated and would 
find its echo decades later: Section 7.1.2; Ch.4). The anomie at the core of the 
corporation (Ch.2A) is reflected in the way defendants describe their own roles and 
their own views on their (lack of) culpability (sections 7 and 8). Moreover, the nature 
of (imperialist) corporate abuse during WWII in East and West - shows great 
similarities to the accumulation by dispossession of the colonial period, as illustrated 
in Ch.2B.  
 
Part A of this Chapter deals with the Allied responses to the economic aspects of 
WWII in Germany, and Part B with Allied policy in the aftermath of WWII in regard 
to Japan. In a joint conclusion to Parts A and B (Ch. 3B S. 9) I compare the German 
and Japanese trajectories and draw broader conclusions about the relation between the 
particular material context existing at the time and the decision to employ international 
criminal law and ask what inferences can be drawn from the post-WWII experience for 
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the future application of ICL to corporate actors, leading to the questions I will seek to 
answer in the following Chapters. 
 
2 Part A: Germany 
 
Any discussion of the Nuremberg and subsequent trials is inevitably coloured by the 
availability of material. To explain the particular effect of a very partial availability of 
materials on the post-WII trials I start this chapter with a brief discussion on the 
sources employed. This is followed by a brief discussion of the process that led to the 
decision to hold international criminal trials after WWII and an exploration of the 
underlying motivations. In Section 3 I describe the lead-up to the main international 
trial at Nuremberg, with a particular focus on the treatment of the ‘economic case’, and 
the debates around the inclusion/exclusion industrialists – in order to highlight what 
has been forgotten in contemporary accounts of WWII.678 
 
Then in Section 7 I examine the Americans’ decision to hold ‘subsequent trials’ at 
Nuremberg, partly motivated by the lawyers’ wish to try industrialists. As during the 
course of these trials US policy towards Germany/Europe changed dramatically (S.6), 
I show how this change reflects in the trials – concretely, in material differences 
between the decisions in the subsequent trials compared with the International Military 
Tribunal (“IMT”) judgment, in similar facts being judged differently, and legal 
concepts being explained and applied differently. More generally, I comment on the 
changed discourse in the subsequent proceedings, and pay attention to the 
representations made by the defendants and the judges on the role of business in 
conflict. Finally, I examine the aftermath of the trials, commenting on the post-trial 
treatment of the lawyers, and the further course of the industrialists. In Section 8 I 
comment on the other Allies’ trials in their respective zones of occupation, including 
the prosecution of Röchling and colleagues by the French Occupation authorities, 
Tesch and Wittig by the British and Töpf by the Soviets. Each of these reveals the 
respective Ally’s own political objectives. 
                                                
678 E.g. Merriman (2009) Ch.26. 
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2.1 Sources 
The fact that ‘Nuremberg’679 and the subsequent proceedings were largely a US 
dominated event, is reinforced for today’s researchers as most of the available 
materials are US-produced and published. Although I carried out this research in 
Germany, by far the most plentiful and detailed resources were the online US 
government archives, detailing the deliberations and discussions leading up to, and 
surrounding, the various US decisions, and trials. Some measure of similar material is 
available in the UK National Archives, in largely unorganised hard copy files. No 
documentation is available online for the UK military cases (summaries of some cases 
are included in the 15-volume ‘Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals’ published by 
the United Nations War Crimes Commission (“WCCLR”)680– the remainder of the 
material is stored in paper form in the UK National Archives, while full texts for the 
French Röchling case are stored in archives in Germany and France.681 Because of 
linguistic limitations I was unable to research Soviet cases except by means of one 
translated bundle.682 In contrast, the US authorities have published a full record of the 
London Agreement negotiations, with minutes of private meetings, several drafts of 
the agreement, and reports by government officials.683 Further records offering an 
insight into the decision making around Nuremberg are available from the US Senate, 
e.g. Senator Kilgore’s sub-committee investigating German industry.684 In addition, 
many US intelligence documents were declassified in 2000, and described and 
commented on in a 2007 working group report.685 
 
The official record of the Nuremberg IMT trial is published in “The Blue Series,” a 42 
volume series of books containing the official record of the proceedings. This is 
supplemented by “The Red Series” or “Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression”, an eight-
volume, 12-book series, with the subtitle “Collection of Documentary Evidence and 
Guide Materials Prepared by the American and British Prosecuting Staffs for 
Presentation before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany.”686 This 
                                                
679 I follow many commentators in using the term ‘Nuremberg’ as a shorthand to denote the post-WWII 
Allied trials in Germany as a phenomenon. 
680 WCCLR. 
681 I am grateful to Fabian Schellhaas (PhD Candidate at the Humboldt University of Berlin) for a copy 
of the Röchling Case decision from the German National Archive at Koblenz. 
682 Prozeßmaterialien. 
683 E.g. Jackson Negotiations Report, Jackson Final Report. 
684 Kilgore Report. 
685 IWG Report. 
686 Blue Series; Red Series. 
 124 
series includes scanned original documents used in evidence, transcripts of pre-trial 
interrogations and summaries of investigations carried out by the US and British 
prosecution teams. The subsequent proceedings are published by the US government 
in a fifteen volume set, the “Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10” or the “Green Series.”687 All of these 
US resources are publicly available through the Library of Congress (“LoC”) online 
collection. 
 
The private archives of some of the key US personalities at the time yielded much 
material: the “Morgenthau Diaries”688; the Robert H. Jackson Center Research 
Archive689; the Telford Taylor Papers at Columbia Law School690 and the Hebert 
Nuremberg Files collection at Louisiana University Library which includes scans of 
handwritten notes the judge took during the IG Farben trial as well as a draft dissenting 
judgment that was never submitted.691 The Harold S. Truman Library & Museum holds 
interviews with many individuals involved in the trials in its oral history collection.692 
Finally, many of the US lawyers involved in the trials have published personal 
memoirs and perspectives on the trials, including Ferencz,693 Jackson,694 Taylor.695 
Calvocoressi,696 and Vishinsky697 have also published on the topic. One of the German 
defence lawyers at Nuremberg, Kranzbühler, has published his commentary698 while a 
great number of the defendants have written autobiographies.699 
 
I have used the UK National Archives for the Tesch, Wittig and Mitsugu trials. 
Excerpts of the German post-WWII trials are published online by the University of 
Amsterdam.700 
 
                                                
687 Green Series. 
688 Parts of which are published in German: Schild (1970) 64ff.; and in English in Blum (1959-67) (three 
volumes). 
689 Jackson Archive.  
690 Taylor Archive.  
691 Hebert Archive. 
692 Truman Library. 
693 E.g. Ferencz (1999); Ferencz Library. 
694 See also the bibliography in Taylor (1992) 680.  
695 Taylor (1992). 
696 Calvocoressi (1947). 
697 A bibliography containing sources in various languages can be found in Frei (2006) at 603-646. 
698 Kranzbühler (2008) 433-444. 
699 E.g. Schacht (1956).  
700 Nazi Crimes on Trial. 
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Most scholarly writing on the issue also comes from the again US. Few British, and 
other European legal scholars have reflected on Nuremberg, though some offer 
descriptive accounts and others focus on specific legal questions.701 In particular a 
number of German academic lawyers have provided descriptive accounts.702 
Unfortunately Polish and Soviet literature is inaccessible to me insofar as it has not 
been translated – and little of it has been. The zonal trials held by the allies have 
received very little treatment in the academic literature.703 A notable exception is Frei’s 
edited collection ‘Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik’ which also includes chapters 
(and an extensive bibliography) on the treatment of WWII war crimes suspects in 
Germany and many other European countries and the Soviet Union.704 Besides the case 
reports and associated documentation, the memoirs of prosecution lawyers Dubois705 
and Sasuly706 provide the main insight into the background to these trials. There has 
been a recent surge in interest in the trials of the industrialists – unsurprisingly 
coinciding with the current interest in ICL in general and ‘corporate responsibility’ in 
particular, with new publications being published and prepared.707 
 
Aside from the materials related to the trials specifically, the papers related to the US 
administration of Germany and Japan, the US Library of Congress has also published 
the declassified “Enactments and approved papers of the Control Council, 
Coordinating Committee and Allied Control Authority for Germany”.708 
 
3 From War to Trials: Why ‘Nuremberg’ 
 
It is striking that the main ICL texts invariably describe that, and also how, in the 
practical sense, the Allies came to try the Nazi leaders at Nuremberg, but not why they 
did so.709 It is as if criminal trials, and the development of an ICL, was simply the next 
                                                
701 E.g.: Kelsen (1947) 165.   
702 Noteworthy is the absence of ‘Nuremberg’ (and WWII more generally) in Grewe (1984). For recent 
examples, see e.g. Burchard (2006), 800.  
703 But see e.g. Ueberschär (1999).  
704 Frei (2006). 
705 Dubois (1952). 
706 Sasuly (1952); Sasuly (1947). The role of IG Farben in WWII and the IG Farben Case has attracted 
by far the most commentary of all ‘subsequent trials’, see, e.g. Borkin (1978); Ferencz (2002); Neumann 
(1963); Hayes (2000). 
707 See Ch.5 below, and see, e.g. Bush (2009); Jeßberger (2010), Frei (2010); Heller (2011). 
708 Library of Congress online collection: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/enactments-
home.html  
709 Cryer (2009); Werle (2009) 7, but see generally Simpson (2007), esp. chapters 4 and 5. 
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logical step in the progression of the IL enterprise. In the context of this thesis, the why 
question is important, not least, as Falk puts it, because “[i]n a fundamental sense, as 
with human rights, it is difficult to comprehend why sovereign states should ever have 
been willing to validate such a subversive idea as that of the international criminal 
accountability of leaders for war crimes. It goes directly against the spirit and ideology 
of sovereignty.”710 Answering this question allows us to reveal “the relationships that 
are expressed in the legal superstructure and those that it ideologically spirits 
away.”711 In this section I examine how ‘Nuremberg’ and ‘Tokyo’ were explained 
publicly, while I also consider what may have been alternative underlying objectives 
and structural causes.  
 
As early as 1942, in the St. James Declaration, the Allies had vowed to “place among 
their principal war aims the punishment, through the channel of organised justice, of 
those guilty of or responsible for [acts of violence against civilians contrary to 
international law in particular the 1907 Hague Conventions], whether they have 
ordered them, perpetrated them, or participated in them.”712 The meaning of 
‘organised’ was more straightforward than that of ‘justice’, which took longer to 
decide than contemporary accounts might suggest. The sixteen-member United 
Nations War Crimes Commission,713 which first met on 20 October 1943, immediately 
commenced collecting evidence of the commission of war crimes through its London 
office and national sub-commissions in the Nazi occupied countries and in the Far 
East. Ten days later, on 30 October, in Moscow, Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt issued 
the Moscow Declaration, largely echoing the 1942 Declaration, adding a Statement on 
Atrocities announcing “German criminals … will be punished by joint decision of the 
government of the Allies”.714  
 
While these declarations were mere statements of intent, perhaps mostly made to 
function as deterrents to the Nazis, they did put the question of trials on the agenda. 
The Statement on Atrocities, largely drafted by Winston Churchill, was, according to 
                                                
710 Falk (1998-1999) at 710. 
711 Arthur (1978) 31. 
712 St James Declaration 1942. 
713 The commission derives its name from the conference, where the participants called themselves ‘the 
united nations’ (Werle (2009) 8; Taylor Report 246); on the establishment of the United Nations, the 
Commission became the UN’s War Crimes Commission. For a short history of the Commission, see: 
Current Notes, AJIL 39(3) 1945 at 565-579. 
714 Statement on Atrocities. 
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Taylor, his attempt to bring the other allies round to a punishment of “German 
criminals” without trial.715 Churchill favoured summary execution.716 The Soviets saw 
the Nazis’ crimes as already clearly proven, and favoured holding short hearings just to 
determine punishment. In the US, Roosevelt’s sudden death on 12 April brought to the 
fore President Truman, who was persuaded by the desirability of trials by Stimson, the 
lawyer at the head of the War Department. Eventually, when Hitler and Goebbels 
committed suicide on 30 April and 1 May 1945, also Churchill gave in to the idea of 
trials.717 One way of viewing this moment is as the triumph of liberalism (liberal 
legalism) over the barbarism of the war (cf. the ‘civilising mission’ discourse above, 
Ch.2B) and also, over prior ways of dealing with the vanquished in the aftermath of 
war. While European leaders had failed to prosecute the German Kaiser post-WWI,718 
now their United States counterparts would take the lead to ‘stay the hand of 
vengeance’.719  
 
This was the nascent hegemon’s moment to shape the IL system of the future: “[a]ny 
legal position asserted on behalf of the United States w[ould] have considerable 
significance in the future evolution of International Law.”720 According to Taylor, the 
idea of war crimes trials originated in US War Department and was “pretty fully 
developed” there.721 While negotiations were still ongoing, Stimson and his colleagues 
had already made significant progress in outlining the “Nuremberg ideas” which 
included the conspiracy charge and the aggressive war charge. Stimson’s personal 
conviction driving this effort was that international law would only be complete if its 
violation would lead to individual criminal responsibility.722 As a corollary to the 
outlawing of aggressive war in Versailles, IL needed individual criminal responsibility 
for initiating and waging such a war.723  
 
On 2 May 1945, Truman appointed Robert Jackson, until then Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court, as Representative of the United States and Chief of Counsel.724 On 
                                                
715 Taylor (1992) 28-31. What follows draws on Taylor (1992) pp.1-40 unless otherwise stated. 
716 Taylor (1992) 30. 
717 Taylor (1992) 32-33. 
718 Werle (2009) 4-6. 
719 Jackson IMT Opening Address. 
720 Taylor (1992) 73. 
721 Taylor (1992) 4. 
722 Taylor (1992) 37. 
723 See the discussion at Jackson Negotiations Report, 65-7, 295, 327, 335. 
724 Quoted in Taylor (1992) 39. 
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May 3rd, 1945 the Allied foreign ministers – who were in San Francisco for the United 
Nations’ foundational conference – riding on the ‘mood of liberal internationalism’725 
discussed and agreed Stimson’s war crimes trial plan, Subsequently, Jackson’s 
negotiations report was presented as the official US position statement and placed 
before all delegations to the London Conference in August. Jackson, according to his 
own account, enjoyed an unusually wide margin of authority to negotiate an agreement 
in London, while “the Foreign Ministers became engaged in other things.”726 The 
contents of Jackson’s report were adopted in the London Agreement of 8 August 
1945.727 All allies had sent legally trained negotiators.728 Vishinsky, the Soviet 
representative, remarked, “[t]he reason we were able to get an agreement was that it 
was left to the lawyers instead of diplomats.”729 Many of the London Agreement’s 
negotiators later appeared as prosecutors or judges at the IMT.730 Justice Jackson 
became the Nuremberg Tribunal’s chief prosecutor, and with that one of the best 
known names attached to the Nuremberg trials. 
 
Taylor surmises that although the initial pressure for post war trials came from the 
peoples of the German-occupied nations,731 in a real sense the trial was conceptualised 
and pushed by a handful of elite US lawyers “with a strong sense of noblesse 
oblige.”732 The Allied Declarations, then, could be regarded as the public result of 
private efforts by (mainly US) government lawyers, who as part of their class and 
profession had a keen sense of the ideological and material role and purpose of law. 
What is harder to grasp is the motivations of the US President in approving the idea: 
did the President bend to the wishes of the lawyers or were there other reasons behind 
the decision? A hint of two further aims is given by Taylor: “To give meaning to the 
war against Germany. To validate the casualties we have suffered and the destruction 
and casualties we have caused” and secondly, “to establish and maintain harmonious 
relations with the other United Nations.”733 Falk adds two further reasons: “the guilty 
conscience of the West that not enough had been done to protect the victims of Nazi 
persecution before during the war itself (for example, the refusal of liberal 
                                                
725 Luban Lecture (2007). 
726 Jackson (1946) 4. 
727 Taylor Final Report; Taylor, IC at 247.  
728 Jackson (1949) 816. 
729 Jackson (1949) 816.  
730 E.g. the Soviet lawyer Nikitchenko. 
731 And the American Jewish Conference and the War Refugee Board (Taylor (1992) at 35). 
732 Taylor (1992) 4, 42.  
733 Taylor (1992) 50. 
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democracies to accept Jewish refugees and the failure to bomb the railroad tracks 
leading to Auschwitz).”734  
 
The humanitarian, liberal impulse was used to communicate the need for trials to the 
public, by claiming that such trials were “demanded by the conscience of the world.”735 
Jackson talks of how the people of the US came to see the Nazi rulers as a “pack of 
brigands”, whose crimes caused a feeling of outrage, while it became more and more 
felt that “these were crimes committed against us and against the whole society of 
civilised nations… I believe that those instincts of our people were right and that they 
should guide us as the fundamental tests of criminality.”736 Moreover, the home public 
had to be persuaded that their sacrifice had been worth it: In this latter sense, the trials 
can be seen as a ‘morality play,’ aimed at producing charismatic authority for the 
Western victor and his ideology.737 On the other hand, the US leadership wanted to 
(had to) satisfy public demand for supporting the war effort, also in possible future 
wars. The price paid for the ‘bodybags’ had to be reasonable and the readiness to go to 
war and defend the nation had to be maintained. Moreover, trying German war 
criminals allowed the creation of an ideological distance between the Nazi leaders and 
the (also often openly anti-Semitic) Allied leaderships.738 
 
To fend off the accusation of victor’s justice, finally, Jackson warned:  
We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants to-day 
is the record on which history will judge us to-morrow. To pass these defendants 
a poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well. We must summon such 
detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this trial will commend 
itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity's aspirations to do justice.739 
 
Here, ICL is presented as applying equally to wrongdoers in an international society of 
formally, legally equal states. Whether this notion was naïve, or its presentation 
cynical, is assessed in this and the next chapters.740 
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In conclusion, it would seem reasonable to surmise that ‘Nuremberg’ came about, on 
the one hand through the perseverance of lawyers, to some extent endowed with a 
sense of mission and ambition to be ‘jurisgenerative’,741 and, like lawyers generally, 
being predisposed to seeking legal solutions to problems. Jackson states in 1947, “[a]s 
the lawyer is the most frequently chosen legislator, diplomat, executive and political 
leader, the intellectual discipline which we call “the law” saturates Western World 
statesmanship and diplomacy.” And, “[a]t the opening of this tortured and bloody 
century, law-trained men dominated the councils of most Western nations.”742 On the 
other hand, the political leadership considered the trial-route fortuitous and in line with 
the objective of asserting the US elite’s moral leadership at this important juncture in 
world history. The international trial at Nuremberg would form the cornerstone of the 
Allies’ post-WWII policy, its main public spectacle and means of communicationto 
home audiences and the wider world. 
 
4 The US occupation and economic reform of Germany 
 
Behind the scenes, the plan on the table was for a ‘pastoralised Germany’ – a Germany 
broken up and stripped of all its economic might, that would never again be able to 
wage an aggressive war. This plan had been authored in 1943-44 by US Treasury 
Secretary Henry Morgenthau, then Roosevelt’s right hand man. The Plan connected 
with the ongoing programme of investigation into German industry, in particular into 
the US based offices and subsidiaries of German firms and the worldwide activities of 
some of the cartels, such as IG Farben, whose assets were frozen or expropriated.743 
Morgenthau’s controversial plan was largely adopted on 25 April 1945 in the guise of 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Decision 1067 (“JCS 1067”).744 Some months later echoes of the 
plan were found in the Potsdam Agreement which was concluded at the close of the 
Potsdam Conference on 2 August by the USSR, the UK and the US.745 The Potsdam 
Agreement established and regulated the Allied Control Council for the governance of 
occupied Germany, and provided for it “to carry out programs of industrial 
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disarmament, demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports” as 
well as complete control over all aspects of the German economy, “with the aim of 
preventing Germany from developing a war potential”.746  
 
5 Nuremberg: Political demands translated into law 
 
The documentary record of negotiations spanning from 22 January 1945 to October 7, 
1946 published by the US Department of State in 1949 gives some insight into the 
manner in which the political demands raised at the time were translated into the legal 
process to be followed in Nuremberg.747 The Nuremberg Charter appended to the 
London Agreement, which was adopted by the four Allied powers and formally 
adhered to by 19 other nations,748 provided in Article 1 for the prosecution of  
‘criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location’. War criminals 
whose crimes could be localised would be tried in those localities once they were 
liberated. Allied occupation courts would be set up in their respective zones in 
Germany and given jurisdiction over crimes committed by Germans within the 
Reich.749 
 
Article 6 of the Charter contained the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal: (a) 
crimes against peace (i.e. the crime of aggression), (b) war crimes and (c) crimes 
against humanity.750 “Crimes against humanity” were primarily included to enable 
prosecution of acts committed against Germans (mainly of course German Jews). A 
final section of article 6 contained the crime of “conspiracy” to commit any of the acts 
in the three other sections. Article 7751 had been recommended by Mr Justice Jackson, 
citing the “principle of responsible government declared some three centuries ago to 
King James by Lord Chief Justice Coke, who proclaimed that even a King is still 
‘under God and the law’.”752 Article 8 encodes the supremacy of the laws of 
humanity/ICL over domestic law and sovereign government orders which was vital 
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considering many Nazi atrocities would not have been unlawful under Reich law.753  
 
5.1 The Trial at Nuremberg 
At the next stage the defendants had to be selected, and indictments drafted. In order to 
produce a coherent historical narrative of the war to be communicated to the public 
and posterity, the trial was to focus on the grand totality (causes/origins) rather than 
the detail (symptoms). The IMT would also only prosecute “Major War Criminals”, 
leaving other suspects to be dealt with in the normal channels of military justice.754 
Chief Prosecutor Jackson stated: 
Our case against the major defendants is concerned with the Nazi master plan, 
not with individual barbarities and perversions which occurred independently 
of any central plan. The groundwork of our case must be factually authentic 
and constitute a well-documented history of what we are convinced was a 
grand, concerted pattern to incite and commit the aggressions and barbarities 
which have shocked the world. … Unless we write the record of this movement 
with clarity and precision, we cannot blame the future if in days of peace it 
finds incredible the accusatory generalities uttered during the war.755 
 
What had enabled WWII to be started, and thus all its atrocities to be committed, had 
been the “captur[e of] the form of the German state as an instrumentality for spreading 
their rule to other countries.”756 The indictment was to reflect this:  
Whom will we accuse and put to their defence? We will accuse a large number 
of individuals and officials who were in authority in the government, in the 
military establishment, including the General Staff, and in the financial, 
industrial and economic life in Germany who by all civilised standards are 
provable to be common criminals.757 
 
From the very start it was clear that the “economic case” – the part of the prosecution 
dealing with the economic causes of, and motivations for, the war and the 
responsibility of economic actors and policy makers - would be key in the Nuremberg 
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Trial.758 From the mid-1930s the German economy had been geared up towards heavy 
industry, which comprised the mining of coal (Germany’s main natural resource) and 
the manufacture of iron and steel and steel products. As a result of a deliberate policy 
of cartelisation implemented in the 1930s,759 these industries were in the hands of a 
small number of large industrial and mining combines including Krupp, Flick, 
Thyssen, the state owned Reich-Werks-Hermann-Göring and the chemicals concern IG 
Farben. The idea behind cartel formation was for Germany to become economically 
self-sufficient in particular with regard to those items needed for war. Not having 
colonies producing rubber and oil itself, Germany’s aim was to produce replacements 
for these resources domestically. Additionally, the occupation and colonisation of 
neighbouring countries was to ensure the German nation’s ‘Lebensraum’ but also the 
resources (including labour) that it lacked.760  
 
When Justice Jackson and his staff commenced work in preparation for the trial, four 
indictment-drafting committees were established each dealing with a different core 
aspect of the war for which charges were to be brought. Committee 1, comprised of 
British representatives, was to handle the aggressive war charge, 2 was to deal with 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in the east (dealt with by the Soviets), 3 with 
equal crimes in the West (dealt with by France), while the Americans would prepare 
the “common plan and conspiracy” charge.761 The latter charge was to cover the pre-
WWII story of Nazism, Hitler’s seizure and exploitation of power, his plans and steps 
to occupy much of Europe, and plan to attack the United States. As the first count of 
the indictment it would comprise the basic narrative of the case as a whole.762 This 
committee was headed by Justice Jackson himself. As a vital part of this charge, the 
economic case – was entrusted to the American lawyer Frank Shea.763 Shea produced a 
memorandum, in which he suggested as defendants Hjalmar Schacht (former head of 
the Reichsbank and Minister of Economics, who had provided the financing of war 
production), Fritz Sauckel (primary figure in the foreign forced labour programme), 
Albert Speer (architect and later Minister of Armaments and Munitions), Walter Funk 
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(Schacht’s successor)764 as well as Alfried Krupp and six other German industrial and 
financial leaders. “The guilt of the industrialists and financiers, as Shea saw it was that 
they had given Hitler the material means to rearm Germany, with full knowledge that 
Hitler planned to use these armaments to carry out a program of German 
aggrandizement by military conquest.”765  
 
Eisenhower would later speak, in his famous farewell speech, of the military-industrial 
complex. In the particular context of WWII, this was called “IG Farbenism”: the 
inherent danger in cartel formation combined with the profit motive, or the work of the 
‘unholy trinity’ of Nazism, militarism, economic imperialism.766 The Soviet 
representative at Nuremberg, A.N. Trainin stated: “Their political position is clear: 
these were the masters for whom the Fascist State machine was zealously working,” 
adding, “the German financial and industrial heads must also be sent for trial as 
criminals.”767  
 
The “economic case”, however gathered criticism from the start, with one critic fearing 
it would “reform European economics.”768 In the end, only the former ministers were 
indicted, with Krupp, due to an apparent British-led effort to keep the list of indictees 
down and the trial short.769 
 
The retention of Krupp, the ‘main organiser of German industry’, in the indictment 
made him the pars pro toto for German industry. However, there was disagreement 
among the different teams of lawyers working on the indictment as to whether Gustav 
Krupp, the man who had run the Krupp concern until 1941, or Alfried Krupp, his son, 
who had been in charge throughout most of the war, was the intended defendant.770 
Eventually, Gustav the elder was selected: the industrialist who had also been the 
president of the State Union of German Industry and high official in the Economics 
Ministry.771  It soon transpired, however, that Krupp was, at 80 years of age, too ill and 
demented to stand trial. The U.S. sought to replace Gustav with his son Alfried Krupp, 
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who had been the company’s executive director since 1941. The prosecution of at least 
one Krupp family member was considered to be in the public interest, explained in the 
words of Justice Jackson:  
Four generations of the Krupp family have owned and operated the great 
armament and munitions plants which have been the chief source of Germany’s 
war supplies. For over 130 years this family has been the focus the symbol and 
the beneficiary of the most sinister forces engaged in menacing the peace of 
Europe. … To drop Krupp von Bohlen from this case without substitution of 
Alfried drops the case from the entire Krupp family and defeats any effective 
judgment against the German armament makers. … The Krupp influence was 
powerful in promoting the Nazi plan to incite aggressive warfare in Europe. 
The Krupps were thus one of the most persistent and influential forces that 
made this war.… Once the war was on, Krupps, both Von Bohlen and Alfried 
being directly responsible therefor, led German industry in violating treaties 
and international law by employing enslaved laborers, impressed and imported 
from nearly every country occupied by Germany, and by compelling prisoners 
of war to make arms and munitions for use against their own countries. … 
Moreover, the Krupp companies profited greatly from destroying the peace of 
the world through support of the Nazi program… The United States 
respectfully submits that no greater disservice to the future peace of the world 
could be done than to excuse the entire Krupp family.772 
 
This request was rejected on 15 November 1945.773 The UK had objected on the basis 
that it may delay the commencement of the entire trial.774 Still, important information 
on what might have been the first international trial of an industrialist can be gleaned 
from the Indictment775 and the underlying prosecution file.776  
 
5.2 The Indictment 
While in Article 22 of the London Agreement a series of trials were envisaged, in fact 
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the IMT eventually only held one large trial, indicting 24 individuals777 and six groups 
or organisations. The Indictment started with the overarching conspiracy charge, 
stating that:  
All the defendants, with diverse other persons…participated as leaders, 
organisers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, 
Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, as defined 
in the Charter of this Tribunal, and in accordance with the provisions of the 
Charter, are individually responsible for their own acts and for all acts 
committed by any persons in the execution of such a plan or conspiracy.778 
 
This count encompassed the ‘Nazi master plan’779 including the strategic part of the 
‘economic case’: acquiring totalitarian control of Germany and the economic planning 
and mobilization for aggressive war, which included using organisations of German 
business as instruments of economic mobilisation for war.780 
 
Count two comprised crimes against the peace by planning, preparing, initiating and 
waging wars of aggression against twelve countries, count three comprised the 
violation the laws and customs of war, which included the widespread use of slave 
labour, both through utilisation of camp internees and through the deportation of 
hundreds of thousands or Soviets, Poles, French, Belgians and Dutch civilians to work 
in the German industries.781 It further included the plunder of public and private 
property, through, amongst others, the confiscation of businesses and plants, by means 
of which the “Nazi conspirators created an instrument for the personal profit and 
aggrandizement of themselves and their adherents.”782 Finally, count four comprised 
crimes against humanity: mistreatment and persecution of Jews and other political, 
racial and religious groups.783 
 
                                                
777 The indictees were charged individually and as members of any of the groups or organisations named 
in the indictment. 
778 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. II: First day, Tuesday, 20 November 1945 Morning Session, 29 – 
94. 
779 For a summary of the prosecution’s case, see Economic Aspects. 
780 See Appendix B. 
781 IMT Indictment Count III section (B) 51 (Deportation for slave labor and for other purposes of the 
civilian populations of and in occupied territories) and Section (H) Conscription of civilian labour. 
782 IMT Indictment Count III section (E) 55, 56. 
783 IMT Indictment. 
 137 
5.3 The IMT Judgment 
The IMT rendered its judgment on 1 October 1946, delivering “the world’s first post 
mortem examination of a totalitarian regime.” Jackson added, “That four great nations, 
flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily 
submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant 
tributes that power has ever paid to reason.”784 
 
Moreover, “the very essence of the Charter is that individuals have international duties 
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state. 
He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of 
the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves outside its competence 
under international law.”785 This, one of the key principles of Nuremberg, which has 
persisted in ICL to date (see Ch. 4) at once responds to the liberal individualist belief 
in individual agency, and permits, through the absorption of blame by the individual, 
the system (Nazism, capitalism) to escape censure, the state and people to be 
rehabilitated and political-economic relations to resume post-prosecution. 
 
5.3.1 The judgment on the ‘economic case’ 
Moreover, and despite Göring’s suicide on the eve of the trial, the ‘economic case’ 
featured prominently in the Nuremberg trial, which still focussed on Göring’s pivotal 
role as “in theory and in practice […] the economic dictator of the Reich.”786 The 
judgment describes how in November 1932 a petition, signed by leading industrialists 
and financiers, had been presented to President Hindenburg, calling upon him to 
entrust the Chancellorship to Hitler.787 Subsequently, according to evidence submitted 
to the Tribunal 
On the invitation of Goering, approximately 25 of the leading industrialists of 
Germany, together with Schacht, attended a meeting in Berlin on 20 February 
1933. This was shortly before the German election of 5 March 1933. At this 
meeting Hitler announced the conspirators’ aim to seize totalitarian control 
over Germany, to destroy the parliamentary system, to crush all opposition by 
force, and to restore the power of the Wehrmacht. Among those present at that 
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meeting were Gustav Krupp, head of the munitions firm, Alfried Krupp, A.G.; 
four leading officials of the I.G. Farben Works, one of the world’s largest 
chemical concerns; Albert Vogler, head of United Steel Works of Germany; 
and other leading industrialists.788  
At this meeting Göring suggested to set up an election fund to support Hitler in the 
March elections (which Göring predicted would be the last election in Germany789).  
 
Subsequent to this meeting in April 1933 Krupp submitted to Hitler - on behalf of the 
Reich Association of German Industry, a plan for the reorganization of German 
industry. He stated the plan was “characterized by the desire to coordinate economic 
measures and political necessity”, and that “the turn of political events is in line with 
the wishes which I myself and the board of directors have cherished for a long time.”790 
The industrialists’ plan was adopted.791 The meeting, the election fund, and the plan are 
mentioned again later in the ‘subsequent trials’ (below, S.7). 
 
Funk, who had been the Minister of Economics and the President of the Reichsbank, 
was convicted by the IMT for crimes against the peace for his participation in the 
economic preparations for war.792 However, Hjalmar Schacht, Funk’s predecessor in 
both positions, was acquitted of the aggressive war charge as the Tribunal considered it 
not proven that Schacht had known of Hitler’s intentions. A factor in his acquittal was 
that Schacht had defected before the end of the war. Additionally Speer, who had been 
Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions, was acquitted on the basis that his 
actions were taken only after the aggressive wars had been well underway.793 
 
The Soviet member of the Tribunal, Justice I. Nikitschenko, filed a dissenting opinion 
to the majority IMT judgment to the effect that he considered Schacht’s acquittal to be 
in contradiction to the evidence presented to the court.794 The strong case for the 
recognition and condemnation of the economic instigators of the war put by the 
prosecution was no longer supported by the majority: an early sign of the differences 
to come. 
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6 The Turnaround: From Germany is our Problem to Germany is our Business 
 
In the Spring of 1947 further signs were appearing of a changing Allied policy towards 
Germany, from one where Germany was to be publicly castigated and disabled (in 
trials and through economic policies as envisaged in the Morgenthau Plan) to one 
where Germany was to be rehabilitated into the world community of states and its 
economy rebuilt.795 Here I focus on how the change (effectively, the start of the Cold 
War) is reflected in the decision-making regarding the industrialists’ trials, and 
subsequently (S.7) how its effects are reflected in the proceedings and the decisions of 
the tribunals. I mainly focus on US policy and sources, as the US at this point has 
emerged as the ideological leader of the West. 
 
Direct economic interests initially stayed in the background in US policy towards 
Germany and were the subject of much internal disagreement within the US 
administration.796 Morgenthau relates how already during WWII orders were given to 
the military to spare German industrial plants.797 In his memoirs, Josiah Dubois (a 
State Department lawyer who was to become the lead prosecutor in the IG Farben 
case) describes a secret State Department memorandum setting out its “post-war 
program” relating to in kind reparations payments from Germany.798 Such reparations 
could form a public justification for sparing, and where necessary, rebuilding 
Germany’s productive capacity, as well as retaining US-German trade ties. However, 
the program remained secret as at this point public and key political support was still 
behind the pacific, ‘pastoralised’ Germany as proposed in Morgenthau’s plan. 
Morgenthau, sensing support for his plan waning, published his as book (entitled 
Germany is our Problem) in an attempt to reinforce his stance.799 
 
Incrementally over time, however, Morgenthau lost ground. Dubois tells of seeing a 
second secret memorandum, circulated within the U.S. delegation at Potsdam. 
According to this memo, the U.S. goal now was “rebuilding a strong Germany as a 
buffer against Communism”.800 While the Potsdam Agreement (and JSC 1067801) 
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mirrored the Morgenthau Plan, Dubois states, “of course, it was never followed 
through. The U.S. officials did do just what Morgenthau was afraid of, and in effect 
what the State Department memorandum recommended.”802 A strong, indentured 
economy was more attractive than a pastoralised state. Shortly after Potsdam 
Morgenthau was “in effect … fired by Truman”.803804  
 
The turnaround was not complete at this point, though, and elements of the plan 
persisted for some time. For example, the work of the Office of the Military 
Government of the U.S. (“OMGUS”) Decartelisation Branch – whose staff were called 
the “Morgenthau Boys”805- continued for two years after Henry Morgenthau’s 
departure. Many items of machinery were shipped to the United States and the other 
Allies by way of reparations payment. The IG Farben Control Commission, which was 
run by all four occupation powers, worked to split the Farben cartel into the four 
sections that had only come together years before: Hoechst, Agfa, Bayer and BASF.806 
The entire German economy came to be strictly controlled by the occupation 
authorities. In the Eastern, Soviet occupation zone, the ‘criminal concerns’ were 
liquidated or nationalised.807 Much has been written about the intimate relations 
between the U.S. (and other, European) corporations and the German cartels.808 In 
return for the (temporary) loss of these trading and scientific partnerships (and to boost 
government research projects), secret programmes were underway to control and 
harvest German scientific development. Thousands of industrial patents, even 
hundreds of scientists were transferred to the U.S. as part of “Operation Paperclip”.809  
 
The public manifestation of the turnaround eventually came on 6 September 1946, in 
an address entitled Restatement of Policy on Germany given in Stuttgart by U.S. 
Secretary of State, Jimmy Byrnes.810 It raised the issue of the political and economic 
future of Europe: “Germany is a part of Europe and recovery in Europe, and 
particularly in the states adjoining Germany, will be slow indeed if Germany with her 
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great resources of iron and coal is turned into a poorhouse.”811 In this statement Byrnes 
effectively echoed Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov’s speech on Germany’s economic 
future at the Paris Peace Conference in July 1946.812 However, unlike Molotov, Byrnes 
omitted mention of the industrialists’ role in WWII, which by then was starting to 
disappear from ‘Western’ discourse, and would disappear all but completely after the 
subsequent trials. 
 
In March 1947 Truman announced the ‘Truman Doctrine’ promising economic support 
to those “states resisting attempted subjugation [to communism].”813 Soviet 
representative Zhdanov responded with his ‘two camps’ speech in which he repeated 
the view that capitalist imperialism, personified in the directors of the cartels, was the 
true perpetrator of WWII.814 In July 1947 JCS1067 was replaced with JCS1779 which 
codified the turn in US policy and stated that “[a]n orderly, prosperous Europe requires 
the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany.”815 German and 
generally Western European recovery took off speedily, partly through the Marshall 
Plan established on 5 June 1947, which aimed to modernise Western European 
industry, to integrate it, and remove barriers to trade among European countries and 
between Europe and the US.816 It was also used as leverage to pressure French and 
Italian governments not to appoint communists to ministerial posts.817 
 
On the Eastern side, the Cominform, the coordinating mechanism for all communist 
parties, was inaugurated in September 1947 as the successor to the Comintern, and 
Zhdanow was installed as its chair. Soviet power in Eastern Europe was consolidating 
and when Soviet troops took control of the Czech government in January 1948, and in 
July 1948 blocked foreign trains and truck routes into Berlin, this sent shockwaves 
through the US trial teams at Nuremberg. Some of the US lawyers and their families 
returned home,818 and the US occupation government now put direct pressure on 
Taylor to wrap up the trials.819 (West) German commentator Kröll summarises the 
Umorientierung (turnaround) as follows: “With the re-formation of political camps 
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during the Cold War and the open warfare in Korea, the involvement of the young 
Federal Republic into the Western alliance weighed heavier than crime and 
punishment of Nazi crimes.”820 East German commentators accused the U.S. of 
“liquidating Potsdam.”821 
 
It is against this backdrop that we must imagine the efforts of US lawyers such as 
Jackson, Taylor and others on their team, to persuade the US political leadership to 
allow further trials.  
 
7 The trials of the industrialists: From morality play to théâtre de l’absurde 
 
In the US military trials of the industrialists we can see how this change and also 
specific historical events such as the blockade of Berlin, leave their mark. Although 
the other Allies’ political priorities were perhaps not as explicit as the US’ (partially 
due to the comparatively very limited publication of official documents) evidence of 
their political objectives can also be found reflected in the choice of defendants, and 
the course and outcomes of the trials in their respective occupation zones. I examine 
these in Section 8.  
 
Not all trials discussed below are ‘subsequent trials’ when seen next to the main IMT 
trial. As early as 1944 the Allied governments had created military courts and 
commissions (Yamashita, see Ch.3B) to deal with crimes being committed by Axis 
nationals.822 The British did so under British Royal Warrant dated 14th June, 1945.823 
The Zyklon B case discussed below took place during the middle months of the IMT 
trial. Parallel to these military courts were the military government courts of the 
occupation, set up by virtue of Control Council Proclamation 1.824 Apart from the 
British, the other Allied military tribunals applied the Control Council Law No. 10 on 
the Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against 
Humanity (“CCL10”)825 which was promulgated on 20 December 1945 by the four 
occupying powers acting through their Zone Commanders in order to “establish a 
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uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar 
offenders, other than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal.”826 CCL10 
is based, and according to some, an improvement, on the Nuremberg Charter.827 
Article II sets out the main provisions on crimes within the scope of the instrument, a 
well as potential defendants.828 One of the main differences was the intended inclusion 
of pre-war crimes against humanity and the explicit mention of persons who have 
“held high position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any such country” as 
potential accused.829 CCL10 authorised each of the four Zone Commanders to arrest 
suspected war criminals and to establish “appropriate tribunals” for their trial.830 
According to Taylor, in the Soviet Zone little or nothing was done to carry CCL10 into 
effect831 although this is contradicted by the literature (S. 8.3). The British tried Axis 
nationals starting from summer 1945 (S.8.1). The major trial held by the French was 
that of Röchling (S.8.2). Of the trials carried out by the Allies and eventually also the 
German courts,832 those of the US, which took place in the same Nuremberg 
courthouse as the IMT trial, are by far the best documented and most widely known. It 
is these trials that are cited in ICL cases to this day (see Chapter 5).833 
 
7.1 The Trials of the Industrialists at the US military tribunal at Nuremberg  
After the IMT judgment, the decision to proceed with ‘subsequent trials’ was not 
without hesitation on the part of the US leadership. As the IMT trial had come to a 
close, criticism increased.834 Dubois and others have noted that some of the criticism 
can be put down to anti-Semitism within the US (and UK) governments.835 That the 
US trials took place at all, can be put down partly to the tenacity of the main US 
protagonists, Jackson, Taylor and their teams at Nuremberg.  
 
                                                
826 CCL10. 
827 For example, CCL10 obviates the requirement for a link between crimes against humanity and war 
(Werle (2009) 783) meaning that crimes committed before the war could be included. 
828 CCL10 S.I See Appendix B. 
829 CCL10 S.II 2. See Appendix B. 
830 CCL10 
831 Taylor Report at 254. 
832 As per Art. III of CCL10 the French, British and Soviet commanders granted German courts 
jurisdiction. 
833 See Ch.5. 
834 E.g. Bloxham (2003) 97. 
835 Dubois (1952) 68-69 and Bush (2009) 1197.  
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My discussion below is limited to trials relevant to the ‘economic case’ and 
industrialists in particular. Beyond a general account of the cases (which demonstrates 
a continuity of corporate abuse following from Ch. 2B and ‘corporate anomie’ 
discussed in Ch. 2A) I highlight three concrete ways that the change in US policy 
reflects in the trials: (1) the use of excessively conciliatory language by the tribunals, 
(2) the tribunal’s decision to ignore in their judgment facts that had been admitted by 
defendants and knowledge that had been established also in the IMT, and (3) use of the 
necessity defence in a way that contravened CCL10 and also disregarded the 
Nuremberg principles. 
 
In the trials of the industrialists at the US Military Tribunals at Nuremberg (NMT) we 
can see the change in US policy reflected. Below the surface, a deeper US need can be 
discerned also: the need to reassure American industrialists, perhaps counter-
intuitively through these trials, that production for the Korean and other, potentially 
aggressive, wars would not lead to prosecution.836 From this perspective, the 
Tribunals’ task was to distinguish culpable involvement with an evil regime from 
innocent ‘business’.837 
 
7.1.1 Deciding whether to have further trials 
Justice Jackson, in his report to the US Government on the IMT judgment, reminded 
the government that the US had wanted to try more industrialists besides Krupp in the 
IMT trial, and that his successor, Brig. Gen. Telford Taylor had already “prepared a 
programme of prosecutions against representatives of all the important segments of the 
Third Reich including a considerable number of industrialists and financiers, leading 
cabinet ministers, top SS and police officials, and militarists.”838 At this point Jackson 
notes a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the other Allies for a second international 
trial. British Foreign Secretary Orme Sargeant feared that such a second trial would 
become a “battle between capitalism and communism” and that “[t]he Russians might 
exploit the proceedings to discuss irrelevancies such as [the British] attitude to German 
rearmament”.839 Jackson stated, “if [the other Allies] were unwilling to take the 
additional time necessary to try industrialists in this case, it does not create an 
                                                
836 Dubois (1952) 21. 
837 Dubois (1952) 20. 
838 Jackson Final Report 435. 
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obligation on the United States to assume the burdens of a second international trial. 
The quickest and most satisfactory results will be obtained, in my opinion, from 
immediate commencement of our own cases according to plans which General Taylor 
has worked out…”840 Eventually, this is what occurred.  
 
The assumption at the time was that it would suffice for the US Military tribunals to 
take on the most prominent cases (British authorities handed the US administration six 
industrialists who had been held in the British Zone, including Alfried Krupp841) and 
that the German courts would eventually try others, on the basis of hundreds of files 
already prepared by the American team.842  
 
The twelve trials of the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“NMT”), which was 
established by the US Military Governor pursuant to Military Government Ordinance 
No. 7 of 18 October 1946,843 each focus on a specific professional group who had 
together formed the elite of Nazi Germany. It includes trials of professional men 
(medical doctors who carried out medical experimentation in the concentration camps 
in the Medical Case and lawyers in the Justice Case,844 senior SS members including 
camp administrators (SS Case) and the Police (Einsatzgruppen Case), industrialists 
and financiers (Cases 5, 6, 10 – see below), military leaders (Cases 7 and 12) and 
Government Ministers (2 and 11 Ministries Case).845 The basis upon which the 
General Counsel decided whom to indict, was described thus: “… one of the first and 
most important responsibilities of my office was to determine, in the light of the best 
available information, where the deepest individual responsibility lay for the manifold 
crimes committed under the aegis of the Third Reich. … it was necessary to scrutinise 
the conduct of leaders in all occupations, and to let the chips fall where they 
might…”846 Bush gives a comprehensive account of the US team’s deliberations on 
choice of defendants. At one time, the list counted 1000 possible defendants, many of 
them industrialists – “so great was the number of dirty corporations and businessmen 
                                                
840 Jackson Final Report 435. 
841 Bloxham at 152. 
842 Bush (2009) 1228.  
843 Appendix to Taylor Report, at 363. For a discussion of the question whether the Nuremberg tribunals 
and CCL10 were International law, or as argued by the German defence and later German 
commentators, “occupier’s law” see, e.g. Appendix to Taylor Report, at 289, and Burchard (2006).  
844 The movie ‘Judgment at Nuremberg’ is based on this case. 
845 Medical Case; Justice Case; SS Case; Einsatzgruppen Case; Ministries Case. 
846 Preliminary Report to the Secretary of the Army by the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, 12 May 
1948, pp2-3, quoted in Appendix to Taylor Report, at 278. 
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that many, even potential ‘major perpetrators’, just slipped through the cracks”.847 For 
example the directors of Daimler-Benz, which had used many tens of thousands of 
forced labourers, including women held captive as prostitutes, and Siemens, which had 
used slave labour from Auschwitz and Sachsenhausen, were not tried.848  
 
Brigadier Telford Taylor was appointed Chief of Counsel for War Crimes on 24 
October 1946 (immediately on the resignation of Justice Jackson).849 Josiah Dubois 
was the main prosecutor in the IG Farben Case. In his memoirs, he relates that already 
prior to his leaving for Germany, he is instructed by the War Department to ensure 
there will be no aggressive war charges against industrialist, as ‘the DuPonts’ 
(prominent US industrialists) would not like it.850 This is an early sign of direct 
political pressure on the industrialists’ trials. 
 
7.1.2 Discussions of theories of liability 
As noted in Section 2, the US has published a far wider range of materials surrounding 
the trials than the other Allies. The documentation describing the lead-up to the 
industrialists’ trials detail the discussion among the lawyers as to the basis (‘theory’, in 
their words851) on which the defendants were to be selected and charged. It is worth 
examining these at some length, as these discussions bear great resemblance to the 
discussions on corporate liability taking place again now (see Ch. 4C).  
 
Among the theories for liability considered by the American team for the prosecution 
of industrialists were conspiracy liability as used by the IMT - a company or even a 
whole industry could be implicated in the conspiracy after which hundreds or 
thousands could be tried for membership. This theory was rejected as it was 
specifically considered to interfere with the US policy objective of rehabilitating 
Germany.852 The second theory discussed was that of trying corporations as legal 
entities. This was proposed by Abraham Pomerantz, a US corporate litigator who had 
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been brought onto the team as a ‘big picture strategist’.853 He saw practical advantages 
to this theory including ease of proof (no need to tie individuals specifically to 
‘corporate’ acts), and also a corporate charge could form the legal foundation for the 
expropriations of company property - that were already occurring. Finally, blaming the 
companies as such rather than individuals, would “disclose the industrial roots of 
Nazism” and “demonstrate to the German people the real powers behind Hitler and the 
NSDAP”.854 The concept of corporate liability existed in both US and UK domestic 
law (see Chapter 2A, S.5.5) and Pomerantz was not dissuaded by the absence of any 
explicit norms in international law on corporate liability or on the possible crimes that 
could be ascribed to corporations. However, Taylor’s deputy Drexel Sprecher 
dismissed the suggestion, arguing that judges would be baffled by the German 
economy about which they knew little, that the media would not give it the 
comprehensive coverage they had given individual trials and that the general public 
would not accept a long, ‘bogged down’ trial. Finally Leo Drachsler, a lawyer on the 
team with a background as a Hungarian refugee, fluent in German, who had previously 
worked on the German Cartels file for the US Government, proposed an ‘institutional 
approach’.855 This approach captured the idea that German industry had formed a ‘third 
pillar’ alongside the German military and the Nazi party, and that German big business 
had acted in unity.856 This unity was evidenced in the meetings held by industrialists in 
the guise of industry associations, where they had reached agreement on the allotment 
of slave labour and other shared goals. Drachsler proposed that symbolic or 
representative defendants be tried.857 Taylor ‘politely rejected’ this option, possibly 
partly as a result of the IMT judgement which had just come out - this contained 
Jackson’s now famous phrase ‘crimes are committed by men, not by abstract entities’, 
and restricted the application of the conspiracy charge.858 Eventually, all ‘adventurous’ 
theories were dropped and Sprecher’s proposal to lay charges against a small group of 
individuals only, and to have no broad presentations against business and no emphasis 
on the planning phase of pre-1939, was selected.859 After the first indictment, in the 
Flick case, had been drafted on the basis of individual liability, it was as if “nothing 
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else had ever been considered.”860 An overall result of the chosen approach is that the 
prosecution of designated individuals left the ‘structure’ or system untouched, and as 
such facilitated the US objective of rebuilding the corporations as part of the economy. 
In this sense it resembled the prosecution of individual political leaders (at the IMT), 
rather than ascribing responsibility to the State as such. 
Finding a middle ground between the lawyers’ persistence and reluctance at the 
political level (an example of intra-class competition), OMGUS set a strict timetable 
and small budget for the ‘subsequent trials’.861 In the summer of 1947, when ten of the 
trials had already been completed, Telford Taylor was told that he could not proceed 
with the six further trials previously approved. He persuaded the Government to allow 
three further trials. The plan of having separate trials for Dresdner Bank and the 
Hermann-Goering-Werks was abandoned, but Taylor managed to agree having 
Dresdner Bank director Rasche and three defendants of the HGW added to the 
Ministries trial.862 
 
7.1.3 The Flick Case, Case No. 5 
The first of the industrialist cases, The United States of America vs. Friedrich Flick, et 
al. (Flick Case)863 started with the indictment of 8 February 1947 and ended on 22 
December 1947. Friedrich Flick and five other officials of the Flick Concern and its 
subsidiary companies were accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed principally as officials of the Flick Concern. The charges included 
participation in the deportation of thousands of foreigners including concentration 
camp inmates and prisoners of war to forced labour in inhuman conditions including in 
the Flick mines and plants; spoliation contrary to the Hague Conventions of property 
in occupied France and the Soviet Union; participation in the persecution (as a crime 
against humanity) of Jews in the pre-war years through securing Jewish industrial and 
mining properties in the “Aryanization” process; knowing participation (of Flick and 
Steinbrinck) in SS atrocities through membership in the “Circle of Friends of 
Himmler” (a select group of industrialists and SS officers).864 The Flick group of 
enterprises included coal and iron mines, steel producing and fabricating plants, and 
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was, at around 1940, the largest steel combine rivalled in size only by Krupp AG.865 
Flick and his colleagues were accused of having exploited more than 60,000 prisoners 
of war as slave labourers under atrocious conditions. 
 
The defendants were not charged with “conspiracy to wage a war of aggression” even 
though the Prosecution had found ample material evidence to support such a charge.866 
Chief Prosecutor Telford Taylor opened this first industrialist case to be tried by the 
Americans with a general summary of the role of industry in the Nazi war plan:  
What we are here concerned with is no mere technical form of participation in 
crime, or some more or less accidental financial assistance of the commission 
of crimes. The really significant thing, which gives the full meaning to the 
crimes charged, not only in this count but in all the counts of this indictment, is 
the fact that the defendants assisted the SS and the Nazi regime with their eyes 
open and their hearts attuned to the basic purposes which they were 
subsidizing. Their support was not merely financial. It was part of a firm 
partnership between these defendants and the Nazi regime that continued from 
before the Nazi seizure of power to the last days of the Third Reich.867 
 
Flick and his colleagues argued that they had not known of the slave labour 
programme and the mass crimes committed by the Nazis, that their position as private, 
business persons shielded them from liability (“we were just doing business”868), that 
they had acted out of “necessity” and under orders and force and threat of the state. 
Flick described his ostensible agreement with Nazi ideas as a self-protective “howling 
with the wolves”.869 They also employed the tu quoque argument of alleged Allied war 
crimes (e.g. the Allied bombing of German cities) previously heard in the IMT, and 
challenged the jurisdiction of the court and applicability of CCL10. Against the 
necessity argument in particular, the prosecution stated,  
The leading defendants, Flick and Steinbrinck, were not reluctant dragons. All 
the defendants are uncommonly able to take care of themselves, and have been 
phenomenally successful at accomplishing what they set out to do. To suggest 
that these men, whose enterprises flourished like the green bay tree under 
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Hitler and who occupied the most powerful and privileged positions in the 
German industrial fabric, spent 12 years skulking about in fear and doing what 
they did not want to do, is ridiculous.870 
 
In Flick, we start to see the effects of a change in US government policy. Taylor’s 
prosecutorial statements become fiercer, while the judges adopt an excusatory tone. In 
its decision, the Tribunal accepted the view that the defendants (except Flick and 
Weiss) had acted under necessity, forced by the “reign of terror” employed by the Nazi 
regime. According to the Tribunal, the provision in paragraph 4(b) of Article II of such 
Control Council Law No. 10 which states- “(b) The fact that any person acted pursuant 
to the order of his Government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility 
for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation” should not “be employed to deprive 
a defendant of the defense of necessity under such circumstances as obtained in this 
case.” (cf. Zyklon B below.) Flick and Weiss, however, were found to have initiated 
the procurement of a large number of forced labourers for two of their plants (letters 
by Flick and Weiss to this effect are reproduced in the U.S. publication) – these “active 
steps …deprive[d] the defendants Flick and Weiss of the complete defense of 
necessity.”871 
 
Further, the tribunal declined jurisdiction over the Aryanisation activities which the 
prosecution had argued amounted to persecution, as “crimes committed before and 
wholly unconnected with the war” were not covered by CCL10, adding (obiter) that 
“the compulsory taking of industrial property” did not fall in the category of acts that 
“affect the life and liberty of oppressed people” so as to amount to crimes against 
humanity.872 
 
On the count of participation in the SS crimes through membership of the Circle of 
Friends of Himmler, Flick and Steinbrinck (who was also an SS member), who had 
participated in the regular Circle meetings and contributed large sums of money to 
Himmler, were found guilty. However, the Tribunal considered a number of factors in 
mitigation, including “fear of retribution” and the idea they may just have attended the 
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Circle’s meetings for its “excellent dinner”.873 This argument had not been made by the 
defendants themselves.  
 
The Tribunal recounted how, “[i]n 1936 [Himmler] took members of the Circle on an 
inspection trip to visit Dachau concentration camp which was under his charge. They 
were escorted through certain buildings including the kitchen where they tasted food. 
They saw nothing of the infamous atrocities perhaps already there begun. But Flick 
who was present got the impression that it was not a pleasant place.”874 Flick was 
sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, Steinbrinck to five, and Weiss to two and a 
half, while the other three defendants were acquitted on all counts.875 In his report, 
Chief Prosecutor Taylor calls the Flick judgment “exceedingly (if not excessively) 
moderate and conciliatory.”876 
 
The Tribunal upheld only those charges that had become uncontrovertible – such as 
the active role in acquiring slave labour shown in letters signed by the defendants. 
CCL10 was specifically drafted to include pre-war acts within the jurisdiction of the 
CCL10 Tribunals as possible crimes against humanity (as mentioned above) but the 
Tribunal misinterpreted this. The Tribunal’s application of the “necessity” defence was 
in direct contravention of CCL10 which had been considered a key foundational ideas 
of the Post-WWII accountability process. The Tribunal deviated from pronouncements 
in previous CCL10 cases,877 for example on its treatment of the slave labour count 
when compared with the Pohl’s Case unqualified condemnation of forced labour, 
regardless of the conditions:  
The freedom of man from enslavement by his fellow men is one of the 
fundamental concepts of civilization. Any program which violates that concept, 
whether prompted by a false feeling of superiority or arising from desperate 
economic needs, is intolerable and criminal. …these defendants today are only 
mildly conscious of any guilt in the kidnapping and enslavement of millions of 
civilians. The concept that slavery is criminal per se does not enter into their 
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thinking. … They simply cannot realize that the most precious word in any 
language is “liberty.”878 
 
In that case, Pohl and three others were sentenced to death by hanging, while eleven 
defendants were given prison sentences ranging from ten years to life, and three were 
acquitted (see below). 
 
While Flick had resented ‘having been singled out to make the German industrialists 
look like robbers and slave-drivers’,879 the bench seems to have been persuaded by the 
defence’s argument that the case formed an attack on German capitalism, wholesale.880 
 
There was much media attention for the case in Eastern Germany, but in the West, 
mainly following the change in the politico-economic environment, it began to 
subside.881 This may have contributed to the tribunals’ preparedness to pass light 
sentences despite the atrocities described by the prosecution. 
 
7.1.4 The IG Farben Case, Case No. 6 
The United States of America vs. Carl Krauch, et. al., (IG Farben Case)882 (indictment 
filed 3 May 1947, judgment 29, 30 July 1948) was the largest of the NMT 
proceedings, comprising 24 defendants and lasting nearly 15 months. The defendants 
included the members of the Vorstand (managing directorate) and four other important 
officers of what was once the biggest combine in Germany, and the biggest chemical 
company in Europe: the Industriegesellschaft Farben AG.883 IG Farben had a global 
network of partners and subsidiaries,884 and as the producer of both Aspirin and Nylon 
stockings, “was present in every American home.”885 The company’s main 
industrial/military products were synthetic nitrates for the manufacture of explosives, 
synthetic rubber made from coal (called buna), synthetic gasoline, and various poison 
gases including Zyklon B. The company had a yearly turnover which exceeded three 
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billion Reichsmark.886 In addition to his position within the company as Chairman of 
the Supervisory Board, Karl Krauch was part of Goering’s staff in the office of the 
Four Year Plan and his principal technical and scientific advisor. The indictment was 
issued in August 1947 and the judgment delivered on 29 July 1948. 
 
The Farben Case was the only industrialist case where the defendants were actually 
put to proof on the charge of crimes against the peace (despite the War Department’s 
warning, above). The defendants were found not guilty on the charge of conspiracy887 
as the Tribunal found that – in relation to this count - they had acted merely like 
ordinary citizens, who, although the majority of them supported the waging of war in 
some way, were not the ones who planned and led a nation. They merely followed 
their leaders and offered no contribution greater than any other normally productive 
enterprise – despite what the IMT had said in its judgment about the role of the 
industrialists and despite the CCL10. Judge Hebert filed a dissenting opinion on the 
dismissal of the slave labour, in which he argued that all defendants should have been 
found guilty on count 3 of the indictment.888  
 
The Tribunal took a generous view on knowledge: 
While it is true that those with an insight into the evil machinations of power 
politics might have suspected Hitler was playing a cunning game of soothing 
restless Europe, the average citizen of Germany, be he professional man, 
farmer, or industrialist, could scarcely be charged by these events with 
knowledge that the rulers of the Reich were planning to plunge Germany into a 
war of aggression.889  
And,  
It is argued that after the events in Austria and Czechoslovakia, men of 
reasonable minds must have known that Hitler intended to wage aggressive 
war, although they may not have known the country to be attacked or the time 
of initiation. This argument is not sound.890 
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Plus, most controversially, “We reach the conclusion that common knowledge of 
Hitler’s plans did not prevail in Germany, either with respect to a general plan to wage 
aggressive war, or with respect to specific plans to attack individual countries…”891 
Here we can see a direct contradiction of the IMT, which had detailed (amongst 
others) the planning and strategising meetings of Himmler’s circle of Friends, of which 
defendant Buetefish had been a part (with Flick and Rasche, amongst others).892 
 
The tribunal, which at times sounds more like a defence counsel, remarks in one 
instance, “It may be noted that this is the only instance in which the defendant Krauch 
talked to Hitler.”893 This would seem unlikely, since Krauch received an Iron Cross 
personally from Hitler at the start of the war, “for his great victory on the battlefield of 
German industry.”894 Even the Vermittlungsstelle Wehrmacht (War Economic Central 
office) of Farben, which the prosecution had considered the main clearing house 
between the military authorities and the three great productive divisions of IG Farben 
(which Göring had requested and which was headed by Krauch, who thus became an 
employee of Göring895) in “neither its organisation not its operation gives any hint of 
plans for aggressive war.”896 In support of the claim that the Farben leaders were well 
aware of, and perhaps more directly involved in planning the aggressive war for their 
own purposes, the prosecution had produced a letter in which Krauch argued for the 
take-over of neighbouring countries’ industries, “peaceably at first”:  
 
It is essential for Germany to strengthen its own war potential as well as that of 
its allies to such an extent that the coalition is equal to the efforts of practically 
the rest of the world. This can be achieved only by new, strong, and combined 
efforts by all of the allies, and by expanding and improving the greater 
economic domain corresponding to the improved raw material basis of the 
coalition, peaceably at first, to the Balkans and Spain.897  
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When in 1936 Krauch joined Goering’s staff on the execution of the Four Year Plan he 
was not authorised to make decisions relating to chemical production, being merely 
retained for his “expert advice” on “recommending plans for expansion or erection of 
plants,” etc.898 While the Prosecution had argued that it must have been obvious to him 
as an expert that the quantities IG Farben had been asked to produce far outstripped the 
demands of a defensive war,899 the Tribunal held, that this knowledge could only be 
inferred “[i]f we were trying military men” and Krauch et al. “were not military men at 
all.”900 Whereas,  
[t]he defendants may have been, as some of them undoubtedly were, alarmed 
at the accelerated pace that armament was taking. Yet even Krauch, who 
participated in the Four Year Plan within the chemical field, undoubtedly did 
not realize that, in addition to strengthening Germany, he was participating in 
making the nation ready for a planned attack of an aggressive nature.901  
 
Seemingly going to great lengths in its effort to ‘talk right’ the actions of the 
defendants brought up by the prosecution, the Tribunal said, “[c]onsidering the whole 
report, it seems that Krauch was recommending plans for the strengthening of 
Germany which, to his mind, was being encircled and threatened by strong foreign 
powers, and that this situation might and probably would at some time result in war. 
But it falls far short of being evidence of his knowledge of the existence of a plan on 
the part of the leaders of the German Reich to start an aggressive war…”902 
 
Eventually the Tribunal summarised its appreciation of the further evidence submitted 
to it out of concern for the length of the judgment and summarily states: “This labor 
has led to the definite conclusion that Krauch did not knowingly participate in the 
planning, preparation of initiation of an aggressive war.”903 The role of other 
defendants is dealt with only briefly. In regard to the 20 February 1933 meeting with 
Hitler and Goering (see above S.5.3.1) after which IG Farben contributed RM400,000 
to the Nazi election fund, the Tribunal states, “[t]his contribution was made to a 
movement that had its basic origin in the unemployment and general financial chaos of 
                                                
898 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1110. 
899 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1112. 
900 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1113. 
901 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1114 (emphasis added). 
902 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1116. 
903 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1117 (emphasis added) 
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a world-wide depression…. To say that this contribution indicates a sinister alliance, is 
to misread the facts as they then existed.”904 Here the tribunal neglects the sentiment 
expressed in Krauch’s letter, cited above.905 
 
On the waging a war of aggression count, the Tribunal manages to subvert the 
meaning of ICL – the individualisation of responsibility in IL - as expressed by Justice 
Jackson at the IMT:  
We cannot say that a private citizen shall be placed in the position of being 
compelled to determine in the heat of war whether his government is right or 
wrong, or, if it starts right, when it turns wrong. We would not require the 
citizen, at the risk of becoming a criminal under the rules of international 
justice, to decide that his country has become an aggressor and that he must 
lay aside his patriotism, the loyalty to his homeland, and the defense of his own 
fireside at the risk of being adjudged guilty of crimes against peace on the one 
hand, or of becoming a traitor to his country on the other, if he makes an 
erroneous decision based upon facts of which he has but vague knowledge.906 
 
The Tribunal appears here to be responding to a sensitive point raised by Krauch 
himself during the proceedings – what if U.S. business were to stop supporting 
American war efforts?907 There was awareness on the bench that US industry was 
watching these trials, and that changing political circumstances (start of the Cold War) 
may well mean the US Government would come to rely on its industrialists.908 
 
With regards to the third count (participation in slave labour programme and in the 
holocaust) the prosecution had argued, “Farben performed most of the research for the 
secret development of poison gas for war. … In 1943, Farben produced 95 percent of 
the poison gas in Germany.”909 The indictment charges in paragraph 131 that “[p]oison 
gases and various deadly pharmaceuticals manufactured by Farben and supplied by 
Farben to officials of the SS were used in experimentation upon, and the extermination 
of, enslaved persons in concentration camps throughout Europe. Experiments on 
                                                
904 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1117. 
905 As well as, amongst others, the analysis supplied in Bernstein IG Farben Report (supra). 
906 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1126. 
907 IG Farben Case, Final statements by the Defendants, Krauch, 1055. 
908 See also the ‘liberal application of the necessity doctrine’ IG Farben Case, 1175 and critique of this 
point in Taylor Report at 317. 
909 IG Farben Case Indictment at 27. 
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human beings (including concentration camp inmates), without their consent, were 
conducted by Farben to determine the effects of deadly gases, vaccines, and related 
products.”910 However, the Tribunal was not persuaded that the defendants knew the 
purpose of the gas supply despite the fact that a number of accused had been members 
of the supervisory council of Degesch, and despite the extraordinary quantities in 
which the gas was delivered to the extermination camps.  
 
Only in the Auschwitz context did the Tribunal find some evidence of Farben’s 
proactive attitude regarding slave labour, but the area of criminal liability was still 
constructed very narrowly. Having considered various locations for a new synthetic 
rubber plant, on the recommendation of defendant Ambros, the small Polish village of 
Oświęcim was selected.911 It is said that Ambros visited construction site of the project 
and saw the concentration-camp inmates at work. He also visited the main 
concentration camp at Auschwitz in the Winter of 1941-42 in company with some 30 
important visitors (possibly the Himmler Circle) and “he saw no abuse of inmates and 
thought that the camp was well conducted.”912 
 
The prosecution had shown how in 1942, at the instigation of Farben, Monowitz was 
built, a separate labour camp across the road from the Farben plant at Auschwitz.913 
“Work-to-death labour” at the Farben factory is described by the Tribunal in its 
judgment euphemistically as “[t]hose [workers] who became unable to work or who 
were not amenable to discipline were sent back to the Auschwitz concentration camp 
or, as was more often the case, to Birkenau for extermination in the gas chambers.” 
Also, it is noted, “[t]he plant site was not entirely without inhumane incidents.”914 
Nevertheless, “[i]t is clear that Farben did not deliberately pursue or encourage 
inhumane policy with respect to the workers. In fact, some steps were taken by Farben 
to alleviate the situation. It voluntarily and at its own expense provided hot soup for 
the workers on the site at noon.”915 When utilising free “work-to-death labour”, 
however, this appears little like generosity and even less an exculpatory factor for the 
Farben defendants. The fact remained, as stated by the Tribunal, that “the labor for 
                                                
910 IG Farben Case Indictment at 54 (emphasis added). 
911 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1180. 
912 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1181. 
913 Dubois (1952) 156-7. 
914 Farben Judgment, 1184. 
915 Farben Judgment, 1185 (emphasis added). 
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Auschwitz was procured through the Reich Labor Office at Farben’s request. Forced 
labor was used for a period of approximately 3 years, from 1942 until the end of the 
war.”916 Only five of the 24 defendants were found guilty under count three, but given 
very light sentences.917  
 
Missing in the judgment is any mention of the number of worker deaths and the fact 
that defendant Dürrfeld actually lived at Auschwitz for three years and entertained his 
colleagues there, and that they socialised with Höss, the camp commander.918 In 
addition, neither did the medical experiments (which had been admitted919) receive any 
mention in the judgment, nor the fact that IG Farben’s Auschwitz plant made artificial 
fertilizer using ashes from the Auschwitz crematorium: “There were times, when the 
production at IG Farben of fertilizers, was at a level with the production (using IG 
Farben chemicals) at Auschwitz of ashes.”920 
 
In his closing statement, Krauch appears to anticipate his ‘amicable’921 sentence: 
When I heard the final plea of the prosecution yesterday, I often thought of my 
colleagues in the United States and in England and tried to imagine what these 
men would think, when they heard and read these attacks hurled at us by the 
prosecution. For after all, they, too, are scientists and engineers; they had 
similar problems. They, like us, were called upon by the state to perform 
certain duties. That was true then, before the world war, and that is true now, 
as we know from information received from the United States. A citizen cannot 
evade the call of the state. He must submit and must obey.922 
 
In particular since Farben had had close relationships with Standard Oil, this trial had 
been watched closely by the US home public,923 something which Krauch had no doubt 
anticipated, allowing him to direct his statements to his cross-Atlantic ‘colleagues’. 
Krauch was sentenced to 6 years, Ambros to 8, and the others received sentences 
                                                
916 Farben Judgment, 1185. 
917 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1205-10. 
918 Dubois (1952) 212. 
919 Dubois describes a scene reminiscent of the film “Schindler’s List” where the camp commander lives 
in a large villa overlooking the camp and hosts many parties there Dubois (1952) 212. 
920 Anon. (1960) 14. Also, Dubois at 212. 
921 Term used in Jeßberger (2009) 924. 
922 IG Farben Case, Final statements by the Defendants, Krauch, 1055. 
923 Taylor Final Report at 79. 
 159 
between 1.5 and 8 years924 – according to Dubois, “sentences light enough to please a 
chicken thief.”925 Four were acquitted. By comparison, in the Justices Case, that same 
week, four life sentences were passed, and in the Pohl Case against the SS Economic 
and Administrative Office (who had handled the logistical and administrative side of 
slave labour) four death sentences were passed, and no prison sentence below 10 years 
with four of 20 or more.926 The defendant Ilgner was considered innocent even of the 
aggressive deeds he had admitted.927 Dubois surmises, “no doubt they [the judges] 
were influenced somewhat by our foreign policy.”928  
 
7.1.5 The Krupp Case, Case No. 10  
The judgment in the last industrialist case at the NMT, The United States vs Alfried 
Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach et al. (the Krupp Case),929 was delivered on 31 July 
1947, the day after the sentencing in the IG Farben Case.  
 
Alfried Krupp, the main defendant in this trial and the son of Gustav Krupp (who was 
still considered unfit to stand trial) had been vested with sole ownership and control of 
the family company by a special Reich decree (the “Lex Krupp”) of 12 November 
1943. In addition to the charges levied against Alfried Krupp and eleven other Krupp 
officials which were comparable to the Flick charges.930  
 
What is remarkable in the Krupp case is that the Prosecution had not argued that 
Krupp defendants had been part of the “Nazi conspiracy” in the meaning of the IMT 
trial, but that they had been part of a “Krupp conspiracy” which was a manifestation of 
something altogether bigger: “Nazism was, after all, only the temporary political 
manifestation of certain ideas and attitudes which long antedated Nazism, and which 
will not perish nearly so easily. In this case, we are at grips with something much older 
than Nazism; something which fused with Nazi ideas to produce the Third Reich, but 
which has its own independent and pernicious vitality.”931 What this was, was 
expansionism close to Bukharin’s understanding of economic imperialism: to ensure 
                                                
924 IG Farben Case, Judgment 1205-10. 
925 Dubois (1952) 339. 
926 Justices Case; Pohl Case. 
927 Dubois (1952) 355 
928 Dubois (1952) 357. 
929 Krupp Case. 
930 Although without SS charges nor “Aryanization” related charges. 
931 Judge Wilkins’ Separate Opinion on Counts 1 and 4, at 412. 
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Krupp’s own continually increasing profitability, it was said to have driven the state 
and military to colonial expansion.932 Dismissing the charge, Judge Wilkins considered 
that Krupp’s expansionism since the 1920s merely meant Krupp had acted in the 
firm’s financial interest as behoves a businessman.933 Taylor calls the acquittal of the 
aggressive war charges ‘rather sketchy’.934 
 
The Tribunal then considered the remaining spoliation and forced labour charges. The 
tribunal found, in contrast to the finding in the Farben Case (above), in terms of 
knowledge with regard to the Krupp firm’s activities at Auschwitz, that the persecution 
of Jews by the Nazis was “common knowledge not only in Germany but throughout 
the civilised World” and that the firm’s officials, could not not have known.935  
 
Apart from ignorance, the defendants had pleaded necessity, stating that production 
quotas were set by the Nazi government and to reach those one had to use slave labour, 
and had they refused to do so, they would have suffered “dire consequences”.936 
Reviewing the Flick decision, the Tribunal rephrased the necessity question in the case 
as this proposition:  
To avoid losing my job or the control of my property, I am warranted in 
employing thousands of civilian deportees, prisoners of war, and concentration 
camp inmates; keeping them in a state of involuntary servitude; exposing them 
daily to death or great bodily harm, under conditions which did in fact result in 
the deaths of many of them; and working them in an undernourished condition 
in the production of armament intended for use against the people who would 
liberate them and indeed even against the people of their homelands.937 
 
The Tribunal did not allow the defence, among others because being convinced, that 
the Krupp defendants enjoyed Hitler’s protection.938 Yet, the finding on the necessity 
defence contravenes the Nuremberg principles. The comparatively heavy sentences 
                                                
932 Kröll connects this with Max Weber’s “Wilhelminismus”: “die Allianz zwischen Großindustrie und 
Pseudoaristokratie mit der Folge der Derationalisierung der deutschen Weltpolitik”, Kröll (1999) 176.  
933 Krupp Case Judgment 1412. 
934 Taylor Report IC, 309. 
935 Krupp Case Judgment 1434. 
936 Krupp Case Judgment 1435. 
937 Krupp Case Judgment 1444-5, also, “If we may assume that as a result of opposition to Reich 
policies, Krupp would have lost control of his plant and the officials their positions, it is difficult to 
conclude that the law of necessity justified a choice favorable to themselves and against the unfortunate 
victims who had no choice at all in the matter,” id. 
938 Krupp Case, Judgment 1446. 
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ranged between six and twelve years for ten defendants, and three years for one, and 
included the forfeiture of Alfried Krupp’s real and personal property.939 When 
compared with Taylor’s statement, after what he called the ‘Krupp snafu’, that 
“Alfried Krupp was a very lucky man, for, had he been named, he would almost 
certainly have been convicted and given a very stiff sentence by the International 
Military Tribunal,”940 the Krupp defendants’ trial seems ‘amicable’ indeed.  
 
7.1.6 The Pohl Case, Case No. 4 
In January 1947, just before the start of Flick, the Military Tribunal II commenced the 
prosecution of Pohl and 17 other defendants in The United States v Oswald Pohl et al., 
with a decision being issued on 3 November 1947.941 Oswald Pohl was the head of the 
SS’s ‘Main Economic and Administrative Department’ (Wirtschaft und 
Verwaltungshauptamt - WVHA) – one of the twelve main departments of the SS.942 
One of the divisions of the WVHA dealt with the allocation of forced labourers to 
public and private employers in Germany and the occupied countries (Amtsgruppe D), 
and another, Amtsgruppe W, was responsible for the operation and maintenance of 
various industrial, manufacturing, and service enterprises throughout Germany and the 
occupied countries.943 Another of the WVHA’s activities was the management of 
property expropriated from Jews.944   
 
A defendant of note in the Pohl Case is Karl Mummenthey. According to the 
judgment, “[i]n his direction and management of the German Earth and Stone Works, 
known as DEST, none of the defendants was more directly associated with 
concentration camp inmate labor than Karl Mummenthey.”945 The DEST companies 
comprised “brickworks and quarries at the Flossenbuerg, Mauthausen, Gross-Rosen, 
Natzweiler, Neuengamme (see Section 8.1.2 below), and Stutthof concentration 
camps. The ceramic works of Allach and Bohemia were also subordinated to office WI 
under Mummenthey. The gravel works at Auschwitz and Treblinka, the granite quarry 
at Blizyn, the Clinker Works at Linz... The DEST industries were strictly concentration 
                                                
939 Krupp Case, Judgment 1450. 
940 Taylor (1992) 94. 
941 Pohl Case. 
942 One of the tasks that Pohl was to execute in this function was the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto. 
Pohl engaged four private contracting firms, who employed forced labour. Pohl Case Judgment 986. 
943 Pohl Case Indictment 6.  
944 Pohl Case Judgment 990. 
945 Pohl Case Judgment 1051. 
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camp enterprises.”946 Interestingly, in his defence it had been “Mummenthey’s plan to 
picture himself as a private business man in no way associated with the sternness and 
rigor of SS discipline, and entirely detached from concentration camp routine.”947 The 
picture failed to convince. “Mummenthey was a definite integral and important figure 
in the whole concentration camp set-up, and, as an SS officer, wielded military power 
of command. If excesses occurred in the industries under his control he was in a 
position not only to know about them, but to do something. … The evidence in this 
case reveals that there was perhaps no industry which permitted such constant 
maltreatment of prisoners as the DEST enterprises.”948 Viz. “Prosecution witness 
Engler, testifying to conditions in the DEST plants at the Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg 
concentration camp, declared that …because of the heavy work and inadequate food 
there was an average of from 800 to 900 deaths per month…. the average life duration 
of a punitive company worker was four weeks.”949  
 
The tone of the judges in the Pohl Case judgment is different from that of the other 
judgments. There is more ad hominen criticism of the defendants and less careful 
analysis of the applicable law. Some of the judgment adopts the cynical tone, e.g.: 
“Mummenthey’s assumed or criminal naivete went to the extreme of asserting that 
inmates were covered by accident insurance.”950 What can be seen in this case, 
compared with the IMT and the earlier cases, that there is an effort on the part of the 
tribunal to put business into a place subordinate to the Nazi state, even to the point that 
Mummenthey considers portraying himself as a businessman would make him less 
culpable. In the judgment, Mummenthey, as an SS officer, is considered to have had 
the power and authority to curb industry’s excesses with regard to the prisoners. This 
case at the same time sends the message (to home industry) that the responsibility for 
setting boundaries of propriety is of the state, not industry, hence industry can continue 
working on defence contracts without fear of liability. 
 
7.1.7 Rasche in the Ministries Case, Case No. 11 
Karl Rasche, former Chairman of Dresdner Bank, was tried in United States v. Ernst 
Weizsaecker et al. (the Ministries Case) as a single private banker amidst 18 former 
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Third Reich ministers and senior civil servants, and two SS Generals.951 In the 
indictment, which was served on 4 November 1947, Rasche was charged with 
facilitating slave labour through making loans to entities using slave labour, and 
economic plunder, as well as membership in the “Circle of Friends of Himmler” and 
the SS. The case took 17 months between indictment and judgment, making it the 
longest of the NMT cases. 
 
The defendant Rasche directed and supervised activities of the Dresdner Bank (the “SS 
Bank”) and its affiliates in occupied western areas involving economic exploitation, 
including particularly activities involving transfer of control of Dutch enterprises to 
selected German firms through the process called “Verflechtung”, which was 
“interlacing” of Dutch and German capital and economic interests with a view to 
crating a single market. He was convicted only on the spoliation count, as the Tribunal 
found Rasche had participated actively in the Reich’s programme of “Aryanization” in 
The Netherlands and Czechoslovakia. In addition he was found guilty of SS 
membership and sentenced to seven years.  
 
According to the Tribunal, “[t]he real question is, is it a crime to make a loan, knowing 
or having good reason to believe that the borrower will us the funds in financing 
enterprises which are employed in using labor in violation of either national or 
international law? Does he stand in any different position than one who sells supplies 
or raw materials to a builder building a house, knowing that the structure will be used 
for an unlawful purpose? A bank sells money or credit in the same manner as the 
merchandiser of any other commodity. … Our duty is to try and punish those guilty of 
violating international law, and we are not prepared to state that such loans constitute a 
violation of that law, nor has our attention been drawn to any ruling to the contrary.”952 
Rasche, in the 452 page judgment that was delivered 18 months after the indictment on 
11 April 1949 “in a vastly altered international climate”, received a lenient sentence, as 
did the other defendants in his case.953 
 
                                                
951 Ministries Case. Other defendants on the economic side included Emil Puhl (Vice President of the 
Reichsbank, Paul Koerner (Deputy to Goering in the Office of the Four Year Plan), Paul Pleiger (the 
dominant figure in the “Hermann Goering Works”) and Hans Kehrl (who had held a number of 
economic positions in the Nazi government) (Taylor Report at 331). 
952 Ministries Case Judgment 622. 
953 Taylor IC Report at 333-334. 
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Discussed sequentially, it is possible to see the changing attitude to business’ role in 
WWII reflected in the cases. A gradual process of exoneration takes place, which is 
crowned, eventually, by the clemency granted the industrialists by Gen. McCloy in 
1951 (S.9.1). 
 
8 Industrialists in other zonal trials 
 
In Germany the other Allies also tried industrialists in their respective zones of 
occupation. Each of the Allies’ political priorities finds its reflection in these trials too. 
 
8.1 Industrialists in the British zonal trials 
According to Bloxham, the British purposively ran a prosecutions programme 
disassociated from the Nuremberg programme, and from the very beginning, sought to 
limit its scope.954 Bush asserts that Britain’s tactic was to coopt a number of industries 
rather than to try industrialists.955 The British Government had been worried about the 
prominence of the ‘economic case’ at the IMT, and according to Bloxham, 
instrumental in preventing an ‘IMT2’ as (at the dawn of the Cold War) they no longer 
wanted to cooperate with the Soviets in what could for them be a propaganda 
opportunity.956 Nevertheless, already before the end of the IMT trial, the British had 
tried personnel of Tesch and later also members of at least one further company, 
Steinöl. There is next to no secondary literature on these specific trials957 nor have 
government deliberations been published which explain why they were held.958 The 
jurisdiction of the British Military Courts covered only ‘war crimes’, defined in 
Regulation 1 of the Royal Warrant as any violation of the laws and usages of war, and 
does not cover crimes against humanity or crimes against the peace.959 This a priori 
limited the British to the prosecution of crimes against Allied nationals only. Handing 
any ‘major’ war crimes suspect found in the British Occupation Zone to the 
Americans, the British tried mostly minor cases relating to crimes against British 
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camp: 1997. 
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servicemen.960 In the absence of published material documenting government policy on 
the issue, the (small) size, (short) length, (low) prominence of the trials as well as the 
language used in the trials would suggest that although there were some 
business(wo)men among the accused, these trials were not intended to ‘send a 
message’ about corporate/business involvement in the war, in the way the US 
industrialists’ trials were.  
 
8.1.1 The Zyklon B Case 
One of the best-remembered British cases is the Zyklon B Case, which at the time, 
however, was a low-profile case,961 “a minor case that rested on the fact that British 
nationals were among the victims”.962 The trial took place during the height of the IMT 
trial, between 1st-8th March 1946, lasting only a week, compared to the 8-17 months of 
the later US industrialists’ cases. Despite being considered a minor case at the time, the 
trial of Bruno Tesch, Karl Weinbacher and Joachim Drosihn at the British Military 
Court in Hamburg, is significant in the debate around ‘corporate accountability’ in that 
it was the first trial of industrialists accused of WWII crimes.963 The Tesch company 
was a subsidiary of IG Farben, which manufactured the Zyklon B gas sold by Tesch 
(see Section xx). While the British objective was to punish those who had killed, 
injured or otherwise harmed British interests/servicemen, they did not limit themselves 
to those directly, physically responsible for the acts. Of the defendants it was said, in 
the trial, that “at Hamburg, Germany, between 1st January, 1941, and 31st March, 
1945, in violation of the laws and usages of war did supply poison gas used for the 
extermination of allied nationals interned in concentration camps well knowing that 
the said gas was to be so used.”964  
 
In his summing up, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) directed the Court that for a 
guilty verdict they would have to be certain of three facts, “first, that Allied nationals 
had been gassed by means of Zyklon B; secondly, that this gas had been supplied by 
Tesch and Stabenow; and thirdly, that the accused knew that the gas was to be used for 
                                                
960 E.g. the famous Stalag Luft case (Bloxham (2003) 106).  
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victims.” 
962 Bush (2009) 1237. 
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the purpose of killing human beings.”965 The JAG further stated “when you know what 
kind of man Dr. Tesch was, it inevitably follows that he must have known every little 
thing about his business.”966 While there was no direct evidence specifically imputing 
knowledge to Weinbacher, such was inferred from “the general atmosphere and 
conditions of the firm”.967 The JAG considered Drohsin to have been a subordinate 
employee and directed the Court that in the absence of any evidence Drohsin could 
have influenced matters, no knowledge as to the use of the gas could make him 
guilty.968 The company officers were not shown (or required to have had) intent vis-à-
vis the killings.969  
 
Necessity was pleaded in mitigation of the sentences in the case. Counsel for Tesch 
stated that any cooperation had happened “only under enormous pressure from the 
S.S.”, and that furthermore, if he had not cooperated, the S.S. would surely have 
achieved their aims by other means.970 Counsel for Weinbacher argued that he as a 
business employee might have thought that the ultimate use of the gas was Tesch’s 
responsibility as the company director and that if he had refused to supply the gas the 
S.S. would have immediately handed him over to the Gestapo.971 
 
Nevertheless, after this trial of seven days, based on the JAG’s directions, the Court 
found Tesch and Weinbacher guilty and sentenced them to death.972 Drohsin was 
acquitted. Appeals were filed on behalf of Tesch and Weinbacher, but these were 
dismissed and the two were hanged in May 1946.973 
 
8.1.2 The Steinöl Case/Neuengamme Concentration Camp 
In January 1947, coinciding with the start of the Pohl case, and after the US 
turnaround, the British tried Prof. Wittig, the director of the Steinöl company, and two 
colleagues. They were tried together with six guards of the (relatively) small 
Neuengamme concentration camp that had been built especially to provide a 
                                                
965 Zyklon B Case 101. 
966 Zyklon B Case 101. 
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workforce for the company’s shale oil extraction. The camp housed mainly Spanish 
communists, Belgian and French resistance fighters and Danish Jehovah’s witnesses, 
and seven of the defendants were convicted in relation to the unlawful deaths and 
maltreatment of Allied nationals. Wittig’s death sentence was commuted to 20 years, 
by Anthony Eden but he was released in 1955.974 As such, being the case that ran 
concurrently with the NMT trials, it follows the US pattern more closely than Tesch. 
 
Little can be said about the significance of British prosecutions policy on the basis of 
these cases and limited discussion in the literature. However, it can be suggested that at 
the time, while it was a British priority to focus on crimes against British servicemen 
(like in the US, heavy losses among troops engaged in the liberation of Europe had to 
be acknowledged) there was a willingness to draw a wide circle of complicity, a focus 
on industry was not apparent. According to the UNWCC commentary, “[t]he Military 
Court acted on the principle that any civilian who is an accessory to a violation of the 
laws and customs of war is himself also liable as a war criminal.”975 At this point, no 
differentiation is made between accessories as to whether they are involved for 
commercial reasons or otherwise (see Ch. 4 below). The question remains why no 
further industrialists were tried by the British in their zone of occupation, for example, 
the Hamburg shipping firms which employed thousands of forced labourers.976 Ties 
between British and German business – which could have received the State’s 
protection as they did in the US -undoubtedly existed, but little has been published on 
this topic. 
 
8.2 Industrialists in the French zonal trials  
The French were keener to prosecute industrialists, so as to strengthen their 
government’s hand against French collaborationist industrialists,977 because French 
industry had suffered considerably from ‘Aryanization’, and as many more French 
citizens had worked as slave labourers. Successful convictions would allow for 
expropriations of collaborators’ property and generally allow the French government 
to regain control over its main industries. Moreover, the specific case of Röchling was 
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of interest to the French as Röchling’s empire was built in the heavily industrialised 
Saar region, long the subject of German-French border disputes. 
 
8.2.1 The Case against Hermann Roechling and Others 
The Roechling Case978 is appended to Vol. XIV of the Trials of War Criminals before 
the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10.979 The 
indictment is dated 25 November 1947, the judgment 30 June 1948 and the judgment 
on appeal 25 January 1949. The main trial, which commenced at the time of the Pohl 
judgment, thus coincided in time with the Farben, Krupp and Ministries cases. 
 
Hermann Röchling and four other directors of the Röchling Enterprises were tried by 
the General Tribunal of the Military Government of the French Zone of Occupation in 
Germany at Rastatt. In what may have been the first recorded 20th Century war crimes 
case against industrialists, Hermann and Robert Röchling and several associates had 
already been sentenced to ten years imprisonment by a French military tribunal for 
wartime plunder after WWI, although the judgment was annulled for technical 
reasons.980 
 
The post-WWII Röchling judgment stands out as the only judgment after the IMT in 
which a defendant was found guilty of waging an aggressive war (distinct from 
planning and preparing), and the only judgment in which an industrialist was found 
guilty on aggressive war charges.981 In that sense, this judgment is truest to the ideas 
about the instigators/causes of WWII expressed by the Allies immediately after the 
war. 
 
Indeed, the Tribunal placed the Röchling Case in the context of the findings of the 
IMT on the economic aspects of war and referred to the prosecutions being prepared at 
the USMT in Nuremberg. The indictment stated that “[i]f the “Directors of German 
Enterprises”[982] plead that they only attached themselves to Hitler in order to oppose 
                                                
978 Roechling Case. 
979 Nuernberg, October 1946 – April 1949 at 1061.  
980 Taylor (1992) 304, fn.159. 
981 Roechling Case, Judgment 1061. 
982 Earlier on the same page, “…it is apparent that these wars of aggression and these crimes could not 
have been rendered possible, except with the conscious assistance of certain great German Industrialists 
and financiers whom we will designate under the appellation “Directors of the German Enterprises.” 
(Roechling Case, Judgment 1062). 
 169 
communism or “Social Democracy,” there exists no doubt that the profound reason for 
their attitude can be sought in their desire, long before the coming of national 
socialism, to extend their undertakings beyond the frontiers of the Reich.”983 Hermann 
Röchling was accused of, amongst others, urging Hitler to invade the Balkans. 
Röchling had appropriated enterprises and resources in a number of occupied 
countires.984 In a letter to a colleague, Hermann Röchling wrote:  
We shall only then succeed in reaching our objective, that is, to obtain definite 
possession of these enterprises, if we act in the capacity of interpreters of 
National-Socialist principles in maintaining these in the strongest manner and 
in practicing them. We must also prove that we are faithful supporters of the 
Fuehrer’s policies, that is to say, that we must follow here a policy of 
Germanization, as much as that is possible.985 
 
Here the scenario is congruent with the IMT’s ‘economic case’. However, the 
Röchling defendants’ sentences were significantly reduced in 1949, showing a 
softening of French attitudes also.986 
 
8.3 Industrialists in the Soviet zonal trials 
For the Soviets and GDR leaderships, the zonal trials were about Systemkritik (critique 
of the (capitalist) system) as much as they were about nationalising German industries. 
As reflected in Molotov’s speech (Section 6), the Soviets held on to the idea that 
WWII had been a German war of imperialism and the inevitable result of the 
convergence of power in the hands of fewer and fewer cartels. Bukharin’s theory on 
Imperialism and World Economy, written in 1915, and elaborated by Lenin in 
Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism, supports this analysis,987 expressed, 
unsympathetically, by Bloxham as “[t]he Soviets harbored the simplistic determinist 
view that Hitler was an instrument of German bankers and big business.”988 While 
there is no clear indication that the Soviets discounted the ‘Hitler factor’989 in this way, 
                                                
983 Roechling Case, Judgment 1062. 
984 Roechling Case, Judgment 1067-8. 
985 Roechling Case, Judgment 1082. 
986 Roechling Case, Judgment on Appeal 1142. 
987 Bukharin (2003), Lenin (1934).  
988 Bloxham (2003) 100. 
989 Hilger (2008) 180. 
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it is clear that the Soviet leadership at least saw a unity of purpose in the actions of the 
Nazi political and military leaderships and the cartels. 
 
It is said that the Soviet Military Tribunals (“SMT”) convicted over 17,000 German 
former members of the Gestapo, SS, SD and civilian Nazi leadership.990 Exact numbers 
are difficult to gauge as most SMT trials took place in secret and were not reported.991 
Exceptions are a number of public trials which Western authors such as Wentker 
describe as ‘political trials’. The trials relating to business must have been many, 
considering that the SMT over the years ordered the expropriation of business 
enterprises and other property under CCL38 in 337 cases.992 As stated above (Section 
2) for linguistic reasons I have not been able to research official records or press 
reports. 
 
According to Wentker, from the 1950s and the foundation of the GDR in 1955 the 
Nazi trials became more clearly propagandistic, aimed at showing the Soviet/East 
German authorities had uprooted fascism in Eastern Germany while in the West many 
key Nazi leaders once again held high positions in government. Moreover, with the 
restoration of liberal capitalism West Germany was considered by the East to have 
once again created the premises for the emergence of fascism. These warnings were 
wrapped into the language of the trials. In 1963 the GDR held an in absentia trial of 
the (then) West German Secretary of State Globke, in a direct response to Israel’s 
Eichmann trial. Globke had been a close colleague of Eichmann and was painted by 
the GDR court as ‘Bonn’s Eichmann’.993  
 
8.3.1 Topf & Söhne 
One example of a case against industrialists conducted by the SMT that has received 
attention in the literature is that against four officials of the firm Topf & Söhne, which 
had delivered specially developed crematory ovens to Auschwitz and other death 
                                                
990 And as at August 1947, 518 persons were sentenced by German courts in the Soviet Zone applying 
CCL10 (Wentker (2002) 64)), and see generally, Marxen (2001) 159. 
991 Wentker (2002) 64. 
992 Wentker (2002) at 69.  
993 Wentker (2002) 72. In fact this ‘show trial’ had the effect of a change in West German attitude to 
former Nazi crimes and the initiation of a number of trials (id. at 73). 
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camps.994 Schüle, in a company history of Topf & Söhne emphasises the generally 
under-researched responsibility of industry for the ‘industrialisation of killing’.995  
 
The firm’s director, Topf, committed suicide within days of the end of the war, and his 
deputy, also a Topf, fled to the US occupied zone. In 1946 four further officials of the 
firm were detained by the Soviet Occupation Authorities, Prüfer, Braun, Schultze und 
Sander. Excerpts of interrogation records were published in Der Spiegel in 1993.996 All 
admitted to their roles in designing, manufacturing and selling the ovens, and 
ventilation systems for gas chambers, to Auschwitz and other death camps. Sander 
died of a heart attack during the trial while the other three were convicted and 
sentenced to 25 years’ in a Soviet penal camp.997 In interrogation, Schulze had said that 
after he and his colleague had discovered the ovens were used for the cremation of the 
victims of mass-murder, he continued his work. “I and Prüfer continued, because we 
were bound, through our signature. We stood under obligation, with the SS, the Topf 
firm and the NS State.”998  
 
Schüle reads in this statement evidence of ‘self-objectification’ – the agency in the 
decision to place a signature on the employment and supply contracts is negated when 
the ‘I’ becomes the object of fulfilment of a duty towards customer and employer.999 
The source of such sense of duty may not necessarily be the ideological agreement 
with the Nazi project, but rather, a traditional mentality of blind loyalty and negation 
of own responsibility. Such negation is facilitated by the legal constructs and 
bureaucracies of the corporation: morality leaves the legal relation. This echoes the 
conclusion of my Chapter 2A, that the corporate ‘structure of irresponsibility’ ‘breeds’ 
anomie, or the dissociation between business(wo)man and affected individual. At the 
same time, in the run of these cases, the ‘necessity’ defence employed in the earlier 
cases (protecting own safety) turns into Mummenthey’s attempt to portray himself as a 
businessman, ‘just doing business’ once capitalism knows itself on safer ground at 
Nuremberg. 
 
                                                
994 Pressac (1994); Vest (2010) fn.7. 
995 Schüle (2003) 215; on the industrialisation of killing see further Traverso (2003). 
996 Der Spiegel (1993). 
997 Der Spiegel (1993). Der Spiegel notes that the confessions were unlikely to have been obtained under 
pressure. 
998 Der Spiegel (1993). 
999 Schüle (2003) 218. 
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9 Aftermath: The warm bosom of the Western powers 
 
Jeßberger writes, the “IG managers had a soft fall, from the ranks of the Wehrmacht 
into the warm bosom of the western powers.”1000 In the IG Farben case the defendants, 
making their final statements to the tribunal seemed to be able to anticipate the 
“amicable justice”1001 they were to receive. 
 
Krauch’s former colleague Kuehne adds:  
The American industry at the present time is undergoing to a much greater 
degree the same development that we underwent at the time of rearmament: 
that is to say, demands concerning air-raid protection, mobilization plans in 
the event of war, counterintelligence, and much more of the same type. It is 
even experiencing the stockpiling of atomic bombs without any industrialists 
being charged on that account for participating in aggressive warfare. And you 
have to bear in mind, Your Honors, there is no nation on your country's 
borders which is a menace to you industrially or ideologically…1002 
 
Lawyers like Dubois and Sasuly, and to a lesser extent also Taylor, left Germany 
disappointed, frustrated, and enraged.1003 On coming home, the case they had been 
fighting was now taboo.  The tables had turned, the capitalists emerged as victors and 
the prosecutors became persecuted.  
 
Kuehne, in his final statement to the Farben Tribunal, cites the New York Herald 
Tribune of 4 October 1947, from a report on a speech held by the Secretary of 
Defense, Forrestal, as follows: 
Mr. Forrestal denied that there was any historical validity for the Marxist 
theory according to which industrialists desired war for the sake of material 
gains. Mr. Forrestal said that there was no group anywhere that was more in 
favor of peace than the industrialists.1004 
 
                                                
1000 Jeßberger (2010). 
1001 Jeßberger (2010). 
1002 IG Farben Case 1073-4. 
1003 This is evident in the tone and content of e.g. Dubois’, Taylor’s and Sasuly’s post-war writing. 
1004 Farben Final Statements of Defendants, Kuehne 1073 
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Several of the lawyers and OMGUS staff were investigated for possible “bolshevist” 
sympathies.1005 Whether these investigations (by McCarthy and his team) were 
intended to ensure the lawyers were subdued we will probably never know. The 
preface to the German edition of Sasuly’s book, states that this text, for political 
reasons, has not been available in the US for many years.1006 The legacy of this has 
been the ‘legal amnesia’ through which the industrialists’ trials were forgotten until 
very recently.  
 
9.1 The Churchill and McCloy Clemencies, McCarthyism and the rebuilding of West 
Germany 
On January 31 1951 in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, US High Commissioner for 
Germany John J. McCloy and Chief of the US European Command Gen. Thomas T. 
Handy commuted 21 death sentences, reduced the sentences of 69 other individuals 
and released 33 other war criminals, including Alfried Krupp the former head of the 
Krupp munitions works. Commissioner McCloy and Gen. Handy also restored 
Krupp’s property rights.1007 Likewise in the UK, “immediately on his return to 
Downing Street [in 1951] Churchill moved to release all remaining Germans”.1008 
Wittig was released in 1955.1009 
 
Throughout 1951, Telford Taylor spoke out against the release of Alfried Krupp, 
which he considered a political move making a mockery of the judicial process.1010 He 
echoes the sentiment expressed by Hebert in a draft dissent on the aggressive war 
charge in the IG Farben case, which has only recently come to light. From Hebert’s 
raw, and seemingly immediate response a similar perspective on the proceedings can 
be gleaned.1011 
 
                                                
1005 Bush (2009) 1240. 
1006 Sasuly (1952) 5. 
1007 Washington Post, 1 February 1951. See also The Nation, 24 February 24, 1951; Taylor (1953) 197.  
1008 Bloxham (2003) 116. 
1009 Wittig File.  
1010 Telford Taylor Papers. Subsequently, McCarthy threatened to subpoena Taylor to appear before his 
committee. By December’s end, however, McCarthy “withdrew his subpoena sword.” Taylor went on to 
represent young Americans who refuse military service in Vietnam on the basis that it is a “war of 
aggression” for which they might incur individual criminal responsibility for participating (Falk (1998-
1999)). 
1011 The scanned type-written document is undated. Available here: 
http://louisdl.louislibraries.org/u?/HNF,55. 
 174 
At this point, ‘Nuremberg’ had turned from a morality play into théâtre de l’absurde. 
The trials served not to discover and treat real causes, but rather to express the 
hegemon’s moral superiority, to appease home economic actors so as to further own 
political-economic longer term goals. Moreover, the trials partially failed to live up to 
Jackson’s promise that ‘justice be done’, in the eyes of the home public as well as 
survivors, and the broader German/European publics. Ratner commented in 2009 that 
“while contributing substantially to the doctrinal and procedural development of 
international criminal law and subjecting Nazi crime to some degree of exposure and 
justice, these trials, even in conjunction with their CCL10 counterparts, were of limited 
value to the societies and victims involved, the ongoing debate over responsibility and 
reparation for Nazi atrocities is testimony to this conclusion.”1012 
 
So, while “[t]he masses of peoples liberated from the yoke fascism demanded the trial 
of the most evil cartel leaders, in Nuremberg,” even those who had received sentences 
were soon to be freed again, and by 1952 many were already back in power at their 
companies.1013 Indeed, IG Farben members soon began to produce military materials 
again (fabric for parachutes) which were used by the US in their war against Korea.1014 
While German industry was rebuilt, the Cold War developed, the European Coal and 
Steel Community, GATT and the Bretton Woods institutions took shape, further 
congealing capitalism, institutionalising IL. In an ironic turn, McCloy was appointed 
to lead the World Bank.1015 Slave labour compensation agreements were made, Flick 
gained new notoriety for refusing to contribute, cause lawyers litigated against banks 
and other companies (see Ch. 6).  
                                                
1012 Ratner et al. (2009) 212. 
1013 Anon. (1960). 
1014 Anon. (1962). 
1015 Bush (2009) at 1193. 
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Chapter 3B: The Tokyo International Military Tribunal, or, How the East was 
Won 
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1 Part B: Japan 
 
Once it was decided international criminal trials would be held in Germany, it seemed 
as if the Allies could not not try Japanese war crimes suspects also. While there are 
substantial differences, in the legal basis of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (“IMTFE”), the content of the Charter, the composition of the bench and the 
shape of the indictment, the similarities with Nuremberg are perhaps more noteworthy. 
To some extent, ‘Tokyo’ was Nuremberg without frills, without Jackson’s flowery 
language to justify it, without theatrics, and without much of an audience. Above, I 
have argued that the Allies (and in particular the US) at Nuremberg had as their dual 
aim on the one hand to create a lasting ‘ICL’, and on the other hand, to immediately 
use this ICL to create a diversion for materially very far-reaching economic reforms. 
Such a combination of trials and reforms I called ‘capitalist victor’s justice’ and its 
desired effect was to cement the US economic hegemony as well as its charismatic 
authority, globally. In Japan, mostly out of view of the West, it seemed the diversion 
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needed to be much smaller to still achieve comparably far-reaching results on the 
economic front.  
The US had created in Japan, to last until today, “an industrial superpower under 
American military protection and within a stable dollar-centred global financial 
framework… The US need Japan today … Japan’s companies manufacture a range of 
both high value-added components and finished products on which America’s 
technological and military supremacy totally depend. Japan’s continued central role in 
financing the US trade and government deficits and propping up a dollar-centred 
international order is … the key explanation for Washington’s ability to project and 
sustain a vast global military establishment … since the mid ‘70s, … it has been the 
Japanese elite that has acted to support the dollar, the Bretton Woods II regime and, by 
extension, the continuation of American hegemony…”1016 
 
In this chapter I highlight aspects of how this effect was achieved, through the main 
trial, the selection (and omission) of indictees, and the occupation policies. I also 
review a number of other ICL and business-related cases, which seem somehow 
unconnected with the future of Japan, but play a role in how we perceive ICL and 
business, going forward. These trials show similarities with the secondary trials on the 
German side (for example, through illuminating how other states conducted trials and 
what the meaning of these trials were to their polities and more widely), and they also 
serve to ‘actualise’ ICL practice. These cases seem to confirm the reality of ICL and 
contribute to the notion that it is a mechanism that can (or will) be applied equally, if 
not now, then at some point soon. 
 
1.1 Sources 
Of the world’s international war crimes trials, those at the IMTFE are probably the 
most under-researched. There are many reasons why these trials are largely forgotten 
(outside of Japan); one is the absence of a readily available version of the judgments. 
Unlike the Nuremberg IMT judgment, the judgments of the Tokyo IMT (the majority 
judgement and several separate opinions) were not published by the US government, 
                                                
1016 Murphy (2006) 47-9, quoted in Callinicos (2009) 216. 
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or indeed any of the other Allied governments participating in the Tribunal.1017 An 
early descriptive analysis by Solis Horwitz (who had been Assistant Prosecutor for the 
US at the IMTFE) was published in International Conciliation in 1950.1018 The US 
government deposited mimeographed copies of the entire transcript (48,288 pages of 
transcript and approx. 30,000 pages of exhibits) at the Department of the Army and 
three US universities.1019 An incomplete set is available at the British Imperial War 
Museum.1020 There is no statement of explanation as to the failure to publish the 
judgment and proceedings. Cassese simply remarks “[t]here were of course political 
reasons for this failure to give publicity to the results of such an important trial.”1021 
 
Not until the 1970s was the judgment published in a form accessible to the wider 
public, by Dutch former Tokyo Judge Röling.1022 In 1981 a 22-volume complete 
transcripts was published by Pritchard & Zaide (which is not widely available).1023 
Justice Pal published his (700 page) dissenting judgment in 1953.1024 Recently a new 
document collection was published by Boister and Cryer, which contains the Charter, 
indictment and decisions.1025 
 
In Japan, China and the USSR various scholarly works and document collections have 
been published, but these did not receive a wide audience outside of their home/region, 
for linguistic, but also political reasons (in the sense that USSR, GDR produced 
publications rarely feature in “Western” libraries).1026 
 
In the US public interest in the trials was very low until the publication of a book on 
the Rape of Nanjing by Iris Chang.1027 Questions began to be asked: Did the US 
Government deliberately repress information? Did the Government grant immunity to 
                                                
1017 Although the indictment had been published by the US: IMTFE Indictment. Apparently no explicit 
reason is given for this non-publication, also, I have not been able to answer the question why the other 
Allied governments did not publish. 
1018 Horwitz (1950) 477. Albertson calls this a “rather prejudiced account of a member of the 
prosecution team” Albertson (1972). 
1019 Horwitz (1950) 576. 
1020 National Archives Research Guide. 
1021 Cassese (1994) 6.  
1022 Röling (1977). It is puzzling why none of the Allies nor indeed a publishing house has published 
least some of the documents before Röling. 
1023 Pritchard (1981). 
1024 Pal Dissent (1953). 
1025 Boister (2008a) xxxiii.  
1026 For a bibliography that includes many Japanese texts, see Totani (2008) 301-321. 
1027 Chang (1997). 
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the former Japanese Emperor Hirohito and Ishii, the notorious General in charge of 
Japanese Army “Unit 731” which had been accused of practising human vivisection 
for bacteriological warfare research?1028 Additionally, the issue of “comfort women” 
came to the fore,1029 as well as the abuse of Allied PoWs by the Japanese. According to 
Drea, “[t]he rise of concern about Japanese war crimes in the 1990s reinforced the 
notion that most Japanese war criminals escaped punishment, either because the US 
government needed their cooperation against the Soviet Union during the early days of 
the Cold War, or to appease current Japanese economic and commercial interests.”1030 
 
In response to this upsurge in interest, the US Congress passed the Japanese Imperial 
Government Disclosure Act in 2000, leading to the declassification of some 100,000 
pages of documents, including all of the Office of Strategic Services (a WWII US 
intelligence outfit) files and many records of the CIA and FBI.1031 
 
Very little is readily accessible about the, around 2,200, other Allied trials held in the 
East post-WWII. Some of the (presumably more noteworthy?) trials are summarised 
by the U.N. War Crimes Commission.1032 Now, aside from paper archives, such 
documentation is becoming available online through the “Forschungs- und 
Dokumentationszentrum Kriegsverbrecherprozesse” at the Philipps-Universität 
Marburg in collaboration with the UC Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center,1033 The 
Hong Kong War Crimes Trials Collection,1034 the ICC Legal Tools Database,1035 the 
Yale University Avalon Project.1036 In the U.K., Pritchard started, but abandoned a 
project to collect all British War Crimes Trials in the Far East.1037 
 
                                                
1028 Harris (2002). 
1029 See, e.g. Chinkin (2001). 
1030 Drea (2006) 14. 
1031 Under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act and the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act  
reportedly over 8.5 million pages of records related to Japanese and Nazi War crimes have been 
identified among Federal Government records and opened to the public, including certain types of 
records never before released, such as CIA operational files. The declassification work is described in 
the Report of the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working 
Group (IWG), 2007. So as to facilitate and stimulate research on the topics the IWG published three 
research guides: Drea (2006). It should be noted that many relevant documents were never classified in 
the first place or had already been declassified, e.g. State Department Bulletins. 
1032 WCCLR (supra Chapter 3A). 
1033 Marburg/Berkeley War Crimes Project. 
1034 Hong Kong War Crimes Project. 
1035 ICC Legal Tools. 
1036 Supra. These are works in progress, with only limited materials available as January 2012. 
1037 Pritchard mentions his project of publishing the 21 volume The British War Crimes Trials in the Far 
East, 1946-1948, which is referred to as “forthcoming, 1997” in fn. 1 of Pritchard (1996) 16. 
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The Yamashita trial1038 is cited in contemporary texts as one of the first war crimes 
trials to deal extensively with the concept of command responsibility.1039 Many 
commentaries on the subsequent trials are based on press articles1040 e.g. Piccigallo’s 
monograph “The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the Far East 
1945-51”1041; and Ramasastry’s article on slave labour.1042 In 1950, the USSR 
published materials on the Chabarovsk Trial in German and English (see below, S. 
4.2.4).1043  Some trials we only know of because they are referred to in other cases (S. 
4.2.3). 
 
Like their counterparts at Nuremberg, some of the lawyers involved in the IMTFE 
have published memoirs and articles, as well as general texts, notably prosecutors 
Horwitz and Donihi, and judges Pal, Keenan, and Röling (the latter in conversation 
with Cassese).1044 While general ICL texts devote some attention to Tokyo,1045 outside 
of Japan,1046 some specialised monographs and edited volumes have been produced.1047 
The recent 60th anniversary of the trial has given rise to various reappraisals and 
revisits. Boister and Cryer, in their “Reappraisal” accompanying the documents 
bundle, provide a retrospective.1048 The dissenting judgment of the Indian Judge Pal 
gave rise to a body of literature that almost rivals all that has been written on the Far 
East beside this.1049 Much of it celebrates Pal’s “postcolonial” stance,1050 some of it in 
an Orientalist manner.1051 
 
2 Why Tokyo? 
 
Again, examining the history behind the trials, the context in which the tribunal was 
set up and organised, the official explanations given for its existence, as well as the 
                                                
1038 Yamashita Case.  
1039 E.g. Werle (2009) 500; Zahar (2008) 259;Van Sliedregt (2003) 120-125. 
1040 Short summaries of English language (media) sources can be found in Welch (2001). 
1041 Piccigallo (1979). 
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1045 Van Sliedregt (2003) 128-130; Cryer (2010) 115-120; Bantekas (2007) 507-508. 
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1048 Boister (2008a); Simpson (2009); Tanaka (2011). 
1049 Boister (2008a) 349; Takeshi (2011) 127. 
1050 E.g. Falk (1998-1999). 
1051 Kopelman (1991). 
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unfolding of events during and after the trial including its ‘quiet burial’,1052 can tell us 
more about the functions and uses of ICL, in particular. 
 
As early as 1942 the St James Declaration included mention of Japanese “acts of 
barbarism and violence”.1053 In the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 which was 
issued at the conclusion of a meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chinese 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek the acts were denounced as “aggressions”.1054 In 1944, 
the United Nations War Crimes Commission set up the Far Eastern Sub-Committee in 
Chungking, specifically to collect information on Japanese crimes in East Asia.1055 The 
Potsdam Declaration (Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender) of 26 
July 1945, included in paragraph (10) “stern justice shall be meted out to all war 
criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.”1056 A US-
directed Far-Eastern Advisory Committee then (October 1945) formulated policies by 
which Japan was to fulfil its obligation of surrender, before this body reconstituted as 
the Far-Eastern Committee (“FEC”) and began to concern itself also with war crimes 
policy.1057 
 
British prosecutor Comyns-Carr wrote, on behalf of the British Commonwealth 
prosecutors, “the aim of this International Trial is to establish the criminality of certain 
acts committed by Japan.”1058 As borne out by the secondary trials in Germany and 
also in the ‘East’ (below), British priority was to deal with crimes against its 
servicemen/PoWs. In addition, however, an Allied objective was the affirmation of 
Nuremberg’s legal findings (in particular on individual responsibility for aggressive 
war1059) - conform the ‘for law’ motivation described above (Chapter 3A S.3). 
 
                                                
1052 Piccigallo (1979) 146. 
1053 St James Declaration. 
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for Japan and the declaration establishing this council also delegated the power to General MacArthur to 
implement the terms of the treaty of surrender and any further directives issued by the Allies. 
1058 Quoted in Totani (2008) 66. 
1059 Totani (2008) 66. 
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Former US prosecutor Horwitz describes setting up the tribunal as a unilateral US 
initiative, but insists that subsequent decisions were taken by the Allies and 
representatives of countries which had been occupied by Japan jointly.1060 They did so 
through their participation in the FEC. Decisions taken by the commission were to be 
translated into Directives by the US and transmitted to the Supreme Commander for 
the Allied Powers (“SCAP”), US General Douglas MacArthur, who was charged with 
their implementation.1061 However, in reality it appears that SCAP and his team 
dominated not only the IMT, but also the organisation of post-WWII affairs in Japan 
generally.1062 
 
The main reasons given by US officials for the go-ahead of the trial, were, (1) to 
“impress” the Japanese,1063 (2) as a way of getting the new Japanese leadership to 
cooperate, to “get down to business”1064 and, finally, “to satisfy a Japanese popular 
demand:  
The Japanese people at present show evidence of being in a mood for reform 
and change, They are now thoroughly disillusioned and there is wide and 
outspoken criticism of the men who misled them and brought disaster upon the 
country. I believe it is correct to say that the Japanese people today expect the 
American authorities to make more arrests and that, on the part of the great 
majority, they will not resent those arrests.1065 
 
This position is contradicted by Futamura, however, who has documented the intense 
resentment of the Japanese people towards the white man’s, victors’ trial (except 
insofar as they believed their leaders deserved punishment for losing the war).1066 
 
In this Chapter, I argue that at least part of the reason for the trials (as in Germany) 
was to provide the ‘public face’ of the Allied administration, a morality play (or horror 
story) to the Japanese public, while mostly concealing to the outside world the far-
                                                
1060 These were, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, The Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippine 
Commonwealth, the USSR and the UK (Horwitz (1950) 481). The tribunal has been accused of racism 
for not including Taiwan and Korea even though these countries had been victims of the war (Totani 
(2009) 13).  
1061 Horwitz (1950) 481. 
1062 E.g. generally, Finn (1992). 
1063 FRUS 922; 926. 
1064 FRUS 942. 
1065 FRUS 952: Atcheson “Top Secret” memo to SCAP dated 6 November 1945. 
1066 Generally, Futamura (2008); also, Onuma (2002); Boister (2008b) 315-322. 
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reaching economic reforms implemented by the US occupation of Japan, a progamme 
of ‘shock therapy’ leading to “Japan’s stunning rise as an economic power”.1067 
 
3 The US Occupation and economic reform of Japan 
 
The 80-month US occupation of Japan has been called, “perhaps the single most 
exhaustively planned operation of massive and externally directed change in world 
history.”1068 Following Potsdam the US published the “US Initial Post Surrender 
Policy,” between June and September 1945, containing a comprehensive plan for the 
occupation of Japan with the purpose, “first: to prevent Japan ever again becoming a 
military menace, and second objective: to bring about the eventual establishment of a 
peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and 
which will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations…”1069 As in Germany, Allied 
occupation of Japan was to be a predominantly US affair.1070 
 
The policy document contained as one of its objectives: “the eventual participation of 
Japan in a World economy on a reasonable basis”,1071 and directives on the 
democratisation and the demilitarisation of Japan, economic policy, the opening up the 
Japanese market for foreign direct investment, and the breaking up of the Japanese 
industrial and banking cartels.1072 
 
In Japan during WWII there were four main zaibatsu (literally plutocrats or financial 
clique1073): the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda.1074 Zaibatsu are horizontally 
structured cartels that typically include a group of subsidiary companies (including 
mining/manufacturing/heavy industry as well as finance) arranged under a holding 
company, each of which was privately owned by one of Japan’s well-known elite 
families.1075 
                                                
1067 Finn (1992) xviii. 
1068 Finn (1992) xix, quoting Ward (1987) i. 
1069 Records of SWNCC. 
1070 Ando (1991) 10. 
1071 US Initial Post-Defeat Policy. 
1072 US Initial Post-Surrender Policy.  
1073 Ando (1991) 18. 
1074 Finn (1992) 57. 
1075 See generally, Seita (1994) 129ff. and Vernon DSB 1947. 
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The zaibatsu are closely linked to the government,1076 the Royal Family1077 and the 
military – at the time of WWII for example the Mitsubishi group was closely linked to 
the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Rikken Minseito political party, while the Rikken 
Seiyukai was considered to have been an extension of the Mitsui group, which was 
also closely linked with the Imperial Japanese Army.1078 The zaibatsu are said to have 
had great influence over Japanese national and foreign policies.1079 By the end of the 
war the ten largest zaibatsu together controlled about 68 percent of Japan’s machinery 
and equipment production, about 53 percent of the financial and insurance business, 50 
percent of mining production, and 38 percent of chemical production.1080 This situation 
shows similar economic domination of key industries by a handful of enterprises 
(directed by a handful of individuals) to Germany before/during WWII. Roth relates 
how the two largest combines, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, in the 1930s disagreed on the 
use of force for economic expansion, with Mitsubishi preferring ‘economic penetration 
by means short of war’ while eventually Fujiwara, the head of the Mitsui zaibatsu 
‘spoke for ever wider sections of the zaibatsu’ when he wrote in his Spirit of Japanese 
Industry: 
Diplomacy without force is of no value. No matter how diligent the Japanese may 
be, no matter how superior their technical development or industrial 
administration may be, there will be no hope for Japanese trade expansion if there 
is no adequate force to back it. Now the greatest of forces is military preparedness 
founded on the Army and navy. We can safely expand abroad and engage in 
various enterprises, if we are confident of protection. In this sense, any outlay for 
armament is a form of investment.”1081 
 
Roth, writing in 1945, describes a similar scenario to that of the German industrialists’ 
joint strategising for expansion in Europe.1082 
                                                
1076 Seita (1994) 139. 
1077 Materialien 533. 
1078 Roth (1946) 61-2. 
1079 Finn (1992) 57. 
1080 Finn (1992) 57; “The significant size of the zaibatsu can be gauged by the number of employees in 
Mitsui and Mitsubishi – the two largest zaibatsu combines-which in 1945 was estimated to be 2.8 
million and 1.0 million, respectively.” Seita (1994) 143. 
1081 Quoted in Roth (1946) 63. 
1082 During WWII there were even attempts to imitate the German model of industrial-political relations 
(Cohen (2000) 10). 
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4 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
 
On war criminals, the US Initial Post Surrender Policy contained to following 
provision:  
2. War criminals 
Persons charged by the Supreme Commander or the appropriate United 
Nations agency with being war criminals, including those charged with having 
visited cruelties upon United Nations prisoners or other nationals, shall be 
arrested, tried, and if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the 
United Nations for offenses against its nationals shall, if not wanted for trial or 
as witnesses or otherwise by the Supreme Commander, be turned over to the 
custody of such other nation.1083 
 
This already implies there is an attempt to minimise the scope of the trial. 
 
On 14 August, 1945, the Japanese Acceptance of Surrender was communicated by the 
Japanese leadership, accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and as such 
proclaiming the unconditional surrender of Japan, placing it under authority of the 
SCAP.1084 On 11 September the order to arrest the major war crimes suspects was 
given by SCAP.1085 
 
On 29 October 1945 already one of the military commissions commenced a 
prosecution: the Yamashita trial at the Manila US Military Court.1086 The trial 
concluded on 7 December 1945 and Yamashita was convicted and sentenced to death 
for, as the commanding general of a Japanese military unit in the Philippines (which 
was still a US possession at the time), having failed to control his troops, who 
committed atrocities against American, Philippines and other nationals, that he must 
have known about.1087 The reason given for this early trial was to establish a 
“precedent” or model, in the informal sense.1088 
                                                
1083 US Initial Post-Surrender Policy. 
1084 Japanese Acceptance of Surrender.  
1085 Totani (2009) 63.  
1086 Yamashita Case. 
1087 See also Van Sliedregt (2003) 120-128. The decision was criticised in the literature (Piccigallo 
(1979) 56-57), amongst others as racist see e.g. Prévost (1992) 192; Piccigallo (1979) 231. 
1088 Piccigallo (1979) 58; Van Sliedregt (2003) 124. Note that also the Soviet Union had been 
prosecuting cases already (Prozeßmaterialien (1950)).  
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The IMTFE was established by means of a proclamation by Douglas MacArthur, the 
SCAP, issued 19 January 1946.1089 The Declaration stated that the Tribunal was based 
on the Instrument of Surrender and the Potsdam Declaration, and established pursuant 
to “allied authority”.1090 The Declaration received formal international sanction on 29 
March 1946.1091 The Charter of the Tokyo IMT (“CIMTFE”), which was contained in 
the directive, was modelled on the Nuremberg Charter and closely resembled it in 
jurisdiction, powers and procedural provisions.1092 Article 1 establishes the Tribunal, 
Arts. 2-4 regulate membership, convening and voting. Article 5 delineates the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction over persons (“Far Eastern war criminals who as individuals or 
as members of organisations1093 are charged with offences which include Crimes 
against Peace”) and offences.1094 Article 6 delineates individual responsibility.1095 
 
In accordance with Article 7 of the CIMTFE, the Rules of Procedure of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East were issued on 25 April 1946.1096 
Article 8 provides for the appointment of one Chief of Counsel by MacArthur, this in 
contrast with the Nuremberg IMT where each of the four Allied Powers appointed a 
Chief. MacArthur appointed prosecutor Joseph Keenan as Chief Prosecutor of the 
International Prosecution Section, where he coordinated the work of the prosecutors 
appointed by the other countries.1097 Articles 9-15 deal with fair trial provisions, 
powers of the tribunal and conduct of trial. Article 16 provides for penalties (including 
the death penalty) and Article 17 finally gives the SCAP the power at any time to 
reduce the sentences. 
 
A main difference of the Tokyo IMT was that all states to which Japan had capitulated 
were represented on the bench, along with India and the Philippines which were at the 
time still under UK and US colonial rule. The Tokyo Tribunal consisted of 11 judges, 
                                                
1089 IMTFE Proclamation. 
1090 IMTFE Proclamation. 
1091 Boister (2008a) xxxvi. 
1092 IMTFE Charter.  
1093 Although, like the Nuremberg Charter, the CIMTFE includes mention of “as a member of a group” 
it was decided not to include provisions on declaring groups illegal as it was found no such groups 
probably existed in Japan the relevant time (Horwitz (1950) 494). 
1094 IMTFE Charter Art. 5. Appendix C. 
1095 IMTFE Charter Art. 6. Appendix C. 
1096 Boister (2008a) 12. 
1097 Keenan was much criticised for his lack of legal expertise, frequent absences and alcoholism, 
Boister (2008a) lvi-lvii. 
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who were appointed by General MacArthur.1098 The Australian Judge Webb oversaw 
the bench. The Tribunal was housed in the former military academy in Tokyo, which 
had housed the War Ministry and Army General Headquarters during the war.1099 From 
a practical point of view, the trial was hampered by the Japanese destruction of official 
war records at the close of the war. The evidentiary standard employed by the Tribunal 
was relaxed (Art.13 IMTFE).1100 The Tribunal was under pressure to deliver its 
judgment quickly.1101 That the US generally appointed lower-level officials to 
functions at the tribunal.1102 
 
Horwitz describes US domination of the process thus: “The first time eleven nations 
had agreed in a matter other than actual military operations to subordinate their 
sovereignty and to permit a national of one of them to have final direction and 
control.”1103 The much tighter US reign was to some extent a policy adopted in 
response to lessons learnt by Jackson and his colleagues at (and prior to) Nuremberg, 
who had had great trouble reaching agreement among the various representatives 
involved there.1104 
 
The indictment was lodged on 29 April 1946 charging 28 defendants with Class A 
(aggression), Class B (war crimes) and Class C (crimes against humanity).1105 The 
Indictment was a list of 55 counts related to specific occurrences (many related to 
maltreatment of allied POWs) with annexes setting out the general historical and 
political context and specifics.1106 
 
                                                
1098 As per Arts 2 and 3 of the IMTFE Charter. 
1099 Totani (2008) 8. 
1100 IMTFE Charter Article 13. Appendix C. 
1101 IMTFE Charter. 
1102 For example, Chief Counsel Keenan was an assistant Attorney-General vs. Nuremberg Chief 
Counsel Jackson who was a Supreme Court Justice. Horwitz comments: “[r]arely has any group of men 
undertaking a project of similar size and scope been less prepared for their task than were the original 
twenty-odd members of the legal staff of the prosecution when they began their labors on 8 December 
1945…. few of them had any knowledge about Japan, the Japanese, or the principal figures involved or 
any real appreciation of the magnitude of the venture they were undertaking.” Horwitz (1950) 494. 
1103 Horwitz (1950) 487. 
1104 Totani (2008) 24. 
1105 The tribunal did not indict anyone who could not plausibly be charged with Class A crimes, possibly 
because this point it was still expected that there might be further international trials. 
1106 Further, Section 4, “Methods of corruption and coercion in China and other occupied territories” – 
includes the use of opium to “weaken the native inhabitants’ will to resist.” 37. Also, “revenue from … 
traffic in opium and other narcotics was used to finance the preparation for and waging of the wars of 
aggression set forth in this Indictment and to establish and finance the puppet governments set up by the 
Japanese Government in the various occupied territories.” (id). 
 187 
The Tribunal formally convened for the arraignment of the defendants on 3 May 1946. 
The first session was spent reading the indictment. The main focus again was the war 
of aggression and conspiracy elements. The Prosecution attempted to show that there 
had been a conspiracy to go to war with the UK and the US since 1928. The 
Prosecution’s strategy was to show how Japan had been taken over by a small group of 
individuals, members of the political cadre, the military and industry: “…the internal 
and foreign policies of Japan were dominated by a criminal militaristic clique … The 
mind of the Japanese people was systematically poisoned with harmful ideas of the 
alleged racial superiority of Japan…” The second paragraph of the indictment read: 
“[t]he economic and financial resources of Japan were to a large extent mobilised for 
war aims, to the detriment of the welfare of the Japanese people.” A conspiracy had 
been formed between the defendants, joined in by the rulers of other aggressive 
countries, “… the main objects of this conspiracy was to secure the domination and 
exploitation by the aggressive States of the rest of the world, and to this end to 
commit, or encourage the commission of crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal…”1107 
 
Like in Nuremberg, the economic side of the war received much attention. The 
“Appendix of Summarized Particulars showing the principal Matters and Events upon 
which the Prosecution will rely in support of the several Counts of the Indictment,” 
included, e.g.: 
Section 3: Economic Aggression in China and Greater East Asia: “During the 
period covered by this Indictment, Japan established a general superiority of 
rights in favour of her own nationals, which effectively created monopolies in 
commercial, industrial and financial enterprises, first in Manchuria and later 
in other parts of China which came under her domination, and exploited those 
regions not only for the enrichment of Japan and those of her nationals 
participating in those enterprises, but as part of a scheme to weaken the 
resistance of China, to exclude other Nations and nationals, and to provide 
funds and munitions for further aggression. This plan, as was the intention of 
some at least of its originators, both on its economic and military side, 
gradually came to embrace similar designs on the remainder of East Asia and 
Oceania. Later it was officially expanded into the “Greater East Asia Co-
                                                
1107 IMTFE Indictment 17-18. 
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Prosperity Scheme: (a title designed to cover up a scheme for complete 
Japanese domination of those areas) and Japan declared that this was the 
ultimate purpose of the military campaign. The same organizations as are 
mentioned in Section 4 hereof were used for the above purposes.”1108 
 
In their expansionist policy, according to the indictment, the Japanese prepared to fight 
both against communism (“to eradicate the Russian menace”) and western capitalism 
(“against Britain and America”- in particular against their interests in East Asia).1109 
The Economic policy with regard to Japanese-occupied East Asia had been led by 
Hoshino Naoki and Kaya Okinori, two financial leaders who were charged at the 
IMTFE. Hoshino had had various high financial posts in Machuria/Manchuoko, while 
Kaya had been Finance Minister (twice), advisor to the Finance Minister (also twice), 
an official in the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, the Asian Development Committee and 
President of the North China Development Company.1110 The Japanese had used a 
colonial model of economic domination of China and its resources. Japanese officials 
took over key government posts, confiscated factories and mines and forced all young 
Chinese men to work in service of the army.1111 
 
In the joint defence, counsel argued that Japan’s economic activities had been 
necessary in the face of encirclement by Western powers.1112 From 1939 onwards, the 
US and other powers had taken measures to restrict Japanese trade (e.g. by the US 
terminating the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation), and the Netherlands had 
‘preemptively’ declared war on Japan when Japan had sought to establish an economic 
relationship with the Dutch colony of Indonesia.1113 
 
The judgment was read out in full over several days from November 4-12, 1948. It 
contained several chapters setting down a historical narrative of the war, including its 
economic aspects, finding (amongst others) that Japanese economic domination over 
                                                
1108 IMTFE Indictment. 
1109 Horwitz (1950) 510. For this purpose Japan had signed both the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany 
in 1936, and the Tripartite Pact in 1940 with Germany and Italy (Horwitz (1950) 513-4). 
1110 IMTFE Indictment 99 (Hoshino) and 100 (Kaya). 
1111 Moreover, the ‘narcotization policy’ generated massive income for the Japanese military (and 
presumably kept Chinese resistance subdued). Japan officially encouraged the production and use of 
drugs, Manchuoko became the centre of world-wide drug traffic and a public enterprise of the puppet 
governments, generating an estimated USD300 million annually (Horwitz (1955) 512). 
1112 IMTFE Indictment.  
1113 Horwitz (1950) 559-60. 
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the region had been a major war objective.1114 This objective was linked to that of the 
Third Reich and Mussolini’s Italy through the “Tripartite Pact.”1115 
 
Hoshino and Kaya were convicted of conspiring to wage wars of aggression. 
Regarding Hoshino, the majority decision stated: “he was able to exercise a profound 
influence upon the economy of Manchuoko and did exert that influence towards 
Japanese domination of the commercial and industrial development of that 
country.”1116 About Kaya it was said that “he took part in the formulation of aggressive 
policies of Japan and in the financial, economic and industrial preparation of Japan for 
the execution of those policies.”1117Jacobson observes that despite the fact that the 
tribunal held “the guilt of the men was derived from their role as government officials 
rather than from any of their personal or corporate commercial activities, …their 
convictions nonetheless serve as a reminder that war-and war crimes-are dependent in 
part upon economic support.”1118 
 
The majority judgment convicted and sentenced six defendants to death for A, B and C 
crimes, one for B and C crimes, sixteen were sentenced to life imprisonment for B and 
C crimes and one to twenty years, on to seven. Two defendants had died of natural 
causes during the course of the trial and one had been declared incompetent.1119 On the 
same day, five judges submitted separate opinions.1120 The French judge, J. Bernard, 
                                                
1114 See e.g. Chapter IV: The Military Domination of Japan and Preparations for war: Introductory, 163 
“Industrial Planning in Manchukuo after the Lukouchiao incident. Involved the creation of larger 
industrial units, responsive to government control.” “Development of the war-supporting industries after 
the Lukouchiao incident: ‘As in Manchukuo, so in Japan itself effect was given to the Army’s plan for 
regimenting heavy industry into larger units, more susceptible of government control, The Major 
Industries Control Law, passed in August 1937, encouraged the formation by industrial groups of new 
associations or cartels, which were given wide powers of self-government.” See also, as part of Chapter 
V: Japanese Aggression against China: “Japan’s Economic domination and exploitation of her subject 
territories,” (179) (includes expansion of the ‘yen-bloc’) and “Industrial preparations: The Synthetic oil 
and petroleum industry” 228-230; Chapter V, Section VII: “Japan’s Economic Domination of 
Manchuria and other parts of China.”(IMTFE Indictment) 
1115 Tripartite Pact: “The Governments of Japan, Germany, and Italy consider it the prerequisite of a 
lasting peace that every nation in the world shall receive the space to which it is entitled. They have, 
therefore, decided to stand by and cooperate with one another in their efforts in the regions of Europe 
and Greater East Asia respectively. In doing this it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a 
new order of things, calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. 
It is, furthermore, the desire of the three Governments to extend cooperation to nations in other spheres 
of the world that are inclined to direct their efforts along lines similar to their own for the purpose of 
realizing their ultimate object, world peace.” 
1116 IMTFE Judgment 604. 
1117 IMTFE Judgment 607. 
1118 Jacobson (2005) 196-7. 
1119 Hisakazu (2011) 8. 
1120 Boister (2008a) lxix. 
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concluded that the entire procedure had been defective and all defendants ought to be 
acquitted, Dutch Judge Röling also critiqued certain legal and procedural aspects, 
Judge Jaranilla of the Philippines considered the prison sentences too light, while 
Judge Pal of India issued a comprehensive dissent defending Japanese actions during 
the war as those of Asia’s liberator from Western colonialism.1121 
 
In his dissenting opinion, Röling discussed the claim by the defence that Japan fought 
in a good cause. Here Röling inquires whether the ideals, to which Japan publicly 
adhered in her propaganda for a New Order, were sincere. Defendants had claimed 
“Japan fought for the liberation of the peoples of Asia, and the construction of a 
regional economic bloc … The New Order … would consist …of the liquidation of 
Western Imperialism, abolishment of the colonial system, and the building of a world 
in which all the peoples would find their proper places.”1122 Röling however concludes 
that the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was primarily aimed at the prosperity 
of the Japanese Empire.1123 
 
The absence of a holocaust in Asia made it harder to pathologise the defendants, and 
showed the conflict to be very similar to imperialist power struggles such as had taken 
place in the world for centuries. 
 
4.1 Missing in Action 
The Tokyo trial has been criticised (apart from on legal grounds1124) for omitting 
crimes against Koreans and Taiwanese (Japanese colonial subjects at the time), for 
ignoring the fact that, and for providing blanket immunity to Western powers’ crimes 
against their own colonial subjects (1 million Indonesians died in the war1125), as well 
as ignoring the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,1126 as well as the US’ 
firebombing of 64 further Japanese cities, plus the Japanese firebombing of several 
Chinese cities.1127 In addition, it was criticised for not prosecuting the Japanese 
Emperor Hirohito, and the leaders of the main business cartels. Indeed, the Soviets 
                                                
1121 Boister (2008a) lxxv-lxxxii. 
1122 Röling Dissent 128. 
1123 Röling Dissent 134. 
1124 For criticism on legal grounds, see generally, Boister (2008b) 28-48), for violating the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege (Piccigallo (1979) 25), for procedural unfairness (Boister (2008b) 114. 
1125 Boister (2008b) 313. 
1126 Hisakazu (2011) 18. 
1127 Tanaka (2011) 294. 
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perceived the IMTFE as an attempt to cover up the guilt of those Japanese most 
responsible for the war, namely the Emperor, major industrialists, capitalists and 
militarists.1128 
4.1.1 Hirohito 
The holy emperor was exempted from trial, ostensibly for legal reasons, though 
perhaps rather for political, or even socio-psychological reasons.1129 According to 
Piccigallo, the “strictly American decision caused perhaps more furore in Allied circles 
that any other relative to war crimes policy.”1130 Hirohito was said to have been a 
“mere figurehead”1131 or conversely, to represent the Japanese state in the eyes of his 
subjects, such that trying him would be perceived as in effect an indictment of Japan 
itself.1132 Totani disputes Röling’s assertion that Emperor Hirohito was granted 
immunity, but suggests the Americans kept the option of trying him open, which 
however did not happen.1133 Donihi links the decision with the feasibility of a US 
occupation of Japan.1134 Convinced that he had played a major role, the Soviets called 
Hirohito the ultimate leader of the zaibatsu.1135 The Emperor, while exempt from 
prosecution, was forced by the US occupation to renounce his divine origin.1136 Otomo 
has argued that this was required because the US “needed Japan to enter the emerging 
fraternity of States as a secular entity; an equal among brothers capable of recognising 
its others and of being sutured into the new international economic system.”1137 By 
analogy, we can say that the US needed Japan (a mostly isolated entity prior to 
WWII1138), in future, to be able to recognise it as a formal legal equal, for the purpose 
of participation in capitalist IL, and in the capitalist world system. 
                                                
1128 Piccigallo (1979) 148 “They are doing their utmost to whitewash and justify the aggressive policy of 
the Japanese imperialists. Wall Street and its agents, who direct US policy, are resurrecting militarism in 
Japan and converting the country into a base for the promotion of their insensate plans of world 
domination.” (Id.). 
1129 Finn (1992) 24-27; 71-74; Hisakazu (2011) 18. 
1130 Piccigallo (1979) 16. 
1131 Horwitz (1950) 497. 
1132 The Emperor had wished MacArthur to let him assume the total burden of guilt for every political 
decision made and military action carried out by his people (Donihi (1992) 746). 
1133 Totani (2008) 4 and generally 43-62. 
1134 Donihi (1992) 740. 
1135 Prozeßmaterialien 543. 
1136 Otomo (2011) 63. 
1137 Otomo (2011) 64. 
1138 But see US (armed) attempts to force Japan to sign the 1852 Treaty of Amity (Otomo (2011) 64). 
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4.1.2 Zaibatsu 
Although mention in the Surrender Policy and the Indictment gives the appearance that 
economic factors played an important role in Japan’s war, no economic actors were 
indicted at the Tokyo IMT. It had been proposed to do so, however. In addition to the 
September/October lists drawn up by the SACP/US State Department1139, the Allies 
listed proposed indictees for the IMTFE and, for example, the Australian completed 
list, presented in October 1945, contained 64 names in all including the Emperor and 
fourteen bankers and industrialists.1140 Among them were the managing director of 
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and the president of the Sumitomo Bank, apparently 
because of their alleged profitable alliance with the militarists.1141 
 
At one point the plan was to try “Class A” suspects in three groups, one of them 
including industrialists and bankers.1142 However, it was decided only to have one 
single trial of 28 defendants.1143 All of the untried Class A war criminal suspects were 
released by Gen. MacArthur in by the end of the first and only trial in 1948.1144 
According to Totani, the Japanese public believed, and continues to believe today, that 
the release of ‘Class A’ prisoners was the result of a US change of heart with regard to 
the pursuit of justice at the onset of the Cold War.1145 
 
SCAP asked the US Ambassador to Japan and MacArthur’s chief political advisor, 
Atcheson, to advise who should be arrested and to provide evidence. Apparently 
largely on the basis of information from Washington, Atcheson submitted four lists in 
November and December.1146 By the end of 1945, 103 major suspects had been 
                                                
1139 FRUS 940, FRUS 944: mentioned US National War Crimes Office general list of Japanese war 
criminals and a special list of major war criminals of 14 September, and was agreed by State, War and 
Navy Departments. These lists were not disclosed to the FEC. The Chinese list of 12 major war 
criminals is published FRUS 948 (dated 20 October 1945). 
1140 Boister (2008b) fn118, and Sissons, D.: The Australian War Crimes Trials and Investigations, 1942-
1951, Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center. 
1141 Boister (2008b) 62. 
1142 It has been implied, however, that Keenan’s mention of further trials that point may have been aimed 
getting prosecution staff to agree on a small number of defendants for the first trial, rather than it being a 
genuine possibility (Totani (2008) 69).  
1143 Keenan recommended against further international Class A trials as they would be repetitive, 
lengthy and of little educational value; moreover, as soon as ‘Nuremberg’ was over there would be no 
more media interest (Totani (2008) 68, 73).  
1144 Finn (1992) 79. 
1145 Totani (2008) 77. Totani suggests, however, that the decision was partly due to Keenan and 
MacArthur’s ‘inattentiveness’ – as well as Washington’s disinterest in Tokyo’s war criminals (id.). 
1146 Finn (1992) 78. 
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arrested, including most of the Tojo 1941 cabinet.1147 As only the US prosecutors had 
arrived in Japan at this point, they took the early initiative in selecting defendants.1148 
However, I have found no unequivocal explanation for the decision to limit Tokyo 
IMT cases to those with a Class A label. In reviewing the State Department Foreign 
Relations of the US -1945 documentation the impression1149 is given that the limitation 
to Class A Crimes was merely a practical intended to speed up matters and to “get 
things over with”.1150 However, even after the limitation to Class A crimes was 
decided, several industrialists were proposed for inclusion.1151 For example, on 
November 12 Atcheson sent a list of thirteen names of “major war criminal suspects, 
together with biographic data concerning each, which we consider sufficient evidence 
to support their arrest for trial under section II, Article 6(a), of the Four Power 
Agreement on War Crimes Trials [which relates to crimes against the peace]. … These 
persons are believed, with others, to have been responsible through the policies which 
they advocated and the influence which they exerted for the initiation and carrying on 
of the attacks launched by Japan on Manchuria in 1931, and on China proper in 1937, 
and on the United States, Great Britain and others of our Allies in 1941.” This list 
names Kuhara, Funanosuke, “prominent politician, industrialist… advocate of strong 
policy toward China. Involved in incident of February 26, 1936 [the “Manchuria 
incident”]. Ardent nationalist, closely associated with military circles and aims.”1152The 
thirteen names listed in the memo came from the War Crimes Office List mentioned 
above.1153 The second list submitted by Atcheson on 14 November includes “Aikawa, 
Yoshisuke. Member, Cabinet Advisory Board, Koiso Cabinet. Brother-in-law and 
close associate of Fusanosuke (sic) Kuhara. Industrialist who worked in close 
                                                
1147 Finn (1992) 78. 
1148 Kentaro (2011) 57. 
1149 Indeed, in the correspondence the question of “desiderata” is raised, but not answered, and it appears 
that proposals are made without any specific and explicit legal, evidential or even political guidelines 
(although such may have existed formally or informally even if this is not evident from the 
correspondence) FRUS 952-953; and FRUS 963: Memo by Marshall, acting Chief of Staff to the SCAP 
to Atcheson: “The main difficulty is to determine just who are the war criminals in that directives to the 
Supreme Commander have been couched in such broad and general terms that he is unable to determine 
those individuals that the American Government or the Allied Governments wish to prosecute.” Note 
this also shows the political, rather than legal considerations that guide the choice of defendants (if only 
legal considerations counted the SCAP could have known himself who to arrest – as any member of a 
domestic police force.) 
1150 FRUS 984 Memo from Atcheson. 
1151 FRUS 960: Communicated in the memo by Acting Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee to the Secretary of State with annexed Draft Message to be sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
to the SCAP: “Position of the US Government is that Tojo, his cabinet and other persons charged with 
crimes in category A in paragraph 1 of Appendix C of JCS 1512 should be tried by an international 
tribunal.” 
1152 FRUS 963-5: Memo from Atcheson to SCAP and Chief of Staff dated 12 November 1945.  
1153 Atcheson mentions this in his memo: FRUS 962. 
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cooperation, and to his great profit, with aggressive elements of Army and 
Government.”1154  
 
On November 17 1945 Atcheson sent the Secretary of State a memo enclosing the 
conclusion of an analysis by a Canadian called E. Norman, chief of the Research and 
Analysis Section of the Office of the Chief Counter Intelligence Officer of General 
Headquarters [of the US occupying force in Tokyo], written about the war guilt of 
Prince Konoye [also spelt Konoe], Fumimare, Prime Minister of Japan until 1941 
(prior to Tojo).1155 The memo motivated the argument for Konoye’s war guilt as 
follows: “The most valuable service which Konoye performed on behalf of Japanese 
aggression was one which he alone could have accomplished – namely the fusing of all 
the dominant sections of the ruling oligarchy, namely the Court, Army, Zaibatsu and 
bureaucracy. …Konoye set in motion those policies and alliances which could only 
lead to a collision with the Western powers. Even though he stepped aside in favour of 
Tojo in October 1941, be still bears a heavy responsibility both moral and legal …, 
since he made no move such as summoning an Imperial conference while still Premier 
to prevent the coming Japanese attack upon the United States and Britain.”1156 
Eventually Konoye escaped trial by committing suicide, and while the US had given 
orders to arrest Tojo and “the entire “Pearl Harbor” Cabinet” on 11 September 
1945.1157 
 
On November 17, Kuhara, Funanosuke, as the only industrialist out of those 
mentioned here, was ordered to be arrested and held at Sugamo Prison Camp pending 
“trial by an international tribunal.”1158 
 
However, on 27 November 1945 Atcheson, advised the arrest for trial of a further two 
major war criminals – again with “sufficient evidence” for an aggressive war charge, 
                                                
1154 FRUS 968. 
1155 Norman also authored the book, Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State” [First published by the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940], a fact which Atcheson mentions in each reference to Norman.  
1156 FRUS 971-2. “Konoye was Prime Minster when Japan attacked China, entered into the Tri-Partite 
Alliance with Germany and Italy, invaded French Indochina… [and] laid the foundation for the 
command economy for total war, and abolished the old political parties.” (id.). When learning of US 
intent to arrest and try him as a war criminal, he committed suicide. [There is considerable 
correspondence in FRUS on whether or not Konoye had been promised immunity, whether (or, as) he 
was the US chosen post-war leader (Finn 1992 41) and whether he had been negotiating a peace 
agreement with the US on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack.] 
1157 FRUS 971-2. 
1158 FRUS 972. 
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the first of which: “Fujiwara Ginjiro: Leading Industrialist with a record of active 
collaboration with the military in positions of major responsibility.” The second person 
listed was: “Nakajima Chikuhei, Leading aircraft manufacturer (founder and president 
of the Nakajima Aircraft Company), war profiteer and politician. He was described as 
“closely bound up with and devoted to the developing of Japan’s war machine since 
before the last war.”  His former posts included: “President, Seiyukai Party 
…Railways Minister … Member Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
Establishment Administration … Munitions Minister etc.”1159 
 
Nakajima, with his roles in industry, defence and politics embodied the idea of the 
zaibatsu elite. 
 
It appears clearly from the US official correspondence that from the Japanese side 
WWII was very much viewed as a joint effort of industrialists, military and political 
leaders, and that the main individuals’ roles were not always clearly 
separated/separable. There was, in other words, a military-industrial complex. It is 
striking that in the correspondence published in FRUS (1945 and 1946) the selection 
of indictees of the IMT is only discussed in terms of whose task it is to decide, rather 
than on what basis a selection is made. No explanation can be found in FRUS for the 
omission of the industrialists. There is some discussion on the omission of the 
Emperor, it seems likely from this that he was omitted because the Japanese public 
would be offended by having the still somewhat mythical figure tried as a common 
war criminal. Another explanation may be that he (like Konoyo) could have exposed 
negotiations with Western States that the Allies would wish to keep under wraps. 
Regarding Shigemitsu and Yamazaki it is later said that they and four others should 
only be arrested “if Mr Keenan [Chief Prosecutor of the Tokyo IMT] decides to try the 
Tojo Cabinet en bloc, their individual records …so far fail to reveal evidence sufficient 
to warrant their apprehension and individual trial under the Jackson formula.”1160 
 
Kentaro describes how, in the IPS discussion to finalise the list of indictees, Keenan 
stated that, although he had wished to prosecute one of the Japanese industrialists, “he 
                                                
1159 FRUS 977-8. 
1160 FRUS 986. 
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was unable to do so because of the complex preparation that would be involved.”1161 
This sounds rather like a (weak) excuse than a serious ground. 
 
Donihi’s account of his work at the IMTFE includes this short paragraph on 
industrialists: “[t]here were no industrialists on trial, distinct from Nuremberg, where 
industry had used slave labour. Despite Soviet pressure, Austin Hauxhurst and I 
(having been assigned by Mr. Keenan to study the question) recommended against the 
inclusion of the industrialists (zaibatsu) category.”1162 Though Donihi gives no explicit 
reason for the exclusion, the reference to slave labour seems to suggest the Japanese 
industrialists did not use slave labour.  
 
As will become clear below, Japanese industry did use forced labour from surrounding 
Asian countries as well as foreign service personnel and members of the colonial 
populations. According to Drea et al., “[d]uring the war years, the Japanese 
government forcibly removed workers from Korea, China, and elsewhere in Asia and 
shipped them to Japan as unpaid labor for dangerous work in coal mines and for heavy 
construction. American POWs were also subjected to brutal labor details.”1163 
 
Horwitz described the dilemma thus (with echoes of the concern for US domestic 
industry response: 3A):  
“A clear distinction must be made between the industrialist who for patriotic 
and economic reasons fills government orders for armaments, munitions and 
other implements of war to be used in connection with an aggressive war, and 
the industrialist, who for economic reasons, or otherwise, aids, abets, or 
collaborates with military and governmental leaders in the formulation and 
execution of a programme of aggression. No evidence was produced by the 
Executive Committee that any industrialist occupied the position of principal 
formulator of policy. Conditions in Japan made it important that the indictment 
of an industrialist not be undertaken unless his conviction was almost a 
certainty since an acquittal might well have been regarded as a blanket 
approval of all Japanese industry and industrialists.”1164 
                                                
1161 Kentaro (2011) 61. 
1162 Donihi (1992–1993) 733. 
1163 Drea (2006). 
1164 Horwitz (1950) 498. 
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However, common sense would hold that convictions for war crimes (use/abuse of 
POWs) or crimes against humanity (forced labour) would not convey a message of 
blanket approval of Japanese industry and industrialists - surely not indicting/trying 
them would sooner convey this message. 
 
Boister cites the IG Farben case as explanation for the decision not to try 
industrialists: “See, for example, the IG Farben case… concerned with the prosecution 
of the directors of IG Farben inter alia for planning and waging an aggressive war and 
conspiracy to do so. The accused were acquitted following the Nuremberg IMT’s lead 
that only political leaders with the power to control government policies could be 
charged with such offences. A point in the prosecution’s favour was that, unlike 
German conglomerates, the zaibatsu had not used slave labour.”1165 
 
As shown above (Ch.3A S.3.1.4), the IG Farben leaders were not acquitted but indeed 
convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity, even if they were found not 
guilty on the aggression charge.  
 
Röling in the record of a long conversation with Antonio Cassesse in the 1970s, 
explains the industrialists had been opposed to the war, and that had been quite correct 
not to try them.1166 Cassesse conversely suggests,“[o]ne might have thought that it was 
done deliberately by the Western countries, because they wanted to cooperate with the 
industrialists of Japan, as they would need their support in future.”1167 Finn comments 
on a discussion between MacArthur and Konoe, where Konoe warns the SCAP of the 
threat of the military-Left alliance, and warns that breaking up the zaibatsu will lead to 
communism “immediately”.1168 In response, MacArthur is reported to have expressed 
his confidence in Konoe as a leader capable of safeguarding liberal/capitalist interests 
even in the event of a breakup of the zaibatsu.1169 
 
                                                
1165 Boister (2008b) 55-56.  
1166 Cassese (1993) 38. 
1167 Cassese (1993) 39. 
1168 Finn (1992) 19. 
1169 Finn (1992) 19. 
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The USSR had asked for the indictment of three industrialists at the IMTFE.1170 The 
decision not to indict industrialists was not received favourably in the Soviet press.1171 
The “leaders of the giant Japanese monopolies…known as the Zaibatsu,” who 
favoured and “were the real instigators” of “predatory war,” had escaped trial. “This 
was no accident,” alleged the Communist Party daily, Pravda, but the results of a 
carefully calculated plot engineered by the zaibatsu’s capitalist counterparts on “Wall 
Street.”1172 Another commentary suggests that Keenan did not prosecute the zaibatsu 
because of their connections with US monopolies.1173 
 
4.2 Other trials of Japanese war crimes in the Far East 
Allied governments tried more than 5,600 war crimes suspects in over 2,200 trials in 
51 different venues around the Far East.1174 The most accessible source for information 
about the subsequent trials by Allies and others in the Far East is Piccigallo’s 
monograph, with chapters on each of the Allies’ war crimes trials.1175 Summaries of 
some of the trials are contained in the WCCLR publication.1176 Some case reviews are 
summarised by the Berkeley War Crimes Study Center (supra). Actual case reports or 
judgments are very difficult to find outside of (and even in) national archives.1177 Most 
of these trial records remain ‘hidden.’1178 I have not been able to look at Chinese and 
Korean cases for linguistic reasons. 
 
The case reports (or summaries/descriptions) that are easier to track down are those of 
cases that have become public campaigning issues (in particular where the victims 
                                                
1170 Brackman (1987) 85–6. 
1171 Piccigallo (1979) 146-8. 
1172 Raginsky, M. and S. Rosenblit, (from Pravda) Soviet Press Translations, 3, No. 14, July 15, 1948, 
p.412; Markov, M., New Times No. 8, April 15 1946, pp. 7-10. Quoted in Piccigallo (1979) 147. 
1173 Trainin, A: ‘From Nuremberg to Tokyo’ (1948) 12 New Times 11, 12. 
1174 Totani (2008) 262. 
1175 Generally, Piccigallo (1979). 
1176 For a very brief description of the “torrent of trials” brought by the British in various locations in 
South-East Asia, see Chapter 6 of Boister (Reappraisal). 
1177 Pritchard echoes this sentiment (Pritchard, 1996). The National Archives describe the case 
documents as being ‘scattered among’ various files (National Archives research guide, supra). Case 
compilations such as the All England Law Reports/Lexis do not include the decisions of these military 
commissions, not even the Oxford Reports on International Law (which does not even have the 
Yamashita decision). 
1178 A recent symposium aimed bringing out some of the stories of these trials: Symposium ‘Untold 
Stories: Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials’ held Melbourne Law School 14-16 October 2010. A 
publication based on this symposium is forthcoming (2012) and will include a paper I presented based 
on the research underlying Chapters 3A and 3B, entitled “Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice? The hidden 
story of the prosecution of industrialists post-WWII and subsequently”. 
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included western citizens). For example, the case against the leaders of the Burma-
Siam railroad project (the “Bridge over the River Kwai”).1179 Another such issue is that 
of the “comfort women”, thousands of women (in fact mostly girls) who were held as 
sex slaves for the Japanese military. Some of the brothels in which these women were 
held were owned and run by private contractors (see below). The victims and other 
activists on the “comfort women” issue have held a citizens’ tribunal,1180 and filed 
compensation suits.1181 The Kinkaseki mine (see below) victims have also campaigned 
for many years with little success.1182 In this section I highlight some examples of cases 
involving businesspersons. 
4.2.1 Dutch trial of Awochi at Batavia 
At the Netherlands Temporary Court-Martial at Batavia (which derived its jurisdiction 
from Dutch law), Japanese businessman Washio Awochi was charged with having “in 
time of war and as a subject of a hostile power, namely Japan,” and as “owner of the 
Sakura-Club, founded for the use of Japanese civilians,” committed “war crime of 
enforced prostitution.”1183 He was accused of doing so “by, in violation of the laws and 
customs of war, recruiting women and girls to serve the said civilians or causing them 
to be recruited for the purpose, and then under the direct or indirect threat of the 
Kempei (Japanese Military Police) should they wish to leave, forcing them to commit 
prostitution with the members of the said club.”1184 Among those who were forced to 
prostitution were girls of 12 and 14 years of age.1185 The defendant pleaded that he had 
operated under orders of the Japanese authorities. He was convicted and sentenced to 
ten years’ imprisonment.1186 
 
This case has received praise as the only criminal prosecution in the “comfort women” 
issue. However, it also illustrates the innate racism of ICL, in that the case related to 
Dutch victims. Of the around 200,000 women and girls (most of the victims were 
teenagers) who were victims of Japanese enforced prostitution/sexual slavery during 
                                                
1179 The Berkeley Singapore docket includes Burma-Siam Railway cases such as the Mizutani Case 
Singapore Cases: No. 235/911which may include business-related cases also: Berkeley War Crimes 
Study Center. 
1180 Jayasimha (2001). 
1181 Hae Bong (2005). 
1182 See the Taiwan POW Camps Memorial Society. 
1183 Awochi Case. 
1184 Awochi Case 122. 
1185 Awochi Case 123. 
1186 Statute Book Decree No. 46 of 1946 concerning the “Legal Competence in respect of War Crimes”, 
id. 123.  
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WWII, only around 200-300 were Dutch/European. The others were Korean, Chinese 
or Japanese.1187  
4.2.2 US Trials at Yokohama 
Suspected Class B and C class war criminals were tried in by a US military tribunal at 
Yokohama, Japan between 1946 and 1948.1188 Some cases (reviews) deal with civilian 
guards employed by companies who were accused and convicted of abusing POWs.1189 
This included, for example, the prosecution of Tagusari, Sukeo, Kei Kai In, civilian 
guard employed by the Tohoku Denki Seitetsu Company. Tagusari had worked at the 
plant where US and other Allied PoWs from Sendai Area PW Camp No. 10 (Honshu, 
Japan) were forced to work. He had beaten PoWs for not working hard enough for not 
doing things “the right way” or, for no reason at all. He was sentenced to 22 years 
confinement and hard labour, a sentence which was not reduced on review by the 
Judge Advocate General – Defense. Another civilian guard and interpreter, Yamauchi 
Kunimitsu, employed by the Mitsui Mining company (part of the Mitsui zaibatsu), 
charged with wilfully and unlawfully committing cruel, inhuman and brutal atrocities 
and other offenses against certain PoWs, was sentenced to 40 years, reduced to 33 on 
review. Yamauchi (who had lived in the US and attended school there) was accused of 
“refusing to interpret” which had meant he had not adequately represented the 
complaints of American PoWs which had been his responsibility.1190 Other guards tried 
had been employed by Osaraizawa Mining Company, Nippon Kokan Kobushiki 
Kaisha and Rinko Coal Company. All were based in Japan, and all were accused of 
mistreatment of American and other PoWs.1191 
 
Clearly here (like in Nuremberg) there would have been a possibility to try the 
directors of these companies for these crimes, the use of slave labour (maybe) 
especially as the cases seem to show that maltreatment was endemic. A common 
                                                
1187 See generally: http://www.comfort-women.org/. 
1188 All cases in this section are taken from Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center, Case synopses from 
Judge Advocate’s Reviews: Yokohama Class B and C War Crimes Trials. 
1189 Cases reviewed by the 8th Army Judge Advocate, and the results are housed the Berkeley War 
Crimes Study Center on 5 microfilm reels titled “Reviews of the Yokohama Class B and C war crimes 
Trials by the 8th Army judge Advocate (1946-1949).”  
1190 This seems an odd case – the Reviewing Authority recommended that, as the accused had been 
educated in the US he “was aware of the humanitarian ideas of Americans. The commission may have 
…thought it an aggravation of the offense.” Perhaps this case is one of disputed loyalty, cf. the mass 
internment of Japanese Americans during WWII. 
1191 Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center. 
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“avoidance technique” in ICL (as in domestic CL) is prosecuting the lowest ranked 
individuals. I discuss this further in the chapters below. 
4.2.3 The British War Crimes Court in Hong Kong: The Nippon Mining Company 
The British tried at least one case similar to the Yokohama cases above. In the absence 
of comprehensive documentation of military tribunal cases by the British, one has to 
rely on other means of discovering their existence. The Nippon Mining Company case 
we know about because it was mentioned in the Krupp case in Nuremberg:1192 
In the trial of Mitsugu Toda and eight others, by a British Military Court in 
Hong Kong, 7th-28th May, 1947, the accused were charged with “committing 
a war crime, in that they at Kinkaseki, Formosa, between December 1942 and 
May,1945, being on the staff of the Kinkaseki Nippon Mining Coy., and as such 
being responsible for the safety and welfare of the British and American 
Prisoners of War employed in the mine under their supervisions, were, in 
violation of the laws and usages of war, concerned in the ill-treatment of the 
aforesaid Prisoners of War, contributing to the death of some of them and 
causing physical sufferings to the others.1193 
 
The main question in the trial of Toda, Mitsugu et al. was whether the responsibility 
over the POWs was the company’s or the camp commander’s (or, as they were called 
by the victim-witnesses in the case, the ‘mine hanchos’ or the ‘camp hanchos’).1194 
Each day the prisoners would leave the POW camp to work in the company mine, 
where they were under the supervision of company foremen. Conditions at the copper 
mine were admitted by all relevant parties to be dangerous, with excessive heat, deep 
pools, falling rocks and poor equipment. Beatings were common and admitted. The 
defence had argued that the POWs were not employed by the company but were being 
made to work at the mine by the military. The defence for Toda also argued the 
foremen were ‘seconded’ to the army and thus fell under their responsibility. Toda was 
the General Manager of the mine, and received a sentence of only one year. Two of the 
foremen received sentences of 10 years.1195 This is another example devolving 
responsibility for international crimes in business cases to the lowest ranked persons. 
 
                                                
1192 Case documentation is held the U.K. National Archives, Mitsugu Case. 
1193 Krupp Case 168. 
1194 Mitsugu Case. 
1195 Mitsugu Case. 
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Ramasastry comments on the case that “it can be inferred that the court held the 
mining company legally responsible for the deaths, injuries, and the suffering of the 
PoWs. This is deduced from the fact that two of the defendants, Toda and Nakamura, a 
mining company manager and supervisor respectively, were found guilty, although 
they did not directly participate in the beatings or mistreatment of the prisoners.”1196 
This is an illogical (incorrect) deduction often seen (e.g. Clapham1197) in those who 
“support” legal person liability – which I will discuss in Chapter 4. Ramasastry makes 
a lot of the fact that Toda was not directly involved in the abuse/did not know it 
happened, but this case concerns command responsibility rather than legal person 
liability. 
 
Three of the former POWs who worked at the mine filed a civil compensation suit 
against Japan Energy Corp. in a US court in 2000, a case which was dismissed in 
2007.1198 In Chapter 5 I discuss the relative merit of civil cases vs criminal 
prosecutions (and the combination: civil claims attached to criminal cases, and also 
punitive/compensatory damages ordered in criminal cases. 
4.2.4 The Soviet trial of Unit 731  
The USSR tried several Japanese war crimes suspects, among them, what may be 
regarded as the Japanese equivalent of the IG Farben scientists: Unit 731.1199 Like the 
Topf u. Söhne trial above, this case shows the Soviet perspective on the war, on 
motivations for crimes, and illustrates the ‘Systemkonkurrenz’ also seen in the West. 
On 25-30 December 1949 in the city of Chabarowsk in the USS.R., twelve former 
members of Unit 731 of the Japanese Imperial Army were tried for preparation and use 
of bacterial weapons. The accused, who in their final statements to the tribunal 
admitted the charges and expressed regret, were convicted to 3-25 years of 
“improvement” through hard labour.1200 Those members of Unit 731 (including its 
commander, Ishii) that had surrendered to the US at the close of the war had reportedly 
been granted immunity from prosecution by the US, in return for know-how.1201 Röling 
                                                
1196 Ramasastry (2002) 115. 
1197 Clapham (2008) and below Ch. 4. 
1198 Titherington vs Japan Energy Corp. [no further info available]; see also BBC News, 23 February 
2000. 
1199 On the IMT’s failure to prosecute Unit 731, see Kei-Ichi (2011) 177ff. 
1200 Prozessmaterialien (1950) 600. 
1201 Cassese (1993) 48. See also, Vernon DSB 1947. Vernon reports that Ishii was brought to the US 
along with what remained of his test result files. For a very recent accusation of US use of 
bacteriological warfare in its war against Korea, see Al-Jazeera, 17 March 2010. 
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and others have said that the scientists were taken to the US in order for the US to 
benefit from their knowledge and the results of their experimentation (the US is even 
said to have taken one of the scientists to Korea during the war there), and also that 
evidence of biological warfare was deliberately withheld (and at one point quietly 
withdrawn) from the IMTFE, despite the fact that defendant Umuzu had been directly 
responsible for setting up the biological laboratory in Manchuria/Manchuoko.1202 
 
It would appear that one difference between the Japanese and German wars/systems 
was that Japan had its army develop, manufacture, test and ultimately apply the 
biological weapons, whereas Germany had used private companies for the invention, 
development and manufacture of poison gases.1203 The Soviet prosecutor at 
Chabarowsk describes how, in the pursuit of its imperialist/colonial aggressive war, 
Japan developed bacteriological weapons that could infect humans as well as cattle and 
seeds. One method of applying such bacteriological weapon was apparently the aerial 
bombing system “Ishii” which was designed to drop pestilent fleas onto enemy 
territory.1204 This technique was apparently used by the Japanese airforce a number of 
times in different parts of China in 1940-42.1205 
 
The lawyer speaking in the main accused Yamada’s defence (N. Below) explains how 
in his view Yamada came to commit such acts. Agreeing with Locke and Rousseau 
that humans are innately good, he explains Marx and Engels’ point of view that 
“mentality, interests, will, character and moral conscience of people is a product of 
their historical milieu, the conditions of society and the education shaped through 
social relations.”1206 Yamada was born in 1881 when Japan was still very much 
organised through the feudal system. The four main families of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Yasuda and Sumitomi reached their monopoly positions through an alliance with the 
emperor in the 19th C. and in the 1930s decided to expand their economic empire 
through aggressive war. War industry (the “bone-mill”) was only additionally 
profitable. Precisely these “most exploitative and rapacious of Japanese Imperialists” 
poisoned the people with an aggressive nationalism and chauvinism, as they knew that 
                                                
1202 Cassese (1993) 48. See also, Totani (2008) 3. 
1203 Witnesses the Chabarovsk trial suggest that the biological warfare programme of Unit 731 fell under 
the direct responsibility of the Emperor, which Röling considers credible (Röling and Cassese (1993) 
49; Prozeßmaterialien 546). 
1204 Indictment, Prozeßmaterialien 11. 
1205 Indictment, Prozeßmaterialien 23-5. 
1206 Prozeßmaterialien 533 (plea of the defence). 
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the war could not be fought without the broad popular masses.1207 The basis of the 
ideology was the holiness and infallibility of the Emperor. Below went on to explain, 
how the zaibatsu, the “inspiration, instigators, organisers and leaders of Japanese 
aggression” had taken the initiative and executive role in the production of 
bacteriological weapons.1208 Within this context Yamada had been “one of the many 
instruments that carried out the nefarious crimes of the Japanese Imperialism,” having 
had the “misfortune” to have been born into such circumstances, a criminal and a 
victim at the same time.1209 
 
This warrants comparison with IMTFE Chief Prosecutor Keenan who was critical of 
Soviet motives for their call to have former Emperor Hirohito tried, and denied 
allegations of Japanese use of bacteriological weapons.1210 Keenan asserted that as 
regards evidence of bacteriological warfare “none whatever” had been introduced at 
the IMTFE.1211 On the other hand, the USS.R. is said to have used this case “to assert 
its moral leadership in Asia.”1212 Like in the discussion of the Soviet trial of the Topf u. 
Söhne defendants (Chapter 3A, Section 8.3), the ideological character of, or motivation 
behind Soviet trials is stressed. Likewise, the ideological motivations behind 
US/Western policy were stressed by the Soviets. It has since come to light that the US 
government offered General Ishii and others of Unit 731 prosecutorial immunity in 
return for their research findings.1213 
 
The USSR accused the US of “instigating a new world war, speeding revival of 
Japan’s industrial war potential”1214 in response to the US’s willingness, to sign a peace 
treaty with Japan without the USSR. Such would lead to a Pacific military alliance 
with Japan as the military and economic foundation, and eventually to the US using 
Japan in its “war for United States domination.”1215 Piccigallo calls the Chabarowsk 
trial “part of a renewed propaganda assault against United States Policy in East 
                                                
1207 Prozeßmaterialien 534. 
1208 Prozeßmaterialien 539. 
1209 Prozeßmaterialien 540. 
1210 “Joseph Keenan meets the Press,” American Mercury April 1950, summarised in Welch (2001) 88. 
1211 Piccigallo (1979) 251 fn56. 
1212 Totani (2008) 60 
1213 Boister (2008b) 64. 
1214 Piccigallo (1979) 150, citing a Moscow Radio report [which is cited in the Malay Mail, May 9, 
1949]. 
1215 Piccigallo (1979) 150.  
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Asia.”1216 In agreement with Viscount Maugham, he states, “the USS.R. regards a trial 
as one of the organs of Government power, a weapon in the hands of the rulers of the 
State for safeguarding its interests.” And Lord Hankey, “the British and American 
systems treat a court as an independent agency responsible only before the law.”1217 
This (positivist) portrayal of law as somehow non-political, however, also actively 
serves to conceal the Western political goals behind the trials. One of them could 
plausibly have been, to divert attention from the US occupation aims in Japan, which 
in many ways were much more far-reaching than the ‘media-genic’ trials. 
 
5 Economic occupation policy: zaibatsu dissolution and the ‘reverse course’ 
 
What it chose not to deal with through the courts, the US dealt with through its 
economic policy as Japan’s occupier. As in Germany occupation included complete 
control over the economy, and deep reform including legal reform (and even, reform 
of the education system1218). This started off with a plan for the break-up of cartels, 
fiscal and land-reform – the Japanese version of the ‘Morgenthau Plan’1219 – but soon 
changed direction in what became known as the ‘reverse course’. 
 
5.1 Zaibatsu dissolution and other reforms 
In 1945 US officials had reported that “not only were the zaibatsu as responsible for 
Japan’s militarism as the militarists themselves, but they profited immensely by it.... 
Unless the zaibatsu are broken up, the Japanese have little prospect of ever being able 
to govern themselves as free men.”1220 The conclusion of the ‘Edwards Mission on 
economic policy’ (a mission sent by the US government to advise on economic 
policy1221) led to the design of a policy aimed at the formation of a broad middle class 
in Japan, as well as land reform, towards allowing broader private ownership of land, 
making these reforms similar to the policies of European colonisers (Ch. 2B).1222 The 
Edwards Mission concluded that the existence of two classes in Japan, the ruling elite 
                                                
1216 Piccigallo (1979)  154. 
1217 Piccigallo (1979) 155, quoting Maugham, F.: U.N.O. and War Crimes, London 1951 and Hankey, 
L.: Politics, Trial and Errors, p. 9 (no further details given). 
1218 More than 400,000 teachers and professors were removed from office (Ando (1991) 17). 
1219 See, e.g Japanese Post-Surrender Policy, excerpt in Appendix C. 
1220 Cohen (2000) 426; see also, Roth (1946) 57-59. 
1221 Japanese Combines Report. 
1222 Finn (1992) 130-2. Generally, Ando (1991). 
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and the masses had led to Japan’s aggression, “The existence of too many peasants on 
too little land under the exacting tenure system imposed by feudalistic landlords was 
the cause of the cheap labour in Japanese industry, which in turn gave birth to a poor 
domestic market and militaristic expansion for overseas possessions.”1223 Effectively, 
in adopting this economic reform policy aimed at creating a middle class, the US 
government acknowledged that the Japanese aggressions had been at least in part, a 
war for markets, similar to European expansion starting in its feudal period. The 
creation of a middle class necessitated breaking up the zaibatsu.1224 Five zaibatsu were 
slated for dissolution by the Holding Company Liquidation Commission: Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Yasuda, Sumitomi (the big four) and Fuji Industrial.1225 The dissolution 
involved the surrender of vast amounts of private property.1226 In December 1946 60 
additional zaibatsu were designated for dissolution while a further number were placed 
under supervision.1227 
 
SCAP issued a directive in December 1946 ordering the removal of undesirable 
personnel from public office. The directive (which extended beyond the “zaibatsu 
problem”1228) affected: 
zaibatsu personnel who at any time between July 7, 1937, and September 2, 
1945, occupied a position as chairman of the board of directors, president, vice 
president, director, adviser, auditor, or manager of certain industrial and 
financial concerns or any other bank development company or institution 
whose foremost purpose was assisting in militaristic aggression.1229 
In February 1947 the first 56 members of 10 zaibatsu were designated for ‘purging’ 
(removal from office and exclusion from similar posts in future).1230 
 
To prevent the reemergence of zaibatsu, the US leadership proposed, and the Japanese 
government adopted, an “American-style” Anti-Trust Law in April 1947.1231 
 
                                                
1223 Ando (1991) 21. 
1224 FEC 230 Policy recommendation; see generally, Vernon DSB 1947. 
1225 Vernon (1947) 59. 
1226 Generally, Ando (1991), who considers aspects of the US economic policy in Japan contrary to 
Hague Regulations Arts. 44 (respecting existing laws) and 55 (occupier’s temporary caretaker function). 
1227 Vernon (1947) 60. 
1228 Vernon (1947) 60.  
1229 Vernon (1947) 60. 
1230 Vernon (1947) 60. Vernon adds that “[t]his action supplements the earlier resignation of important 
zaibatsu officers which took place shortly after the start of the occupation.” Id. 
1231 Ando (1991) 20. 
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5.2 Reverse course 
As mentioned above (Chapter 3A Section 6) Byrnes’ Frankfurt speech, the publication 
of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 and the Marshall Plan in July 1947 marked a 
turning point in US policy not only in Europe but globally. In Japan, the arrival in June 
1950 of John Foster Dulles, marked the beginning of the end of the occupation.1232 
Dulles came seeking to negotiate a treaty, needing an ally in the face of the Korean 
War and the rise of Mao in China.1233 The restrictions on Japanese industry, which had 
caused food shortages, were gradually relaxed as part of what was called the “reverse 
course” effort to reindustrialise Japan as a bulwark against communism,1234 and a 
supplier in the Korean war.1235 The US leadership acted partly on the advice of a group 
of prominent US businessmen.1236 By July 1948 225 of the 325 companies slated for 
“deconcentration measures” had been taken off the list.1237 In addition, by 1950-1 
almost all of the business leaders affected by the purge law were “depurged”.1238 In 
1955 also, all those who received prison sentences at the IMTFE, were released.1239 At 
the same time, harassment by the US occupier of the political left in Japan 
continued.1240 
 
Some of the more far-reaching reforms the US occupation leadership had instigated, in 
particular land-reform, fiscal reform, the opening up of the economy to foreign (US) 
investment, remained in place,1241 and can be said to have achieved what was set at the 
outset as a priority goal of the US occupation: “the eventual participation of Japan in a 
World economy on a reasonable basis.”1242 The ‘World economy’ in this vision was the 
capitalist world’s economy. 
 
                                                
1232 Finn (1992) 241. 
1233 Finn (1992) 242. 
1234 Kennan (1967) 368. Additionally, “as the communist movement inside Japan became active in the 
course of 1948, SCAP and the Japanese government resorted to [the purge] directives to remove the 
communist influence from the Japanese political scene. During 1949 and 1950, 61 executive committee 
members and editorial officers of the Japanese Communist Party, including 13 Diet members, were 
designated purged persons, while more than 10,000 communists or sympathizers were removed from 
various government posts, Several leftist organisations were ordered to liquidate and their property was 
seized.” (Ando (1991) 27.) 
1235 Finn (1992) 226, 241. 
1236 Ando (1991) 25. 
1237 Ando (1991) 26. 
1238 Seita; Ando (1991) 27. 
1239 Cryer (2010) 119. 
1240 Finn (1992) 243. 
1241 Ando (1991) 28. 
1242 Ando (1991) 28. 
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One of the Class A war crimes suspects released from Sugamo Prison by the US 
occupation was Kishi Nobusuku, the former Minister of Industry and Commerce, who 
became Prime Minister in 1957. He was responsible for the renewal of the US-Japan 
Security Treaty with Pres. Eisenhower in 1960, the treaty “which many Japanese 
regarded as Kishi’s helping hand to entrench American military, political, and 
economic domination over Japan.”1243 Totani adds, “[i]t is perhaps not surprising that 
the Japanese public responded to the apparent collusion between the former Class A 
war crimes suspect-who had escaped prosecution by the grace of the United States- 
and Eisenhower by leading one of the largest popular demonstrations ever to be seen 
in the history of Japan.”1244 
 
6 Conclusion to 3A and 3B: Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice 
 
The decision to submit the authors of the war to international trials was taken in a 
mood of ‘liberal internationalism’, promoted by government lawyers, and it presented 
at the same time an opportunity to create both new law and a particular narrative of the 
war that would appease home publics and allow for the rehabilitation of Japan and 
German as major trading partners. While on the Western side, which was in the public 
limelight at least for the duration of the international trial, the ‘economic case’ was 
initially included, and industrialists were prosecuted, on the Eastern front the trial 
focused almost entirely on pathologising the Japanese military and political leadership, 
while the secondary trials were largely limited to cases affecting allied service 
personnel.  
 
The industrialists’ trials in Europe offer a unique perspective on business in conflicts: 
individuals’ rationalised explanations for their actions illustrate how the ‘corporate 
anomie’ generated by the corporation as a structure of irresponsibility (Ch. 2A) allows 
individuals to become involved in gruesome acts for profit. The very stories of the 
involvement of the German cartels and Japanese zaibatsu illustrate corporate 
imperialism, or the imperialism at the core of the corporate form, as argued in Ch. 2B.  
In conclusion, in Japan as in Germany, the United States orchestrated/stage managed 
international criminal trials so as to give the semblance of accountability of the authors 
                                                
1243 Totani (2008) 77. 
1244 Totani (2008) 77 (emphasis added). 
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of the war, while in fact ensuring that those elites considered responsible at the outset, 
turned from adversaries into allies. The German and Japanese industrialists and 
capitalists who had been part of the national imperialist ventures, became enmeshed in 
the global economic system dominated by the US. Through breaking up the cartels and 
co-opting its leaders, the US transformed controlled, monopolised closed markets into 
an open Europe and Japan where US companies would find plenty of investment 
opportunity as well as markets for its products, access to technology and labour. I have 
argued that the trials formed the public face of a much broader post-war policy, 
occupation, reform, shaping the future Europe and East Asia - in ways similar to 
colonial times (Ch.2B). They did so by establishing the hegemon’s moral authority, 
which legitimised far-reaching economic intervention. The trials also served to justify 
involvement in Europe and Japan during and especially also after WWII to the home 
public.  
 
The remarkable move that happened, and that I describe here in these Chapters 3A and 
3B through the story of the main Tokyo and Nuremberg IMT trials, is that the story of 
the humanitarian side of the story remains in the currently dominant liberal accounts, 
the story of the prosecution of criminals who threatened ‘our humanity’. The 
ideological separation between capitalism and communism at the inception of the 
‘Cold War’ split ‘the economic’ off from the ‘humanitarian’ in ICL, thereby 
influencing not only the trials being held at the time in concretely identifiable ways, 
but also, qualitatively changing the way conflict would be understood, and as a result, 
how the role of ICL in relation to conflict would be imagined: in terms of individual 
(or regime) pathology instead of conflict (inevitably) produced by the mode of 
production. The ‘economic side’ of WWII only remains present in Soviet and GDR 
literature.1245   
 
The economic causes of conflict were removed from ICL. Public and private, the 
logics of humanitarianism/peace/rights and of economy/trade (Ch. 2B) were once 
again separated – although we can see how economic reconstruction, development and 
market liberalisation remained allied to the peace (and security) narrative.1246 The UN 
Charter stayed clear of the structural economic causes (and effects) of the very 
                                                
1245 E.g. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus (1960), (1962). 
1246 Duffield (2001) esp. 22-42, 108-128. 
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problems it was designed to address.1247 As we shall see in the next Chapters, result 
was a change in the way conflict came to be understood: conflict was no longer a result 
of imperialism, expansionism, but of an individual and/or ethno-racial pathology.  
 
Moreover, the prosecutions of industrialists post-WWII were largely forgotten, and 
only recently have ‘business and conflict’ been reconnected in our thinking about ICL 
– seemingly as a new phenomenon (Ch.4, 5). 
 
The tenacity and pluck of the Nuremberg lawyers mimics the “victory of law” over 
barbarism. In the clash between their liberal impulse and the capitalist logic, the liberal 
impulse lost out in substance if not in semblance, causing the liberal lawyers to be 
disciplined, and recruiting ICL to the ‘capitalising mission’.  
                                                
1247 Kennedy (2006) 162. 
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1 Introduction to A, B and C 
 
In recent years the phrases ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ have become 
ubiquitous, in the media, on the streets, in legal practice and also in the academy.1248 
There are high expectations that ICL will be deployed to remedy many ills in the 
world. In the first part of this chapter I ask, how did ICL become the accountability 
tool of choice? Why is it, specifically, that some of us are asking for ICL to be applied 
to business in conflict? In Part B I look at how ICL has developed to make it 
potentially applicable to business in conflict, and in Part C I ask why, when demanding 
the application of ICL to business, we do not (or no longer) speak of individual 
business(wo)men, but of application to the corporation per se. 
 
In the aftermath of Nuremberg the trials were criticised by key international lawyers 
on legal grounds – it was said, for example, that law had been applied retrospectively, 
and that Nuremberg had been an exercise of ‘victor’s justice’.1249 This was one of the 
grounds for its rethinking and remaking: ICL had to be prepared for the future. 
Another was, that from the particular circumstance of WWII, a universal ICL had to be 
fashioned. “International criminal law” as we know it today, was largely (re-
)constructed, while building on the post-WWII experience, by lawyers, state 
representatives, and other members of the same class1250 (the GCC) post-Cold War (in 
                                                
1248 E.g. Miéville (2005) 296-7. 
1249 E.g. Kelsen (1947); Schwarzenberger (1946-47); Jescheck (1957/2008); generally, Mettraux (2008); 
Koskenniemi (2002).  
1250 Marx (1979) 116. 
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Ch. 5 I discuss the reason for this timing). In Chapter 4A I focus on academic1251 
lawyers’ role in constructing ICL’s foundational narrative: its history, meaning and 
purpose. It is academic lawyers’ task (habit, or even compulsion) to take legal events 
(such as Nuremberg and Tokyo) and make doctrinal sense of them. ICL in this mode is 
treated as a found object, or an unreturnable gift left to us by a previous generation. It 
needs to be studied, analysed, their parts named and explained. In particular, we need 
to figure out how it fits into our pre-designated categories (or: whether it requires new 
categories?) and how it fits into our broader system of law, that abstracted, artificial 
‘whole’. Academic lawyers perform a post-hoc legal rationalisation of an event, attach 
to it a history and a logic and send it forward into ‘progressive development’. 
Lawyers’ explaining, legitimating and rationalisation may or may not be consciously 
ideological devices1252 - but they inevitably become so. These are then employed by 
state negotiators (and the official law-makers, e.g. Parliaments), civil society groups, 
business people and others (potentially members of different classes) to negotiate over, 
and struggle for. Lawyers, as noted in Ch. 1, are thus not the ‘myopic handmaidens’ of 
this world order, but active (more or less consciously) ‘chefs’1253 as members of the 
‘ruling’ elite, congealing capitalism.  
 
In this Chapter I show this process in the ‘Making of ICL’. The fact that ICL was taken 
up as a project for (re-)construction suggests that similar material circumstances 
existed to the latter half of the 1940s affecting material interests at home and abroad 
that required some manner of intervention (Ch.3A S.3: ‘Why Nuremberg’ – and see 
Ch.5 below). On a more general level, the ‘need’ for an ICL can be deduced from its 
significance as the missing piece of the IL project (as perceived pre-Nuremberg by e.g. 
Stimson). It could additionally be because ICL - as part of the ‘humanitarian’ element 
of IL - serves to legitimise IL as a whole (“lending the legitimacy that comes with the 
enterprise of pursuing the worst criminals”1254) or, it could be, as Schwarzenberger 
suggests, because lawyers were simply following a fashion.1255 The latter points us to 
ideology. Why ICL is ‘in fashion’, the accountability tool of choice, I will seek to 
discover here.  
                                                
1251 As, especially in ICL, there is no clear separation between academic and practising lawyers, it 
would be more accurate to say, lawyers acting in their academic capacity. 
1252 Marks (2000) 18-25. Marks here outlines a number of ideological devices – here I seek to discover 
how some of these work in the ‘Making of ICL’. 
1253 Scott (1998); and Alston (1997). 
1254 Mégret (2010) 180-1. 
1255 Schwarzenberger (1950) 263. 
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In Section B I look at the ‘congealing’ of capitalism from deeper inside ICL, where the 
detailed rules are worked out on the subjects and other modalities of ICL. This 
happens largely in the negotiations over the tribunals’ statutes, and in their cases. 
Academic lawyers play a role in this also, not least because academic lawyers have 
been doing much of the work in ICL, e.g. as part of the ILC, as judges and in other 
legal jobs at the tribunals, as negotiators on behalf of countries in the ICC negotiations, 
etc.  
 
While ICL post-WWII complemented the enlightened liberal Individualisierung 
(individualisation/atomisation, below S.2.3) of society, law, and responsibility,1256 in 
the past decade the Individualisierung of ICL has come to be challenged by scholars 
proposing various perspectives on ‘system crime’. Among these new critiques is the 
discussion of (actual or potential) corporate liability in ICL, which is taking place 
subsequent to the reification of the corporation in IL described in Ch.2B. The putative 
corporate ICL springs from the contradiction of corporate international personality in 
ILIP on the one hand, and on the other, the development of a regime of responsibility 
in IL to be applied to an area in which business involvement is increasingly visible. In 
4C I analyse these developments and relate them also to domestic ‘corporate crime’ 
scholarship.  
 
2 Introduction to A: Constructing ICL’s foundational narrative 
 
Academic lawyers’ provision of a foundational narrative of ICL, providing it with a 
history, a sense of ‘where it came from’ can be contrasted with the way history has 
been written out of the mainstream company law texts. In Ch.2A I argued that this is 
because company law is considered mature and ‘settled in its identity’, as opposed to 
ICL, which to some extent is still fluid and subject to appropriation for different 
purposes.  Yet while ICL is acknowledged to be ‘new’,1257 there is also a felt need to 
historicise it, to gain venerability.1258 Although lawyers’ narrativization serves partly to 
congeal ICL’s fluidity, it has resulted in different views on the related questions of the 
meaning of ‘international criminal law’, what constitutes an ‘international crime’, and 
                                                
1256 Pashukanis (1978) 178. 
1257 Boas (2010) 501: Boas notes (fn.1) “It must be recalled that international criminal law, at least in its 
modern manifestation is merely 15 years in existence.” 
1258 Marks (2000) 19-20. 
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subsequently what ICL’s (stated) purpose is (sections 2.1-2.4). A further, more recent 
debate is over who the actual or potential subjects (or objects) of ICL are – who is a 
potential ‘international criminal’: does this include the individual company director or 
officer or business person, the company as a collective, or, the company per se as a 
legal person? The narrativization is a point where one can observe lawyers’ congealing 
work in action, where one can see structural dynamics and individual agency at work. 
 
The breadth and shape of the field of ICL is said to range from the very narrow 
approach (one could perhaps call this an institutional approach) adopted by Cryer et al, 
to the strict doctrinal (positivist) approach adopted by Werle and others, and the 
cosmopolitan ‘justice’ approach of Cassese. These first three approaches I discuss here 
are variants of what Kreß in the MPEPIL calls ICL ‘strictu sensu’;1259 a fourth is the 
‘catholic’ or ‘omnibus’ approach espoused by policy-oriented authors.1260 In section 3 I 
show how each of these four approaches contributes to the overall making of ICL – by 
forming ICL’s ‘ideological backbone’. In Section 4 I propose an alternative, 
perspective that forms the basis of a preliminary critique of ICL to be built on in Parts 
B and C and the following Chapters. 
 
2.1 Against all atrocities: A distinction based on morality 
The school of thought on ICL with by far the strongest appeal, including outside of 
legal academia, is the “humanitarian” school of thought on ICL, of which the late 
Antonio Cassese was a major proponent.1261 With clear echoes of Jackson’s Nuremberg 
orations, Cassese described the telos of international criminal law (in line with the ICC 
Statute Preamble) “protecting society against the most harmful transgressions of legal 
standards of behaviour perpetrated by individuals.”1262 In this perspective, international 
crimes are something qualitatively different from ‘ordinary’ crimes, and should have 
their own, exclusive ‘area’ of law. Calling ICL a new branch of international law, he 
explicitly excludes crimes such as piracy, as, in his view, the concept has not only 
become obsolete, but it “does not meet the requirements of international crimes 
proper.”1263 Piracy was not punished for the purpose of protecting a community value, 
                                                
1259 Kreß (2009).  
1260 Cryer (2005) 1; Ratner (2009) 12.  
1261 Besides Cassese, followers of this approach include, e.g. Ferencz, See, e.g. Ferencz (1979). 
1262 Cassese (2008) 20 (emphasis added). 
1263 Cassese (2008) 12. 
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and not thought so abhorrent as to amount to an international crime. Cassese further 
stated: “the notion of international crimes does not include illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances, the unlawful arms trade, smuggling of nuclear and 
other potentially deadly materials, or money laundering, slave trade or traffic in 
women.1264 This is because these are normally perpetrated by private individuals or 
criminal organisations, “states usually fight against them, often by joint action. …as a 
rule these offences are committed against states.”1265 Apartheid is also excluded as 
according to Cassese it has not yet reached the status of a CIL crime.1266 Cassese 
restricts ICL to offences occurring predominantly in the ‘public sphere’, and 
perpetrated mostly by public actors for political motives.1267 He includes as 
international crimes, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, 
aggression and terrorism, which shows that even among the authors who limit their 
understanding of ICL to ‘core crimes’, crimes strictu sensu (see below, s.3.3) or 
‘international crimes proper’, there is disagreement over what those are.1268  
 
2.2 Optimists and Skeptics: A distinction based on enforcement mechanisms 
The next most prominent perspective is one that builds on the historical manifestations 
of (attempts at) ICL enforcement. It anchors ICL’s foundational narrative in 
international legal (in the ‘law in action’ sense) and legal institutional development. 
Cryer et al. in An Introduction to International Criminal Law (the “first 
authoritative”1269 and now “market-leading”1270 textbook on the subject) define ICL as 
the law of the crimes over which International Courts and Tribunals have been granted 
jurisdiction in general international law.1271 This covers what are also called “core 
crimes”, namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of 
aggression. Those that delineate ICL in relation to international enforcement 
mechanisms (but also other strictu sensu proponents), normally commence any 
                                                
1264 Cassese (2008) 13. 
1265 Cassese (2008) 13. 
1266 Cassese (2008) 13.  
1267 Cassese (2003) 1. Cassese in his second, 2008 edition, omits the first chapter of the 2003 edition, 
which was entitled “The Reaction of the International Community to Atrocities” and appraised non-
judicial responses to atrocities, such as UN Security Council sanctions, countermeasures, revenge (in the 
biblical sense) and forgetting. Examples of what Cassese meant by atrocities were, the violence and 
bloodshed caused by the growing disparity between rich and poor, increasing poverty and hopelessness, 
nationalism religious fundamentalism, etc. 
1268 Cassese (2008) 3.  
1269 O’Keefe (2009) 485. 
1270 Cryer (2010) (second edition, back cover). 
1271 Cryer (2007) 2; Cryer (2010) 4. 
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discussion of substantive ICL with a historical progress narrative which traces ICL’s 
origin to the Allies’ attempts at prosecuting the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, and ends at 
the present day ICC.1272 In effect, the narrative that was suggested by the lawyers at 
Nuremberg as a putative justification for the IMT trial, is here taken and naturalised. 
This narrative would list certain key moments in the development of the ICL 
enforcement regime, starting just before Versailles. Following World War I, seemingly 
unwilling to allow the Kaiser’s self-imposed exile in The Netherlands to secure his 
immunity from prosecution for the heinous acts committed in Germany, the victorious 
Allies created a commission to look into the question of responsibility of the ‘authors 
of the war’. The Commission reported to the 1919 Preliminary Peace Conference, that 
the Central Powers (the losing side in WWI) had committed numerous acts in violation 
of established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity.1273 This 
led to the inclusion in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles of three clauses in which the states 
party ordered the prosecution of the Kaiser (and almost 900 others1274) by an 
international tribunal.1275 The Versailles Treaty marks the first time the concept of 
individual criminal responsibility was explicitly mentioned in an international 
treaty.1276 Thus, in this narrative, the ICL notions of war crimes and an emerging 
concept of crimes against the laws of humanity had been introduced at this point.1277  
Histories of this kind then narrate the very tentative 1920 proposals for an ICC,1278 and 
following this the concrete proposal (which was supported by only thirteen member 
states1279) by the League of Nations following the assassination of King Alexander of 
Yugoslavia in 1934.1280 Eventually, the determination of the World War II Allies led to 
the conclusion in 1945 of the “London Agreement” with annexed the Nuremberg 
Charter (the “birth certificate of ICL”1281) and the establishment of the two IMTs at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo. While the Allied post WWII trials are thus construed as laying 
                                                
1272 See e.g. Cassese (2008) 30-1, Werle (2007) 1-30. Cryer (2005) 9-72 (Cryer starts in antiquity); 
Bassiouni and Schabas, list earlier examples including Peter von Hagenbach’s 1474 trial in Germany  
(Bassiouni (1974) 414; Schabas (2007) 1). Ratner (2009), gives a “History of individual accountability” 
3-9. 
1273 WWI Commission Report. The Report names 32 charges, including ‘systematic terrorism’ and the 
‘abduction of women and girls for the purpose of enforced prostitution’, adding that the list is not 
exhaustive, pp 114-5.  
1274 Werle (2007) 8. 
1275 Versailles Treaty, excerpt in Appendix D; Schabas (2007) 2. 
1276 Werle (2007) 13. 
1277 No individuals were in fact prosecuted under these provisions, although some were tried by domestic 
German tribunals in the ‘Leipzig Trials’, Schabas (2007) 4, Werle (2007) 8; Ratner (2009) 6).  
1278 Phillimore (1922-3); Draft Statute 1927. 
1279 Werle (2009) 18. 
1280 ICC Convention 1937. 
1281 Werle (2007) 14. 
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the foundation for contemporary global ICL, its further development was taken over 
by the UN system, also established in 1945. The United Nations General Assembly 
(“UNGA”) tasked its International Law Commission (“ILC”) in 1947 to draft a ‘Code 
of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ based on the IMT Charter 
principles and judgment.1282 After formulating the Nuremberg Principles in 19501283 
and a draft code in 1954,1284 the ILC suspended its work until 1983 because of the Cold 
War impasse.1285 
 
Such histories invariably show the development of international criminal law gaining 
momentum after the end of the Cold War with the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). These momentous events were followed by the 
completion in 1996 a new Draft Code,1286 which then formed a basis for the 
negotiations over the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Statute.  Thus, the history 
of ICL culminates in the establishment of the ICC.1287 In this narrative, the ICC Statute 
forms the embodiment (if imperfect) of a maturing system of ICL.1288 It is therefore 
perhaps more accurate to describe this narrative as one of the enforcement 
(possibilities) of ICL on the international level, rather than one of ICL in general. 
Strikingly, all cast their histories back before Nuremberg, not accepting that as its 
originating moment, loosening themselves from its flaws.  
 
2.3 German positivists: A distinction based on doctrine 
The third perspective is internal to law, the ‘legal scientist’s perspective’ – the lawyer 
whose task it is to explain law and ‘legal happenings’ resulting from legal processes, 
as part of, and in terms of, a coherent, autonomous system of law. This perspective is 
dominant in German-speaking legal academia,1289 where Völkerstrafrecht (equivalent 
terms exist in Portuguese, Spanish, French and Italian but not in English - Kreß 
                                                
1282 UNGARes. 177. See ICL Nuremberg Principles Commentary. See also, Ratner (2009) 8.  
1283 Nuremberg Principles. 
1284 Draft Code 1954. 
1285 Ratner (2009) 8. 
1286 Draft Code 1996. 
1287 See Schabas (2007) 1-21; De Than and Shorts (2003) 271-341; Schwarzenberger (1950) 263; 
Ambos (2002) (uses the term “gipfelt” which translates as “culminates”). 
1288 Werle (2007) V. See also, Sliedregt (2003) 3; Werle (2009) 4, 18; Ambos (2002) (in the title of his 
book). 
1289 Werle (2007) fn153. 
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diplomatically suggests ‘international criminal law strictu sensu’1290) is defined as “all 
norms of PIL, that directly create, exclude, or in another way regulate criminal 
liability”.1291 In their perspective, Völkerstrafrecht must be distinguished from 
Internationales Strafrecht.1292 In the French literature the same distinction is made 
between droit international pénal, on the one hand, and droit pénal international, on 
the other.1293 Thus, the international crimes within this definition are what authors 
writing in English may call ‘core crimes’ (war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide and aggression)1294. The subtle difference in terms of the content of the 
enforcement narrative above, is that this includes CIL crimes that do not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC or the international tribunals, such as certain specific crimes in 
internal armed conflicts,1295 and single occurrences of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and the CIL norms on crimes in civil war (some of) which are included in 
the jurisdiction of the ICTR and ICTY. The core crimes covered in Völkerstrafrecht 
are as a category included in the ICC jurisdiction and defined there, however, 
Völkerstrafrecht generally includes custom and other sources, where these crimes are 
also regulated.1296 Implicitly, Art 22 (3) of the ICC Statute itself evidences that there 
exist other IL crimes than those listed in the Statute.1297 The bigger difference is the 
motivation for the difference, in that the ‘German’ approach includes as 
Völkerrechtsverbrechen all those crimes the substantive content of which is found in 
IL, regardless of where (or even whether) these crimes may be prosecuted. It is thus a 
distinction that finds its source in doctrine per se. The substantive content of the 
Völkerrechtsverbrechen should be found directly in IL itself. Whether a domestic 
constitution does or does not permit the direct application of the international norm 
containing the crime in domestic law does not affect the validity of the norm in IL.1298  
Crimes such as torture (in the CAT sense)1299 or certain crimes against air traffic are 
                                                
1290 See also Kreß (2009); Vitzthum (2010) 19. 
1291 Werle (2007) 34, fn153. 
1292 Werle (2007) 35. 
1293 The distinction on the same basis also exists in the Portuguese, Italian and Spanish legal tradition 
(Cassese 2003 15). See also Hollán (2000), Schwarzenberger (1950).  
1294 Cryer (2010) 4. 
1295 Werle (2007) 942. 
1296 E.g. Ferdinandusse (2006) 11. 
1297 ICC Statute Art. 22 (3): “This article shall not affect the characterisation of any conduct as criminal 
under international law independently of this Statute.” 
1298 Werle (2007) 111. 
1299 For the view these and other crimes attracting universal jurisdiction should be counted as 
‘Völkerrechtsverbrechen’ see also, Dahm (2002) 999. 
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thus not ICL strictu sensu, but “international criminal law in the meaning of 
internationally prescribed/authorised municipal criminal law.”1300 
 
In the German understanding, when Völkerrechtsverbrechen occur in the context of a 
systematic or massive attack or use of force, for which a collective, normally a state is 
responsible, the collective deed is the sum of all individual deeds.1301 Völkerstrafrecht 
forms part of a gapless system of IL, and borders the law on state responsibility. 
Völkerstrafrecht forms part of Internationales Strafrecht (lit. international criminal 
law), which includes all areas of criminal law that have international aspects.1302 This 
encompasses supranational criminal law (criminal law made by supranational 
organisations, which thus far does not exist), the law on the international cooperation 
in matters of criminal law (which includes e.g. extradition treaties), and national 
choice of law and jurisdiction norms.1303  
 
A key aspect of the German approach is the Individualisierung of responsibility 
provided by ICL: “The individual allocation shows that international crimes are 
committed not by abstract entities such as states, but always require the cooperation of 
individuals. This individualization is important for the victims and their families 
because they have a right to the whole truth. The individualization of the perpetrators 
are an opportunity to process their personal stake in the system crimes. Finally, it is 
important for society, because it rejects a theory of collective guilt.”1304 
 
2.4 No distinction: The catch-all ‘omnibus’ approach 
Alternative narratives of ICL compared to the ones discussed above do start their 
account of its origins with the international norms applicable to piracy.1305 According 
to these, since the time of the Phoenicians and the Vikings piracy has been condemned 
as a crime against the law of nations.1306 In this view, the activities of pirates, 
committing acts on the open seas that under most national jurisdictions would amount 
                                                
1300 Schwarzenberger (1950) 266; and Werle (2007) 111. 
1301 Werle (2007) 40.  
1302 Werle (2007) 52. 
1303 In Werle’s view, the source of the universal jurisdiction principle for Völkerrechtsverbrechen is 
domestic law (Werle (2007) 54). 
1304 Werle (2007) at 43. 
1305 Bantekas (2007) 1. 
1306 Ferencz (1995) 1123. 
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to crimes, led to the development and application of international rules.1307 These 
histories also include early regulation of the slave trade, the opium trade, and other 
phenomena, in addition to the events and developments described above.1308 In this 
narrative, slave trade and piracy were both crimes in CIL before treaties were adopted 
which included crimes with a similar content.1309 Neither offences had (or have) 
specific international enforcement mechanisms attached to them,1310 but “every state 
may seize a pirate ship … and arrest the persons and seize the property on board” 
according to treaty law the capturing state, and according to CIL, applying universal 
jurisdiction, any State may prosecute the pirate.1311 The prohibitions, violations of 
which amount to crimes in this approach constitute erga omnes obligations, meaning 
that every state in the world has an interest in their observance. As the enforcement of 
the norms on piracy occurred only in national courts, ‘strictu sensu’ authors argue that 
the CIL rule on piracy is merely jurisdictional.1312 Counter to this stands the ‘omnibus’ 
view that the crime of piracy is defined in IL (both the content of the crime and the fact 
that it is a crime), regardless where that norm may be enforceable.  Crimes like piracy 
are thus considered ‘international crimes’ in this perspective regardless of 
enforcement, or even whether it is explicitly designated as a ‘crime’ or indeed an 
‘international crime’ in international law.1313 Whether the ICL norm can be directly 
applied in a domestic court or needs the intermediation of a piece of domestic 
legislation does not detract from the ‘international’ nature of the crime.1314 This 
approach is the least dogmatic, most pragmatic, problem-solving oriented approach. 
 
This approach is best able to deal with a ‘messy’ reality, for example one where IL 
instruments do not always clearly specify whether a crime in question is an 
‘international crime’.1315 Nor do all instruments specify if a crime is subject to 
international jurisdiction, to universal jurisdiction in national1316 or international fora, 
or whether the treaty only obligates or authorises states to criminalise a certain event in 
                                                
1307 E.g. ATCA in the US (see further below Ch.6). See also, eg In re Piracy. 
1308 Ferencz (1995) 1126; Cryer (2005) 57; Schabas (2007) 10. 
1309 According to Ferencz ((1995) 1123), since the time of the Phoenicians and the Vikings piracy has 
been condemned as a crime against the law of nations. Art. 15 High Seas Convention; Art. 101, 
UNCLOS. 
1310 In re Piracy. 
1311 For a discussion of contemporary forms of piracy, see Guilfoyle (2008). 
1312 Cassese (2008) 28. 
1313 Bantekas & Nash (2007) 6. 
1314 Bantekas & Nash (2007) 6. 
1315 E.g. Art. 1 Genocide Convention. 
1316 E.g. Art. 105 UNCLOS. 
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domestic law1317 and/or to prosecute or extradite a suspect.1318 In the omnibus approach, 
this situation is dealt with on a case-by-case basis, with authors coming to occasionally 
different conclusions.1319 Generally the crimes that Werle would designate as 
‘international crimes’ are included.  
 
Because this is the approach potentially most receptive to ‘business crimes’, it is worth 
giving some examples, in particular as they relate to legal persons. Certain 
international instruments, such as the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions1320 and the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime1321 require states to 
criminalise the behaviour of legal persons if this is congruent with national legal 
principles. Another category exemplified by conventions such as the Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste, seems to 
encompass the criminalisation of behaviour in international law, while leaving it to 
states to chose the object of domestic law criminalisation.1322 
 
The majority of these instruments require national authorities to legislate so as to give 
effect to the terms of the treaty – it leaves it to states to decide whether to legislate for 
the possible imposition of “corporate crime” sanctions or administrative sanctions or 
measures on corporations, or indeed criminal sanctions on individual company 
officials (the principle of ‘functional equivalence’).1323 However, the introduction of 
the concepts into treaty law (despite possibly limited ratifications, or the regional 
nature) when there is no consensus yet on corporate crime in domestic jurisdictions, 
normalises, and perhaps stimulates the development of a concept of corporate crime in 
international law.1324 
 
3 These approaches as the ideological building blocks of ICL  
 
                                                
1317 E.g. Arts. 5, 6, 8 Organized Crime Convention. 
1318 E.g. Art. 4 Convention Against Torture 
1319 Cf. lists of crimes considered ICL crimes in Van den Wijngaert (1996) and Steiner (2007) 1136. 
1320 Bribery Convention, excerpt in Appendix D. 
1321 Transnational Crime Convention, excerpt in Appendix D. 
1322 Basel Convention, excerpt in Appendix D. 
1323 Bantekas & Nash (2007) 49. 
1324 Ratner (2009) 17; Bantekas and Nash (2007) 47-49; Humboldt Symposium. 
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Each of the four approaches described above contributes one of the vital elements 
supporting the construction of ICL. First, Cassese’s approach provides the ideological 
justification, almost the emotional need, for intervention in ‘foreign’ jurisdiction ‘for 
the protection of higher values’.1325 This at once universalises ICL, serves us, our 
community interest and represents us, our collectively held values.1326 What those 
values are and how we may discover them Cassese does not further explain. He states, 
“[t]he values at issue are not propounded by scholars or thought up by starry-eyed 
philosophers. Rather, they are laid down in a string of international instruments, which, 
however, do not necessarily spell them out in so many words.”1327 Broad aspirational 
statements of ‘values’ are regularly found in preambles to treaties. Triffterer 
comments, that those declarations found in the Preamble to the ICC Statute “echo, in 
the arena of international affairs, the loftiest aspirations of an ever advancing 
society”.1328 They must thus be self-evident to us. Ferdinandusse has warned, that “a 
certain scepticism is in order” when such normative appeals are used to ground 
particular effects under which we might include what is/is not an ‘international 
crime’.1329 Ferdinandusse rightly recognises such normative claims “as techniques in a 
hegemonic struggle for greater control between different actors in international 
law”.1330 Additionally, the ‘civilising mission’ of law is clearly present in Triffterer’s 
comment.1331 
 
Within the narrative focused on the enforcement mechanisms and possibilities of ICL, 
two strands can be detected: those that consider the Court half full and those that 
consider it half empty. This rational narrative provides us with a history of how ICL 
was built up brick by brick, how this logical development culminated in an 
overarching ICC. It privileges concerns about effectiveness and how to improve ICL 
institutions, e.g. so as to avoid ‘selectivity’.1332 This approach also supports global 
institution building in the global governance sense generally (Ch. 2B S.4). The 
implication is that all ICL’s teething problems will be resolved when we have strong 
international institutions that apply the rules equally to all. The latter is also a concern 
                                                
1325 Cassese (2008) 11. Emphasis in original. 
1326 See also, Mégret (2010) 210. 
1327 Cassese (2008) 11. 
1328 Bergsmo (2008) 6. 
1329 Ferdinandusse (2006) 157.  
1330 Ferdinandusse (2006) 158. 
1331 On this notion, see Koskenniemi (2003) 108-110 and more generally Koskenniemi (2002). 
1332 HRW: Courting History; ICC website: Situations and Cases. For a discussion, see Cryer (2005), esp. 
Ch.5; Heller (2009). 
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for the ‘German positivists’. Both, however, assume that it is a structural possibility 
for this to become reality: these approaches therefore enable a ‘progressive’ debate and 
real activity on improving and expanding ICL’s institutions.1333 Curiously, at the same 
time, it also allows for the argument not to expand ICL enforcement: we must not 
grow too fast. Crawford has suggested that the current limitation of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction is quite simply motivated by the risk of the court being “swamped” 
otherwise. This is a common, but peculiar argument, as the ‘size’ of the court merely 
depends on the funding governments make available. An analogous argument on the 
domestic level is unthinkable.  
 
The ‘German’ variant seems to approach law from a purely analytical, scientific 
(Kelsenian positivist) perspective.1334 It thus appears to be technical, value neutral. The 
differences and distinctions are purely ‘botanical’ and of limited value other than from 
the academic perspective of studying law as a system. For example, Kreß’ remark that 
the ICC Statute contains (and perhaps even creates) crimes that are not in fact 
‘international crimes’ is likely to find resonance with only the smallest circle of 
academic specialists.1335 Yet, precisely such debates serve to give ICL doctrinal 
credibility. Moreover, lost in doctrinal detail, it guarantees bigger (political) questions 
will not be asked. Most importantly, it sets the ‘legal scientist’ apart from the politician 
and thus denies lawyers’ role in, amongst others, congealing capitalism. 
 
Proponents of the ‘omnibus approach’ tend to be more practice-oriented than most 
other academic lawyers. Bantekas & Nash conceptualise ICL as a ‘fusion of IL and 
domestic criminal law’ and include in their textbook on ICL discussion of IOs’ and 
NGOs’ progressive efforts on the eradication of issues such as human trafficking.1336 
Grant and Barker’s Deskbook of International Criminal Law (a documents bundle, 
aimed at the ICL practitioner) contains conventions ranging from the 1926 Slavery 
Convention to the European Convention on Cybercrime.1337 Dugard and van den 
Wijngaert see ICL as a means for states to help each other in the application of their 
respective domestic criminal laws, necessitated by the internationalisation of crime – 
and thus come closest to interpreting ICL in the practical sense permitted in 
                                                
1333 Crawford (2003) 122. 
1334 See generally, Kelsen (2008). 
1335 Kreß (2009) in MPEPIL. 
1336 Bantekas & Nash, 2007, 1. For the converse view, see, Jescheck (1995) 1120. 
1337 Grant (2006). 
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Schwarzenberger’s critique.1338 Ramasastry expresses no view on the doctrinal nature 
of ICL, but asks only “what it can do for us”.1339  
 
Viewing these approaches as key ‘ingredients’ of today’s ICL, we can see that ICL is a 
mixture (in varying quantities) of emotions, rationality, pragmatics and ‘legal 
soundness’ – altogether, what I will show (here and in Ch. 6) to be an irresistible 
package to lawyers, policy makers and the general public. The pragmatic element 
gives it flexibility, for example to develop new rules/policies in the ‘war on terror’ 
context, the positivist foundational narrative gives it ‘academic kudos’ while the 
enforcement focus supports efforts to strengthen institutions. Moreover, as ICL 
symbolises ‘justice’ in IL,1340 it has become something to believe in: it “carries a 
religious exercise of hope that is stronger than the desire to face everyday life.”1341 Its 
crimes have become reasons to invade other countries.1342 This is why ICL is in 
fashion. It is something to propose as a remedy to a perceived problem (such as 
‘business in conflict’), and, something to rally around, to continually work to improve. 
Most of all, ICL communicates to us, reassuringly, its exceptionality (e.g. Cassese’s 
effort to exclude certain ‘less grave’ crimes), while also confirming to us, these, these 
select international crimes, are the ills of international society. All other problems 
pale in comparison or even disappear altogether.1343 
 
In Parts B and C I investigate how business(wo)men and corporations do, or do not, fit 
into this narrative, and in Ch. 6 I show how various factions are challenging the notion 
that these are really the only ills in international society. 
 
4 An alternative foundational narrative for ICL 
 
We cannot directly attach to ICL the explanation for domestic criminal law commonly 
proposed by Marxist theorists, namely that it serves to maintain its class rule and 
suppress the lower classes – as “organised class terror”.1344 ICL crimes are mostly 
                                                
1338 Van den Wijngaert (1996) 1.  
1339 Ramasastry (2002). 
1340 Mégret (2010) 210, 220, 224, also Tallgren (2002a) 580. 
1341 Tallgren (2002a) 593. 
1342 In the next section and in Chs. 5 and 6 I argue that there are other reasons beyond this, or that these 
crimes are mainly used as a public justification. 
1343 See Ireland, who speaks of the “mysterious disappearance of capitalism” (2002). 
1344 Tallgren (2002a) 575; Pashukanis (1978) 173. 
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‘leadership crimes’ and those tried in ICL courts have been mostly members of elites. 
Yet, according to Pashukanis, “[e]very historically given system of penal policy bears 
the imprint of the class interests of that class which instigated it.”1345 “Society as a 
whole” in whose name ICL is created, does not exist.1346 What then are the GCC’s 
interests in ICL? In Ch.2 I showed how a ‘public’ domain was shaped, a separate 
sphere in which new, humanitarian, areas of law (such as the laws of war, human 
rights and also ICL) could develop, to apply only in a limited ‘public’ sphere. This 
humanitarian side serves to legitimise the IL enterprise as a whole. Currently, 
however, the contradiction in the artificial public/private divide is making it (more) 
permeable, hence the consideration now also of the corporate person in ICL (4C). 
Pashukanis analysed the particular element that makes ICL so attractive, and seem so 
necessary, and as something we cannot do without. Applying the commodity form 
theory to criminal law on the domestic level, he notes “this [criminal] procedure 
contains particular features which are not fully dealt with by clear and simple 
considerations of social purpose, but represent an irrational, mystified, absurd element. 
We wish …to demonstrate that it is precisely this which is the specifically legal 
element.”1347 The practical social purpose he refers to is the compensation of victims 
(which is often absent in CL in any case), the protection of society (which could be 
achieved better in other ways) or the treatment and rehabilitation of the offender 
(which is likewise not normally a priority).1348 The value in CL according to 
Pashukanis lies in its “morality” – which is present both in its demonstrative function 
and in the ‘compulsory atonement’ it demands of the convicted criminal.1349 Criminal 
law functions as the ‘remoralisation’ of society post-cash nexus (Ch. 2A, and 
analogous to the ‘humanitarian makeover’ of IL in Ch.2B S.5). Once law has replaced 
human relationships with legal relationships, law is – or, law-makers are  - there to 
inform us what is right. “Law creates right by creating crime”.1350 This commodified 
morality1351 tells us when to feel revulsion, or when to forgive, it is ‘canned morality’. 
It can be fostered and instrumentalised – and develop on its own according to the logic 
of the market.1352  
                                                
1345 Pashukanis (1978) 174. 
1346 Pashukanis (1978) 174. 
1347 Pashukanis (1978) 177. 
1348 Pashukanis (1978) 176-8. 
1349 Pashukanis (1978) 185, 187. 
1350 Pashukanis (1978) 167. 
1351 Or what Shamir calls ‘market-embedded morality’, Shamir (2008); see also Baars (2011).  
1352 In Ch. 6 I elaborate on this latter aspect further in S. 4.4 on the ‘market for responsibility.’ 
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Such artifice (fetishisation) was also hinted at by Schwarzenberger. Writing in 1950, 
Schwarzenberger identified six different usages of the term ICL, and concluded none 
of them were correct – indeed in his view there was no such thing as an international 
criminal law at all.1353 According to Schwarzenberger, most of what others called ‘ICL’ 
was in fact internationally prescribed or authorised municipal criminal law.1354 He 
further queried the need for an ‘international’ criminal law per se. This he illustrates 
by discussing the then newly created Genocide Convention, and quoting Hartley 
Shawcross, “murder remains murder whether committed against one or a million.”1355 
Schwarzenberger adds, “in either case a criminal can only be hanged once.”1356 
Practically speaking, the crimes covered by ICL are covered by domestic law in most 
cases, and a horizontal extension of jurisdiction, plus international cooperation on 
extradition, evidence gathering, etc. could be used to cover crimes committed by 
citizens abroad.1357 Schwarzenberger’s critique metaphorically pulls the rug from under 
the preceding justifications of ICL. If ICL, new ICL norms and institutions, are not in 
fact needed to try ‘murderers’ and ‘torturers’ then why do we call for it? Designating 
certain behaviour as an international crime to be tried in an international forum 
implies another motivation and purpose than pure practical necessity. What ICL allows 
for, and what cannot be ‘done’ in any way fitting law’s configuration as it stands, is to 
intervene in other states to criminalise through supranational law acts that are not 
criminal in the relevant domestic law, and to allow for their prosecution externally (or 
post-regime). In other words, by ‘lifting’ certain behaviour, events and individuals 
(‘vertically’1358) into international law, ICL creates the option of centralising the 
regulation and administration of this regime according to the interests of the GCC 
directly, as per the example of ‘international investment arbitration’ in Ch. 2B. When 
stripped of the practical justifications, what remains is the purely ideological element 
of ICL, namely the way that ICL designates certain behaviour as ‘international crimes 
which form an attack on the fundamental values of the international community’.1359 
This ideological element has very real practical uses: one is, (through ICL 
                                                
1353 Schwarzenberger (1950). 
1354 Schwarzenberger (1950) 266-274. 
1355 Schwarzenberger (1950) 292. Hartley Shawcross was the head of the British prosecution team 
Nuremberg.  
1356 Schwarzenberger (1950) 292. 
1357 Schwarzenberger considers the trials Nuremberg to have been domestic trials conducted by the 
Allies in their role as the substitute sovereign over occupied Germany (Schwarzenberger (1950) 289-
290). 
1358 See also generally, Mégret (2010). 
1359 This idea is expressed in the Preamble to the ICC Statute. 
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prosecutions) to create specific explanations of conflicts that exempt/exonerate the 
economic/capitalism. Another is to form the diversion or Trojan Horse for the 
intervention in states that goes much further than ICL.1360 Both we have seen in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, and I discuss them also in the contemporary context in Ch.5.   
 
Schwarzenberger’s reservations regarding the need for an ICL still stand today. Yet, 
the existential question is now no longer posed.1361 ICL continues to be constructed, 
and ‘believed in’,1362 on various grounds. Ultimately the designation ‘more harmful’ 
used by Cassese appears to be Cassese’s own, to reflect his moral indignation. Yet, 
aside from the harm caused, Cassese also seems to imply that the emotive reaction to 
his “international crimes proper” (“so abhorrent as to offend the international 
community as a whole”1363) is universally felt and absent (or less) in the case of other 
crimes, or, for example, in the face of mass starvation, or, say, tens of thousands of 
children dying preventable deaths each day.1364  
 
Carl Schmitt once said, “[w]hoever invokes humanity wants to cheat.”1365 The 
humanitarian narrative was reconstructed, re-invented, re-emphasised after Nuremberg 
(and Tokyo). A critique of the ‘humanitarian’ narrative of ICL may be made 
analogously to Marks’ critique of the concept of “Humanitarian Intervention”.1366 
Presenting ICL as a necessity for the benefit of humanity, against atrocities, works as a 
rhetorical move, the function of which is to justify inaction of the political field vis-à-
vis situations of injustice and suffering, and to ignore the root causes.1367 The 
contradiction is visible in Ambos: “the worldwide impunity for grave human rights 
violations leads to a factual accountability gap, the closure, or at least the narrowing, 
of which ICL has made as its highest priority task.” Tellingly, the author adds in a 
footnote: “[i]t concerns a factual, not a normative accountability gap, because the 
impunity can be traced back not to a lack of norms on international crimes, but on a 
                                                
1360 The Genocide Convention appears “based on the assumption of virtuous governments and criminal 
individuals, a reversion of the truth in proportion to the degree of totalitarianism and nationalism 
practised in any country”, Schwarzenberger (1950) 292. 
1361 Cryer (2005) 2.  
1362 Tallgren (2002a) 593. On IL generally as secular religion, generally, Koskenniemi (2007). 
1363 As per ICC Statute Preamble. 
1364 Beckett (2012); http://www.unicefusa.org/ . 
1365 Schmitt (1996) 54 – quoted by Koskenniemi (2003) 97. 
1366 Marks (2006).  
1367 Marks (2006) 344; Marks (2011). 
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lack of States’ political will to prosecute.”1368 Why, one might ask, would state leaders 
create a body of norms to do something, that they do not in fact want to do? It only 
makes sense, if (a) that body of law is not, in fact, designed to do this thing, or (b) it is 
so designed, but only in relation to specific others, or exceptional, acceptable 
situations, or, (c) if it is done in response to a felt need (or public call) to be ‘doing 
something’ and the creation of these norms alone, with the promise of enforcement 
satisfies this need. ICL gives us faith that ‘something is being done’. Akahvan also 
posits, “In contrast to the prevention of ongoing atrocities through military intervention 
or peacekeeping, and substantial postconflict economic assistance and social 
rehabilitation, resort to international tribunals incurs a rather modest financial and 
political cost. However, the attractive spectacle of courtroom drama, which pits 
darkness against the forces of light and reduces the world to a manageable narrative, 
could lead international criminal justice to become an exercise in moral self-
affirmation and a substitute for genuine commitment and resolve.”1369 Or, indeed, a 
cloak for the systemic root causes1370 of ‘crimes’, which may be endemic to the current 
mode of production. 
 
In his monograph, Cryer lays the cause of selectivity at the dependence of courts on 
financiers and expects this situation to change with time. Already, he states, “the court 
represents a quantum leap beyond what went before.”1371 What Cryer and others 
overlook is the fact that this impunity gap itself is also created through ICL. The 
makers of ICL create its inclusions as well as its exclusions – planned impunity - 
including by deciding the budget of the ICC and other institutions.  
 
A popular demand for justice for certain types of cases, is manufactured,1372 based on 
criminal law’s visceral appeal,1373 and instrumentalised for economic goals, with 
Cassese’s emotive discourse (like Jackson before him) providing the legitimising 
element. As Tallgren suggests, “[p]erhaps [ICL’s] task is to naturalize, to exclude from 
the political battle, certain phenomena which are in fact the preconditions for the 
maintenance of the existing governance; by the North, by  wealthy states, by wealthy 
                                                
1368 Ambos (2002) 39.  
1369 Ambos (2002) 30. 
1370 Marks (2010).   
1371 Cryer (2005) 231. 
1372 Generally, Chomsky (2002). 
1373 Tallgren (2002a) 591. 
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individuals, by strong states, by strong individuals, by men, especially white men, and 




In this section I have outlined four broad representative approaches to international 
criminal law, each of which seek to define the field, respectively, along parameters 
given by policy, law/legal doctrine, and morality. Each of these forms a building block 
supporting the construction of ICL. Here we saw thought-leaders at work, as members 
of a class,1375 of a college of experts, whose differences are ultimately only differences 
of degree – as I will show in the following chapters. The given purpose of ICL is now 
ostensibly considered limited to ‘humanitarian’.1376 
 
I pick up this critique of ICL again in Ch. 5. First, I must finish my analysis of the 
‘direction of development’ which may, or may not, be heading towards the inclusion 
of the company as a legal person in ICL rules, if probably not in ICL practice.  
 
                                                
1374 Tallgren (2002a) 595. 
1375 Marx and Engels (1979) 116. 
1376 Which is also notable considering the first international cooperation on criminal law enforcement in 
the early 20thC (and compare also cooperation on combatting piracy) occurred in the area of opium and 
white slave trade – i.e. ‘private’ for profit activities and not ‘core crimes’ - Schwarzenberger (1970) 54-
55. 
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1 Introduction to B 
 
At Nuremberg and Tokyo, and in the other post-WWII trials, the allied lawyers and 
politicians worked out who they conceived of as ‘subjects’ of ICL (to whom they 
wanted ICL to apply) and what relation between person and act (and the victim) 
needed to exist (both in the factual and the ‘fault’ sense) before such a person could be 
considered guilty. After the revival of ICL post-Cold War these modalities were to 
some extent worked out afresh, partly because Nuremberg (and Tokyo) had been 
somewhat ‘rough and ready’ and was criticised on legal grounds,1377 and partly because 
the ‘new ICL’ was being applied in specific new circumstances. The lawyers of the 
ICTY and ICTR (and those who had negotiated their statutes) developed more intricate 
modalities of ICL, performing the abstraction of real (or imagined) persons and 
relationships into legal categories and modes of responsibility: the further congealing 
of ICL. This congealing served to further rationalise criminal justice policy1378: both in 
the sense of allowing the determination of the transactional value of each mode of 
responsibility,1379 and, to make it seem “as if there are good reasons why things [here: 
ICL] are as they are”.1380 As I argued in the previous chapter, academic lawyers played 
an important role, both indirectly by providing ICL, post hoc, with its foundational 
narrative (Part A) but also directly because of the overlap between practising and 
                                                
1377 Ch.4A S.1.  
1378 Pashukanis (1978) 178. 
1379 Pashukanis (1978) 179. 
1380 Marks (2000) 19. 
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academic lawyers in ICL. In particular, legal scholars (and to a lesser extent 
practitioners) are playing a role in deciding the legal person liability question (Part C).  
 
The most remarkable change in ICL post-Cold War is in relation to business in 
conflict. Some of the scholars writing in this area claim (despite the Nuremberg cases) 
that ICL is not clear on the potential applicability to business in conflict,1381 argue that 
business involvement is somehow different from the involvement of other participants 
in a conflict,1382 and that there is a need for new rules for example in the form of a 
‘Wirtschaftsvölkerstrafrecht’.1383 The preceding views do not differentiate between 
individual or corporate liability, while Cryer et al. in 2007 and in 2010 describe 
‘corporate liability’ as an area that “deserves more study”.1384 I show in Sections 1.2-
1.5, that several doctrines have been developed in ICL that could (in theory) very well 
be applied to business(wo)men as individuals and possibly even to legal persons. The 
discursive distantiation between business and criminal liability must have causes other 
than doctrinal, that I explore further in Chapter 4C, suggesting the perception of the sui 
generis nature of business actors fostered in IL in general (Chapter 2B) (which is based 
on the domestic creation of the concept of the corporation: Chapter 2A) is responsible 
for this ‘indecisiveness’ and eventually, the privileged treatment of business actors (I 
show this in Chapter 5).  
 
1.1 “No soul to damn and no body to kick”1385? Attribution, perpetration and mens 
rea in business 
In the ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence, and lately also in the ICC, ICL is applied to 
individuals in who form part of state or military structures, which have role-
delineations, functional hierarchies and power relations comparable in many ways to 
those in companies.1386 In military and civil administrations, like in companies, some 
material facts of crimes may be outwardly innocuous or involve mainly desk-activity, 
                                                
1381 See, e.g. Vest (2010).  
1382 Note that the distinction between ‘armed groups’ and ‘corporations’ is another artificial 
categorisation of persons carrying out particular activities in some form of cooperation for particular 
purposes, using particular means, etc.  
1383 Jeßberger coins this term, literally meaning ‘ICL of the economy’ Jeßberger (2009). 
1384 Cryer (2007) 453; Cryer (2010) 587. In the latter the 2008 JICJ Symposium is referenced in the 
footnote, evidencing the perspective that it is the study performed by academic lawyers that create legal 
rules.  
1385 Coffee (1980-81) quoting Edward Thurlow 1731-1805. 
1386 See generally, Farrell (2010). 
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words alone or no activity (omissions), or, may involve acts by several individuals that 
together result in a crime. ICL has been applied to members of non-state groups in 
ways analogous to the prosecution of members of criminal gangs, and wide and 
amorphous organisations such as the mafia, transnational crime networks, or in 
instances of ‘mob violence’ on the domestic level.  
 
In this section I seek to imagine the modes developed in ICL as mapped onto relations 
between individual business(wo)men and those affected by their activities (or 
omissions). If corporate liability is considered a possibility in ICL, corporations as 
legal persons could likewise be considered, e.g. as principal perpetrators, or part of a 
JCE, conceivably, together with military or government officials and/or with 
individuals ‘inside’ the corporation. The mens rea of a corporation could be conceived 
(or avoided) analogously to domestic law (Ch. 4C) through strict liability, vicarious 
liability, attribution through a ‘directing mind’ (an example of the identification 
doctrine) or through aggregation, and other doctrines developed in domestic law on 
corporate crime.1387  
 
Although Arts. 6 of the ICTR Statute, Art. 7 of the ICTY Statute, and Art. 6 of the 
SCSL Statute (which correspond in all material respects: see Appendix D) do not 
distinguish hierarchies of perpetration, in their decisions these tribunals have 
differentiated between perpetration as principal (commission as perpetrator, joint 
criminal enterprise) and accessory liability (planning, ordering, instigating, aiding and 
abetting).1388 Farrell (who is currently the ICTY’s Deputy Prosecutor) has argued that 
co-perpetration/joint criminal enterprise and complicity/aiding & abetting are the two 
modes of liability most likely to be applicable to both individual business(wo)men and 
legal persons.1389 Perpetration as a principal, however, is generally considered to form 
the gravest mode of criminal liability in ICL doctrine.1390 This hierarchical 
differentiation carries some ideological weight and mystificatory potential (Ch. 4C). 
Here I discuss these modes together with command responsibility (S.1.4) and the 
putative doctrine of ‘perpetration through an organisation’ (S.1.5). 
                                                
1387 Simester (2010) 274-9; French (2009) 636-9. 
1388 Werle (2009) 168. 
1389 Farrell (2010) 873. 
1390 Werle (2009) 170. 
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1.2 Co-perpetration and Joint Criminal Enterprise 
As a sophistication of the Nuremberg conspiracy idea, the ICTY and the SCSL have 
developed the concept of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ (“JCE”) to include both direct and 
indirect co-perpetration.1391 The difference between joint criminal enterprise and mere 
participation lies in the mens rea – joint perpetration/JCE requires a common plan, 
design or purpose’ which must be aimed at committing one or more crimes against 
international law1392, while other forms of joint perpetration may come in three 
categories ranging from the same mens rea as JCE, down to intention to participate in 
a group with the aim of committing an offence.1393 Importantly for the business 
context (where crimes may result from what are seen as ‘neutral acts’1394 or ‘business 
as usual’), an accused’s contribution to the JCE need not be criminal in itself.1395 The 
JCE construct can be applied to situations where business leaders (managers, decision 
makers) work together to perpetrate crimes through organised structures of power. The 
hypothetical example Farrell gives is that of a corporation and a governmental 
authority cooperating in order to forcibly remove local people from an area where oil 
may be extracted.1396 The provision of means by the company (e.g. trucks or weapons) 
may then constitute the ‘significant contribution’ required for the JCE. Further 
elements required (for e.g. war crimes or crimes against humanity) would depend on 
the context.  
 
The ICC Statute’s Art. 25(3)(d) covers a ‘group of persons with a common purpose’ 
which broadly corresponds to the JCE construct – while in the early decisions the ICC 
has placed emphasis on control as mentioned above.1397 In particular, joint perpetration 
involves the vicarious responsibility of all for the acts of others in the group 
(Lubanga1398), while a slightly different form which was employed in Al-Bashir,1399 
co-perpetration, relies on joint control, meaning that each member of the group could 
frustrate the commission of the crime by withdrawing.1400 Art. 25(3)(d) does not 
                                                
1391 Krasjisnik Appeals Judgment; Sesay Appeals Judgment; Werle (2009) 171-178; Cryer (2010) 363-
374; Boas (2010) 510-519. 
1392 Tadić1999 Appeal 188. 
1393 Tadić1999 Appeal 204, 228, see also Van der Wilt (2009) 158-9; Werle (2009) 174-5; Van Sliedregt 
(2003) 94-110.  
1394 See, e.g. Farrell (2010) 878. 
1395 Krasjisnik Appeals Judgment 218. 
1396 Farrell (2010) 879. 
1397 See also, Manacorda (2011). 
1398 Lubanga Charges Decision 513. 
1399 Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant; and see generally on this point Jeßberger (2008) 853. 
1400 Lubanga Charges Decision 342; Cryer (2009) 364-5. 
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contain a requirement that the contribution be made with the intent to commit the 
crime, or for the purpose of assisting the crime, only intention towards the 
contribution, and knowledge of the crime is required. This would work to capture a 
corporate actor at some distance removed from events.1401 JCE is criticised, for 
example by Van der Wilt who argues that the doctrine, as (over)used by the tribunals 
enables the lax application of criminal law standards on individual involvement in 
order to ‘catch’ a maximum number of members of the group.1402 This critique 
approximates a ‘collective punishment’ critique (see further below, Ch. 4C). 
 
1.3 ‘Complicity’, Aiding & Abetting 
A key phrase in the business & human rights discourse is ‘corporate complicity’.1403 
(see below Part C) The popular phrase ‘corporate complicity’ evokes the idea that 
corporations (business(wo)men) may inadvertently get tangled up in others’ HR or 
IHL violations, but never are the principal perpetrators.1404 As a mode of liability to 
capture business(wo)men and potentially legal persons, the main advantage of the 
complicity/aiding and abetting mode is that there is, in ICTY, ICTR and SCSL law, no 
need for the aider and abetter to share the intent of the principal perpetrator.1405 As 
such, it covers the situation where the business(wo)man’s intent is only commercial 
(e.g. selling weapons that are then used in a genocide), as opposed to ultimately 
commercial in the forced displacement example above.  
 
The standard developed by the ICTY and ICTR for accomplice liability has come to be 
seen as part of general international law.1406 It has been identified by the ICTY as 
“providing practical assistance that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime, with knowledge that these acts would substantially assist the commission of the 
offence.”1407  The complicit corporate actor need not share the intent of the principal 
offender – the aider and abettor merely needs to know, or be aware, that her act assists 
                                                
1401 Farrell (2010) 881. 
1402 E.g. Van der Wilt (2009) 181. See also, Zahar (2008) 224-234. 
1403 E.g. Schabas (2001); Jacobson (2005); Clapham (2001); Tófalo (2006); ICJurists Complicity Report 
Vol.2 (2008). 
1404 Clapham (2002). 
1405 Farrell (2010) 882. 
1406 This is accepted, for example, by the US courts in ATCA litigations, and by the Dutch courts, in the 
recent case Van Anraat (2005). 
1407 Furundzija Judgment. 
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in the commission of the crime.1408 A person need not have consciously decided to act 
for the purpose of the assistance of a crime.1409 As to causation, in Kayishema (ICTR) 
it was held that ‘substantial’ contribution suffices.1410  Further, the ICTY has included 
intangible assistance, for example moral support and encouragement. Relying on a 
survey of CIL on aiding and abetting, the ICTY also found that actual physical 
presence at the scene of the crime was not required. Authority and presence can 
constitute a form of assistance, particularly when a person with the authority to stop an 
act from occurring (e.g. by ordering subordinates to desist) fails to do so.1411   
 
Article 25(c) of the ICC Statute also includes accomplice liability for those who 
“otherwise assist in its commission, … including providing the means for its 
commission.”1412  In contrast to the ICTY and ICTR statutes and their interpretation in 
case law, the ICC Statute contains no requirement for the accomplice to make a direct 
or substantial contribution to the commission of crime.1413  On the other hand, the 
mens rea requirement includes “the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a 
crime”, which appears to be more specific than the rule of CIL employed by the 
tribunals. Farrell illustrates (by using the US Talisman Alien Tort Claims Act case (see 
below Chapter 5B) which adopts the ICC standard, the Dutch van Anraat case (id.) 
which adopts a Dutch law standard equivalent to the CIL/ICTY standard, and the 
ICTY Blagojević and Jokić decision) that the ICC regime, if it were to congeal into 
CIL, would be less useful for capturing corporate actors.1414 It remains to be seen how 
the ICC will interpret this in its own jurisprudence, and how member state domestic 
systems deal with this when complying with the requirement to bring their domestic 
laws in line with the ICC Statute.1415 The fact that international courts do look to 
domestic law as an informal persuasive authority1416 and the US is the place where IL 
is considered most regularly in ATCA cases, it may well be that the ICC/ATCA view 
persists. This, despite the fact that the Talisman court’s finding that the ICC standard is 
                                                
1408 Krnojelac Judgment. 
1409 Mrksić Appeals Judgment 159. 
1410 Kayishema Judgment 199 
1411 Furundzija Judgment 249; on moral support see 232. 
1412 ICC Statute. 
1413 Schabas suggests the absence of the word “substantially” in the ICC Statute may imply that the 
Diplomatic Conference meant to reject the higher threshold of the recent case law of The Hague. 
Schabas (2001) 448. 
1414 Farrell (2010) 883-885. 
1415 This may of course depend to some extent on the doctrines of accomplice liability already in use in 
these respective systems.  
1416 For example, the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case. 
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the standard in general IL, rather than the ICTY standard which is part of CIL, is 
erroneous.1417 
 
As to the CIL standard, the contribution of an aider and abettor need not be ‘direct’ but 
must be ‘substantial’, with the former being an evidentiary issue depending on the 
mens rea.1418 A substantial contribution may include moral support or be an 
accumulation of acts of support.1419 For example, this could include the company 
director’s acquiescence in military oppression of union leaders for the benefit of the 
company. 
 
1.4 Command responsibility 
The exact content of the construct of ‘command’ or ‘superior’ responsibility is in 
dispute.1420 Some argue that it is a specific crime where a superior fails to comply with 
her own obligations in IL (the duty to look after/control subordinates), yet others argue 
a superior is effectively responsible for the crime of a subordinate which she fails to 
prevent or punish/report.1421 The latter interpretation gives rise to a ‘collective 
responsibility’ critique (Part C S.1). The Tokyo Tribunal took a very broad view of 
Command responsibility (see above, Chapter 3, S.4). Vest has argued that “[b]usiness 
leaders may under Article 28(b) ICC Statute, which deals with hierarchical 
relationships outside the military sphere, may be applied to business.1422 Subparagraph 
(b)(ii) states that the subordinates’ crimes must concern activities within the superior’s 
effective responsibility and control1423, which is interpreted to mean the superior may 
not be responsible for acts falling outside of the scope of her duties.1424 This may give 
rise to a debate along the line of that regarding functional immunity in IL - can the 
commission of crimes ever be considered to be part of someone’s role or job 
description? In ICL a superior may be liable if s/he knew or ‘should have known’ 
                                                
1417 Farrell (2010) 887. In addition, the Talisman court erroneously sought to rely on the USMT 
Ministries case (supra) while in this case the knowledge standard was explicitly cited. In addition, this 
was in line with other USMT cases such as the Einstatzgruppen case, Flick, IG Farben, and the British 
trial of Tesch (Farrell (2010) 888-9 and Chapter 3 above). 
1418 Farrell (2010) 891. 
1419 Blagojević and Jokić (supra). 
1420 Werle (2009) 188; Cryer (2010) 397. 
1421 Werle (2009) 188-9. See also generally the JICJ Symposium on command responsibility in JICJ 5 
(2007) 599-682. 
1422 Vest (2010) 869. 
1423 Emphasis added. 
1424 ICC Statute; Mucić TC Decision 593. 
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about the acts in question and failed to respond appropriately in the circumstances.1425 
A doctrine of superior responsibility could only be effective in reducing crime if it 
encouraged, rather than discouraged, superiors from playing an active role in the 
supervision of subordinates, and if it were possible to avoid the situation where 
employees commit offences outside of their ‘official’ job description while superiors 
actively ‘look away’. 
 
1.5 Perpetration through an organization? 
Art. 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute includes the notion of perpetration ‘through another 
person’. This could be the perpetration by a ‘perpetrator behind the perpetrator’ who 
pulls the strings, or perpetration though a non-culpable person such as a minor. In 
Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber used this concept where 
crimes were said to be committed through the control of a hierarchical organisation.1426 
Explicitly referring to the German concept of Organisationsherrschaft (translated by 
the court as perpetration through an ‘organised and hierarchical apparatus of power’), 
the ICC Trial Chamber defined the necessary elements of an ‘organisation’, which  
must be based on hierarchical relations between superiors and subordinates. 
The organisation must also be composed of sufficient subordinates to 
guarantee that superiors’ orders will be carried out, if not by one subordinate, 
then by another. These criteria ensure that orders given by the recognised 
leadership will generally be complied with by their subordinates.1427  
The perpetrators behind the scene, or removed from the physical site of the crime 
“decide whether or how the offence will be committed”1428 and “the leader’s control 
over the apparatus allows him to utilise his subordinates as a mere gear in a giant 
machine”.1429 Citing Eichmann, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirms, “the degree of 
responsibility increases as we draw further away from the man who uses the fatal 
instrument”.1430 From the descriptions of the factual situations in corporations as 
related in Chapters 3 and 4 it is clear how this analysis may approximate corporate 
actuality. 
 
                                                
1425 ICC Statute Arts. 28(a)(i) and (b)(i). 
1426 Katanga Charges Decison; Werle (2009) 178-180; Cryer (2010) 366. 
1427 Katanga Charges Decison 512. 
1428 Katanga Charges Decison 485. 
1429 Katanga Charges Decison 515. 
1430 Katanga Charges Decison 503, citing Adolf Eichmann (1961) 197. 
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Weigend however has queried “whether this doctrine is helpful in analysing the cases 
of indirect perpetration in the context of systemic crime; it might be preferable to ask 
what it takes to control the will of another person to such an extent as to ‘make him’ 
commit a crime. The existence of an organization controlled by the perpetrator may be 
no more than one factor relevant for answering that question.”1431 Arguing that the 
constructs of ‘instigation’ and ‘ordering’ already can be employed to cover the kinds of 
situations in Katanga and Chui, Weigend suggests that the design of the concept of 
‘perpetration through an organisation’ satisfies “our sense of judicial aesthetics” rather 
than a doctrinal need.1432 The important question to ask, however, is whether 
“perpetration through an organisation” lets ‘organisation’/company in through the back 
door – considering the ICC membership have not utilised the opportunity of the review 
conference to include legal person liability?1433 Weigend notes, however, that 
domestically in Germany (where this construct was used to prosecute GDR border 
guards1434) the proposal to employ this doctrine in the business context “has been 
widely criticized by legal scholars, mainly because a business enterprise lacks all the 
main characteristics (tight hierarchical structure, general lawlessness, fungibility of 
members) that might justify the imposition of liability as a perpetrator to the leaders of 
a military or political organization.”1435 Such attempt to curb the use of a doctrine to 
particular types of organisation seems clearly ideological. 
 
2 Conclusion: So many (wo)men, so many modes 
 
One can see that it can at times become difficult to distinguish between the various 
modes of responsibility. The point to take away from this is that it would seem that 
ICL modes are flexible enough to cover every conceivable scenario – including that of 
business actors perpetrating or otherwise involved in international crimes. In Chapter 5 
I will show that despite this development, there has been virtually no ‘mapping’ of 
these modes onto the relations within the corporation and between the 
                                                
1431 Weigend (2011) 91. 
1432 Weigend (2011) 102. Weigend holds that “[t]here is certainly nothing to even remotely suggest that 
the concept of ‘perpetration through an organisation’ is a form of criminal liability recognized as 
customary international law,” id. 106. 
1433 See generally, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ReviewConference/ . 
1434 Weigend (2011) 98. 
1435 Weigend (2011) 99. 
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business(wo)man and ‘victims’ or persons affected by their acts or omissions. In this 
sense, the corporation remains a ‘structure of irresponsibility’ as proposed in Ch. 2A. 
 
The fact that business in conflict is not normally discussed in terms of these modes 
(except by Farrell from whose article I quoted above) points toward an attempt at the 
creation of a sui generis position for business for ideological reasons, in order to create 
a space between business (good) and, say, armed groups and other (private) non-state 
actors potentially involved in conflict (bad). So does the attempt to argue that business 
involvement is somehow, unexplained, but obviously, qualitatively different from the 
involvement of other participants in a conflict situation, and thus requires its own, yet 
to be developed, area of law (Wirtschaftsvölkerstrafrecht).1436 Here we see an analogy 
with the deliberate fragmentation of legal regulation in the context of FDI discussed in 
Chapter 2B. These rhetorical moves go in the same direction: making it more difficult 
for us to imagine individual business(wo)men in the framework of ICL. Also, the 
reification of the corporation and its frequent anthropomorphisation (Ch. 2A, 4C and 
6) lets the corporation’s ‘humanity’ take over from that of the directors, who remain 
anomic, anonymous and hidden. 
                                                
1436 Generally Jeßberger (2009); Pearce (1990) 424. 
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1 Introduction to C 
 
Strikingly – when compared to the discourse of the Nuremberg Industrialists’ trials - 
the current legal literature on business in conflict centres almost exclusively on the 
putative liability of the corporate legal person. While ICL has been about the 
Individualisierung of IL, ILIP’s reification of the corporation (Ch. 2B S.3) posits it as 
a putative ‘individual’ subject of ICL.1437 Although ‘corporate liability’ in ICL is 
considered by most only lex ferenda, some argue it already exists.1438 These proposals 
spring from the contradiction between corporate ILP in the ‘private’ side of IL, 
increasingly visible business involvement in conflict and the development of a regime 
of responsibility dealing with responsibility especially for crimes in conflict. Already, 
certain regional (and also global) treaties require states to criminalise certain 
acts/omissions by corporations domestically (if this is congruent with national legal 
principles - 4A S.2.4), which, by some, is seen as the ‘seed’ of exceptional corporate 
criminal liability regionally1439 or indeed used to argue the legal person is already a 
subject of ICL.1440 Here, once again, we could see the ‘trend’ (‘progress’/‘fashion’) of 
ICL at work. 
 
                                                
1437 Cf. Stahn and Van den Herik who speak of the “de-individualisation” of ICL (Stahn (2010) 315). 
1438 In the latter category, e.g. Clapham (2000), Ramasastry (2002), Chiomenti (2006). 
1439 Bantekas & Nash (2007) 48. 
1440 Generally, Clapham (2000). 
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Broadly three types of arguments are made by those who consider corporate liability in 
ICL lex ferenda. The first is not an argument strictly speaking, although it is often 
phrased as such, but rather a description or explanation in the style of a progress 
narrative, reflected for example when describing the number of states that have 
‘already accepted’, ‘recognised’, or ‘acknowledged’ corporate liability.1441  For 
example, the International Commission of Jurists notes that “significant opposition to 
the imposition of criminal sanctions on companies as legal entities remains,”1442 
however, this opposition is “broadly conceptual” and based on a memory of “national 
criminal laws developed many centuries ago.”1443 “[T]he fact that increasing numbers 
of jurisdictions are applying criminal law to companies is evidence that these 
difficulties can be overcome.”1444 The second type of argument for corporate liability is 
this: “the lack of a norm of corporate liability in ICL leaves business involvement in 
crimes unaddressed.”1445 Both variants are grounded in the almost complete reification 
of the corporation (concealing individuals) that I described in Ch.2B above and will 
discuss here in this context. It also builds on corporate crime law in (some) domestic 
jurisdictions: “just as the concept of corporate criminal responsibility emerged as a 
reaction to the industrialization process in the common law jurisdictions over a century 
ago, so should the concept now be lifted to the international level in order to address 
the demands and realities of the relentless globalization process.”1446 
 
A third argument for the existence, or creation of a norm allowing a finding of 
corporate liability in ICL that is being made by some scholars, forms part of a broader 
debate on ‘system criminality’ (see also Ch.3A S.7.1.2). Nollkaemper in the 
introduction to his edited volume on the subject explains system criminality as “the 
phenomenon that international crimes – notably crimes against humanity, genocide 
and war crimes – are often caused by collective entities in which the individual authors 
of these acts are embedded.”1447  
 
                                                
1441 E.g. FAFO (Ramasastry) (2006); FAFO (Ramasastry) (2004); Ramasastry (2002). 
1442 ICJurists Complicity Report Vol. II 59. 
1443 ICJurists Complicity Report Vol. II 59. 
1444 The Panel gives as its only two reasons why CICL might be a good thing, the possibility of financial 
redress for victims, and the chance that ‘corporate culture’ might improve after the imposition of a 
criminal sanction on a company (ICJurists Complicity Report Vol. II 59). 
1445 Van den Herik (2010) 362.  
1446 Van den Herik (2010) 358. 
1447 Nollkaemper (2009) 1. 
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Many of the arguments both for and against corporate criminal liability echo those 
made in the last Century regarding the question of state criminality.1448 The concept of 
state crime was discussed at length in the context of the development of the rules on 
state responsibility.1449 The ILC removed Art. 191450 from the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility in 19981451 (apparently because of the clause’s problematic wording and 
some states’ vehement opposition to the concept of state crime1452) and the Articles 
adopted by the General Assembly in 2001 did not contain the concept.1453 Nonetheless, 
the idea of state crime persists in the popular political discourse of ‘rogue states’.1454  
 
One common objection to state crime (or other forms of ‘collective’ criminality) is that 
enforcement of the concept would result in collective punishment.1455 Yet, current 
individualised ICL practice is also criticised for leading to ‘collective punishment’1456 
by punishing leaders for crimes physically committed by other individuals under their 
command. Additionally, ICL is being criticised for leaving ‘system criminality’ 
unaddressed.1457 The question on individuals versus collective responsibility is being 
reopened, and I discuss this below.  
 
2 The ‘new ICL’ and re-opening the debate on collective liability 
 
Now that the ‘new ICL’ has had two decades to develop, scholars and practitioners 
alike are starting to reflect on and critique it – and to map out (im)possible, probable 
and desired directions for future development. On the one hand, ICL has been about 
the Individualisierung of responsibility, the neat delineation of each human 
individual’s agency in a complex situation,1458 on the other, it deals mostly with 
‘collective’ acts (in a broader situation of conflict where many persons are involved) 
                                                
1448 E.g. Weiler (1989); Pellet (1999). 
1449 See, e.g. Brownlie (2008) 433ff. Crawford’s view on this issue of State criminality was that it was 
unnecessary and divisive and had the potential of destroying the project as a whole: Crawford (1999) 
442. For a contemporary reappraisal see Doucet (2010). 
1450 Art. 19.2 ILC Draft Articles 1970. 
1451 ILC 1998 Report 319-331. 
1452 ILC 1998 Report 241-259.  
1453 UNGARes 589; ILC State Responsibility Articles; also see Serbia Genocide Convention Case. 
1454 Simpson (2004) xi. 
1455 E.g. Van Sliedregt (2003) 343-4. 
1456 Van den Herik (2010) 362. 
1457 Nollkaemper (2009) 1. 
1458 Werle (2007) 48. 
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that some critics say cannot be ascribed to individuals singly.1459 Questions are asked, 
for example, as to whether individuals behave differently as part of a group or within a 
particular system, and if so, whether this should affect the level of responsibility they 
can be ascribed, or even to whom responsibility can be ascribed.1460 Some even argue 
that some actions are not those of individuals but of something above or outside of 
them: the corporation, or the government, or ‘the system’ (Section 4).1461   
 
Current individualised ICL practice of the ICTY, ICTR is also being criticised for 
leading to collective punishment when punishing senior leaders for the crimes 
(physically) committed by (usually junior) personnel ‘on the ground’. This critique is 
made in relation to the use of the concept of command or superior responsibility (Part 
B S.1.4).1462 Both these critiques hinge on how we see a crime, and foregrounds the 
physical, violent, ‘bloody’ end of crime over the ‘invisible’ ‘intellectual’ crime of the 
individual who designed the policy, gave the order, authorised the operation, or who 
has the overall command over those on the ground. This person is the minister, the 
senior civil servant, the proverbial desk-killer, white-collar criminal or 
‘Schreibtischtäter’ as Arendt has it, or, general in a grey suit, in Dubois’ words.1463 
This shift presupposes the freedom to choose not to comply with an order (the freedom 
to walk away), a question that was discussed at length also at Nuremberg (see above 
Ch. 3A). The ‘freedom’ presupposed here, as it is the freedom of the one at the bottom 
of the hierarchy, is analogous (or identical) to the ‘freedom’ of labour in the Marxist 
sense.1464  
 
A related critique is made in relation to the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (Part B 
S.1.2). Boas calls the ICTY’s practice in regard to the latter “an increasingly obsessive 
preoccupation with the apportionment of responsibility to political leaders for 
committing crimes from which they are physically and structurally very far 
                                                
1459 E.g. Nollkaemper (2009) 2.  
1460 Ceretti (2009) 5-15. Ceretti in particular discusses the group dynamics of collective violence from a 
sociological perspective and emphasises the importance of denial of individual moral culpability by 
perpetrators and denial of what happened to them by those affected (at 5, 13). 
1461 See e.g. generally, Arendt (1994), and to a lesser extent, Nollkaemper (2009) 1; Herik (2010) 364-5: 
“social scientists …view corporations increasingly as more than the aggregation of a number of 
individuals … In these situations, …the ‘guilt’ does not lie principally with easily identifiable specific 
individuals but rather with the corporation as such.” 
1462 Werle (2009) 188. See also generally Meloni (2007); Meloni (2010). 
1463 Dubois (1952) (title). 
1464 Gray (2006) 875. 
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removed.”1465 Boas posits that JCE is (over)used to attach the special stigma of being a 
committer, rather than an instigator or aider or abettor.1466 Again, this critique hinges 
on individuals’ perceived and actual role in a larger structure. If a special stigma is 
indeed attached to being a committer as Boas suggests, then a complicity conviction of 
a leader would signal a lower level of culpability, perhaps that of someone only 
marginally involved in an action directed by others, perhaps even ‘from below’. A 
conflict could then be portrayed as ‘leaders failing to control the masses’, rather than 
leaders actively perpetrating acts of conflict and ordering/forcing ‘the masses’ to 
participate. In Ch.5 I will query whether the conflicts in the FYR and Rwanda can be 
characterised as such. 
 
3 “De-Individualising ICL”: Towards legal person liability?  
 
It is not clear which way IL will develop with regard to legal person liability.1467 Yet, 
as evidenced in recent literature, the trend is to argue for, or to find, legal person 
liability.1468 It is on this putative legal person liability that I focus in the remainder of 
this section. I start with a look at the debate between the negotiators at the drafting 
stage of the ICC Statute because, as I argued in 4A, the ICC tends to be seen as the 
‘culmination’ of ICL and as such as indicative of ICL development as a whole.1469 
 
3.1 The ICC negotiations on legal persons  
The Preparatory Commission’s draft which formed the basis for the ICC Statute 
negotiations included in Art. 23: 
5. The Court shall also have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception 
of States, when the crimes were committed on behalf of such legal persons or 
by their agencies or representatives 
                                                
1465 Boas (2010) 502 (emphasis in original). 
1466 On the significance of this stigma, see also Guilfoyle (2011). 
1467 Specific fora for discussion of business in ICL in the past years have been the JICJ (2008) Workshop 
the Humboldt Symposia and the ICJurists Complicity Report. 
1468 E.g. Clapham (2006) 31; and generally, Herik (2010) 350-368, Voiculescu (2007) 418-430; 
generally, Chiomenti (2006), Stoitchkova (2010); for an exploratory perspective, see Burchard (2010).  
1469 Others have discussed it in terms of the application of ICL on the domestic level: Kyriakakis (2010), 
Wanless (2009). 
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6. The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the criminal 
responsibility of natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices in the 
same crimes.1470 
 
In the negotiations the French delegation proposed and argued strongly in favour of the 
inclusion of legal persons in the ICC’s jurisdiction.1471 The article they initially 
proposed on 16 June 1998 was a mirror image of Art. 10 of the IMT Charter (on 
criminal organisations). It envisaged the declaration by the ICC of an 
organisation/company as a ‘criminal organisation’ under certain circumstances.1472 It 
went one step further than the IMT Charter by allowing the imposition of fines on the 
criminal organisation. France considered this important in terms of restitution and 
compensation orders for victims (effectively displaying the same priority it had during 
the Röchling trial, Ch. 3A S.8.2).1473 The 19 June 1998 proposal put forward was 
significantly different. It proposed giving the ICC jurisdiction to try legal persons in 
the same way it would try natural persons. It was limited to cover only companies (and 
thus not the myriad of other groups/persons that could potentially be included such as 
political parties, organised armed groups, etc.), linking their criminal responsibility to 
that of leading members of those corporations who were in positions of control and 
who committed the crime “acting on behalf of and with explicit consent of the 
corporation and in the course of its activities”.1474 France emphasised that [t]here was 
nothing in the proposal to permit the concealment of individual responsibility behind 
that of an organisation.”1475 Eventually this proposal, too, was rejected. The delegates 
of the Scandinavian countries stated that the inclusion of legal persons would detract 
from the purpose of the ICC which was the prosecution of individuals.1476 The 
representative for Syria noted that the inclusion of corporate legal persons would beg 
the question why States, though legal persons, could not be prosecuted.1477 The Greek 
representative said categorically that there is no criminal responsibility which cannot 
                                                
1470 ICC PrepCom Report 1998.  
1471 Ambos (2008) 746. 
1472 French Corporate Crime Proposal: Article 23: Appendix E. 
1473 Ambos (2008) 746. It may be a funding point – the French government may have considered it 
preferable for victims to be compensated from the funds of perpetrators rather than the court (members) 
itself. 
1474 The term ‘juridical person’ was defined as ‘a corporation whose complete, real or dominant 
objective is seeking private profit or benefit, and not a State of other public body in the exercise of state 
authority, a public international body or an organisation registered, and acting under the national law of 
a State ad a non-profit organization.” WGGP Working Paper 23 1-2. 
1475 Id., see also Committee of the Whole Record: 32, 33. 
1476 Committee of the Whole Record 43, 55. 
1477 Committee of the Whole Record 56. 
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be traced back to individuals.1478 The representative of China emphasised that the 
‘criminal organisation’ provisions in the Nuremberg Charter had not been intended as 
a means of prosecuting legal persons as such. He added that the political context 
existing at the time of the Nuremberg trials was very different from the sensitive 
political context pertaining today. Also, he reminded the meeting that the Nuremberg 
trials had been conducted by victorious over defeated countries.1479  
 
In preparing this draft, France had been closely collaborating with the Solomon Islands 
– which were being represented by Andrew Clapham.1480 Eventually, France withdrew 
the proposal apparently due to time constraints.1481 The Statute that was adopted on 17 
July 1998 limits the Court’s jurisdiction to natural persons.1482 The ICC’s Article 25(1) 
reads: ‘The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this 
Statute’.1483  The extension of the ICC Statute to cover legal persons was not proposed 
at the 2010 ICC Statute Review Conference, which focussed mainly on the definition 
of the crime of aggression.1484  
 
So while the ILC put aside the issue of state crime at a time when no consensus could 
be reached, the ICC membership put corporate (and armed group qua group) liability 
aside, potentially to be picked up again in the future. In the meantime, consensus is 
emerging, evidenced by statements such as “The striking phenomenon is that many 
other international instruments have been adopted which, unlike the Rome Statute, 
introduce, at the international level, the concept of corporate criminal liability.”1485 
While this statement relies on a misreading of the international instruments (see Ch. 
4A S.2.4) this argument is increasingly made, contributing to the naturalisation of the 
idea of corporate ICL, which is the first step to its adoption in law.1486 
 
                                                
1478 Committee of the Whole Record 57. 
1479 Committee of the Whole Record 36. 
1480 Clapham (2000) fn.1. 
1481 Clapham (2006) 31. 
1482 ICC Statute (supra). 
1483 The ICTY and ICTR also confine jurisdiction to natural persons: Art. 6 ICTY Statute; Art. 5 ICTR 
Statute.  
1484 See generally, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ReviewConference/ . 
1485 Swart (2008) 947. 
1486 E.g. Stoitchikova (2010). 
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3.2 Legal person liability for business in ICL: The ‘progress view’ 
The corporate liability debate in the NGO literature employs the concept of ‘corporate 
complicity’ – which is part of the ‘legalising CSR’ push (see further Ch. 6), and posits 
that while (or, as long as) corporations cannot be liable per se, they can still be 
‘complicit’ in violations committed by or on behalf of a state.1487 Human Rights Watch 
(“HRW”) Director Kenneth Roth states, that in the 1980s, “[o]ut of the blue, we came 
up with the concept of complicity. It is very interesting watching it evolve into a 
criminal concept, because that was not what we had in mind at all.”1488 The non-legal 
concept of ‘complicity’ in that literature was picked up and given legal content by the 
International Commission of Jurists,1489 UN Special Rapporteur on Business & Human 
Rights John Ruggie (see Ch. 6) and legal scholars.1490 The road to legalisation is one of 
‘narrativization’ and ‘naturalisation’1491: a discursive process in which NGOs, legal 
scholars and UN officials played the main roles – and where the same individuals often 
switch between roles within this process. Andrew Clapham, for example, who is an 
influential scholar who has published widely on corporations and human rights and 
international criminal law, represented the Solomon Islands in the ICC negotiations 
(above) and served as the Special Adviser on Corporate Responsibility to High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson.1492 He has said, about corporate 
liability in ICL, “it will happen if we say it enough times” – in other words, if the idea 
is naturalised.1493 Even if formal adoption of the concept for example through 
extension of the ICC’s jurisdiction is not achieved, the desired effect (see Ch.6) may 
be reached even if it is not in fact enforced internationally but there is ‘popular opinio 
iuris’ – and/or a common understanding among the ‘thought leaders’ such as Ruggie 
and Clapham that it exists.  
 
Above (Section 1.1) I quoted Van den Herik’s view that corporate liability ‘should’ be 
adopted in response to the ‘relentless globalization process’ just as it was adopted on 
the domestic level. I also mentioned texts that cite those that have not yet adopted 
                                                
1487 ICJurists Complicity Report. 
1488 Roth (2008) 960 – see also below, Ch.6. Kenneth Roth has been Executive Director of Human 
Rights Watch since 1993. 
1489 ICJurists Complicity Report. 
1490 E.g. Clapham (2008), Stoitchikova (2010), Cernic (2010). 
1491 Marks (2000) 19.  
1492 Clapham webpage. 
1493 Conversation with Clapham at Humboldt Symposium. 
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corporate criminal liability as traditional.1494 The US tort litigation where corporations 
are accused of international crimes (see Ch.6) also plays a part in the normalization of 
the idea of corporate criminal liability.1495 Other arguments in the ‘progress’ vein seem 
to be limited to simply stating corporate liability should be adopted because 
corporations are there, or because corporations hold great power, or because not doing 
so would leave ‘corporate crime’ unaddressed.1496 These are all arguments that make 
sense on the superficial level, that ‘ring true’ and therefore have traction and the effect 
of their repetition may well be that these ideas are internalised, and that the norms 
come to exist by some sort of ideological learning process rather than through their 
formal adoption. 
 
Many who argue for corporate criminal liability do not explain why such liability 
would be a good thing – this appears as a given: to deny this would mean to deny “this 
idea that corporations should be prohibited from assisting governments in violating 
international law”1497 and to leave corporations “largely immune from liability.”1498 
The question of responsibility here presupposes the subjectivity in IL of the 
corporation. Moreover, corporate liability in ICL is thus presented as the solution, 
while no evidence is produced how, or that it would ‘work’, for example by showing 
that corporate crime regimes on the domestic level have reduced corporate offending, 
and most importantly, no indication of how corporate crime enforcement would 
actually be executed on the international level. There is no elaboration of how the 
mental element of a crime (or indeed the actus reus) would be established in the case 
of multinational corporate groups, or whether doctrines of attribution or identification 
would be proposed or suitable. Finally no explanation is given how such a norm would 
even be formally adopted at all, considering “the … realities of the relentless 
globalization process”1499 (the nature of which remains unexplained). The desirability 
of corporate ICL is supposed to be self-evident to the point where criminal law must 
                                                
1494 See, E.g. Stessens (1994) 493: “Though some jurisdictions (e.g. the United States) have taken this 
step earlier, other criminal law systems in Europe apparently still have not been able to…”; Cockayne 
(2008) 955. 
1495 Generally, Harvard Law Review, Anon. (2001) 2025, which asks the question of corporate liability 
in IL from the point of view of ATCA cases, which it says “The international community should view ... 
as a call to collective action.” (2049). 
1496 Van den Herik (2010) 362. That it exist is also sometimes argued on the basis that it should exist, 
e.g. Chiomenti (2006) 295: “In conclusion, the concept of criminal responsibility for corporations is 
now generally accepted at the level of both national and international law.” 
1497 Clapham (2008) 899. 
1498 This argument is made in the Harvard Law Review (Anon. (2001)) 2026 “Corporations thus remain 
immune to liability, and victims remain without redress.”; Steinhardt (2005) 177;  Cockayne (2008) 955. 
1499 Van den Herik (2010) 358. 
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be fundamentally changed in order to enable corporate liability: e.g. “[i]t is thus 
necessary to reconceptualize the parameters of guilt and blame in order to develop a 
criminal law theory that is tailored to corporations.”1500 
 
Other arguments for corporate liability appear practical: for example, “when there is 
not one individual that can be blamed given the collective decision-making, because 
the individual who originally took decision [sic] already left, or as a result of unclear 
corporate structures.”1501 The modes of liability developed by the tribunals (see 4B) are 
assumed to be inadequate, even if they have at times been applied to individuals part of 
‘unclear structures’.1502 Here, the evidentiary difficulty inherent in pinning criminal 
blame on one (or, possibly more than one) legal person within the group structure of 
multinationals (the parent company, which may be a holding company, a local 
subsidiary close to the physical site of the crime, or the whole group) is not examined. 
ICL is of course formally equipped to deal with a person who has ‘already left’ the 
company or indeed the country. A further situation in which corporate liability is 
argued to be appropriate is where collective decision-making in the company makes it 
hard to see who exactly should be liable.1503 Again, these arguments may sound 
rational and attractive, but as discussed above, the ICL tribunals have tackled exactly 
these questions in the context of military, state and other group structures, and on the 
domestic level such questions are addressed when dealing with organised crime, mob 
violence, etc. It becomes difficult to assess why these scholars would make (‘perform’) 
such arguments about corporate criminal liability – perhaps one partial explanation, as 
Schwarzenberger has suggested (above Part A S.1) that these lawyers are simply 
susceptible to fashions in the realm of political ideology – and argue within a certain 
liberal capitalist ‘mood of the time’.1504 The absence of discussion on attribution 
doctrines suggests these authors implicitly consider liability of the corporation per se 
the desired option, as per Pomerantz (Ch.3A S.7.1.2) who saw the practical advantage 
of not having to tie specific individuals to ‘corporate acts’. As the trend (‘fashion’) 
may be corporate reification in other areas of IL (e.g. in ILIP, Ch.2B – and arguably in 
international human rights law1505), this may be catching on in ICL too. The notion of 
                                                
1500 Van den Herik (2010) 364. 
1501 Van den Herik (2010) 368.  
1502 Viz. the cases employing a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ construct, e.g. Krajisnik Appeals Judgment. 
1503 ICJurists Report 56. 
1504 Schwarzenberger (1950) 263. 
1505 E.g. Muchlinski (2007). 
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legal scholars arguing within a (structural/ideological) trend shows the limits of their 
agency (see Ch.1 S.4) and provides clues as to the creation of the ‘unbreakable circle’ 
referred to in Ch.1. 
 
3.3 Legal person liability: The systems view 
In the UK and other domestic legal systems that include the concept of corporate 
liability, it is possible to distinguish between ‘artificial’ corporate liability (i.e. liability 
based on the actions and/or intent of one or more individuals within the company using 
attribution or identification doctrines1506) and what Simester et al. call “corporate 
corporate guilt”.1507 In domestic jurisdictions, there appears to be a trend towards the 
adoption of the latter construct. For example, in the UK the Corporate Manslaughter 
and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 expresses the grounds of corporate liability in 
organisational terms,1508 while in Australia corporate corporate liability is independent 
of the liability of individuals through the idea of ‘corporate culture’.1509 Authors 
(explicitly, as opposed to impliedly – above) arguing from an analogous perspective in 
ICL regard a company (or in Nollkaemper et al.’s term: a system) as something 
qualitatively different from the sum of the individuals ‘inside’ it. Corporate corporate 
liability, according to Van den Herik, serves where “indicting one individual may not 
capture what really happened, may not provide an appropriate narrative, may not 
address the crime properly, and may not place the responsibility where it belongs.”1510 
What really happened, according to this view, is that a ‘corporate culture’ has 
“induce[d] employees to act in a certain way that they would not do outside the 
corporation”1511 (taking the notion of corporate anomie one step further) and what is 
therefore really responsible is the corporation itself. In many ways this line of thought 
echoes that of the turn of the last century (see Ch. 2A), that of “Frankenstein, Inc.”,1512 
                                                
1506 On the basis of the vicarious liability of the company for the acts of its agents, on the basis of the 
‘identification doctrine’ where the state of mind of a ‘directing mind’ (a senior manager/director who is 
in actual control) and the acts of what Denning called the hands (workers) is attributed to the 
corporation, or on the basis of aggregation – where the acts and intentions of a number of individuals 
within the corporation are aggregated so as to constitute ‘the company’s crime’ even if such acts were 
not criminal on their own – see generally, Simester (2010) 279-80. See also, Lederman (2001). 
1507 Simester (2010) 281-3. 
1508 Appendix E. 
1509 Where “corporate culture means an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing 
within the body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities 
takes place”, The Criminal Code Art. 12.3(6). See also generally, Wells (2001). 
1510 Van den Herik (2010) 365. 
1511 Van den Herik (2010) 364.  
1512 Wormser (1931). 
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the idea that corporations, like robots would become intelligent and outgrow their 
makers (“it’s not me, it’s the corporation”1513). Current scholars take this reified model 
to be part of the solution however, rather than the source of the problem.  
 
The ‘corporate culture’ construct responds to the argument that corporations cannot 
have criminal intent as such1514 by assuming intent from the culture prevailing amongst 
(and presumably created/generated by) company employees and directors.1515 Criminal 
intent can on the other hand be seen as only an extension of the abstraction in other 
areas of law: while a corporation is frequently assumed to have ‘intent to create legally 
binding obligations’ in contract law, why could it not have ‘intent to permanently 
deprive’ in criminal law, or even ‘intent to destroy all or part of a group’ in ICL? It 
would seem easier to imagine ‘intent’ in ‘purely economic’ transactions, while 
seemingly non-economic, seemingly irrational behaviour (which may and indeed must 
also be rational – Ch. 2A) requires more imagination, and perhaps more convoluted 
‘theories’ to be applied. However, CSR and corporate crime in domestic law is making 
such much easier. Indeed, such is acceptance of the abstraction of law, that “[t]he 
social constructedness of these concepts [intentionality and agency] make them 
amenable to credible reformulations that are suitable for a new paradigm of corporate 
agency and responsibility.”1516 I discuss this further in Ch. 6 below. 
 
Aside from its use in the formulation of ideas around corporate liability, ‘system 
criminality’ could be a useful term when employed to identify, analyse and critique 
exactly those structural factors causing ‘deviant’ behaviour, as per the ‘Systemkritik’ 
(Ch. 3A section 8.3). The inherently ‘psychopath’ (as Bakan described it-Ch. 2A), 
conducive to immoral behaviour (the ‘amoral calculator’), creates a distance between 
the employee/manager and affected party (Marx’ term alienation could be used by 
analogy), and in fact mandate immoral behaviour solely focused on surplus value 
extraction. Thus far, such analyses have been mostly left to criminologists who have 
not yet started work on ICL.1517 
 
                                                
1513 Steinbeck (1939) 38 (Ch.2A S.6). 
1514 Other arguments may include, for example, that holding corporations to account in (international) 
criminal law would not actually reduce the incidence of ‘corporate crime’ in general, or that such an 
‘artificial’ idea as corporate criminal liability negatively affects the ‘special nature’ of criminal law. 
1515 Schwarzenberger (1952) 263. 
1516 Voiculescu (2007). 
1517 See further Ch. 6, and the work of Tombs, Pearce, Gray and others cited there. 
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4 Conclusion to C 
 
As noted, Van den Herik asserts that the lack of formal norms on corporate liability 
“leave[s] corporate involvement in international crimes unaddressed.”1518 While there 
was some distaste for the idea of corporate liability in the style of Nuremberg 
(declaring an organisation criminal so as to enable prosecution of its ‘members’) partly 
motivated by the fear of collective punishment, and attribution models of corporate 
crime are not finding traction in the literature, ‘corporate corporate liability’ or 
corporate crime emptied of individuals (as the corporation itself, Ch.2A), is gaining 
popularity. While efforts abound not to allow ICL to ‘unnecessarily’ affect leaders (S. 
above) - I will argue in Ch. 6 that corporate corporate liability has the effect, instead 
(if enforced and even if not enforced) of ‘collectively punishing’ both workers and 
external society.  
 
5 Conclusion to A, B and C: Who let the Dogmatisierung out? 
 
It is said that “in the latter period of ICL’s lifespan [one] can … speak of (some extent 
of) doctrinalisation of ICL”.1519 The relevance of analysing these ‘competing 
narratives’ (and their origins) is that “norm production is also, transnationally, 
increasingly the result of professional networks of experts who control certain 
fields.”1520 I have highlighted here that the ICL norm creation happens in two main 
ways. One is through States (through their representatives and consultants) creating 
treaty law and setting up institutions, and through ‘doing’ state practice. The other is 
the above-mentioned professional experts who act as staff of the international tribunals 
and as consultants/advisors to governments. The formal norm creation field is in the 
hands of a very small group of individuals, who take up various roles in the field at the 
same time.1521 Much also depends on the (class1522) progeny of the judges and other 
lawyers, and the still dominant view of “major legal systems of the civilised world” as 
well as the respected authors.1523 In the last instance, moreover, such rules (and 
                                                
1518 Van den Herik (2010) 362. 
1519 See generally Bassiouni (2003); Sliedregt (2003) Chapter 1.  
1520 Dezalay & Garth (1996) (no page no. given), cited by Megret (2008) para 33. 
1521 Viz. the passage in Cassese’s textbook about a dissenting opinion at the ICTY by Judge Cassese, 
which the textbook author declares is obviously the correct view (Cassese (2008) 23). 
1522 E.g. Kennedy (1978). 
1523 Cassese (2008) 6; Article 21(1)(c) ICC Statute. 
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enforcement, if any) are an articulation of the prevailing economic relations and mode 
of production and the forces of competition, imperialism that propel capitalism. 
 
Although some authors speak of ICL as a ‘maturing’ system, which is undergoing 
doctrinalisation or Dogmatisierung, from the first part of this Chapter this may appear 
as mere wishful thinking. There is no consensus on the nature, sources, content and 
subjects of ICL. “There is no international legislative policy”1524 on international 
criminal law, and “[n]one of the proponents so far has developed a doctrinal 
framework, nor a methodology, that combines the approaches of international law, 
comparative criminal law and procedure, and international human rights law”.1525 I 
have argued that what is driving ICL development is not policy, but structure, the form 
of law and the logic of capitalism. Within this structure, the development of ICL has 
many different instigators (and those wishing to be), with different interests: 
practitioners on the defense, prosecution or judicial sides, NGO activists and careerists, 
MaNGOs, academics of various streaks, public servants, elected leaders of powerful 
and less powerful states, etc. A propos Ferdinandusse, the various claims regarding the 
content of law serve “as techniques in a hegemonic struggle for greater control 
between different actors in international law”.1526 Those victorious in this struggle (at 
any given point, on any given issue) can employ ICL’s ‘canned morality’ to support 
their interests. The competition between these actors takes place within the structural 
constraints of the form of law and the logic of capitalism. In Chapters 5 and 6 below I 
assess this dynamic further. 
 
Notwithstanding the ‘constructive’ efforts of scholars in the first four approaches 
outlined above, Schwarzenberger’s scepticism takes us to the ‘dark side’ of ICL.1527 
Moreover, Pashukanis’ analysis of criminal law generally suggests that “international 
criminal processes are more a matter of asserting authority and monopolising virtue 
than of curbing violence and reducing security [sic]”1528 The ‘ICL industry’ producing 
‘canned morality’ would almost implicitly divert our attention from the structural 
causes of conflict. As Clapham and Marks also query, “[ca]n individual responsibility 
be pursued in ways that do not impede efforts to understand and address the political, 
                                                
1524 Bassiouni (1987) xxxiii. 
1525 Bassiouni (1987) xxxiv. 
1526 Ferdinandusse (2006) 158. 
1527 Cf. Kennedy (2005).  
1528 Clapham & Marks (2005) 234. 
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economic, social, and indeed legal, conditions within which international crime 
becomes possible?”1529 To this question is where I turn next. 
 
 
                                                
1529 Clapham & Marks (2005) 234-5 (emphasis added). 
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In the preceding section I discussed the construction of a humanitarian ‘foundational 
narrative’ for ICL and showed that ICL has developed a reasonably intricate scheme 
that would seem to be capable of application to business actors. It might seem logical, 
after the various wars and other serious conflicts in the past decades, that like in 
Nuremberg, the international community would seek to prosecute those military, 
civilian, business and professional elites thought to have been responsible for the 
outbreak of the conflicts and any violations committed in it. This would seem 
appropriate (as in, fitting within the discourse, raison d’être given to ICL), especially 
considering the vast rise of reports detailing business involvement in conflict in the 
past two decades. An informal survey reveals, that since the 1940s, no individual 
businessperson has been tried in an international forum, with minor exceptions, which 
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are discussed below.1530 Domestic courts likewise have not often applied ICL to 
businesspeople.  The trial of Dutch chemicals broker Frans van Anraat in the 
Netherlands in 2004 is treated as a novelty by commentators. Here I analyse and 
discuss these exceptional cases, paying particular attention to the modes of 
responsibility employed in the case, the discussion of mens rea, the identity of the 
initiator of the case and the political context of the crime as well as the prosecution. I 
include also a section on “host state cases” – a particularly interesting category that, 
considering the importance attached to the ‘principle of complementarity’ in ICL, 
should be, but clearly is not, the main category here.  
 
I argue here, that, as was the case in Nuremberg and Tokyo, the economic causes of 
the conflicts are being excluded from the story/the explanations of the conflicts being 
created through international criminal trials held at the ICTR, ICTY, SCSL and other 
venues. We also see ICL being used to ‘open up’ the legal market, to carry through 
wholesale political and legal reforms largely for the benefit of capital. In conclusion it 
can again be said, as Telford Taylor suggested, that ‘humanitarian’ laws are at base 
really commercial laws, despite appearances. 
 
I conclude that the non-application of ICL to businesses and businesspersons has given 
rise to NGOs and so-called ‘cause-lawyers’ stepping in and, in a variety of ways, 
seeking to remedy this situation by ‘strategic lawyering’ (See further Ch.6). Describing 
a list of cases against business actors can distort the picture. I therefore also devote 
some attention to situations that have not been the subject of court action. 
 
As noted above (Ch.4A S.1) post-Cold War, the time was finally considered right for 
ICL to be institutionalised on the supranational level. In 1993 the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was founded, on an ad hoc basis, the Rwanda 
Tribunal followed soon after and the negotiations for the final piece of the IL puzzle, a 
permanent international criminal court, began. The ICTY was created at a moment 
when the UN Security Council was stepping up its peace enforcement activities, 
implementing a new ‘internationalism’ with a strong liberal foundation, or varnish, 
                                                
1530 Those I have been able to check: I rely on various networks, mailing lists and personal contacts here, 
including with the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
Sherpa, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, European Coalition for Corporate Justice, 
CorpWatch, CorporateWatch, The European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, Reprieve, 
Redress, the Universal Jurisdiction Yahoo group, and others. 
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depending on one’s point of view.1531 However, although the Security Council forms a 
broader coalition than the post-WWII Allies, it is a more selective, elitist group of 
leaderships than what would become the membership of the ICC. Moreover, both the 
ICTY and ICTR were set up to intervene in internal armed conflicts, which supports 
the argument that global institutionalised ICL forms part of an effort to shift power to a 
global governance regime, and is aimed to allow for intervention in less powerful 
states/against less favourable individuals, further breaking down (or, keeping porous) 
sovereignty and penetration of GCC interest/hegemony (as per 2B and 4A). 
 
1.1 The Balkans and the ICTY 
It is perhaps fitting that the first concerted international application of ICL post-Cold 
War would come in the context of a conflict borne out of an economy in systemic 
transition. According to Woodward, the cause of the Balkans war was the process of 
transformation from a communist state to a market economy by means of a shock 
therapy stabilization.1532 A critical element was a programme designed to resolve the 
sovereign debt crisis.1533 Yugoslavia was struggling to repay its IMF loans and ten 
years of ‘austerity measures’ (combined with a loss of the health and education 
benefits of communism) fuelled resentment against the Serbian and other local elites 
who were seen to be benefitting from the market liberalization. The reforms demanded 
by creditors demanded political suicide: to reduce the state’s ability to govern 
internally.1534 At the same time, Europe/the West saw the opportunity to embrace the 
new territories ‘coming out from the cold’, territories they saw as forming part of the 
so-called “‘Eurasian Balkans’ - the vast, unstable, but energy-rich region extending 
from South-eastern Europe and the Horn of Africa, through the Middle East, into 
Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.”1535 Where in Nuremberg and Tokyo ICL had 
been used to ward off communism, here it was being used to ‘welcome back’ nations 
coming out of communism, into the (Western) European fold.1536 
 
                                                
1531 Koskenniemi (2002). 
1532 Woodward (1995), esp. Chapter 5 and 114ff.  
1533 Woodward (1995) 15. 
1534 Woodward (1995) 114. See also, Woodward (2002). 
1535 Callinicos (2009) 217, citing Brzezinski (1998). 
1536 Cooperation with the ICTY was and is seen as a precondition for the former Yugoslav republics to 
join the European Union, see e.g. Del Ponte (2005) Serbian leaders recently relinquished Ratko Mladic 
in an effort to smooth EU-entry, see, e.g. The Guardian, 26 May 2011. 
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The UN Security Council adopted the resolution founding the Tribunal under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, which governs the UNSC’s power to take measures aimed at 
restoring international peace and security. The hope was expressed in the resolution’s 
preamble that prosecution of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia would 
restore international peace and security.1537 Aside from this stated objective, what 
could have been the reasons behind the ICTY? Perhaps this was the opportunity that 
the international leadership had been waiting for, to revive ICL? It was also the 
opportunity to create a particular narrative of the conflict,1538 to distract from, and to 
justify, the controversial ‘illegal but legitimate’ nature of the NATO intervention1539 (as 
with Tokyo/Hiroshima and Nuremberg/Allied bombing of German cities), and to 
divert arguments as to the West’s early inaction and later arguably ineffective, or 
counterproductive intervention in the conflict1540- as an ‘insurance policy’ for being 
found complicit by ‘posterity’.1541 There had been much media coverage of the 
atrocities committed and public demand for action was great.1542 Also, it was a way of 
ensuring ‘regime change’ in an area where the leadership was still very popular despite 
the allegations (and later convictions) of atrocities.1543 
 
The ICTY case files and decisions do not give the impression that business played a 
major role in the Balkan conflict. However, there is mention of an important role for 
arms and drugs, and even organ traffickers, the illicit business ventures finding a profit 
opportunity in the war.1544 Woodward mentions deliberate intervention by Western 
bankers which served to escalate the pace of political disintegration in Yugoslavia1545 
and describes how the German government persuaded the EU to recognise Croatia’s 
independence (in 1992) as it served German economic interests and substantial 
investments in the area.1546 With a focus on the local, and the illicit, the role in the story 
of the macro-level, and the ‘normal’ is excluded from the historical record created by 
                                                
1537 UNSCRes. 827. For a discussion of the legality of this basis, see Zahar and Sluiter (2008) at 6-9 who 
conclude it was probably lawful. 
1538 Carla del Ponte specifically mentioned this objective in her speech (Del Ponte (2005)). 
1539 See The Kosovo Report 185-198, which labeled the Kosovo-intervention as illegal, but legitimate. 
1540 Woodward (1995) at 374. 
1541 Megret (2002) 1273. 
1542 Zahar and Sluiter (2008) at 6 fn.13. 
1543 Del Ponte (2005). 
1544 Del Ponte (2005).  
1545 Woodward (1995) at 145. 
1546 Woodward (1995) at 185-6. 
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the ICTY.1547 It suited both internal and external interests to portray the conflict as 
caused by ethnic nationalism rather than socio-economic circumstances. According to 
Woodward: “contrary to those who argue that these wars represent a clash of 
civilizations- between civilized and barbarian, Western and Balkan, Roman Catholic 
and Eastern Orthodox, Christian and Muslim – the real clash is social and economic. 
Territorial war for new states does not put an end to the political, economic, and social 
conflicts raised by the policies of global integration but that lost out to the nationalist 
juggernaut; they are simply played out under the guise of ethnic conflict.”1548 Creating 
such a narrative secures the systemic causes from attack, and moreover helps to create 
the impression (aimed at the external audience) that the economic system will not lead 
to conflict in our communities, which do not share the same peculiar ethnic divisions 
and history.1549 
 
In relation to business, the ICTY may have served another goal. Carla del Ponte, the 
ICTY’s Chief Prosecutor at the time gave a speech at Goldman Sachs in London in 
2005 (as part of a fundraising tour), in which she explained the purpose of the tribunal, 
and international criminal justice more broadly, in different terms.1550 She told the 
audience,  
It is dangerous for companies to invest in a State where there is no stability, 
where the risk of war is high, and where the rule of law doesn’t exist. This is 
where the long term profit of the UN’s work resides. We are trying to help 
create stable conditions so that safe investments can take place. In short, our 
business is to help you make good business…1551 
 
ICL can thus be seen as a way to insert (a particular type of) law into a system that 
may have been developed or run on a different basis. ICL as law reform would fit into 
the national law reforms already ongoing as part of the IMF intervention – which may 
have been threatened by a break-up of the state – and fits into the broader legal (and 
economic) reform programmes carried out by the international intervention in, and 
                                                
1547 On the (tenuous) distinction between illicit and ‘normal’ business, see Chiomenti (2006), 287-312 at 
288. 
1548 Woodward (1995) at 271. 
1549 This point is also made by Kamola (2008) 54. 
1550 Del Ponte (2005).  
1551 Del Ponte (2005). 
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administrations of the various former Yugoslav republics.1552 Ultimately these EU and 
UN administrations would also have had the purpose to restore such law and order as 
would be conducive to ‘good business’, presumably with the ultimate aim of the new 
states joining the EU. 
 
Towards the end of her speech in London, Carla del Ponte said, “International justice 
is cheap. The yearly cost of the Tribunal is less than one day of US military presence 
in Iraq. …Our annual budget is well under 10% of Goldman Sachs; profit during the 
last quarter. See, I can offer you high dividends for a low investment.” 1553 
 
The ICTY receives part of its funding from non-state voluntary donors.1554 In the ICTY 
such donations are not regulated by the Tribunal’s Statute.1555 The ICC however, is 
explicitly entitled to receive donations from amongst others, corporations, according to 
Art. 116 of its Statute. Although such donations would have to conform to the “UN 
Policy on Voluntary Donations”,1556 corporate funding of ICL institutions is not likely 
to be conducive to corporate accountability in the sense it is mainly used now, 
although it will aid accountability in the Weberian sense (Ch.2A). 
 
1.2 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
A year after the ICTY was founded, the ICTR was created on the same basis. The 
ICTR did in fact indict and prosecute a small number of business persons. I first 
examine these, before placing them in context in Section 2.2.6 below. 
1.2.1 Kabuga and Rutaganda 
Félicien Kabuga was first indicted by the ICTR in August 1997.1557 Until today 
Kabuga remains listed as “accused at large” by the ICTR.1558 In the 2004 indictment 
                                                
1552 On the administration of the former Yugoslav Republics, see generally, Wilde (2008). 
1553 Del Ponte (2005). 
1554 See the ICTY website, section “Support and Donations” 
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY/SupportandDonations In the ICTY such donations are not 
regulated by the tribunal’s Statute. The ICC however, is explicitly entitled to receive donations from 
amongst others, corporations, see Art. 116 ICC Statute. See also PICT Financing Report. 
1555 It would be interesting to see if Goldman Sachs did indeed donate, it is not mentioned in the ICTY’s 
annual reports of 2005 or 2006; the financial reports are not linked on the ICTY website. ICTY officials 
have thus far (07/12/11) not responded to my correspondence on this matter (dated 29 June 2011).  
1556 Although this policy is mentioned on the ICTY website, I was unable to locate the document itself 
and have written to the UN information desk requesting it – no response received as at 5 Jan. 12. 
1557 Kabuga Indictment. 
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Kabuga is “at all times referred to in this indictment: (a) a wealthy and influential 
businessman”.1559 The indictment states that under President Habyarimana’s rule, 
political and financial power in Rwanda was consolidated within a tight circle (known 
as the Akazu1560), of which Kabuga was a prominent member. As such he “wielded 
great power and influence”, having de facto control and authority over (among others) 
the Interahamwe,1561 while he also had control of the employees of the business 
enterprises that he headed, such as Kabuga ETS.1562  
 
Kabuga is accused in the indictment of (count 1) conspiracy to commit genocide, 
(count 2) genocide, or alternatively, (count 3) complicity in genocide, (count 4) direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide and (count 5) extermination as a crime 
against humanity.1563 It describes how, allegedly, Kabuga, with other powerful and 
influential figures (including Nahimane and Barayagwiza, about whom below) agreed 
on a plan to destroy in whole or in part the Tutsi ethnic group, and to this end “to plan, 
fund, launch and operate a radio station (RTLM) in a manner to further ethnic hatred 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi.”1564 As President of the Radio station, Kabuga had de 
jure control of programming, operations as well as finances of the station, and by 
virtue of his chairmanship of the management committee, also de facto control. The 
radio station, during the genocide, functioned as a major source of information to the 
population of Rwanda, broadcasting information identifying the location of Tutsi and 
urging members of the Rwandan population to find and kill all Tutsi.1565 
 
In addition, Kabuga is said to have chaired a number of meetings where the Fonds de 
Défense Nationale (“FDN”) was established, a fund to provide financial and logistical 
support and arms to the Interahamwe. The indictment states that “[a]t least one of these 
meetings was attended by  large number of businessmen from Gisenyi and other major 
                                                                                                                                        
1558 Accused at large, ICTR website, 
http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/77/default.aspx?id=12&mnid=12. 
1559 In addition, he is described as (b) President of the Comité Provisoire of the Fonds de Défense 
Nationale, or the National Defence Fund (the “FDN”); and (c) President of the Comité d’Initiative of 
Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines SA (“RTLM”), Kabuga Indictment 1. 
1560 Literally, ‘little house’, a term used for the inner circle of the President (Glossary, Nahimana TC 
Judgment 5). 
1561 Literally, ‘those who kill together’, the Tutsi militia (Glossary, Nahimana TC Judgment 5). 
1562 Kabuga Indictment 2. 
1563 Kabuga Indictment 2. 
1564 Kabuga Indictment 6. 
1565 Kabuga Indictment 9. 
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trading centres.”1566 The support received from FDN is said to have facilitated the 
Interahamwe in attacking, killing and injuring thousands of civilian Tutsis.1567 
Specifically, logistical support in the form of vehicles said to have been provided by 
Kabuga, were used to transport arms and Interahamwe militia to massacre and killing 
sites, and Tutsis to a site where they were killed. Kabuga is also said to have ordered 
the employees of his company ETS to import machetes, and to have ordered members 
of the Interahamwe to distribute these among their group. The Interahamwe is then 
said to have used machetes during the period between 7 April and 17 July 1994 to 
exterminate the ethnic Tutsi population.1568  
 
Not much more can be said about Kabuga, other than that his indictment shows 
(alleges) a situation in Rwanda similar to that of Nazi-Germany and Japan, with a 
small group of political, military and business leaders directing the conflict. According 
to a Kenyan newspaper, senior U.S. official Mr Stephen Rapp, the ambassador-at-large 
for War Crimes, claims Kabuga is present in Kenya,1569 despite a USD5million bounty 
on his head.1570 In 2003 the UNSC “called on all States, especially Rwanda, Kenya, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of the Congo, to intensify 
cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the ICTR, including on 
investigations of the Rwandan Patriotic Army and efforts to bring Felicien Kabuga and 
all other such indictees to the ICTR and calls on this and all other at-large indictees of 
the ICTR to surrender to the ICTR.”1571 Nevertheless, Kabuga is said to be able to 
travel freely, including to Sweden and Norway in 2008.1572 
 
Rutaganda, who was also a prominent businessman from an elite family, had joined 
the MRND party as he thought it would best protect his economic interests1573 and 
became the second vice president of the Interahamwe on the national level. He was 
convicted of genocide for ordering massacres in Kigali and elsewhere, and two counts 
of crimes against humanity (murder and extermination) for (among others) also 
                                                
1566 Kabuga Indictment 14. 
1567 Kabuga Indictment 15.  
1568 Kabuga Indictment 29. 
1569 Nation, February 10, 2010, see also: ICG Rwanda Report 15-16. 
1570 Rewards for Justice.  
1571 UNSCRes. 1503. 
1572 African Press International, 8 May 2008. 
1573 Rutaganda TC Decision 24-30. 
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directly participating in the massacres.1574 In his case, the Prosecutor had submitted: 
“He endorsed the genocidal plan of the interim government. At the same time, he 
seized the occasion for his personal gain.”1575  
1.2.2 Government 1 
Due to his failure to appear before the court Kabuga’s case was separated from that of 
the other accused in what was to become known as the trial “Karemera et al.”,1576 
which reached its final judgment on 21 December 2011 with Ngirumpatse and 
Karemera being given life sentences.1577  
 
In this trial, Karemera (a lawyer by training and a Minister in the Interim Government 
of 8 April 1994), Ngirumpatse (also a lawyer, president of the MRND political party, 
former diplomat and general manager of an insurance company), and Nzirorera (a 
former MRND parliamentarian and Minister for Industry) are accused of (amongst 
others) conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to genocide, 
genocide or alternatively complicity in genocide.1578 They are said, in order to commit 
the crimes alleged, to have formed a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ together with groups of 
named political leaders and prominent businessmen. The businessmen named include 
Barayagwiza, Kabuga, Musema and Bagaragaza (among others) – the indictment 
details some of the meetings that are said to have taken place between the accused and 
these businessmen including one organised by Kabuga with the aim of setting up a 
fund “to support the interim Government in “combating the enemy and its 
accomplices.”1579 Ngirumpatse is also accused of having participated in the creation 
and financing of RTLM, which counts toward his incitement charge.  
 
1.2.3 Nahimana/Radio cases 
The other case of relevance here is that against Ferdinand Nahimana (a Professor of 
History and Dean of the Faculty of Letters of the Rwanda National University), Jean-
Bosco Barayagwiza (a lawyer) and Hassan Ngeze (journalist and editor with the 
                                                
1574 Rutaganda TC Decision 472. Rutaganda was portrayed in the movie “Hotel Rwanda”. 
1575 Rutaganda TC Decision 460 (iii). 
1576 Karemera Kabuga Severance Decision. Kabuga was also included in a second indictment: Bizimana 
Indictment Decision. 
1577 BBC News 21 December 2011 (Decision not yet on the ICTR Website as at 12 January 2012). 
1578 Karemera Indictment 1. 
1579 Kabuga Indictment 50. 
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Kangura newspaper),1580 co-founders and board members of RTLM. This case is 
known as the ‘media case’ as it deals with the power of those in control of the media to 
“create and destroy fundamental human values.”1581 These accused had been part of the 
Akuza and co-founders, promoters and contributors to RTLM.1582 
 
The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s findings that RTLM’s broadcasts 
after 6 April 1994 contributed significantly to the commission of acts of genocide.1583 
The significance of this is of course that if Kabuga is brought to trial this will be an 
important point in his disfavour. While the Appeal Chamber dismissed the genocide 
charges against Nahimana, it confirmed his ‘command responsibility’, in that he had 
been a superior of RTLM staff who had the material ability to prevent or punish the 
broadcast of criminal utterances by such staff, and that there was no doubt that he 
knew or had reasons to know that his subordinates at RTLM were about to or had 
already broadcast utterances inciting the killing of Tutsi, and that he had not taken 
necessary and reasonable steps to prevent or punish incitement by RTLM staff. Thus 
Nahimana’s conviction on the count of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide pursuant to Art. 6(3) of the ICTR Statute was upheld, as was the finding of 
guilt for persecution as a crime against humanity.1584 Zahar has criticised this judgment 
amounting to ‘judicial activism’, arguing the radio broadcasts did not amount to 
incitement nor did Nahimana and Barayagwiza have ‘command responsibility’ over 
the radio station.1585 
1.2.4 Musema 
Another example of the application in the business context is the ICTR prosecution of 
Musema.1586  The Musema case concerned the director of one of the largest state-
owned tea factories who had been present at the site of, and on several occasions 
participated in alongside his employees, acts of mass killing of Tutsi. His employees 
on some of these occasions wore the company uniform and drove the company cars. 
                                                
1580 Nahimana TC Decision; Nahminana Appeals Judgment. 
1581 Nahminana Appeals Judgment 3. 
1582 Other businessmen involved in RTLM were shareholder Georges Rutagando (above) and Joseph 
Serugendo, also a board member of RTLM and a radio engineer, see Serugendo Decision. 
1583 Nahimana Appeals Judgment. 
1584 The hate speeches and speeches calling for violence’s against Tutsi that were broadcast on RTLM 
themselves were considered acts of persecution (310-313). Should Kabuga ever face trial, he, having 
been the president in overall charge (his role as such is mentioned in the discussion (796) may be 
convicted on the same basis. 
1585 Zahar and Sluiter (2008) 195 fn.205. 
1586 Musema TC Decision; Musema Appeals Decision. 
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The Trial Chamber found that also for those acts where he had not himself 
participated, “Musema incurs individual criminal responsibility, on the basis of Article 
6(1) of the [ICTR] Statute, for having ordered, and, by his presence and participation, 
aided and abetted in the murder of members of the Tutsi group…”. The Chamber 
established that Musema had de jure and de facto control over his employees and was 
personally present at the attack sites. From this the court inferred that “he knew, or at 
least ought to have known, that his subordinates were about to commit [the acts in 
question]. …Musema, nevertheless, failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent the commission of said acts by his subordinates, but rather abetted 
in their commission, by his presence.”1587 For these events, and also for the occasions 
where he had participated1588 Musema was found guilty of genocide and extermination 
as a crime against humanity1589 and sentenced to life imprisonment.1590 
1.2.5 Bagaragaza 
Bagaragaza was the Director General of OCIR/Thé, the government office that 
controlled the tea industry in Rwanda.1591 In this capacity, he controlled eleven tea 
factories, which employed approximately 55,000 persons. He was also the vice 
president of Banque Continentale Africaine au Rwanda (“BACAR”) and a member of 
the comité préfectoral of the MRND political party in Gisenyi préfecture.1592 He was 
also a member of the Akazu.1593  
 
Bagaragaza pleaded guilty and the ICTR accordingly found him guilty of complicity 
pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute for complicity in genocide pursuant to Article 2 (3) 
(e) of the ICTR Statute.1594 The tribunal found Bagaragaza had substantially contributed 
to the killings of more than one thousand Tutsis who sought refuge at Kesho Hill and 
at Nyundo Cathedral. His contribution consisted in allowing the Interahamwe to use 
company vehicles and fuel, allowing the company employees to participate [the 
indictment had accused him of having ordered those over whom he had authority and 
                                                
1587 Musema TC Decision 905. 
1588 In the indictment around 15 very similar events with all slightly different details, sometimes he is 
said to have joined, sometimes just watched, sometimes he ordered persons to carry out certain acts e.g 
4.6-4.10. 
1589 Musema TC Decision 7. 
1590 Musema TC Decision 8. 
1591 Bagaragaza TC Decision 18. 
1592 Bagaragaza TC Decision 18. 
1593 Bagaragaza TC Decision 19. 
1594 Bagaragaza TC Decision 27. 
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or instigated those over whom he did not1595) in the attacks, being heavily armed, 
concealing arms in company factories since 1993. He also paid a significant sum of 
money to the militia leader after having been told money was needed to buy alcohol as 
an incentive for the Interahamwe to carry out its attacks. Bagaragaza knew about the 
attacks and the Interahamwe’s genocidal intent through several meetings with the 
group’s leaders. He did not himself share the genocidal special intent.1596  
 
1.2.6 Discussion 
These cases paint the picture of the Akazu as the small group of political, military 
leaders plus businessmen and members of various professions centred around 
President Habyarimana, similar to the leadership exercised by the “Himmler Circle of 
Friends” in Nazi Germany and the Zaibatsu families with the court of the Emperor in 
Japan. While showing this element, the ‘economic case’ as it was told at Nuremberg is 
not made here. The indictments, and decisions do not go into why Musema and the 
others did what they did. Of course in criminal law generally motive is only of 
evidentiary interest as opposed to mens rea which is an essential element of a crime. 
Yet even the motivation behind, e.g., the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part” is not 
discussed in these cases. The ICTR indictments give a limited historical context to the 
occurrences of 1994. The judgments only give a brief account, a summing up of 
events. The bigger question of why the powerful majority Hutus seem to have wanted 
to exterminate a minority is not answered in the court documents or in the (legal) 
scholarly writing on the ICTY cases.1597  
 
Political scientist Chossudovsky has asserted that “the civil war was preceded by the 
flare-up of a deep-seated economic crisis. It was the restructuring of the agricultural 
system which precipitated the population into abject poverty and destitution.”1598 His 
assessment of the cause of the genocide can be summarised as follows. Rwanda had 
inherited a colonial export economy based on coffee (constituting 80% of its foreign 
exchange earnings) and a colonial rentier administration based on local chiefs who 
each controlled local plantation labour forces. The Germans and later the Belgians 
                                                
1595 Bagaragaza TC Decision 16. 
1596 Bagaragaza TC Decision 24, 25. 
1597 Chossudovsky (1996), pp.938-941. See also, Ansoms (2005); Reyntjens (2006); Reyntjens (2004); 
Ansoms (2009); Reyntjens (2011); Marysse (2007). 
1598 Chossudovsky (1996) 938. 
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used a system of ‘divide and rule’ between the ethnic groups, placing one in control of 
the other (which tactic prevailed during the various Western interventions undertaken 
since). Communal lands were transformed into individual plots for cash crop 
production. When the International Coffee Agreement collapsed, coffee prices 
plummeted and famines erupted throughout the Rwandan countryside. The state fell 
into disarray and IMF imposed austerity measures made the health and education 
systems collapse. At the high point of the economic crisis and the moment fighting 
started, multilateral ‘balance of payment aid’ came in but were likely at least partly 
diverted to arms acquisition, which was aided by a French bilateral military aid 
package.1599  
 
Jeffremovas describes a situation similar to that of the ICTY above: “[t]he media have 
emphasized the role of ethnicity and ethnic politics in [the Rwandan genocide] and 
imbued them with an air of inevitability as one more example of ‘tribal violence’ in 
Africa. [In fact,] Economic recession, economic restructuring, population growth, 
patterns of elite access to power, regional politics, civil war, ‘democratization,’ the 
politics of other countries of the Great Lakes Region, and international policies al 
played a role in the move to the genocide.”1600 She also shows how the violence was 
not strictly Hutu/Tutsi but instead the elite which in places consisted both of Hutu’s 
and Tutsis, against the people. Keane and Jeffremovas both argue the killings were 
systematic and planned well in advance, with Keane adding that “[t]he theology of 
hate espoused by the extremists was remarkably similar to that of the Nazis in their 
campaign against the Jews prior to the outbreak of the Second World War”1601 and 
“Hutu extremism was essentially a useful tool by which the corrupt elite that ran the 
country could hold on to power.”1602  
 
Peter Uvin has described how the Bazungu (lit. ‘white folk’) had played out the Hutus, 
Tutsis and Twa against each other from the 19th C., creating local elites through allying 
one or the other group to their own economic and political leadership.1603 Post 
decolonization, those Bazungu that remained in Rwanda controlled the large financial 
                                                
1599 Chossudovsky (1996) 938. A very similar account is given by Kamola (2008). 
1600 Jefremovas (2002). For similar arguments, see also the book by BBC reporter Fergal Keane: Keane 
(1995) 21. 
1601 Keane (1995) 10. 
1602 Keane (1995) 25. This view is also expressed by Uvin (1998) 54. 
1603 Uvin (1998) esp. 13-39, and see also Kamola (2008) 63-67. 
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resources coming in through the development aid system, fostering a system of 
clientalism. Uvin also argued that the international aid system contributed to a climate 
of structural violence: inequality, exclusion, prejudice and hatred, which fed the 
frustration and enmity that led to the killings.1604 
 
In this context we can reassess the case against Musema. An economic study into the 
1994 genocide carried out at Leuven specifically mentions Musema: 
 
The tea-plantations and tea-factory in Gisovu Commune were the only object 
of interest for the Habyarimana regime [in this region]. The plantation and the 
factory were managed by Ocir-thé and directed by Alfred Musema, member of 
the Akazu. Since Rwanda only had six tea-plantations, the Gisovu plantation 
was of considerable importance for export earnings. With the decline in the 
price of coffee at the end of the eighties, an increase in tea production and tea 
export became an important objective for the Habyarimana government. The 
local peasant population was very hostile to the establishment of the tea-
plantation since their land was expropriated. The peasant families had to move 
to other, less fertile land or even migrate.1605   
“Most of the tea producing facilities were financed by donor agencies, 
making the tea industry, and more specifically its high operating costs, 
a good example of rent-seeking by the Akazu members. Only the Akazu 
really benefited from tea production.”1606  
 
This scenario is reminiscent of the clearances described in Chapter 2A and also the 
colonial land reform in 2B and 3B.  
 
The fact that genocide is often discussed in terms of irrational, emotional racist 
ideologies may lead to the subconscious exclusion of business actors from the scope of 
possible perpetrators because business actors are thought to make decisions on rational 
grounds. However, looking at Musema above, plus the particular economic context of 
the region, it is conceivable that Musema wanted to exterminate (part of) the Tutsi in 
order to clear land for the tea plantation, for example. Uvin has suggested that “it is 
                                                
1604 Uvin (1998) 103ff. On the role of international aid, see also, Van der Walle (2001). 
1605 Verwimp (2001). 
1606 Id, citing Uvin (1998); see also Longman (2001) 169. 
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…possible that some participated in the genocide in the hope to appropriate other 
people’s land.”1607 With Musema’s deeper motivation remaining unexplored, this open 
question is answered by our expectations/the common emotive discourse of ICL rather 
than a number of possible alternatives.1608  
 
It is not my aim here (nor in this thesis in general) to give definitive explanations for 
historical events or the motivations of actors, rather, to comment on the interaction 
between law and material reality. While ICL purports to allocate responsibility, the 
responsibility of others (persons, factors, processes) is concealed. In particular, the 
narrative generated by the ICTR cases discussed here, while to some limited extent 
including local economic disparity, excludes the wider role of the market, and in 
particular, the international economic angle in the form of colonial processes, post-
colonial processes, possibly neo-colonial processes of WB/IMF/the donor community 
in general.1609 The role of particular Western corporations is, even in the critical 
literature, difficult to find.1610 
 
A better source on more detailed information of third state and company involvement 
is NGO reports. The international human rights NGO Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) 
in its January 1994 report, “Arming Rwanda” describes six foreign governments 
supplying arms to Rwanda before, during and after the Rwandan war with Uganda. 
Corporate involvement, among others was alleged by means of credit guarantees by 
French bank Credit Lyonnais. HRW suggests another hidden responsibility in its 1995 
report “Rwanda/Zaire: Re-arming with Impunity: International support for the 
Perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide” written by Kathi Austin (see below).1611 
HRW’s report and further reports led to an UNSC Resolution on the basis of which a 
                                                
1607 Uvin (1998) 55. 
1608 The Musema decision is criticised elsewhere as having “nothing to do with business activities at all” 
(Wilt 2010 871). Vest states, “it seems absolutely clear that the production of tea as such does not 
constitute any risk of perpetrating or contributing to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide 
at all”, which stands in contrast with his recital of the example of business leaders’ involvement in 
forced displacement earlier in the article (868) but is perhaps emblematic of the attitude that ‘neutral’ 
acts are unlikely to amount to crimes (generally, id.863-4). 
1609 Also, post-genocide Rwanda went through a programme of drastic privatisation. Gisuvo Tea 
Company was bought by an Indian-owned British company, McLeod-Russell, the largest tea producer in 
the world: All Africa 14 February 2011, while the bulk of coffee production was bought up by US giants 
Costco and Starbucks: Development Afrique, 10 November 2009. 
1610 Slapper and Tombs have suggested that academics may self-censor research on corporate crime 
(especially on specific companies) for fear of loss of research funding or libel suits by corporations, 
which may be winnable but are expensive to defend (Slapper & Tombs (1999) 231-2). 
1611 HRW Rearming Report. 
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Panel of Experts was set up to investigate arms supplies. The Panel published its 
Interim Report S/1996/67 in which it describes approaching governments of Bulgaria, 
China, France, Seychelles, South Africa and Zaire, each of which were accused of 
having exported arms to Rwanda. So while the ICTR includes Rwandese 
businesspersons on its case list, it also excludes, and thereby potentially conceals the 
involvement of Western banks and arms companies. 
 
1.3 Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Moving to the West of Africa, the indictment of Charles Taylor by the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) (which was established pursuant to a bilateral agreement 
between the UN and Sierra Leone1612) is of interest here because of its potential impact 
as a persuasive precedent for prosecuting arms dealers and others who aid and abet 
perpetrators through financing or engaging in trade with a violating party. Charles 
Taylor is indicted for (amongst others) having aided and abetted abuses perpetrated by 
the Sierra Leoneans.1613 While Charles Taylor is generally seen as a political leader and 
not a businessman as such he is said to have supplied arms to the Revolutionary United 
Front (“RUF”) in Liberia in exchange for “diamonds and other riches.”1614 In the 2003 
indictment this is phrased as follows:  
 
20. To obtain access to the mineral wealth of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in 
particular the diamond wealth of Sierra Leone, and to destabilize the State, the 
ACCUSED provided financial support, military training, personnel, arms, 
ammunition and other support and encouragement to the RUF, led by FODAY 
SAYBANA SANKOH, in preparation for RUF armed action in the Republic of 
Sierra Leone, and during the subsequent armed conflict in Sierra Leone.1615  
 
Writing in 2004, HRW heralds the Taylor indictment saying it will set a precedent to 
prosecute other arms dealers around the world for complicity in international 
crimes.1616 In the same publication, HRW noted that “the SCSL is also currently 
                                                
1612 SCSL Agreement. 
1613 Taylor 2007 Indictment. 
1614 HRW Weapons Report 2. See also BBC News, 20 May 2010.  
1615 Taylor 2003 Indictment. 
1616 HRW Weapons Report. 
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investigating other arms suppliers.”1617 Considering Charles Taylor’s well-publicised 
international relations amongst others with supermodel Naomi Campbell and the 
Russian arms dealer Victor Bout, the SCSL had the opportunity to prosecute a 
significant number of businesspersons on the conflict diamond and arms circuits. 
However, the SCSL has decided not to proceed with the prosecutions.1618  
 
Moreover, on 17 March 2006 an Amended Indictment was filed in the Taylor case in 
which the paragraph above no longer appears,1619 nor does it appear in the Second 
Amended Indictment of 2007, which is rather brief, and vague about the exact way in 
which Taylor may have aided and abetted the crimes committed by the RUF and 
others:  
 
By his acts or omissions in relation to the below described events, the 
ACCUSED, pursuant to Article 6.1. and, or alternatively, Article 6.3 of the 
Statute, is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below.1620 
 
Once again, it seems the case will focus on ethnic differences rather than economic 
resources that could potentially involve many western individuals and companies. The 
one exception is the prosecution of Guus van Kouwenhoven in The Netherlands – who 
is accused of supplying Charles Taylor with arms (Section 5). 
 
2 The ICC 
 
Although the ICC does not have jurisdiction over legal persons, it could prosecute 
individual business persons (see Ch. 4B). The Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Louis 
Moreno Ocampo, has often expressed his wish to prosecute business actors, but thus 
far has not indicted any.1621 
                                                
1617 HRW Weapons Report. 
1618 Anonymous comment from a lawyer at the SCSL: “the court knows who the people supplying 
arms/buying diamonds are (outside of CT) but they aren’t in any way pursuing them.” (Email 10 June 
2010). 
1619 Taylor 2006 Indictment. 
1620 Taylor 2006 Indictment. The crimes below include, “crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 
Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II an other serious violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, in violation of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the [SCSL] Statute.” 
1621 E.g. at BLIHR (2005). 
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2.1 The Democratic Republic of Congo 
Sometimes business involvement in conflict comes up in other venues. For example, 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in DRC v Uganda cited evidence that 
Ugandan military commanders had planned to exploit the DRC resources for business 
purposes; that Ugandan military aircraft had been used by businessmen to transport 
resources out of the DRC, and in conclusion that the Ugandan government was liable 
for acts of military.1622 The ICJ is not in a position to tackle this issue, but the ICC 
could. An ICC statement of 2003 has signalled the Prosecutor’s interest in 
investigation corporate involvement in international crimes in the DRC: “the 
prosecutor will work together with national investigators and prosecutors in order to 
determine the contribution, if any, that these businesses are making to the commission 
of crimes in the DRC.  …The Prosecutor of the ICC hopes that the prosecution of 
these cases [of alleged business practices fuelling atrocities] will contribute to the 
ongoing peace process [in the DRC] and ultimately yield stability for the DRC, 
fostering not just political stability but also healthy markets.”1623 However, the DRC 
list does not contain business actors as at November 2011.1624 
 
2.2 Kenya 
In Spring 2010 it was announced that the ICC would prosecute six “political and 
business leaders” who are thought to have been responsible for the election violence 
that claimed 1200 lives in Kenya in 2007/8.1625 The Prosecutor has whittled down an 
initial 20 “business and political leaders,” presented in March 2010,1626 to the current 
six. The Kenyan file raised the interest of the Pre-Trial Chamber for utilising the 
concept “state or organizational policy” in the latter, rather than the former meaning. 
In response to a request for clarification, the Office of the Prosecutor explained that 
“state or organizational policy” can apply to non-state actors (here, political 
parties).1627 
 
                                                
1622 Armed Activities 2005; Okowa (2007). 
1623 ICC Ituri PR (emphasis added); see also ICC Ituri Communications PR. 
1624 See the ICC website, Situations, The Democratic Republic of Congo: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/ . 
1625 France 24, 12 May 2010. 
1626 “The Office has presented a preliminary list of 20 political and business leaders to the Judges, 
belonging to or associated with both parties, the PNU and ODM. As you know, this list was just 
indicative. It is not binding.” Ocampo Kenya Statement 2010. 
1627 Prosecutor Organisation Indicators, Appendix F. 
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Making it clear that a political party can, in the Prosecutor’s view, amount to an 
organization for the purposes of the ICC Statute, it may be, that the Prosecutor is 
paving the way (indirectly) for corporate liability in ICL (see Chs. 4 and 6).1628 
 
3 Alternative ways of dealing with business in conflict 
 
There are limited international interventions in business involvement in conflict by 
other means, mostly diplomatic. 
 
3.1 The UNSC Embargoes, sanctions and fact-finding missions 
When the UNSC decides that the use of force or the creation of a tribunal is not the 
appropriate option, Chapter VI of the UN Charter gives other options of dealing with 
past, present or potential future international crimes. It seems the preferred method for 
dealing with arms trade (when the need is felt to ‘do something’) is UNSC arms 
embargoes. Violation of such embargoes do not necessarily attract the publicity court 
cases do, and can be resolved diplomatically (or ignored).   
 
In 2000, the President of the Security Council asked the UN General Secretary to 
appoint a panel of experts to examine the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the connection between such exploitation and 
the conflicts in the area.1629 This move was the first time at this level that conflict and 
private economic activity in the natural resources sector was the subject of 
investigation. The Panel’s mandate was extended four times, ending in with a final 
report in October 2003.1630 In its 2002 Final Report, the Panel described having found 
three ‘elite networks’ of politicians, military and business leaders that each controlled 
the natural resources in three separate areas controlled by the governments of the DRC, 
Uganda and Rwanda.1631 It also found a direct ink between the exploitation of natural 
                                                
1628 On 31 March Kenya filed a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber to declare the case inadmissible, on the 
basis that Kenya is investigating the issue itself: Kenya ICC Request. 
1629 UNSCP Congo Panel Request, Appendix F. 
1630 UN Congo 2003 Report. 
1631 UN Congo 2003 Report 25-64. At 21: “The networks consist of a small core of political and military 
elites and business persons and, in the case of the occupied areas, selected rebel leaders and 
administrators. Some members of the elite networks occupy key positions in their respective 
Governments or rebel groups….The elite networks ensure the viability of their economic activity 
through control over the military and other security forces…The networks monopolize production, 
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resources and the ongoing conflict in the region and abuses that included the use of 
child forced labour.1632 In this report it also made the ‘unparalleled’ move of naming 29 
companies and 54 individuals, whose association with the elite groups was well-
documented.1633 The Panel recommended the imposition of financial restrictions and 
travel bans. It further listed 85 companies (among which many UK, Belgian and other 
western) that it found to be in breach of the OECD guidelines.1634 However, in its 2003 
Final report, the Panel removed a number of these companies and indicated others as 
‘resolved’, which commentators have taken to show that  
the panel did not manage to counter political pressure by business lobbies and 
governments generated by its unprecedented step of naming specific TNCs. This 
is reflected in the Panel’s 2003 Final Report, which raises many questions with 
respect to the Panel’s ultimate categorization of companies and its listing of 
cases as resolved without including further information.1635 
 
Further to the Panel’s findings, the Security Council imposed an arms and ‘related 
material’ embargo on the Kivu and Ituri districts of the DRC1636 and established a panel 
of experts (sanctions committee) to monitor compliance with the embargo.1637 One of 
the tasks of the group was:  
(b) To examine, and to take appropriate action on, information concerning 
alleged violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493 
and information on alleged arms flows highlighted in the reports of the Panel of 
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, identifying where possible 
individual and legal entities reported to be engaged in such violations, as well as 
aircraft or other vehicles used. 
 
Kathi Austin, one of the Experts appointed to the panel, at an international conference 
in The Hague stated that the Security Council informally instructed the panel to 
disregard information related to non-African companies and individuals violating the 
                                                                                                                                        
commerce and fiscal functions…The elite networks form business companies or joint ventures that are 
fronts through which members of networks carry on their respective commercial activities.” 
1632 UN Congo 2002 Report 149-154. 
1633 UN Congo 2002 Report Annex I and Annex II. 
1634 UN Congo 2003 Report Annex III. 
1635 Papaioannou (2006) at 283. 
1636 UNSCRes1493. 
1637 UNSCRes1533. 
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embargo or otherwise contributing to the arms flow into the relevant localities.1638 
Nevertheless, the panel gathered this information and Austin is now hoping to bring 
western corporate involvement in the Congo conflict to light by taking this information 
to US and possibly other domestic courts (see below, Ch.6).1639  
 
The absence of business representatives from the ICC’s DRC trial list, the UN Security 
Council’s decision to opt for an embargo instead of setting up a tribunal or urging the 
ICC to prosecute, and the Security Council’s apparent wish to protect western 
corporate interests as alleged by Kathi Austin, would seem to underline the empirical 
unlikeliness of Western corporate actors becoming the subject of an ICL prosecution. 
What is remarkable, at the same time, is the fact that Ms. Austin, having described an 
abuse of power in the political institution of the UN, continues to have faith in law 
itself, and to believe that domestic legal institutions will recognise the truth of her 
story and deliver ‘justice’. It is on this ‘faith’ by cause lawyers and others in the 
domestic legal system that I focus briefly in the next section and again in Ch. 6.  
 
4 ICL on the domestic level 
 
If reading ICL literally, taking ICL’s word seriously, then according to the ‘principle 
of complementarity’, the enforcement of ICL should occur primarily on the domestic 
level.1640 Pursuant to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (and other conventions such as 
the ICC Statute, for member states) states have obligations to enact national laws 
criminalising certain specific activities, and in respect of a number of these, they have 
the obligation to seek out and prosecute or extradite individuals suspected of these 
crimes.1641 According to the principle of universal jurisdiction (which exists in CIL as 
well as in treaties), certain crimes that violate obligations of a ius cogens nature (e.g. 
torture, genocide, apartheid), can potentially be tried by any state, regardless of the 
nationality of the perpetrator or the place where the crime is said to have occurred.1642 
All in all, it would seem, that according to the discourse ICL can (should) be used on 
the domestic level with the ability to make serious inroads into combating the 
                                                
1638 Austin (2010).  
1639 Austin (2010). 
1640 See generally, Ferdinandusse (2008) 482-520; Ferdinandusse (2009). 
1641 See further, Articles 1 and 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949. 
1642 On the principle of universal jurisdiction, see, e.g. Cryer et al. (2010) 50-63; Zahar & Sluiter (2008) 
496-503. 
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prevalence of international crimes. Depending on national laws of the jurisdiction, 
cases can either be brought by prosecutorial authorities at their own instigation (which 
is rare for various reasons, not least cost), by private parties if such is possible in a 
domestic legal system (e.g. in France) or as a result of a complaint lodged on behalf of 
victims (by NGOs, victims’ groups or private (cause) lawyers. Immigration authorities 
play a role in the detection and detention (or expulsion) of war crimes suspects.1643 In 
particular, Rwandan refugees have been under scrutiny in their host states – leading to 
deportations and/or prosecutions in Germany, Belgium and elsewhere.1644 From the 
examples below of ICL on the domestic level we can see that ICL contains the 
empirical impossibility of its promised ‘accountability’, amounting to ‘planned 
impunity’. 
 
4.1 Van Anraat and Kouwenhoven, the exception and the rule 
Media attention and public interest in the case can help persuade prosecution 
authorities to proceed with a case. Sometimes, such as in the case of Frans van Anraat, 
a suspect appearing in the media boasting about his pursuits renders it politically 
difficult for the public prosecutor to decline prosecution.1645 That, combined with the 
Dutch treaty-monist system where international conventional law prevails over 
domestic law in case of conflict, made The Netherlands a relatively receptive venue for 
a first case against a Western businessman in for crimes against IL.1646 
 
Above I noted that the van Anraat case forms the exception that confirms the rule of 
‘impunity’ for business actors. The Kouwenhoven case, on the other hand, (thus far) 
                                                
1643 See, e.g. Ratner et al. (2009) 281-5. 
1644 Id. This includes the case in Belgium of Rwandan businessmen Etienne Nzabonimana and Samuel 
Ndashykirwa (“The Two Brothers” case), concerning crimes committed during 1994 genocide. 
Prosecutors said the two businessmen provided weapons, vehicles and beer for militias in Rwanda’s 
south-eastern Kibungo region during the April 1994 killings. The brothers were sentenced to 12 and 10 
years in June 2005, BBC News, 29 June 2005. 
1645 Van Anraat appeared on national Dutch television boasting about his relationship with Saddam 
Houssein. The Dutch secret service had paid van Anraat and accommodated him in a safe house in 
return for intelligence on Iraq but the public revelation made it difficult to ignore him: see, among 
others, Karskens (2006).  
1646 Dutch Constitution, Chapter 5(2), Arts. 90ff. e.g. “Article 94 Statutory regulations in force within 
the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are 
binding on all persons or of resolutions by international institutions.” 
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conforms to the more regular pattern of impunity for business involvement in 
conflict.1647 
  
4.2 Van Anraat 
The van Anraat case bears resemblance to the Zyklon B Case discussed in Chapter 3 
(both in content and in law), in that it provides another example of inferred knowledge 
vis-à-vis an act of assistance. Van Anraat was a chemicals broker. The significance of 
van Anraat being a broker rather than supplier is that the products never entered the 
European Union’s jurisdiction, and that van Anraat himself did not personally hold or 
handle them.1648 He was tried for having brokered the supply of chemicals to former 
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The chemicals were then used to manufacture 
mustard gas with which the Kurdish populations of northern Iraq and Iran were 
attacked (the “Anfal Campaign”). Van Anraat claimed in his defence that he believed 
the chemicals were for use in the garment industry. However, the court found, that 
although the type of chemical sold were commonly used in the garment industry, the 
quantities requested by the Iraqi President must have given Van Anraat cause to think 
he may have had another purpose for them.1649 Additionally, as Van Anraat was an 
experienced chemicals dealer he must have known the chemicals could be used as a 
component in the manufacture of poison gas, and finally, as a regular newspaper 
reader and someone who had spent considerable time in Iraq, Van Anraat must have 
known that, considering that Iraq was at war with its neighbour and in conflict with the 
Kurds in Northern Iraq, in the ordinary course of things, the mustard gas, once 
manufactured, would be used, and eventually was used, to gas the Kurds.1650  
Importantly, Van Anraat delivered another shipment of the chemicals after the Halabja 
attack in 1988 which had been widely covered in the news. On this basis Van Anraat 
was considered to have aided and abetted Saddam Houssein in his war crimes: he was 
not required to have had intent towards crimes carried out by Saddam. In other words, 
Van Anraat was not required to have wanted the Kurds to be gassed, it was sufficient 
                                                
1647 On the Van Anraat and Kouwenhoven cases generally, see Huisman (2010); Van Sliedregt (2007); 
Van der Wilt (2006); Van der Wilt (2008). 
1648 Mark Thomas Documentary. 
1649 Van Anraat Appeal Decision 12.1.1. 
1650 Van Anraat Appeal Decision, 11.17. 
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that he knew (must have known) the chemicals would be used to this end.1651 Van 
Anraat was sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment.1652 
4.3 Kouwenhoven 
Also in The Netherlands, businessman Guus Kouwenhoven is being prosecuted on the 
accusation of having delivered arms to Liberia and of being involved in war crimes 
committed by Liberian troops and/or militias during the reign of Charles Taylor. 
Kouwenhoven was convicted of the weapons supply charges but acquitted of the war 
crimes charges by a lower court in 2006,1653 then and released in 20071654 and fully 
acquitted by the Court of Appeal in 2008,1655 but recently (20 April 2010) the Dutch 
Supreme Court ordered a retrial (expected 2012), considering the Court of Appeal had 
neglected to hear important witnesses in the case.1656  
 
Kouwenhoven had been put on a UN travel ban list in 2000 because of his alleged 
arms and diamond dealings for Charles Taylor and the RUF.1657 The Global Witness 
report “The Usual Suspects” claims that OTC, the company managed by 
Kouwenhoven, ran a militia of 2500 armed fighters.1658 Kouwenhoven is also 
mentioned by name in the UN Panel of Experts Reports on Liberia.1659 OTC, the 
company he ran was registered in Liberia and part of a Chinese-owned group, which 
may explain why Kouwenhoven was indicted as an individual in The Netherlands, and 
the company was not.1660 
 
The fact that Frans van Anraat was prosecuted is partly the result of an investigation 
carried out by a journalist, Arnold Karskens, and partly the result of ‘prosecuterial 
activism’. Although The Netherlands had one of the first ‘war crimes units’ as part of 
                                                
1651 See also, Van der Wilt (2008).  
1652 On 1 July 2009, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld the judgment, but shortened Van Anraat’s 
sentence by six months due to the length of the trial. The Supreme Court also ordered the lower court to 
reconsider the compensation claims made by Kurdish victims, Van Anraat Supreme Court Decision. 
1653 Kouwenhoven 2006 Judgment. 
1654 Kouwenhoven Interim Judgment. 
1655 Kouwenhoven Acquittal. 
1656 Kouwenhoven Supreme Court Judgment 2010. 
1657 UNSC Liberia Asset Freeze List; UN Liberia 2007 Report; Bankrolling Brutality. 
1658 Global Witness Liberia Report 13. 
1659 E.g. UN Liberia 2007 Report. 
1660 In a magazine interview in 2007, Kouwenhoven’s lawyer claims that Global Witness’ report is 
tainted by the fact that the organisation received funding from OSI-West Africa, where at the relevant 
time Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was the Chair of the Board. She is now (2007) the President of Liberia and, 
according to Kouwenhoven’s lawyer, had an interest in eliminating her rival Taylor’s main source of 
finance, the timber trade (of which the OTC was the main producer). He also accuses Global Witness of 
pressing for a timber embargo from the UNSC on the same grounds: Vrij Nederland, 31 Maart 2007 77. 
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the office of the public prosecutor,1661 international cases such as those against van 
Anraat and Kouwenhoven are expensive to investigate and run. As a result of this, the 
outside help of journalists such as Karskens, or NGOs such as Global Witness, can be 
a sine qua non. However, according to the prosecutors, the case of Kouwenhoven fell 
apart when NGO-produced evidence was rejected by the court,1662 witnesses were 
intimidated, etc.1663 Viewing the situation from a different angle, when such 
prosecutions depend to such a large extent on external assistance, it also shows us 
something about the government’s/public prosecutor’s budgeting priorities. 
 
The two Dutch prosecutions are essentially “progressive” cases. However, van Anraat 
and Kouwenhoven both acted as loners, even outlaws. Van Anraat incriminated 
himself when by boasting on tv about his dealings with Saddam Houssein. 
Kouwenhoven’s company OTC was not prosecuted per se. The U.S. company that 
manufactured the TCG that van Anraat brokered was fined USD 200,000 for 
sanctions-busting.1664  
 
It is perhaps the model case for what we (a putative ‘ideal’ college of liberal lawyers, 
as well as an ‘ideal’ general public) imagine ICL could be (or, what ICL promises to 
be): a greedy villain, an evil dictator, a firm but fair judge, a long jail sentence and a 
reassured public. Van Anraat and Kouwenhoven is that they are both really 
mediagenic “James Bond baddies” with a certain charm. This makes prosecuting them 
into a popular spectacle. The case is being turned into a film.1665 At the same time, it 
creates an artificial distinction between these two bad guys, and ‘legitimate’, normal, 
clean corporate business. Van Anraat, and (potentially Kouwenhoven) is thus the ‘fall 
guy’ for the ‘backlash’ (Ch.6). 
 
5 Host state cases 
 
It is rare to hear of (especially Western/Northern) corporate actors being prosecuted in 
‘host states’ – the states where these individuals and companies do business, and 
where violations of the kind discussed here generally occur. Part of the reason for this 
                                                
1661 Office of the Public Prosecutor: http://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/oorlogsmisdaden/  
1662 Conversation with members of the War Crimes Unit, 29 October 2010. 
1663 Karskens blog. 
1664 Karskens (2006) 169. 
1665 Het Parool, 1 July 2010. 
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is that these cases are not widely reported in the Western media. However, some 
examples deserve mention. When such prosecutions do occur, reports of obstacles and 
buying off of judges/authorities also appear (e.g. Trafigura in Cote d’Ivoire1666). 
Additionally, in cases such as the prosecution of Warren Anderson, CEO of Union 
Carbide/Dow which has been ongoing since 1987, it would be difficult to get the 
suspect to appear in court or even be extradited.1667 The 2010 Bhopal Court decision 
lists Anderson as ‘absconder’.1668 A claim for USD489m. worth of damages that a 
Nicaraguan court awarded plaintiffs (who had suffered injury from pesticides) against 
Shell Chemicals, Dow Chemicals, Standard Fruit was declared unenforceable by a 
California court in 2003.1669 A recent documentary on Al-Jazeera mentioned a local 
Colombian lawsuit against Chiquita, which is accused of killing local trade union 
leaders, workers and social activists. I have not found further details on this local case 
but the ATCA case in the US is well-documented.1670 On 4 January 2012, a court in 
Ecuador ordered Chevron to pay USD18bn for dumping oil-drilling waste in unlined 
pits, polluting the forest and causing illness and deaths among indigenous people.1671 
Chevron’s staff immediately denounced the decision: “[The] decision is another 
glaring example of the politicisation and corruption of Ecuador's judiciary that has 
plagued this fraudulent case from the start.”1672 
 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, on 14 December 2006, three former employees 
of Australian mining company Anvil Mining (together with nine Congolese soldiers) 
went on trial on charges of complicity in war crimes over a 2004 massacre in the DRC. 
Pierre Mercier, the Canadian who was the general manager of Anvil Mining Ltd.’s 
Congolese subsidiary, as well as two South Africans stood accused of having 
“knowingly facilitated” war crimes committed by Congolese troops when the military 
suppressed an uprising near Anvil’s Dikulushi mine in the Katanga Province, allegedly 
killing at least 70 civilians.1673 The trial ended six months later in the acquittal of all 
accused.1674 
                                                
1666 De Volkskrant, 24 August 2009. 
1667 BBC News, 7 June 2010. 
1668 Bhopal Indian Criminal Case. 
1669 Joseph (2004) at 150 (case not reported). 
1670 Chiquita documentary.  
1671 The Independent, 5 January 2012. 
1672 The Independent, 5 January 2012. 
1673 See Australian Broadcasting Corporation list of articles on the subject: 
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2005/s1408730.htm . See also ABC Kilwa Documentary. 
1674 Anvil Mining PR. 
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On 17 July 2007, RAID and Global Witness together with two Congolese NGOs 
published a report, “The Kilwa Trial: a denial of justice”, which presents a detailed 
chronology of events from October 2004 to June 2007. The report argues that the 
proceedings were “plagued with obstructions and political interference”1675 and 
documents “serious flaws and irregularities” in the trial of nine Congolese soldiers for 
war crimes and three employees of Anvil Mining for complicity in war crimes 
committed in Kilwa, in the DRC.1676  
 
In Ch.1 I commented above on the notion of ‘corporate power’ and quoted statistics 
such as “the combined sales of four of the largest corporations in the world exceed the 
gross domestic product of Africa.”1677 Likewise, over 90% of Nigeria’s foreign 
exchange earnings are said to come from Shell,1678 which would make local litigation, 
let alone prosecution, very difficult. Moreover, Shell is said to have “someone on their 
payroll” in every government department in Nigeria.1679 Also, in Chapter 2B I 
mentioned how ‘stabilisation clauses’ in BITs leave host states very little room to 
adopt or strengthen human rights and other restrictive legislation. While the benefit of 
western (and East Asian) MNCs is felt by Third World elites, the GWC are virtually1680 




There are many other examples of recent conflicts where we may have imagined 
international criminal trials to have been brought against the businesspersons or 
companies implicated.  
 
                                                
1675 E.g. RAID Kilwa PR. 
1676 RAID Kilwa PR. 
1677 Ch.1 S.1.1. 
1678 Usman (2011) 294. 
1679 The Guardian, 8 December 2010. 
1680 See Chapter 6 below. 
1681 This includes African Human Rights NGOs, e.g. Africa Legal Aid (AFLA) who published The 
Cairo-Arusha Principles: “The Principles provide that universal jurisdiction applies to gross human 
rights offences committed "even in peacetime." The Principles also provide that universal jurisdiction 
should not be limited only to natural persons, but that it should extend to legal entities as well. The 
Principles suggest that crimes such as acts of plunder and gross misappropriation of public resources, 
trafficking in human beings and serious environmental crimes, which have "major adverse economic, 
social or cultural consequences," should be added to the list of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction.” 
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One such example is South Africa, where the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission held three days of ‘Business Sector hearings’.1682 In a submission, the 
Center for Conflict Resolution (University of Cape Town) asserted, “Sections within 
the business community, through their extensive involvement in domestic arms 
production, and as an active participant in Total Strategy,1683 provided the material 
means for the maintenance and defence of apartheid, both domestically and in the 
context of South Africa’s destabilisation campaign of the Southern African region. As 
such, elements within the business community are guilty of directly and indirectly 
perpetuating the political conflict and associated human rights abuses which 
characterised South Africa between March 1960 and May 1994.”1684 It further asserted 
the emergence of a ‘military industrial complex’ functioning “on the basis of a 
structural pairing between business and military that inevitably develops into mutual 
interests.”1685 
 
The Truth & Reconciliation Commission’s Final Report weighed up two dominant 
points of view it had had represented to it at the hearings:  
One view, which sees apartheid as part of a system of racial-capitalism, held 
that apartheid was beneficial for (white) business because it was an integral 
part of a system premised on the exploitation of black workers and the 
destruction of black entrepreneurial activity. According to this argument, 
business as a whole benefited from the system, although some sections of the 
business community (most notably Afrikaner capital, the mining houses and the 
armaments industry) benefited more than others did. This position is most 
clearly articulated in submissions by the African National Congress (ANC), the 
South African Communist Party (SACP), the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), Professor Sampie Terreblanche of the University of 
Stellenbosch and the Black Management Forum (BMF). … The other position, 
argued mainly by business, claims that apartheid raised the costs of doing 
business, eroded South Africa’s skill base and undermined longterm 
                                                
1682 TRC Business Sector Hearings Excerpt in Appendix F. 
1683 The strategy developed by the South African government over the years aimed at repelling the 
“communist onslaught” it expected, and which included recruitment of the private sector, and 
“depended on the active participation of private sector business.” CCRSA TRC Submission. 
1684 CCRSA TRC Submission. 
1685 CCRSA TRC Submission citing Smith (1983), 74. 
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productivity and growth. In this view, the impact of apartheid was to harm the 
economy.1686 
 
The TRC’s findings on business was, first and foremost: “Business was central to the 
economy that sustained the South African state during the apartheid years. Certain 
businesses, especially the mining industry, were involved in helping to design and 
implement apartheid policies. Other businesses benefited from co-operating with the 
security structures of the former state. Most businesses benefited from operating in a 
racially structured context.”1687 No prosecutions ensued, with ‘truth and reconciliation’ 
being the chosen strategy for transition. That this was not satisfactory to many victims 
of Apartheid, can be concluded from the class actions brought in their name against a 
number of corporations in the US (Ch.6).  
 
Another example is the situation in Iraq. One could have imagined prosecutions, by 
analogy to the prosecution of Tesch and Zyklon B, of the other manufacturers and 
suppliers of the gas that Saddam Hussein used to kill the Kurds of Halabja and across 
the border in Iran. Likewise, we could imagine prosecutions for complicity in war 
crimes committed in post-2003 Iraq by probably every major arms supplier who 
supplied the US military, the banks that provided the finance, the companies that 
supplied the manpower in the form of mercenaries/private military contractors.1688 I 
have argued that Van Anraat’s prosecution is the exception that confirms the rule: it 
appears that ICL is not designed to do this, this is not what ICL is for. As I have tried 
to show in this chapter, ICL’s purpose is partly for pro-capital intervention, partly 
ideological: to create a particular narrative of conflict which excludes economic 
causes. 
 
While in Iraq, one trial was organized for Saddam Houssein and seven of his 
colleagues (a trial that has received much criticism in itself1689) the US occupation put 
through a programme of economic and legal reform in Iraq that was in many ways 
similar to that in Japan, in Yugoslavia, and generally the reforms that accompany 
World bank and IMF finance. In Iraq, US appointed Bremer passed orders allowing 
                                                
1686 TRC Final Report Volume 4, C.2pp18ff deal with the business sector hearings.  
1687 TRC Final Report 48. See further, Appendix F. 
1688 Generally, Klein (2007) 323-382; Scahill (2007). 
1689 See, e.g. Alvarez (2004); Shany (2004); Zolo (2004). 
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100% foreign ownership of Iraqi companies, leaving the oil industry in the hands of a 
professional management team independent from political control and headed by a 
former Shell CEO, major tax reforms, the creation of a US-Iraq free trade area, etc.1690 
Saddam’s trial formed only a thin veil over those reforms. But while many (lawyers 
and others) focus on the legality or illegality of the war, legal issues surrounding 
detention in Guantanamo and elsewhere, and torture,1691 (one could call this ‘law’s 
‘CNN effect’) very few if any research focuses on the dispossession of the resources in 
Iraq. Our faith in ICL is important to the capitalist IL, partly because it keeps activists’ 
and leftist legal academics’ focus on prosecuting suspected war criminals. Tallgren 
suggests: “Focussing on the idea of international criminal justice helps us to forget that 
an overwhelming majority of the crucial problems of the societies concerned are not 
adequately addressed by criminal law.”1692 (Nor, indeed, that many of them are caused 
with, through law.) 
 
ICL forms an integral part of the structure of rules congealing the economically 
exploitative relationships between the GCC and the GWC.  
 
Koskenniemi and Ratner both contend that the ICTY and ICTR were created for 
political ends. Ratner asserts: “the [UN Security] Council created [the ICTY and 
ICTR] as substitutes for robust international action to prevent or stop the atrocities in 
these two regions”1693 The visual performance of the trials at those tribunals masks the 
failure to prevent the tragedies in the first place. The Nuremberg, Tokyo and 
associated courts have overwhelmingly received the same criticism. Brownlie has 
stated that “political considerations, power and patronage will continue to determine 
who is tried for international crimes and who not.”1694 Rather than presenting ICL as a 
triumph of law enforcement (and the recognition of individual criminal responsibility) 
over politics that should be improved by eliminating ‘selectivity’,1695 we should 
perhaps speak of the instrumentalisation of individual responsibility for political ends. 
These ends would include not only the accountability of, say Serbian leaders or 
                                                
1690 See Gathii (2010) 71-93; Klein (2007) 323ff., Coalition Provisional Authority website: 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/. 
1691 Viz. e.g. the case brought in Germany against Donald Rumsfeld, the case in Spain against John Yoo 
et al., attempted arrests or George W. Bush in Switzerland and Canada, etc. – the work of cause lawyers 
(see Ch. 6 below). 
1692 Tallgren (2002a) 593. 
1693 Ratner et al. (2009) 9. See also, Koskenniemi (2002). 
1694 Brownlie (2008) 604. See also, Mégret (2003).  
1695 This is the conclusion of Cryer (2005). 
  285 
African warlords, but also (for example) the impunity of Western (business and 
political) leaders and e.g. NATO commanders.1696 Impunity, too, is a legal 
construct.1697  
 
Moreover, Akhavan has suggested that the purpose of ICL is utilitarian in the sense 
that accountability may contribute to post-conflict peace building and the long-term 
prevention of mass violence.1698 Why this is important, he suggests in the East-
Timorese example: “Accountability for atrocities and corruption … is the key to 
obtaining the international investment and aid Indonesia desperately needs.”1699 
Similarly, former Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, said in a speech that the function 
of the ICTY was “to bring law where there is none, so that we can invest.”1700 This 
suggests, that when peace and justice are good for business, we use it to hide this 
effect, but when ICL is bad for business, ICL remains our vital dream, forever 
deferred.  
                                                
1696 ICTY NATO Bombing Report. See also Benvenuti (2001). 
1697 Cf. Susan Marks, who asserts ‘empire is a legal construct’ (Marks (2006) 347).  
1698 Akhavan (2001) 30.  
1699 Akhavan (2001) 29. 
1700 Del Ponte (2005). 
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In the ‘accountability gap’1701 left by the non-application of ICL to business in the 
ICTY, ICTR, other international venues or indeed the domestic courts, it is possible to 
distinguish three closely related developments in the area of ‘business in conflict’ over 
the past 20 years. What connects these three is that they all revolve around the 
corporation per se, the corporate person – building on the reification of the corporation 
described in Chs.2A and 2B. The first development is the continuation of the trend 
introduced in Ch.2A: that of the representation of the corporate legal person as a ‘good 
citizen’, in what has become the thriving discourse and practice area of corporate 
social responsibility, “CSR”. In Section 2 I discuss CSR’s material and intellectual 
provenance and its development into a movement for the promotion of non-binding 
rules on corporate behaviour. The second development is that of ‘ICL cause 
lawyering’ (Section 3). It is both the availability of ICL norms, and the discontent with 
the level of ICL enforcement on the international level (and public prosecutor-initiated 
cases on the domestic level), and frustration with (of) the possibilities in host states, 
that has given rise to multiple attempts by NGOs and ‘cause-lawyers’ to ‘bring 
corporations to account’ in western domestic courts. Such cause lawyering forms a 
                                                
1701 A term now often used in NGO literature on business & human rights, e.g. Amnesty Dignity Report. 
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response to the CSR movement, which in turn has developed partly to alleviate the 
‘bad corporation’ accusations of the cause lawyers.1702 The final development 
discussed here in Section 4 is the call for the legalisation of CSR, which seeks to form 
a compromise between the first two responses and has advocates in the NGO/practice 
world as well as in academia.1703 One particular demand within the ‘legalised CSR’ 
ambit is the inclusion of the corporate legal person as an object of ICL – as introduced 
above in Ch. 4C.  
 
In Section 4 I critically assess the practical meaning of the corporate accountability 
proposed or supported within these three strategies. Most importantly, the contribution 
these developments make to the reification/anthropomorphisation of the corporation 
changes (‘spirits away’1704) the relationship of responsibility for harm from individual 
to society at large/affected communities, to one of individual victims with ‘the 
corporation’. The practical effect of this is that individuals affected by the particular 
excesses of capitalism (as perpetrated by business(wo)men) in conflict, are constituted 
as victims who, in a legal relationship as formal equals with the corporation, can seek 
to negotiate the ‘price’ of the harm done to them, under the commodified responsibility 
relationship. 
 
In Section 5 I reflect on the claim quoted in Ch. 1, that ‘corporate rule is here’. In the 
preceding chapters I have shown that the GCC rule, to a significant degree, through 
and with the corporate form, which “hides the essential brutality and indifference to 
the plight of others that characterises [corporate] profit-making activities.”1705 Their 
‘corporate rule’, is not only material, but also ideological1706 - the corporation rules 
with a ‘combination of force and guile.’1707 The two depend on, and mutually reinforce 
each other. Berle wrote in 1957: 
The first question is that whenever there is a question of power there is a 
question of legitimacy. As things stand now, these instrumentalities of 
tremendous power [corporations] have the slenderest claim of legitimacy. This 
is probably a transitory period. They must find some claim of legitimacy, which 
                                                
1702 Shamir (2004) 635.  
1703 E.g. the various contributions in McBarnet (2007), Bankrolling Brutality and Amnesty Dignity 
Report. 
1704 Arthur (1978) 31 (see Ch.1). 
1705 Glasbeek (2007) 249. 
1706 Pearce (1990) 428. 
1707 Ollman (2003) 11. 
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also means finding a field of responsibility and a field of accountability. 
Legitimacy, responsibility and accountability are essential to any power system 
if it is to endure. They correspond to a deep human instinct.1708  
 
Glasbeek notes “[a] good deal of intellectual and political massaging is needed to 
maintain the standing of the corporation.”1709 Here, I discuss such in the context of 
corporate accountability. My conclusion (S.5) is this: as ICL was the ‘completion 
piece’ to legitimise the IL enterprise, CSR, corporate litigation, and also ‘corporate 
ICL’ – together ‘corporate accountability’ - form the main part of what Klein has 
called, “the 50 year campaign for total corporate liberation.”1710 In particular, (putative) 
corporate corporate ICL serves to complete the corporation as a political citizen rather 
than an amoral calculator, thus allowing the corporation to exercise legitimate 
authority within ‘global governance’. 
 
I add an afterword (S.6) in which I highlight current anti-corporate resistance as a 
strand in broader anti-capitalist resistance, which presents the seed of the new. 
 
2 Corporate social responsibility: Company law and the ‘last maginot line of 
capitalism’ 
 
Glasbeek calls ‘corporate social responsibility’ (“CSR”) the ‘last maginot line of 
capitalism’, which it has ‘dug’ in the face of the last remaining resistance to its main 
bearer, the corporation.1711 It is possible to track today’s concept back to Marx’ debate 
on the length of the working day.1712 In Ch.2A I introduced the early stages of the 
process, which should be viewed as part of a reformist agenda aimed at creating a 
‘kinder capitalism’.1713 What we can see is that CSR (and the ideas about corporate 
citizenship preceding the notion) appear at times of (economic) crisis, when there is a 
‘backlash’ against the legitimacy of the corporate form and profit-making activities.1714 
                                                
1708 Berle (1957) 16. 
1709 Glasbeek (2007) 249. 
1710 Klein (2007) 19. In Shock Doctrine, Klein describes this process as represented in the economic 
reforms including privatisations and corporate involvement in i.a. occupied Iraq and post-Katrina New 
Orleans (Klein (2007)). 
1711 Glasbeek (1987-88) 363. 
1712 Marx (1976) 375-416; Baars (2011), Appendix G. 
1713 Glasbeek (2002) 3. 
1714 Generally, Broad (2002); Vernon (1971); Tugendhat (1971). 
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CSR is thus in part a legitimisation strategy. It is not my aim here to provide a detailed 
account of the various instruments proposed and adopted, the roles of the various 
‘players’, the corporations, platforms, coalitions, projects, foundations and institutions, 
the standards, decisions, principles, guidelines, best practices, pledges, compacts, 
handbooks and compliance measuring tools of CSR (which has been done 
elsewhere1715), but instead, I aim to show what its effects are. 
 
CSR appears to rely on the notion that the corporation’s mandate is wider than simply 
maximisation of shareholder return: it may include acting for the benefit of other 
‘stakeholders’, though doing so may also be profitable. Although, as noted in Chapter 
2A, the profit objective was by the late 19th C. the only lawful objective for the 
corporation in UK law, in the 1883 case of Hutton v West Cork Railway Co the court 
held that a company board could make a decision that at first sight went against 
shareholders’ interests. This would be lawful when the decision indirectly does make 
business sense, for example by pacifying employees and thereby reducing risk of 
industrial action or other loss of productivity: “[t]he law does not say that there are to 
be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for 
the benefit of the company.”1716 
 
Critiques of the corporate form have been uttered on occasion since its inception 
(Ch.2A) and have generally grown stronger at times of economic crisis. Soon after the 
corporation had been formalised in the 1850s some feared it might become a 
Frankenstein monster.1717 To allay this fear, reification had to be followed by 
anthropomorphisation, and the concern was now to reinvest the corporation with 
morality, to portray it as a ‘good citizen’, or ‘soulful company’ rather than an ‘amoral 
calculator.’1718 The corporation had to be ‘re-moralised’ – but this was to be done 
within the logic of the market – utilising ‘commodified morality’ as discussed in Ch.4. 
In 1908 the U.S. telecommunications giant AT&T was one of the first to launch an 
advertising campaign aimed getting the public to ‘love and hold affection for’ the 
corporation.1719 By the end of WWI, the US’s other leading companies had followed 
suit, creating images of themselves as benevolent and socially responsible, in what 
                                                
1715 E.g. Zerk (2006); Shamir (2005); Muchlinski (2008); McBarnet (2007); Forcese (2009). 
1716 Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883). 
1717 Wormser (1931). 
1718 Pearce (1990) 425. 
1719 Bakan (2004) 17. 
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became known as the ‘New Capitalism’.1720 In the 1930s corporate social responsibility 
became known as the “best strategy … to restore people’s faith in corporations and 
reverse their growing fascination with big government.”1721  
 
Yet, the purpose of the corporation continued to generate discussion.1722 In the 
economically more secure US of the 1950s, the economist Friedman in 1952 once 
again floated the idea that any managerial concern with interests outside of shareholder 
interests (and such others as are by law required to be the corporation’s interest) 
reduce social wealth due to increased agency cost.1723 Additionally, Friedman asked 
whether it should not rather be up to the state to set the rules on, e.g. wages, the 
environment, other ‘stakeholder’ issues, and that business(wo)men could not presume 
to know, and that it is not their task to decide what is best for society in general.1724 
Nevertheless, eventually for the domestic US and UK audiences, the stakeholder 
model proved dominant, an important achievement of/for CSR.1725 This can be 
ascribed to the dual development of consumer activism and the realisation that such 
presents a lucrative business opportunity.1726 Moreover, it presents an opportunity to 
some extent to devolve responsibility for corporate responsibility to consumers: 
“[w]hether we like it or not, this [the emergence of the corporation] is what has 
happened…. The dangers are obvious. But history cannot usually be reversed. Until 
engineers and economic forces give us a way by which anyone can manufacture an 
automobile in his back yard we will continue to have organizations the size of General 
Motors or Ford – as long as people want Chevrolets or Fords.”1727  
 
During the economically abundant (in the West, at least) and activist 1960s, companies 
came under scrutiny in a world that became more politically vocal.1728 Ralph Nader in 
1965 published Unsafe At Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American 
Automobile in which he criticised the American automobile industry, which had found 
                                                
1720 Bakan (2004) 18. 
1721 Bakan (2004) 19. 
1722 Berle (1931); Dodd (1932); Berle (1932). See also, Sommer (1991). 
1723 Glasbeek (1987-1988) 384. 
1724 Friedman (1962) fn.26 133-4. 
1725 In the UK this view was confirmed in the 1962 case of Parke v Daily News Ltd. Importantly, though, 
Friedman’s and more generally the Chicago School’s economic theories played a vital role in 
government policy including foreign policy – the results of which in Rwanda and the FYR I have 
described in Ch. 5; Klein (2007) 18-21. 
1726 Muchlinski (2007) 3. 
1727 Berle (1957) 15. CSR is most popular among producers of consumer goods, for obvious reasons. 
1728 Broad (2002) 6; Bakan (2005) 60; Lang (2011) 61ff. 
  291 
it economically rational to produce unsafe cars and pay out compensation to accident 
victims after lawsuits, causing a scandal.1729 In addition, the anti-Vietnam war 
movement of the 1960s also rallied against companies such as General Motors, 
General Dynamics and Chrysler, which were seen to be making large profits from the 
war, and against Dow Chemical, which produced the napalm used in Vietnam.1730 
During the 1970s crisis the global class struggle intensified,1731 and resulting (amongst 
others) in the NIEO Resolution mentioned in Chapter 2B.  
 
The 1980s and 90s were once again good decades for unfettered capitalism, and it was 
not until the 00s that the ruthless Gordon Gecko executive lost attraction, which was 
partially to blame on the corporate scandals of Enron (2001) and WorldCom (2002).1732 
What is interesting to note is that these scandals led to a highly visible application of 
individual criminal liability.1733 Perhaps this was the last push the CSR movement 
needed to get off the ground in earnest. In Shamir’s words, “capitalists and capitalist 
entities do not sit still when faced with threats and challenges. Corporations and 
corporate executives constantly mobilize a host of agents (e.g. NGOs, research 
institutions, business associations, state bureaucrats, etc.) to maintain their ideological 
and practical supremacy.”1734 CSR has been institutionalised through the work of UN 
Special Rapporteur on Business & Human Rights John Ruggie,1735 contributing to 
CSR’s development into a sizeable industry in its own right, with a willing market of 
‘ethical consumers’.1736 For producers of consumer products using a CSR strategy now 
‘makes business sense’ and thus fits within the corporation’s profit mandate.1737 Some 
concern among NGOs that CSR may amount only to window-dressing, has led to a 
call for replacing the various non-binding guidelines on corporate behaviour with 
binding rules and thus to ‘legalise’ CSR.1738 Some who call for a legalised CSR also 
                                                
1729 Generally, Nader (1965). 
1730 Glasbeek (1987-88) 391. Dow also produced Agent Orange which would later become the subject of 
the Agent Orange ATCA suit, and was responsible for the disaster Bhopal (see Muchlinski (1989)). The 
thalidomide issue was another cause for growing scrutiny of business. 
1731 Muchlinski (2007) 4. 
1732 Karstedt (2006) 1013. 
1733 Glasbeek (2010) 248-9. 
1734 Shamir (2005) 94, citing Sklair (1997).  
1735 See e.g. Ruggie (2008) Report; Ruggie (2011) Report, and Baars (2011) 425-7 Appendix G. 
1736 Muchlinski (2007) 100. 
1737 World Business Council on Sustainable Development, Corporate Social Responsibility: Making 
Good Business Sense, Jan. 2000. 
1738 E.g. McBarnet (2007). In the UK this has resulted in Companies Act 2006, s.172, which includes a 
wider ‘stakeholder’ conception of director’s duty to act in the interest of the company. See further, 
Baars (2011). 
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include the application of ICL to companies (S.4). It is imaginable that this call is 
stimulated by the recent rediscovery of the Nuremberg Industrialists Trials in cause-
lawyering practice.  
 
3 Cause lawyering 
 
The availability of ICL norms and hard-hitting NGO reports about business 
involvement in conflict (Ch.1, 5), has led ‘cause lawyers’1739 to attempt to hold 
corporations (and occasionally business(wo)men) to account for violations of 
international law. Cause lawyers (and broader publics) have been mobilised, and 
respond to, the emotive discourse around ‘corporate impunity’, calling forth Cassesse’s 
foundational narrative of ICL (Ch.4) and the efforts of the liberal lawyers at 
Nuremberg (Ch.3). Their lawsuits appear to form the counterpoint to CSR, being 
aimed at ‘bad corporations’.1740 On another level, the cause lawyers are the designated 
(and thus far only) putative ‘enforcers’ of (legalised) CSR and corporate ICL.1741 
 
Cause lawyers and legal/human rights NGOs have found various ways to bring claims 
in national courts ultimately based on violations of ICL.1742 Best known of these are the 
compensation suits brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act and other provisions of 
US law, which have been numerous and highly publicised.1743 A small number of 
similar cases have been brought in Canada1744 and in Europe.1745 Where civil 
compensation claims for ICL violations are not possible, cause lawyers have found 
other strategic litigation methods around corporate involvement in conflict. This may 
include bringing an ICL crime back to its most basic domestic law element, such as 
murder, or theft, as suggested by Schwarzenberger (above, Ch. 4).1746 Public interest 
                                                
1739 Sarat and Scheingold are credited with the term ‘cause-layweringing’ which they define as follows: 
“Cause lawyering” denotes the practice of law by those committed to furthering through the upholding 
of a particular cause by legal means, the aims of the good society: Sarat (2001). 
1740 Elsewhere I discuss these cases in more detail, also taking into account questions of representation: 
Baars (2012). 
1741 See, e.g. the work of the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights in this field. 
1742 See, e.g., Business & Human Rights Legal Accountability Portal.  
1743 This U.S. instrument allows aliens (and Americans) to bring civil suits in the U.S. courts against 
parties who have, or are accused of having, committed a violation of international law (ATCA). 
1744 Bil’in (Village Council); see Yap (2010) 631. 
1745 In the UK, human rights abuse cases have been brought amongst others against Cape Plc. Evidence 
of a growing interest in such cases is the recent number of conferences and workshops on the issue, such 
as the recent effort by the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, see 
http://www.ecchr.eu/events_2/articles/conference-tnu.html .  
1746 In re. Agent Orange was a product liability case. 
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lawyers in France have taken some more imaginative public law and contract law 
cases.1747 In this vein a recent criminal case in France against the timber company DLH 
deserves mention for articulating a case against a ‘conflict timber’ company in terms 
of a ‘handling stolen goods’ complaint.1748  
 
In the US, Peter Weiss, chairman of the Center for Constitutional Rights (“CCR”), 
unearthed the long-forgotten Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) in the 1970s while 
searching for a legal means to hold to account those responsible for the My Lai 
massacre, but drew on his experience as one of the Morgenthau Boys when applying 
the instrument to litigation against corporations involved in conflict.1749 In 1996 CCR 
filed cases under ATCA against Unocal, accusing the US oil company1750 of using 
slave labour in its plants in Burma, in collusion with the Burmese dictatorship.1751  
According to Colliver, the facts of the Unocal cases were “typical of this generation of 
ATCA cases, in which the corporation enters into a business arrangement with a 
repressive regime or its instrumentalities … to facilitate natural resource 
extraction.”1752 Similar cases at the time were brought against the major western oil and 
mining companies1753 and against financiers of, and suppliers to, oppressive regimes 
such as the South African Apartheid government.1754 Many of these cases explicitly 
refer to the Nuremberg Industrialists’ trials and the Zyklon B case.1755 A major series 
of cases that is still ongoing is the Holocaust Litigation cases – including against Ford 
for the use of forced labour.1756 Also, cases were filed in relation to corporate atrocities 
during colonialism,1757 and against suppliers of the means to commit atrocities in war 
zones such as Vietnam and Palestine.1758 
 
US Courts have found that corporations (as private actors, and legal persons) could be 
held directly responsible for slave trade, genocide, war crimes, and other so called 
                                                
1747 AFPS v Alstohm. 
1748 DLH Complaint. 
1749 Weiss Interview 26. 
1750 This section in particular draws on Baars (2007). 
1751 Doe v Unocal Corp. (1999). 
1752 Coliver et al (2005) at 209. 
1753 Eg Shell (Wiwa v Shell), Chevron (Bowoto v Chevron), Freeport McMoran (Beanal v. Freeport). 
1754 Barclays and Citigroup, amongst others, in the Apartheid Litigation Cases. 
1755 E.g. Caterpillar Appeal 37. See also Jacobson (2005); Skinner (2008). 
1756 See, eg, Holocaust Insurance Litigation. 
1757 Hereros Complaint. 
1758 Agent Orange, Caterpillar; Baars (2007). 
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“offences of universal concern”.1759  They have also accepted the principle of corporate 
liability for complicity in state acts of torture and summary execution, crimes against 
humanity, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, torture, violation of the right to life, 
liberty and security of person, prolonged arbitrary detention, and peaceful assembly.1760 
However, after the recent decision in Kiobel (on a claim brought on behalf of Ogoni 
Valley claimants against Royal Dutch Shell) the future of corporate ATCA litigation is 
uncertain.1761 The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit in Kiobel held that the ATCA 
does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear claims filed under the ATCA 
against corporations, 
“… because no corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability 
(whether civil or criminal) under the customary international law of human 
rights, we hold that corporate liability is not a discernable—much less 
universally recognized—norm of customary international law that we may 
apply pursuant to the ATS.”1762 
 
Notable here is the qualification ‘of human rights’ – implying that international legal 
personality in other areas of IL does not necessarily imply such in others (cf Ch. 2B). 
Also notable is the peculiar reasoning: ‘because no company has ever been held to 
account, there is no rule that they can be so held to account.’ However, certiorari was 
granted and the US Supreme Court is expected to commence hearings in 2012.1763 
 
None of the ATCA corporate cases have thus far resulted in a court win for the 
claimants. The ‘business in conflict’ claims relate to serious atrocities that have usually 
affected large numbers of people. Many of these cases take years, and amicus briefs 
are filed by other NGOs, churches, victim support groups, trade associations, legal 
scholars and governments.1764 Courts generally dismiss these cases on technical 
grounds, without consideration of the merits.1765 In certain cases, to try to avoid, or 
settle, a mass of lawsuits against particular companies, states have set up mechanisms 
                                                
1759 In the sense that motions to strike out these cases brought by the defendant, for example, on the basis 
that (the specifically claimed provisions of) ICL did not apply to corporations (and thus that the plaintiff 
failed to state a claim, or the court lacked jurisdiction), were dismissed, see, e.g. The Presbyterian v 
Talisman, Wiwa v. Shell, Bowoto v Chevron. 
1760 Baars (2007) 121. 
1761 Kiobel v. Shell (2010). The Kiobel case had been consolidated with the Wiwa case (supra) – but 
Kiobel et al refused to settle, see CCR Wiwa docket. 
1762 Kiobel v. Shell (2010), 48. 
1763 CCR Wiwa docket. 
1764 E.g. The Presbyterian v Talisman. 
1765 E.g. Caterpillar. 
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to channel compensation payments to individuals that have suffered losses as a result 
of companies’ actions or inactions.1766 Some of these settlements have been challenged 
(unsuccessfully) as infringements on individual rights to redress.1767 In other cases, 
such as recently in the Wiwa v Shell case, a settlement was reached directly by the 
(representatives of the) company and (representatives of) victims where thousands of 
victims are to receive nominal sums for the injury to their bodies, lives and 
environments, in return for abandoning the right to file future claims.1768  
 
3.1 Cause lawyering problematized 
 
The promise of ICL has turned civil rights and criminal defence lawyers into lawyers 
seeking criminal prosecution.1769 The romantic ideal of the civil rights movement, of 
“little people and landmark decisions”,1770 of “speaking law to power” has – in the 
context of ICL, turned lawyers to voicing traditionally statist claims for order and 
control through criminal law. Viewed through a Marxist theoretical lense, such cause 
lawyering attempts might be seen as a form of resistance or class struggle, as a tactical 
‘principled opportunism’1771 that may be successful when it coincides with ‘judicial 
activism’.1772 Here I argue that while these attempts do amount to resistance, they are 
not emancipatory, and their (unintended) effect is rather, on the one hand, to 
domesticate class struggle, and on the other, to actualise,1773 legitimate and thus 
strengthen the existing structures of power.1774 In particular compensation claims and 
settlements create an exchange relationship where the ‘victim’ sells her right and the 
corporate offender calculates risk.1775 
 
The active agent in actualising the legal relationship between the individual ‘victim’ 
and the corporation is the cause-lawyer him/herself. While human rights claims are 
                                                
1766 E.g. Swiss Banks Holocaust Settlement. 
1767 E.g. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Lit. 
1768 CCR Wiwa docket.  
1769 I am grateful to Hannah Franzki for this insight. 
1770 Haaretz, 28 Nov. 2008. The byline of the article is, “Sometimes all it takes to right a wrong is for 
one person to stand up and make his or her voice heard.” 
1771 Generally, Knox (2009). 
1772 Generally, Marks (2007). 
1773 Pashukanis (1978) 93. 
1774 This is the conclusion of Ziv (2001); Sfard (2009); Barzilai (2007). 
1775 However, these cases do have limited mobilisation and demystification value (Baars (2012)). 
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‘claims for admittance to law’,1776 the role of lawyers persuading people to bring cases 
in (western) foreign courts is in some way the equivalent of ‘spreading capitalist law’ 
(as part of the civilising or capitalising mission) as done by the corporate colonisers in 
the 19th C., of the arbitration decision that held English law should be applied (Ch.2B 
S.3.2), and Carla del Ponte’s wish to bring law where there is none (Ch.5 S.1.1). In 
order for a claim to be valid and recognised, the human being must become a legal 
subject, she must articulate her needs, grievances and desires in legal vocabulary and 
in a western courtroom, through the mouth of a white man.1777 She must ‘join the 
system’ in the same way that ‘decolonised’ peoples had to join the Western state 
system and European international law.1778 As western lawyer I may think I am the 
enabler, the empowering medium in this equation but in fact I am the opposite, as I 
produce (constitute) the ‘victim’1779 and demand her surrender to my expertise, to 
become a rights-entrepreneur.1780 (Similar critiques are made of development 
practice.1781) I, the white lawyer claim to speak for the oppressed, for justice, but I 
speak for capitalism, as its enforcer.1782  
 
4 Legalising CSR and Corporate ICL problematized 
 
In recent years scholars and others have started to demand that CSR be ‘legalised’1783: 
for example, through being codified in an optional protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social  and Cultural Rights,1784 or through the extension of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction to corporations.1785 Just as it was argued in the 1940s that IL would 
only ‘make sense’ with an ICL, corporate social and human rights obligations ‘make 
sense’ together with corporate ICL,1786 corporate ICL completes, validates CSR. CSR 
and corporate ICL both support the reification of the corporation (anthropomorphising 
focussing on its ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sides or incarnations), and both ‘lift’ 
corporate/business(wo)men’s behaviour out of local jurisdictions and potential local 
                                                
1776 Douzinas (2010) 95. 
1777 Cf. Neocosmos (2006) 357. 
1778 Anghie (2007). 
1779 Madlingozi (2010) at 208. 
1780 Davis (2008) 44 (uses this term for cause lawyers). 
1781 Zanotti (2011); Tartir (2011). 
1782 A more pessimistic scenario is that of cause lawyers ‘creating’ victims instrumentalising them for 
their own political or personal goals. 
1783 Generally, e.g. McBarnet (2007). 
1784 ICESCR; UN Legalising CSR Report. 
1785 E.g. Stoitchikova (2010) and see Ch. 4C above. 
1786 Voiculescu (2007) 419. 
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control (the locality of the harm and thus the affected persons) into a de facto Western 
capitalist realm of international normativity. Moreover, I argue here that the two 
strategies are closely intertwined in their practical and ideological objectives. Here, I 
focus on three areas that show these to be part of the problem of business in conflict: 
compliance and class (4.1), and enforcement and imperialism (4.2). In 4.3 I comment 
on the idea of a ‘market for responsibility’ – which is where corporate ICL, CSR and 
cause lawyering potentially meet. I conclude on corporate power and legitimacy (4.4). 
 
4.1 Compliance and class  
 
In Ch.1 and Ch.4 I noted that “corporate ICL”1787 is being advocated as part of the 
solution for the problem of business involvement in conflict, and that this argument 
has developed out of the CSR and corporate complicity debates. A preliminary critique 
of the development of such Wirtschaftsvölkerstrafrecht is that it 
excludes/shields/privileges business actors from a general legal regime on the basis 
that it is sui generis and should thus have its own set of rules – something that also 
occurred on the domestic level (Ch.2A) and in ‘other’ areas of law separated off 
through fragmentation (Ch.2B) and more generally by the mere fact of becoming 
‘caught’ by IL rather than, say, domestic criminal law (Schwarzenberger’s critique of 
ICL in Ch.4).1788 The mere existence alone of a corporate corporate crime rule would 
appear to detract the focus from individual business(wo)men.1789  
 
The main lesson from (UK) domestic law is that ‘corporate crime’, despite having 
been ‘on the books’ for decades, has not been used to prosecute corporations but for in 
a small number of cases.1790 On the domestic level, under neo-liberal regimes, rather 
than enforcement/punishment models, compliance models of corporate regulation are 
predominant.1791 This is a function of corporate economic power and common class 
interest among business and legal/political elites.1792 For this reason, there is likely 
only to be a semantic difference between the voluntary and legally binding norms as 
the latter are unlikely to be enforced with much rigour. Nevertheless, the mere 
                                                
1787 Stoitchikova, McBarnet, etc. 
1788 Pearce (1990) 424. 
1789 Cf. Simester (2010) 282-3.  
1790 Whyte (2009) 103; one such exceptional case is R v P&O Ferries [1991]. 
1791 Gray (2006) 887. 
1792 Miliband (1969) 124-6. 
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existence of binding CSR/corporate ICL combined with a ‘compliance culture’ has the 
power to quell the complaint of ‘corporate impunity’. Building, and invoking a 
compliance culture has two main effects described (in the domestic context) by 
Hawkins, Snider, Slapper and Pearce & Tombs in the ‘punishment model versus 
compliance school debate’ of the early 1990s.1793 The first is, that a corporation can 
immunise itself from criminal liability by adopting programmes that provide technical 
compliance while not actually reducing the incidence of crime, and the so-called ‘due 
diligence defence’ could be invoked (by arguing managers had followed protocol) to 
ward off the risk of a finding of non-compliance.1794 On the international level 
compliance programmes could include the various non-binding soft law tools 
developed jointly by business and NGOs.1795 The second is that internally, compliance 
programmes have the tendency to devolve responsibility down to individual members 
of lower ranked technical, operational staff (workers).1796 This means that, even with 
corporate ICL, the most likely target of enforcement action is an individual worker. 
 
CSR (specifically, the adoption of a CSR policy or document) can function to insulate 
against a finding of violation of the OECD Norms.1797  From this it is not difficult to 
imagine how court litigation may be decided in a similar way: companies show 
readiness to cooperate by emphasising their CSR policies, promise to adopt such 
policies, etc. This would prove pivotal as grounds for dismissing the claim. John 
Ruggie (UN Special Rapporteur on Business & Human Rights) has defined the ‘duty 
to respect’ human rights as “in essence mean[ing,] to act with due diligence to avoid 
infringing on the rights of others.”1798 What does due diligence mean and how do we 
know when we have been duly diligent? Legalised CSR, which would likely be based 
on the Ruggie Framework,1799 would have the same effect as other business regulation: 
it enables those same corporations to continue being harmful in a more controlled 
manner. Regulation works through the delegation of responsibility: each lower level 
employee has her/specific task list and has received training on compliance and has to 
                                                
1793 On the punishment vs compliance models debate in criminal law generally, see the debate in the 
British Journal of Criminology between Pearce & Tombs (for punishment) and Hawkins (for the 
compliance model) in 1990–1991: Hawkins (1990); Hawkins (1991), Gray (2006). 
1794 Wells (2001) 159. 
1795 E.g. International Alert Conflict Sensitive Business Practice Guide. 
1796 This is the general argument of Gray (2006) 
1797 NCP Afrimex Statement. 
1798 Ruggie (2009) Report, 2. 
1799 Ruggie (2008) Report; Ruggie (2009) Report and Ruggie (2011) Report; see also, UN legalising CSR 
Report. 
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sign off on compliance on tasks.1800 This constitutes a ‘compliance system’ put in place 
by a company/senior manager (who has thus acted with due diligence) such that all 
aberrant result is the result of worker deviance. As such, corporate 
responsibility/liability immunises the capitalist class within the firm by shifting the 
blame to the workers. Compliance obviates ‘command responsibility’ (Ch.4B S.1.4). 
 
Should legalised CSR or corporate ICL be enforced in an exceptional case, a financial 
penalty, or indeed any penalty that in a practical sense translates into a financial 
penalty (e.g. ordering closure of a ‘blood diamond’ mine) will be accounted for by for 
example raising prices of products or services, cutting workers’ numbers, pay or 
conditions or cutting expenditure on, say, measures to decrease the corporation’s 
negative effects on the environment.1801 As such punishment of the corporation is 
‘socialised’ like any other risk, and may lead to the (collective) punishment of workers 
or external parties. Bakan has described how corporations opt to pay a fine rather than 
employ technology to conform to environmental regulation, if the latter is more 
costly.1802 The key barrier to ‘effectiveness’ of sanctions in the sense normally used in 
criminal law is that a sanction would not change the rational basis for corporate 
decision-making, nor the individuals that made the relevant decisions, but the burden 
of compliance would affect the global working class.1803  
 
4.2 Enforcement and imperialism 
 
Not only is corporate supremacy expressed through CSR (above), Western capitalism 
in general and capitalist law’s supremacy is also thus confirmed. Forcese has described 
CSR as only being necessary because Third World countries, with ‘underdeveloped 
legal systems’ simply are not able to write and enforce their own rules for corporate 
behaviour.1804 Such countries moreover may have ‘oppressive leaders’ making it even 
more necessary for developed country multinationals to, voluntarily, seek to set 
standards of good behaviour. Forcese suggests that CSR could be ‘administered’ by 
                                                
1800 Gray (2006) 885. 
1801 Simester et al (2010) at 283: keep in mind negative effects of fines on employees, creditors, and 
shareholders not implicated in wrongdoing. Other options such as corporate probation or equity fines are 
wrought with practical and theoretical difficulty: Simester (2010) 283. See also, Coffee (1981); 
Clarkson (1996). 
1802 Bakan (2005) 57. 
1803 Gray (2006).  
1804 Forcese (2009) 273. 
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the international investment dispute resolution mechanisms, and/or by means of ‘smart 
sanctions’.1805 Such language clearly echoes that of international law’s ‘civilising 
mission’ discussed in Chapter 2B, and ICL as a tool for intervention in Ch. 5.  
The now near-complete (formal and ideological) reification of the corporation in 
(‘private’) international law, which I already referred to in Chapter 2B (Section 5) 
mirrors the reification of the corporation in domestic law (Chapter 2A) and the 
emergence/construction of the concept of corporate crime in many Western countries, 
as well as the effective exclusion of white collar workers from criminal law 
enforcement in general (as argued by Sutherland, Whyte etc.1806). This process in legal 
discourse is supported by the reification of corporations in public discourse (and vice 
versa), and the fact that corporations are no longer associated directly with a family 
(e.g. Krupp, Flick, DuPont etc. or prominent individual: Ch. 3). Even when firms 
(multinational corporate groups) are associated with their individual directors (e.g. Bill 
Gates, Steve Jobs, even Donald Trump and Eric Prince1807) it is usually in a positive 
‘celebrity’ sense. We no longer associate ‘crimes’ or situations of ‘human rights abuse’ 
with decision-makers within the corporation, but rather (if we do), with the (brand) 
name of the corporation “Shell in Nigeria”, “Chiquita in Colombia”, “Nike’s 
sweatshop scandal in Vietnam” etc.1808 This is also partly due to the alienation, 
increased distance between individuals in these mega-corporations and “us” (western 
publics) as well as the shift of manufacturing and extraction industries to the global 
south, where the ‘crimes’ are not directly visible to us, and the victims are not known 
to western publics.  
 
At the same time, corporations (even corporate groups, multinationals) are 
anthropomorphised both by lawyers and through branding, advertising in the general 
public. For example Swart compares ‘corporate culture’ with human character: 
“[Corporations] are able to develop their own social identity, their own personality. In 
this respect it is usual to refer to the corporate culture of a corporation, and to point to 
many similarities between the culture within a corporation and the character of a 
                                                
1805 Forcese (2009) 283. 
1806 Generally, Sutherland (1983), Slapper, Tombs (1999), Whyte (2009). 
1807 Although Eric Prince has been accused (among other things) of personally having murdered or 
facilitated the murder of individuals who cooperated with federal authorities investigating the company, 
see, e.g. The Nation, 4 August 2009, Scahill, J.: “Blackwater Founder Implicated in Murder”.  
1808 E.g. in the abundant “business & human rights” literature: Joseph (2004); and the contributions in 
De Schutter (2006). 
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human being.”1809 Corporations are said to be capable of learning, of developing 
‘institutional memory’ and have been held by the US Supreme Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights to have “the right to freely express their views on matters of 
concern to society”1810 and to contribute to election campaign funds.1811 All these 
factors combined could render it ‘not intellectually absurd’ or plausible to think of 
corporations as capable of making moral decisions and bear culpability for crimes in 
mainstream discourse. 
 
If we combine this with Forcese’s point (or attitude) above, we can see how corporate 
crime, warded off by the adoption of CSR compliance programmes, may create a 
distinction between ‘civilised’ western-based multinational corporations on the one 
hand, and host state companies and ‘rogue traders’ like van Anraat and Kouwenhoven 
(Ch.5) on the other.  It opens the door to selective application of ICL equivalent to that 
of the ‘African Criminal Court’ (Ch.4).1812 
 
An example of potentially ‘imperialist ICL’ is the OSI pillage litigation project,1813 
which has as its aim to intervene in the (mainly) African context of conflict resources. 
It could become the paragon of pro-business use of ICL – if it activates the proposals 
offered during the launch of the project publication – which would appear to be aimed 
at regulating the natural resource market in the conflict zones of Africa so as to enable 
prosecution of ‘rogue’ traders and miners connected to armed groups, thus enabling 
international corporations to mine and trade without the (costly) ‘blood diamond’ 
label.1814  
 
4.3 Settlements and Selling Rights: A Market for Responsibility 
 
Through the lens of the commodity form theory in particular, compensation claims and 
settlements create an exchange relationship where the ‘victim’ sells her right and the 
corporate offender calculates the risk (price). The corporate decision maker gets to 
calculate the benefit of the violation (e.g. conflict diamonds are likely to be cheaper 
                                                
1809 Swart (2008) 952. 
1810 Swart (2008) 953. 
1811 Citizens United. 
1812 Heller (2010) 227; Cryer (2005) 191ff. 
1813 Stewart (2010). 
1814 On the topic of conflict diamonds, see, e.g. http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html . 
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than ‘clean’ diamonds), the chance that those affected will speak out, find (or be found 
by) a human rights organisation (or UN appointed expert), that they will commence 
litigation, the chance a court will keep the case going for a few years while the human 
rights NGO publicises the issue, the expected drop in sales and or share price, lawyers’ 
fees, finally, to come to a settlement. The decision whether to cause the harm has a 
calculable price tag. For the ‘victim’, the need, desire to be free of injury becomes a 
‘right’ which can be worth investing in, lawyers’ fees, time away from regular 
productive labour, a calculable chance of success, what is my price, for what sum will 
I relinquish all further claims? Victim and violator negotiate as formal legal equals. 
 
The question arises why business(wo)men would settle such cases at all if the record 
shows that the likelihood of the petitioners winning in court is next to nil.1815 To 
analogise Sfard, who asks a similar question in the context of anti-occupation cause-
lawyering in the Israeli courts, such settlements are beneficial to the company both 
directly as it allows them to look generous and recover from bad press, it allows them 
to get claimants to sign statements relinquishing future claims, and on a broader level, 
it ‘supplies the oxygen’ of the system of capitalism itself, helping to render it 
sustainable and legitimate.1816 
 
The essence of my critique here is that ATCA cases and similar (including, potentially, 
legalised CSR and corporate liability in ICL with mainly financial penalties) turn the 
‘international crime’ from a problem of international society1817 into a problem 
between the individual victim (or group) and an abstracted, powerful fictional entity in 
a powerful state - a quantifiable problem if it is “settled” or receives a financial 
penalty.1818 However, criminal fines could partially be allocated to victims, meaning 
that a successful criminal conviction, should such occur, would ‘yield’ the same result 
as a successful civil complaint. For example, in December 2011, Trafigura was 
convicted in a Dutch court of causing harm to thousands of Ivory Coast citizens 
                                                
1815 I adapt this point from Sfard (2009) at 44: “Why are the authorities ready to compromise ‘in the 
shadow of the court’ when reality shows that the Court rarely, if ever, decides in favour of the 
Palestinian petitioners?” 
1816 Sfard (2009) at 45 (by analogy). On this notion see Barzilai (2007) 270: “Defying silence through 
litigation has also further legitimated the state, its main narratives, and state courts as markers of state 
and society relations.” 
1817 Compare Weber and the community/family => calculable law 
1818 For the current ‘enforcers’ such as CCR and other private cause lawyers it is not financially feasible 
to file criminal cases (aside from whether criminal cases can be brought/initiated by private parties) 
because they normally rely on settlement deals for their own funding also. 
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affected by toxic waste dumped from Trafigura’s ship. The company’s fine was 
decreased by the court to €1m because the company had set up a compensation fund 
for victims.1819 This ‘solution’ serves to take the ‘victim’ out of the picture as an agent 
and merely positions her as a recipient of goodwill gestures from the corporation.1820 
Corporate accountability commodifies the ‘right’ of the individual to be protected from 
crime (to remain free from harm), the individual is forced to sell by means of a 
material and (thus) power differential. I say forced, because the situation is comparable 
to ‘free’ labour and may be necessary for survival just as a third world employee 
cannot walk out on a situation where her rights are being abused (compare: struggle 
over the working day). As such, the rights/crimes paradigm is liberalism’s essence: in 
global governance, it is each individual’s own responsibility to ‘valorize’ or to claim 
(negotiate, exchange) their right: claim your prize! and responsibility for violating a 
right (causing harm) only exists insofar as (and to the value of) the right (which) is 
claimed: accountability is achieved. 
 
4.4 Corporate Power and Legitimacy 
 
On the domestic level, Glasbeek has argued, corporate corporate responsibility (see 
Ch.4C) was a “major response developed by law-makers trying to put their fingers in 
the dyke holding back the flood of illegitimacy threatening to drown the corporate 
form.”1821 I noted above that corporate power has material and ideological elements. 
Corporate ICL, legalised CSR, actualised through claims by cause lawyers, constitute, 
and complete the corporation as a person. Corporate corporate liability constitutes the 
corporation not as an amoral calculator, but as a political citizen who occasionally 
errs.1822 Criminal law is a regime of exception, where corporate transgressions would 
be constituted as exceptional rather than the normal, inevitable and a necessary 
consequence of the prevailing means of production.  
 
The US Government on 21 December 2011 filed an amicus curiae brief in support of 
the claimants in Kiobel (S.3 above), arguing that it is for the federal courts exercising 
their “residual” common law powers to determine whether and when corporate 
                                                
1819 Trafigura Appeal Court Decision. 
1820 Shamir (2010), 531-53. 
1821 Glasbeek (2004) 17. 
1822 Pearce (1990) 423. 
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liability is appropriate.1823 Taking into account the arguments raised in this chapter, it is 
clear to see why the US government would wish to keep the corporate liability for 
international law violations option open. The US Government itself phrases its interest 
in the case thus: “The United States has an interest in the proper application of the 
ATS because such actions can have implications for the Nation’s foreign and 
commercial relations and for the enforcement of international law.”1824  
 
5 Conclusion: The dark side of ‘corporate accountability’ 
 
Although these regulatory efforts may occasionally serve to restrain business 
involvement in conflict or improve the situation of persons affected by such 
involvement, added together these regulatory efforts are only cosmetic changes on the 
surface of ongoing corporate involvement in conflict.1825 They are significant cosmetic 
changes in that they in fact function to sustain our illusion of the possibility, forever 
deferred, of systemic change through law. “Human rights law”, ICL, etc. thus serve as 
a “ruse to perpetuate class rule”1826 – while here, ICL trials are put in the limelight, by 
other means we reduce the room for legal manoeuvre in the states hosting our FDI and 
providing the workers that sow our garments and extract the resources we ‘dispossess’ 
from them.1827 Their effect is rather, on the one hand, to domesticate class struggle, and 
on the other, to actualise, legitimate and thus strengthen the existing structures of 
power.1828 All that is challenged in court and allowed to pass without sanction, is 
implicitly declared innocent. All that is not challenged by ‘rights-entrepreneurs’ never 
even happened.1829 
 
At the same time, an active human rights/cause lawyering scene willing to engage 
corporations in court creates the impression (illusion) that the system is democratic, 
                                                
1823 US Government Kiobel Amicus. 
1824 US Government Kiobel Amicus 1. 
1825 Sfard (2009) at 39. Sfard as a practitioner has been involved in many cases challenging the route of 
the Israeli Wall in the West Bank, where in some instances the court has decided that the Wall must be 
moved some distance away from a Palestinian village, while remaining on Palestinian land – partial 
victories which render the new route “legal”. Sfard’s office also represented the petitioners in the 
Canadian Bil’in Village Council v Green Park case, above S.2). 
1826 Glasbeek: “it is important for law to mask that it exists for capitalism” (2010) 250. 
1827 I use the word ‘dispossess’ to refer to Harvey’s ‘accumulation by dispossession’ Harvey (2003) 137. 
1828 Barzilai (2007) 270. 
1829 Pashukanis: “the normal as such is not prescribed at first; it simply does not exist.” Pashukanis 
(1978) 167. 
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that there is access to ‘justice’ and a remedy, that capitalism is rule-governed, with the 
broader implication being a “sociological and psychological process of transference of 
moral responsibility from the individual … to the justice system.”1830 As such, cause 
lawyering is a profoundly liberal ‘in-power’ activity.1831  
 
In Ch. 4A I argued that ICL was the ‘completion piece’ of IL, which served, along 
with other elements of ‘humanitarian’ IL, to legitimise the IL enterprise. By analogy, it 
can be said that CSR, corporate litigation, and also ‘corporate ICL’ – together 
‘corporate accountability’ – completes the reification of the corporation commenced in 
the 18th Century. As such, ‘corporate accountability’ forms the main part of what Klein 
has called, “the 50 year campaign for total corporate liberation.”1832 By constituting the 
corporation as a responsible citizen, who ‘like everyone else’ risks criminal penalty for 
doing wrong, the GCC have completed the corporation’s reification, thus allowing the 
corporation to exercise legitimate authority within ‘global governance’. The re-
moralisation of the corporation described in this Chapter at first sight appears to be the 
reverse of the project achieved by ‘calculable law’ described in Ch2A. However, the 
corporation is infused with ‘canned morality’, a commodity form ethic, it is not. 
Corporate accountability is still, ‘corporate accountability’. ‘Marketised morality’,1833 
the ‘responsibilised’ corporation, has moreover dissolved the epistemological 
distinction between society and the market (more or less, the public and the private, or 
the economic and the political – Ch.2B).1834 In pluralist global governance conceptions, 
corporations, states and individuals can now interact as formal legal equals.1835 
‘Corporate rule’, or the multiplication of GCC rule through corporations, is here, and 
legitimate. Thus, the corporate imperialism described in 2B can continue. At the same 
time, the contradiction inherent in this situation, is that such legally constructed 
‘irresponsibility’ (planned impunity1836) contributes to the anarchy of capitalism which 
will inevitably lead it to its collapse.1837 This, together with the GWC’s discontent and 
growing class-consciousness – the active factor in the coming revolution, is the ‘seed 
of the new’. 
                                                
1830 Sfard (2009) 45. 
1831 Barzilai (2007). 
1832 Klein (2007) 19. 
1833 Shamir (2008) 9; Shamir (2010) 531; Baars (2011) 427-430.  
1834 Shamir (2005) 373. 
1835 E.g. Krisch (2009). 
1836 Paraphrasing Marks (2011). 
1837 Luxembourg (2008) 45. 
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6 Consciousness-building and The Seed of the New 
 
Rosa Luxemburg, in her polemic against the reformer Bernstein, argued that trade 
union work, while it would never lead to more than cosmetic improvements to 
workers’ lives, did perform the role of mobilising and organising workers around a 
common cause and getting them to analyse their situation and publicly voice their 
demands.1838 While some cause lawyers believe that they will ‘win in court’, others 
know that this is unrealistic and bring cases specifically to bring public attention to the 
case, and also to show up exactly the ‘injustice’ of the out of hand dismissal of what 
may on paper be a very strong case.1839 Ironically, this tactic is considered clandestine 
and so-called ‘political cases’ (or, ‘lawfare’) lead to dismissal for that very reason 
alone. 
 
There is naturally a high level self-awareness of cause-lawyers and many find 
themselves to be in an unbreakable bind between the potential opportunity to ease 
individual human suffering and “potentially empower[ing] the regime and 
contribut[ing] to its sustainability”.1840 As another lawyer put it, with a different spin: 
“We always win. Either we win in court, which is great for the client, or we lose, in 
which case we can blame the system!”1841  
 
The potential for consciousness-building of cause lawyering is curbed by the extent to 
which it “depoliticise[s] popular politics, and … produce[s] a passive citizenship 
dependent on power [states, empire, NGOs, etc.] for its existence.”1842 Conversely, like 
Icarus, lawyers may be reluctant to demystify law, as they “may use their profession 
and fly, but not too high lest their power be melted and dissolved.”1843 
Consciousness-building is also limited by rare, but celebrated victories. Miéville 
counters the claim that “developments in IL mean that Henry Kissinger must be 
careful where he travels” by stating there is no realistic expectation that Kissinger 
                                                
1838 Luxembourg (2008) 111; Baars (2011) 423. 
1839 Anonymous interview. 
1840 Sfard, writing on the work of Israeli lawyers working on occupation-related cases (‘massive internal 
legal resistance’), Sfard (2009) 37-50. 
1841 Hassan Jabareen, Director of Adalah, conversation, September 2006. 
1842 Neocosmos (2006) 357. 
1843 Barzilai (2007) 275. 
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would actually be prosecuted.1844 Per Miéville, “the apparent triumph of international 
law in cases such as this is in fact a triumph in the court of public opinion; it is a 
pyrrhic, extra-legal victory which only serves to underscore the inefficacy of IL as a 
strategy of counter-hegemonic action.”1845 It also underscores the efficacy of 
‘humanitarian’ IL as a part of the ideological strategy employed by the GCC. 
 
HRW Director Roth relates the origin of ‘corporate ICL’ as something that developed 
through systemic forces rather than (or, despite) his/civil society agency:  
[o]ut of the blue, we came up with the concept of complicity. It is very 
interesting watching it evolve into a criminal concept, because that was not 
what we had in mind at all. … The reason is that we did not need criminal 
liability for what we do. First of all, it is a remote possibility that corporations 
will actually be charged and given our day-to-day concerns, we were not going 
to be relying on prosecutors pursuing corporations; that really did not even 
enter in our concerns. Further, we do not get involved in tort litigation. We 
tend to operate in places where the judicial system does not function. The way 
we enforce rights is, in a sense, by appealing to peoples’ [sic] moral sense of 
what is right and wrong and building up that popular sentiment as a source of 
pressure on the actor concerned, whether it is a government or a rebel force 
or, in this case, a corporation.1846 
 
It would seem that the move Roth describes needs to be reversed. Recently, in 
particular in the context of the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement, activism directly 
against corporate personhood has come to the fore.1847 However, the point is not (just) 
to get rid of corporate personhood or to realise/remember that there are human 
individuals behind the corporate shield. The point is not to then to seek prosecute those 
individuals – the point is to realise that the property owning classes (the GCC) are 
employing the law in this way, to enable exploitation, ‘shift’ or sell risk, and protect 
themselves as individuals. As the foundational norm of law is the legal ownership of 
private property, however, law cannot but function in this way, and our resistance must 
                                                
1844 Miéville (2005) 296; Marks (2007) 205. See also, Jurist, 13 April 2011: “Spanish Court turns torture 
investigation over to US”. 
1845 Mieville (2005) 297, cf. Marks (2007). 
1846 Roth (2008) 960. 
1847  Occupy Shut Down the Corporations Call; “Target Ain’t People” flashmob. 
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turn against the concept of private property, against capitalism and against law: away 
from legal emancipation and toward human emancipation: 
 
[o]nly when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, 
and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday 
life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has 
recognised and organised his “forces propres” as social forces, and 
consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of 
political power, only then will human emancipation have been 
accomplished.1848
                                                
1848 Marx (2000) 64. 
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A common call anno 2011 is ‘business must be held accountable’. Increasingly, 
academic scholars, legal practitioners and interest groups engaged with this topic also 
argue for the application of ICL to companies involved in conflict. Employing a 
Marxist theoretical framework and methodology set out in Chapter 1, in this thesis I 
have argued that we cannot use ICL to restrain harmful business involvement in 
conflict.  
 
1 Theory and method 
 
The first reason for this is structural. In Chapter 1 I outline the commodity form theory 
of law as proposed by Pashukanis and developed by Miéville and myself in this thesis. 
According to this theory, the very form of law approximates that of the commodity, 
and is a product (or rather, an essential element) of the capitalist mode of production. 
Legal relations inhere in the commodity exchange between ‘formally equal legal 
subjects,’ while the foundational norm of law, the basic premise on which all law is 
constructed, is the private ownership of property. It is through this concept, 
specifically, the ‘mine-not-yours’ nature of the right to private property that force is 
introduced into the legal relationship: force (or the possibility of force) to exclude 
others from my property actualises the legal relationship. Based on this model, as a 
consequence, legal relations are never actually (if formally) ‘free’ or consensual, and 
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always include an element of coercion and exploitation: law congeals capitalism. 
While the form of law (structurally) precludes law’s emancipatory potential, the 
content of law is also determined (immediately or in the last instance) by the economic 
reality at the material base. Legal outcomes occur within the parameters set by the 
market, which can be shown empirically. While the theoretical frame already answers 
the thesis question (in the negative), I endeavoured in the rest of the thesis to show 
exactly how this works and manifests itself (or not – as the workings of law are often 
concealed or made to appear the opposite of what they are) in material reality. To 
achieve this, I employed the dialectical method put forward by Bertell Ollman. 
Throughout, while examining historical development and the development, application 
and change of law, I sought to pay particular attention to the role of individuals of 
different classes and identities (in particular lawyers) within the given structure of 
capitalism. As the global capitalist class rules with a ‘mixture of force and guile’, I 
also observed the ideological tactics employed with or though law. 
 
2 Roots, development and context 
 
In Chapter 2A I showed how the corporate form was developed specifically as a 
structure of irresponsibility: one that would allow the calculation and externalisation 
(to broader society) of risk, the pursuit of a narrow mandate of surplus value extraction 
and to shield the human ‘operatives’ from liability through the creation of a separate 
legal person. The creation of the modern corporation replaced forms of communal 
burden-sharing during the transition to capitalism, and enabled the rise of the middle 
class and consequently the industrial revolution. As such, it formed an integral part of 
the creation of the modern capitalist state system and the capitalist economy that in 
existence today.  
 
The narrow profit mandate and limited liability, plus the legal and ideological 
separation between the human individual and the legal entity of the corporation 
inevitably creates both the impetus and opportunity to pursue profit based solely on 
rational material calculation (the cash nexus), and therefore inevitably leads to 
business involvement in conflict (broadly conceived).  
 
  311 
The legal form of the corporation has over the past two centuries been developed in 
such a way as to enable profit maximisation and liability-minimisation in changing 
material circumstances: for example, the multinational corporate group generally 
allows the legal separation of subsidiary company activities (e.g. in the global south) 
from the parent company, while techniques such as ‘defensive asset partitioning’ allow 
for high-value assets to be shielded from high-risk operations (such as those in 
conflict). Such arrangements have found the protection of domestic courts, congruent 
with the commodity form theory of law.   
 
On the global level, as I show in 2B, the joint stock corporation at the same time 
caused, and was a product of, colonial expansion, primitive accumulation on a global 
scale and the development and universalisation of international law and the modern 
state form. From the 20th C. onwards the corporation was also a tool for the 
continuation of western imperial interests in the global south after ‘decolonisation’ and 
continued ‘accumulation by dispossession’ into the present time, enabled by the 
international legal regime of investment protection. Various ideological ‘devices’ 
within law serve to advance and obscure these interests. For example, the creation of 
new, sui generis regimes for the protection of capitalist interests, as well as ‘lifting’ 
certain issues into (favourable) international law could be seen as defensive 
partitioning (fragmentation) of law. This is supported by an ideological separation of 
the public and private realms in international law, which are explained/understood to 
follow the logics of peace/humanitarianism and the logic of the market respectively. 
Moreover, this separation constricts the scope for resistance to exploitation especially 
in/for the global south. In an immediate sense, international investment arbitration is a 
particular site where capital’s interests are forced on ‘unfree’ and unequal Third World 
States. Likewise, the international financial institutions, and national governments 
through international development programmes, use international law to force pro-
capital reforms on the Global South, minimising scope for global class struggle. 
 
Bringing together the threads from these Chapters 2A and 2B, I identified two 
contradictions inherent in the public/private divide, corporate personality and corporate 
imperialism, combined with the humanization and of law, that would in the near future 
come to focus much more closely on the individual. It is out of these contradiction that 
‘Nuremberg’ and ‘Tokyo’ would emerge.   
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3 Business, conflict and ICL meet 
 
In Chapter 3 I described how World War II on both fronts was understood by the 
victorious Allies as a war of economic imperialism. The existence of a number of large 
industrial cartels was tied directly to the aggressive expansion of Germany in Europe, 
and Japan in Asia. In Chapter 3A I described how, when it was decided, partly as a 
result of efforts by liberal lawyers, to subject the vanquished leadership to international 
criminal trials at Nuremberg, the ‘economic case’ and industrial leaders had to be 
included. This was the change born out of the contradiction of the public/private divide 
in 2B. While the most ‘public’ trials at Nuremberg in part formed a ‘morality play’ 
(performing humanitarian IL) for the home audience which had paid a heavy price for 
the Allies’ (viz. Allied elite) participation in the war, it descended into a farce when it 
was realised that economic interests demanded the reform (liberalisation) and 
rebuilding of the vanquished (and surrounding) economies.  
 
In Ch. 3B I showed, how at some distance away from the public eye in Tokyo the 
international trials largely ignored the economic side, while the occupation policies 
managed far-reaching liberalisation of the Japanese economy ‘behind the scenes’. The 
economic reforms in Europe and Japan post-WWII served to further congeal global 
capitalism. Apart from the particularities of the WWII context, these chapters show 
that ICL has in the past to some extent ‘successfully’ been employed in arguably one 
of the most egregious cases of business in conflict, but that the interest of capital all 
but effectively reversed this when the German industrialists were amnestied and 
largely reinstated in 1951. On the basic level, these chapters also showed the alienation 
inherent in the corporate/legal form, through the (amoral) activities and self-
understanding of business leaders evidenced in their defence statements. It also 
showed the ideological use of ICL in support of prevailing power structures. 
 
4 Remaking ICL: removing business(wo)men and inserting legal persons as 
subjects  
 
Although the ICL genie was out of the bottle it was not until after the Cold War that it 
was developed as an academic discourse and that it was put into practice again. In 
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Chapter 4 I show how academic lawyers have (re)imagined ICL in different ways, 
each of them remaining however within the basic parameters set by ICL within 
capitalist IL, namely ICL existing, being necessary and being a ‘good thing’. Legal 
scholars have thus contributed to the actualisation of ICL and as such to the 
completion of the IL enterprise, which, mirroring the domestic level, seeks to develop 
a ‘strong arm’ for the international/global protection of material interest of the global 
capitalist class. ICL in this function works alongside imperialist war, and economic 
liberalisation/exploitation, and fulfils the legitimating function that we also saw post 
WWII: it (further) congeals capitalism.  
 
In Chapter 4B I further showed how practising lawyers and state negotiators, on the 
other hand, (re)created the modalities for ICL prosecution by abstracting real or 
imagined scenarios into legal rules and doctrines. I showed that these rules and 
doctrines are technically suited for application to individuals in ‘business in conflict’ 
scenarios and highlighted the current debates over the in- or exclusion of corporate 
actors as subjects of ICL. At the same time as norms were being formulated which 
were capable of application for the prosecution of individual business(wo)men, I 
placed emphasis on the move away from individual liability to a ‘de-individualised’ 
ICL in (much of) the literature (4C). This, the move to acceptance of the concept of 
corporate legal person liability mirrors a similar move towards ‘corporate corporate 
criminal liability’ on the domestic level. The unstated effect of this move is the 
reification of the corporation in ICL and a near-removal of the individual 
business(wo)man from the grasp of ICL.  
 
5 On not drinking the poisoned chalice 
 
In Chapter 5 I showed the effects of the ‘new ICL’ in practice: despite evidence of 
business(wo)men’s involvement in the various conflicts of the past three decades, 
almost none were in fact prosecuted, including at the ICTR and ICTY. At the same 
time, ICL scholars’ work, while being focussed on those rare cases where enforcement 
did occur (e.g. Van Anraat), masks the much larger impunity which is also a legal 
construct. Business(wo)men continue to be involved in ways similar to the colonial 
and WWII periods (expropriation, forced labour, etc) and remain protected despite the 
activation of ICL enforcement. Where Western business involvement in conflict does 
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seem to cause public concern (e.g. in the DRC with the coltan and ‘conflict diamond’ 
trade) the preferred method of dealing with (and to some extent protecting) is via the 
diplomatic channels of the UN Security Council. Overwhelmingly, however, our 
conceptualisation of conflicts is based on pathologising individual leaders and/or 
essentialising ethnic/racial/religious strife, rather than viewing it as an inevitable result 
of the mode of production. This conceptualisation fostered by ICL courts conceals 
business(wo)men’s involvement. 
 
6 “The 50 year campaign for total corporate liberation” 
 
In the final chapter (Ch. 6) I showed how, as a response to challenges to corporate 
legitimacy over time, and the perceived ‘accountability gap’, three different strategies 
can be discerned. 
 
Global elites have developed regimes of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (“CSR”), 
consisting of soft law that effectively softens law and at the same time marketises 
morality. Secondly, ‘cause-lawyers’, driven by frustration over ‘corporate impunity’ in 
the face of the existence of seemingly suitable ICL norms, have started taking private 
criminal cases and to engage in ‘strategic litigation’ against corporations (as 
corporations) involved in conflict (including many of the conflicts featured earlier in 
this thesis) on behalf of ‘victims.’ I have argued that these cases, rather than a form of 
resistance or class struggle, in fact form part and parcel of the liberal rights structure 
and serve to legitimate and sustain it. They are also ways to domesticate resistance, 
produce ‘victims’ and ‘civilise’ them into making ‘claims for admittance to law’. 
Moreover, while these legal cases tend to fail, some are settled with compensation 
payments, which I argue amount to the quantification of suffering (on the ‘victim’s’ 
side) and on the corporation’s/business(wo)man’s side, an opportunity to calculate and 
barter for personal freedom on an unequal, unfree basis.   
 
The quest for corporate accountability through legalised CSR and corporate ICL 
legitimises the corporation by constituting it as a political citizen exercising legitimate 
authority within global governance. As ICL was the ‘completion piece’ to legitimise 
the IL enterprise, CSR, corporate litigation, and also ‘corporate ICL’ – together 
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‘corporate accountability’ – legitimate corporate authority within global governance, 
or, rather, GCC rule through corporations. 
 
The fact that we tend to regard law, the legal form, corporations and capitalism as 
‘given’, and ‘good’, ignoring their provenance at a specific moment in history for a 
specific purpose (this ‘naturalisation’ is evidenced by the failure of much of legal 
academic texts to explore/explain the history of the corporation, for example) leads to 
the situation where “rather than change the world ourselves, we ask for law to change 
it.”1849 Thus, many legal scholars and others continue to demand, in vain, that 
‘corporations be held accountable.’ 
 
Nevertheless, “[e]very ideology dies together with the social relations which produced 
it. This final disappearance is, however, preceded by a moment when the ideology, 
suffering blows of the critique directed at it, loses its ability to veil and conceal the 
social relations from which it emanated.”1850  
 
The future is already being built: the ‘seed of the new’ is already all around us. Despite 
its negative aspects, the search for corporate accountability may have limited use as a 
demystifying immanent critique, and of coalition- and consciousness-building. Cause 
lawyers’ methods fail, the pyrrhic victories1851 will cease, while those affected by 
corporations (workers and communities mainly in the south) will reject 
intervention/representation. Global governance – which we effectively already have 
with hollowed-out state structures in the south – will replicate elsewhere, in the West 
we will see through ATCA and CSR, in the South workers will throw off the yoke of 
Western MNCs. In the North recent anti-capitalist activism is aimed at dismantling the 
corporate form, specifically, and at creating extra-systemic spaces. Lawyers must join 
the revolution: we have nothing to lose but our legal chains. 
                                                
1849 Kropotkin (undated, unpaginated pamphlet). 
1850 Pashukanis (1978) 64. 
1851 Mieville (2005) 297, see also, Marks (2007) 205. 




Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res 3281 (1974) UN Doc A/RES/29/3281. 
The Charter includes, e.g.: 
2. Each State has the right: 
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national jurisdiction 
in accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with its national objectives 
and priorities. …;  
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within its national 
jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities comply with its laws, rules and 
regulations and conform with its economic and social policies. Transnational corporations 
shall not intervene in the internal affairs of a host State….;  
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case 
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into 
account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers 
pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it 
shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State …. 
  




Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945, between the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and the U.K. 
B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES. 
11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and 
implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. 
Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war 
economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to 
meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production 
shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on 
Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed. 
12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of 
eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by 
cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements. 
13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of 
agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. 
14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this 
end common policies shall be established in regard to: 
(a) mining and industrial production and its allocation; 
(b) agriculture, forestry and fishing; 
(c) wages, prices and rationing; 
(d) import and export programs for Germany as a whole; 
(e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs; 
(f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential; 
(g) transportation and communications. 
In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions. 
15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary: 
(a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament, demilitarization, of reparations, and of 
approved exports and imports. 
(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of 
the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average 
living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European 
countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R.). 
(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of 
essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout 
Germany and reduce the need for imports. 
(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions including 
exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of 
achieving the other objectives named herein. 
(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies research and experimental institutions, 
laboratories, et cetera connected with economic activities. 
16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, 
German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the 
fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be 
brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and 
any break-down in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run 
counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited. 
17. Measures shall be promptly taken: 
(a) to effect essential repair of transport; 
(b) to enlarge coal production; 
(c) to maximize agricultural output; and 
(d) to erect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities. 
18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of 
disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which 
have taken part in the war against Germany. 
19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist 
without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must 
be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports 
from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports. 
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Appendix B cont. 
The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and 
4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement. 
III. REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY. 
1. Reparation claims of the U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany 
occupied by the U. S. S. R., and from appropriate German external assets. 
2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of 
reparations. 
3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to 
reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets. 
4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the 
U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones: 
(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from 
the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German 
peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an 
equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other 
commodities as may be agreed upon. 
(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace 
economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government 
on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. 
Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously. 
5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations 
must be determined within six months from now at the latest. 
6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed 
within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 
(a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U. S. S. R. in agreed installments 
within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial 
capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation 
shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, 
with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from 
which the equipment is to be removed. 
 
IMT Charter 
London Agreement Establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279 (no. 251). 
Article 5.  
In case of need and depending on the number of the matters to be tried, other Tribunals may be set up; 
and the establishment, functions, and procedure of each Tribunal shall be identical, and shall be 
governed by this Charter. 
Article 6. 
The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of 
the major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons 
who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of 
organizations, committed any of the following crimes. 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which 
there shall be individual responsibility: 
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war 
of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in 
a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose 
of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons 
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns 
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the 
war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated. 
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts 
performed by any persons in execution of such plan. 
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Article 7. 
The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government 
Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment. 
Article 8. 
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him 
from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that 
justice so requires. 
 
CCL10 
Control Council Law No. 10, 20 December 1945, in Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control 
Council and Coordinating Committee, Applied Control Authority, Germany, 1945, Vol. 1, p. 306. 
1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: 
(a) Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of 
international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, preparation, initiation or waging a 
war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 
(b) War Crimes. Atrocities or offenses against persons or property constituting violations of the laws or 
customs of war, including but not limited to, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labour or for 
any other purpose, of civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of 
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction 
of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. 
(a) Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in 
violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated. 
(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the International 
Military Tribunal. 
CCL 10 II 2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed to 
have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an 
accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting 
part therein or (d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a 
member of any organization or group connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) with 
reference to paragraph 1 (a) if he held a high political, civil or military (including General Staff) 
position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high position in the 
financial, industrial or economic life of any such country. 
3. Any persons found guilty of any of the crimes above mentioned may upon conviction be punished as 
shall be determined by the tribunal to be just. … 
4. (a) The official position of any person, whether as Head of State or as a responsible official in a 
Government Department, does not free him from responsibility for a crime or entitle him to mitigation 
of punishment. 
(b) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of a superior does not free 




Indictment   of the International Military Tribunal  : The United States of America, The French   Republic, 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain  and Northern Ireland, and the Union Of Soviet  Socialist 
Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal 27 1947. 
Indictment Count I section (E) at p. 35. 
Having gained political power the conspirators organized Germany's economy to give effect to 
their political aims. 
 
 
                                                
1852 Emphasis added. 
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1. In order to eliminate the possibility of resistance in the economic sphere, they deprived labor 
of its rights of free industrial and political association as particularized in paragraph (D) 3 (c) 
(1) herein. 
2. They used organizations of German business as instruments of economic mobilization for 
war. 
3. They directed Germany's economy towards preparation and equipment of the military 
machine. To this end they directed finance, capital investment, and 'foreign trade. 
4. The Nazi conspirators, and in particular the industrialists among them, embarked upon a 
huge re-armament program and set out to produce and develop huge quantities of materials of 
war and to create a powerful military potential. 
5. With the object of carrying through the preparation for war the Nazi conspirators set up a 
series of administrative agencies and authorities. For example, in 1936 they established for this 
purpose the office of the Four Year Plan with the Defendant GORING. 
 
Indictment Individual responsibility, Krupp von Bohlen von Halbach 
KRUPP: 
The Defendant KRUPP was between 1932 and 1945: Head of Friedrich KRUPP A.G., a member of the 
General Economic Council, President of the Reich Union of German Industry, and head of the Group 
for Mining and Production of Iron and Metals under the Reich Ministry of Economics. The Defendant 
KRUPP used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his connection with the Fuehrer in 
such a manner that: He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation 
of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparation for 
war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the military and economic planning and 
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International 
Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Count One and Count Two of the Indictment; and he 
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and 
the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including more particularly the 
exploitation and abuse of human beings for labor in the conduct of aggressive wars. 
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Charter of the (Tokyo) International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1946, TIAS No. 1589. 
 
ARTICLE 5. Jurisdiction Over Persons and Offenses. The Tribunal shall have the power to try and 
punish Far Eastern war criminals who as individuals or as members of organization are charged with 
offenses which include Crimes against Peace. The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: 
Crimes against Peace: Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or 
undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing;  
Conventional War Crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war;  
Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. leaders, organizers, instigators and 
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit 
any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such 
plan. 
ARTICLE 6. Responsibility of Accused. Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the 
fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be 
sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such 
circumstances may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so 
requires. 
Art. 13 The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the 
greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it 
deems to have probative value. 
 
Japanese National Diet Library U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC150/4/A), 21 
September 1945.  
(Part I (1)), “The occupation forces will be under the command of a Supreme Commander designated by 
the United States. Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate 
advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which 
will satisfy the principal Allied powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among then, the 
policies of the United States will govern”, war criminals, Part II(2), democratisation (“The Japanese 
people shall be afforded opportunity and encourage to become familiar with the history, institutions, 
culture, and the accomplishments of the United States and the other democracies,” the economy (Part 
IV) which includes the break up of cartels (para 2 (a)), a “prohibition on the retention in or selection of 
individuals for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future 
Japanese economic efforts solely towards peaceful ends,” reparations payments (para 4, “Reparations 
for Japanese aggression shall be made … (b) Through the transfer of such goods or existing capital 
equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying of the 
occupying forces.”) and opening the market for FDI (para 8 “Equality of Opportunity for Foreign 
Enterprise within Japan”).1853 
  
                                                
1853 Emphasis added. 
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Versailles Treaty 
Treaty of Peace, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, 285-286.  
Article 227 
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German 
Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. 
A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential 
to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following 
Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. 
In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy, with a view to 
vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international 
morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed. 
The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands for the 
surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial. 
Article 228 
The German Government recognises the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before 
military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. 
Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will 
apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory 
of her allies. 
The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one of them 
as shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs 
of war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or employment which they held under the 
German authorities. 
Article 229 
Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be 
brought before the military tribunals of that Power. Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals 
of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before military tribunals 
composed of members of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned. In every case the accused will 
be entitled to name his own counsel. 
Article 230 
The German Government undertakes to furnish all documents and information of every kind, the 
production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, 
the discovery of offenders and the just appreciation of responsibility. 
 
Bribery Convention 
Article 2 - Responsibility of Legal Persons 
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to 
establish the liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public official. 
Article 3 - Sanctions 
1. The bribery of a foreign public official shall be punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal penalties.  … 
2. In the event that, under the legal system of a Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal 
persons, that Party shall ensure that legal persons shall be subject to effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions, for bribery of foreign public officials.” 
 
Transnational Crime Convention 
Article 10 - Liability of legal persons  
1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, consistent with its legal principles, 
to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in serious crimes involving an organized 
criminal group and for the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this 
Convention. 




Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste adopted on 22 
March 1989 
14.  “Person” means any natural or legal person” 
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ICTY Statute Article 7 Individual criminal responsibility 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1993 UN Doc. S/RES/827 
(1993). 
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be 
individually responsible for the crime. 
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate 
punishment. 
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a 
subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that 
the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not 
relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
International Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
  
ICTR Statute Article 6 Individual Criminal Responsibility 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1994 UN Doc S/Res/955 (1994). 
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be 
individually responsible for the crime. 
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate 
punishment. 
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a 
subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had 
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior 
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators 
thereof. 
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not 
relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that justice so requires. 
 
SCSL Agreement Article 6 Individual criminal responsibility 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2178 UNTS 138. 
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be 
individually responsible for the crime. 
2. The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate 
punishment. 
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a 
subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had 
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had 
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators 
thereof. 
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not 
relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
Special Court determines that justice so requires. 
5. Individual criminal responsibility for the crimes referred to in article 5 shall be determined in 
accordance with the respective laws of Sierra Leone. 
 
ICC Statute Article 25 Individual criminal responsibility 
International Criminal Court Statute 1998, 2187 UNTS 91. 
1.         The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.      
2.         A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually 
responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.     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3.         In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
(a)     Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another 
person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;  
(b)     Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; 
  
(c)     For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists 
in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;   
(d)     In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a 
group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall 
either:  
(i)     Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, 
where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court; or  
(ii)     Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;    
(e)     In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide;  
(f)     Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a 
substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's 
intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the 
completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to 
commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose. 
4.         No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the 
responsibility of States under international law.  
 
French Corporate Crime Proposal  
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/L.3, 16 June 1998, PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY 
FRANCE 
Article 23 Individual criminal responsibility 
Legal persons 
Paragraphs 5 and 6 (criminal organizations) 
[5. When the crime was committed by a natural person on behalf or with the assent of a group or 
organization of every kind, the Court may declare that this group or organization is a criminal 
organization. 
6. In the cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Court, this group or 
organization shall incur the penalties referred to in article 76, and the relevant provision of articles 73 
and 79 are applicable. 
In any such case, the criminal nature of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not be 
questioned, and the competent national authorities of any State party shall take the necessary measures 
to ensure that the judgement of the Court shall have binding force and to implement it.] 
 
[Article 76 
Penalties applicable to criminal organizations 
A criminal organization shall incur one or more of the following penalties. 
(i) Fines;  
(ii) deleted  
(iii) deleted  
(iv) deleted  
(v) Forfeiture of [instrumentalities of crime and] proceeds, property and assets obtained by 
criminal conduct;] [and]  
[(vi)       Appropriate forms of reparation].] 
 
Corporate Manslaughter Act 2007 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 c.19 
1 The offence 
(1) An organisation to which this section applies is guilty of an offence if the way in which its activities 
are managed or organised— 
(a) causes a person's death, and 
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(b) amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the 
deceased. 
(2) The organisations to which this section applies are— 
(a) a corporation; 
… 
(3) An organisation is guilty of an offence under this section only if the way in which its activities are 
managed or organised by its senior management is a substantial element in the breach referred to in 
subsection (1). 
(4) For the purposes of this Act— 
(a) “relevant duty of care” has the meaning given by section 2, read with sections 3 to 7; 
(b) a breach of a duty of care by an organisation is a “gross” breach if the conduct alleged to 
amount to a breach of that duty falls far below what can reasonably be expected of the 
organisation in the circumstances; 
(c) “senior management”, in relation to an organisation, means the persons who play significant 
roles in— 
(i) the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of its activities 
are to be managed or organised, or 
(ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those 
activities. 
… 
(6) An organisation that is guilty of corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide is liable on 
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Prosecutor Organisation Indicators  
The Prosecutor laid out “relevant indicators to determine the existence of an organization” as follows:  
• Existence of pre-determined objectives, whether formally or informally adopted by the members of the 
organization. 
• Existence of a common identity, whether political, ethnic, religious, etc. 
• Activities carried out by the group, including meetings, financial transfers, fund raising, logistical 
arrangements, etc. 
• Public discourse, including communications, writings, broadcast, etc. 
• Ability to pursue their objectives through certain agreed methods and active involvement such as 
directing or instigating the crime. 
• Sufficient resources (material and personnel) to pursue their objectives”. Id. 
 
UNSCP Congo Panel Request 
“The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to establish this panel, for a period of six months, 
with the following mandate: 
–      To follow up on reports and collect information on all activities of illegal exploitation of natural 
resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including in violation of 
the sovereignty of that country; 
–      To research and analyse the links between the exploitation of the natural resources and other forms 
of wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the continuation of the conflict; – To revert to the Council with recommendations”.  
 
TRC Business Sector Hearings 
The Commission further found that: “162 Businesses were reluctant to speak about their involvement in 
the former homelands. A submission by Mr Sol Kerzner and Sun International would have facilitated 
the work of the Commission. 
163 The Land Bank and the Development Bank of South Africa, in particular, were directly involved in 
sustaining the existence of former homelands. 
164 The denial of trade union rights to black workers constituted a violation of human rights. Actions 
taken against trade unions by the state, at times with the cooperation of certain businesses, frequently 
led to gross human rights violations. 
165 The mining industry not only benefited from migratory labour and the payment of low wages to 
black employees; it also failed to give sufficient attention to the health and safety concerns of its 
employees. 
166 Business failed in the hearings to take responsibility for its involvement in state security initiatives 
specifically designed to sustain apartheid rule. This included involvement in the National Security 
Management System. Several businesses, in turn, benefited directly from their involvement in the 
complex web that constituted the military industry. 
167 The white agricultural industry benefited from its privileged access to land. In most instances, it 
failed to provide adequate facilities and services for employees and their dependants.” 
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Versailles Treaty: Treaty of Peace, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, 285-286. Excerpt in Appendix 
A. 
Berlin General Act: General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa, 26 February 1885. 
Hague Regulations: Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. UKTS (1910) 9. 
Geneva Conventions: Geneva Conventions 1949, 75 UNTS 3 (Nos 970-973). 
Additional Protocols: Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, 1125 UNTS 3 (No. 
17512). 
The Tripartite Pact: The Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, 1940, 
Potsdam Agreement: Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945, between the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and the 
U.K. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp 
Joint War Crimes Declaration: Joint Declaration on Punishment for War Crimes made on 13 January 
1942 in London, by the Government of Belgium, the Government of Czechoslovakia, the Free French 
National Committee, the Government of Greece, the Government of Luxembourg, the Government of 
the Netherlands, the Government of Norway, the government of Poland and the Government of 
Yugoslavia, reprinted in Current Notes, AJIL 39(3) 1945 at 565-579.  
Declaration on German Atrocities in Occupied Europe (The Moscow Declaration), November 1, 1943, 
reprinted in 1 T.W.C., at viii. 
The Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract 
Debts, October 18 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, UNTS 537. 
PCIJ Statute: Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice LNTS, vol. 6, 380-413. 
Iran-US Tribunal Rules: Iran-US Claims Tribunal Rues of Procedure http://www.iusct.org/tribunal-
rules.pdf 
UN Charter: Charter of the United Nations 1945, 1 UNTS xvi.  
ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social  and Cultural Rights 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (No. 
14531). 
ICTY Statute: Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1993 UN Doc. 
S/RES/827 (1993). 
ICTR Statute:  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1994 UN Doc S/Res/955 
(1994). 
IMTFE Charter: Charter of the (Tokyo) International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1946, TIAS No. 
1589. 
IMT Charter: London Agreement Establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279 (no. 251). 
ICC Statute: International Criminal Court Statute 1998, 2187 UNTS 91. 
SCSL Agreement: Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2178 UNTS 138. 
High Seas Convention: Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, 450 UNTS 82;  
UNCLOS: United National Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 1833 UNTS 3. 
Genocide Convention: Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, 
78 UNTS 277. 
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Organised Crime Convention: U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2000, UN Doc 
A/55/383. 
Convention Against Torture: Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment and Punishment 1984, 1465 UNTS 85. 
Bribery Convention: OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, reprinted in 37 ILM 1 (1998). Excerpt in Appendix 
D. 
Transnational Crime Convention: United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, 
2000, UNTS 2225, 209. Excerpt in Appendix D. 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste adopted on 22 
March 1989, UNTS 1673 57. Excerpt in Appendix D. 
ICSID Convention: Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States of 1965, 575 UNTS 532. 
 
International Reports/UN documents/Resolutions 
WWI Commission Report: Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29, 1919, 
reprinted in 14 AJIL 95 (1920). 
Draft Statute 1927: Draft Statute for and international Criminal Court, International Law Association, 
Report of the 34th Conference, 1927. 
ICC Convention 1937: 1937 Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, (1938) 
League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement 156. 
WCCLR: Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and prepared by the  United Nations War 
Crimes Commission, 1947–1949. 
UNGARes. 177: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 177 (II) of 21 November 1947.  
Nuremberg Principles: Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal 1950, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1 
Draft Code 1954: Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1954, UN Doc 
A/2693 (1954). 
Draft Code 1996: Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996, UN Doc 
A/48/10 (1996). 
ICL Nuremberg Principles Commentary: Commentary, International Law Commission Yearbook, Vol. 
II, (1950) 374. 
ILC Draft Articles 1970: Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1970, vol. II, document 
A/CN.4/233. 
ILC 1998 Report Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, 24 April 1998, UNDoc. 
A/CN.4/490 
UNGA Res. 589: UNGA Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 28 January 2002 [on the report of 
the Sixth Committee (A/56/589 and Corr.1)] 
ILC State Responsibility Articles: ILC Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, UN 
Doc. A/RES/56/83 2001. 
ILC Fragmentation Report (2006): Report of the study group on the fragmentation of international law, 
finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UNDoc. A/CN.4/L.682 13 April 2006.  
ICC PrepCom Report 1998: Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 14 April 1998. 
French Corporate Crime Proposal: United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/L.3, 16 June 1998, 
Proposal submitted by France: Article 23: Excerpt in Appendix D. 
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WGGP Working Paper 23: Committee of the Whole Working Group on General Principles, Working 
Paper on Article 23, paragraphs 5 and 6, UNDoc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.5/Rev.1 (1998) (19 June 
1998) 1-2.  
Committee of the Whole Record: United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy   15 June - 17 July 1998, 1st meeting of the 
Committee of the Whole, UNDoc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.1    
UNSC Res 827: UN Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, UN Doc. S/Res/827 (1993).  
UNSC Res 1493: UN Security Council Resolution 1493 of 2003, UN Doc S/Res/1493 (2003). 
UNSC Res 1503: UN Security Council Resolution 1503 of 2003, UN Doc S/Res/1503 (2003). 
UNSC Res 1533: UN Security Council Resolution 1533 of 2004, UN Doc S/Res/1533 (2004). 
GARes 1803: General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962. 
GARes 2158: General Assembly Resolution 2158 (XXI) of 1966. 
GARes 3171: General Assembly Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) of 1973. 
CERD: Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res 3281 (1974) UN Doc 
A/RES/29/3281. 




NIEO Resolution: General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI). Declaration on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order UN Doc A/Res/S-6/3201. 
UNSCP Congo Panel Request: Statement of the President of the Security Council, dated 2 June 2000, 
UN Doc. S/PRST/2000/20, Appendix F. 
CEPAL FDI Arbitration and Water Report: Revisiting Privatization, Foreign Investment, Arbitration 
and Water, M. Solanas, United Nations Publication (UNEP/CEPAL) (2007)  
UN Congo 2003 Report: Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 23 October 2003, UN 
Doc. S/2003/1027. 
UN Congo 2002 Report: Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 16 October 2002, UN 
Doc. S/2002/1146.  
UN Liberia 2007 Report: Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted pursuant to paragraph 5 
(e) of Security Council resolution 1792 (2007) concerning Liberia, 12 June 2008, UNDoc. S/2008/371. 
UNSC Liberia Asset Freeze List: List of Individuals And Entities Subject to the Measures Contained in 
Paragraph 1 Of Security Council Resolution 1532 (2004) Concerning Liberia  (The Assets Freeze List) 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1521/aflist.shtml 
Ruggie Appointment Resolution: Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2005/69, 20 April 2005 
(UN Doc. E/CN4/RES/2005/69).  
Ruggie (2008) Report: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, 7 April 
2008 (UN Doc.  A/HRC/8/5).  
UN Legalising CSR Report: Report of the Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social  and Cultural Rights on its Fifth Session, 18 June 2008 (UN Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/8/7).  
Ruggie (2009) Report: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 22 April 2009 (UN Doc. 
A/HRC/11/12) 
Ruggie (2011) Report: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 21 March 2011 (UN 
Doc. A/HRC/17/31).  
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International cases and proceedings 
IMT Nuremberg 
Blue Series: a 42 volume series of books containing the official record of the proceedings. This is 
supplemented by  
Red Series: “Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression”, an eight-volume, 12-book series, with the subtitle 
“Collection of Documentary Evidence and Guide Materials Prepared by the American and British 
Prosecuting Staffs for Presentation before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany.” 
Green Series: Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council 
Law No. 10. 
Jackson Opening Address: Jackson, R.: IMT Opening Address, 1 International Military Tribunal, The 
Trial of German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg 
Germany (Commencing 20th November, 1945) 3 1946. 
IMT Indictment: Indictment   of the International Military Tribunal  : The United States of America, The 
French   Republic, The United Kingdom of Great Britain  and Northern Ireland, and the Union Of Soviet 
 Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals before 
the International Military Tribunal 27 1947. 
IMT Judgment: International Military Tribunal, Judgment of 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German 
Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany 
(Commencing 20th November, 1945) 22 (22nd August 1946-1st October 1946).  
Krupp Motion: Motion on behalf of Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen for Postponement of the Trial 
as to Him, dated 4 November 1945, in I Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International 
Military Tribunal 124. 
Krupp Answer: Answer of the United States Prosecution to the Motion on Behalf of Defendant Gustav 
Krupp Von Bohlen, dated 12 November 1945, in I Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the 
International Military Tribunal 134-5. 
Krupp Order: Order of the Tribunal Rejecting the Motion to amend the Indictment, dated 15 November 
1945, in I Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 146.  
Krupp Memorandum: Memorandum of the British Prosecution on the motion, in I Trial of the Major 
War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 139. 
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 2, Chapter XVI Part 13. 
Economic Aspects: Economic Aspects of the Conspiracy, 1 Office of United States Chief of Counsel for 
Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression 349 (1946), Chapter VIII. 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo) 
IMTFE Judgment: International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment of 12 November 1948 20 1 
The Tokyo War Crimes Trial 1. 
Pritchard, J. and S.M. Zaide (eds.): The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Complete Transcripts of the 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Vol. 1-22, Garland, New York, 
1981. 
IMTFE Indictment: in Trial of Japanese War Criminals. Documents: 1. Opening Statement by Joseph B. 
Keenan, Chief of Counsel. 2. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. 3. 
Indictment, United States. Dept. of State, 1 v. Washington: U.S. Govt. print. off., 1946. 
Röling Dissent: in Röling, B. and C. Rüter, (eds.): The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, Amsterdam: University Press, 1977. 
Pal Dissent (1953): in Boister, N. and R. Cryer: Documents on the Tokyo International Military 
Tribunal: Charter, Indictment, and Judgments, Oxford University Press, 2008a. 
Permanent Court of International Justice 
Mavrommatis (1924): Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Jurisdiction), Greece v UK (1924) 
PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 2, 12. 
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Mavrommatis (1925): Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions Case (Jurisdiction), Greece v UK (1925) 
PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 5, 6. 
Factory at Chorzów: Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów, 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 9 (jurisdiction); 
1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17 (merits).  
International Court of Justice 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Case: United Kingdom v Iran, Judgment ICJ Rep. 1952, 93. 
Interhandel: Interhandel case (Switzerland v United States) (Preliminary Objections) ICJ Rep. 1959, 6. 
Barcelona Traction: Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. Case, (Belgium v Spain) ICJ Rep. 1970, 3. 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Rwanda) ICJ 
Judgment 19 December 2005. 
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo: (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) ICJ Judgment of 30 
November 2010. 
Reparations for Injuries: Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, 174. 
Certain Expenses Case: Certain Expenses of the United Nations, ICJ Rep. 1962, 151. 
Arrest Warrant Case: Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 
ICJ Rep. 2002, 3. 
Serbia Genocide Convention Case: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 2008, 412. 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
Krasjisnik Appeals Decision: Prosecutor v Krajisnik (IT-00-39) Appeals Chamber 19 March 2009. 
Krnojelac Decision: Prosecutor v Krnojelac (IT-97-25-T), Trial Chamber 15 March 2002. 
Mrksić Appeals Decision: Prosecutor v Mrksić et al. (IT-95-13/1-A) Appeals Chamber 5 May 2009. 
Tadić 1999 Appeals Decision: Prosecutor v Tadić (IT-94-1) Appeals Chamber Judgment of 15 July 
1999. 
Furundzija Decision: Prosecutor v Furundzija (IT-95-17/1-T) Trial Chamber 10 December 1998. 
Mucić TC Decision: Prosecutor v Mucić et al. (IT-96-21) Trial Chamber Judgment of 16 November 
1998.  
Blagojević and Jokić: Prosecutor v Blagović and Jokić (IT-02-60) Trial Chamber Judgment of 1 
September 2004. 
ICTY Website: ICTY website, section “Support and Donations” 
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY/SupportandDonations  
ICTY NATO Bombing Report: Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review 
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (2000) 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/otp_report_nato_bombing_en.pdf 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
Bagaragaza TC Decision: The Prosecutor v. Michel Bagaragaza, (ICTR0-05-86-S), Trial Chamber 
Judgment 17 November 2009. 
Kabuga et al Indictment Decision: The Prosecutor v. Augustin Bizimana, Édouard Karemera, Callixte 
Nzabonimana, André Rwamakuba, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera, Félicien Kabuga, Juvénal 
Kajelijeli, (ICTR-98-44-I), Confirmation and Non Disclosure of the Indictment (Judge Navanethem 
Pillay), 29 August 1998. 
Kabuga Indictment: The Prosecutor v. Félicien Kabuga, (ICTR-97-22-I), Indictment 30 October 1997. 
Kabuga TC Decision: The Prosecutor v. Félicien Kabuga, (ICTR-98-44B-I), 1 October 2004 
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Karemera Kabuga Severance Decision: The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-I), 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Severance of Félicien Kabuga’s Trial and for Leave to Amend 
the Accused’s Indictment (TC), 1 September 2003.  
Karemera Indictment: The Prosecutor v Édouard Karemera, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzidorera, 
(ICTR-97-24) amended Indictment dated 25 August 2005.  
Bizimana Indictment Decision: The Prosecutor v. Augustin Bizimana, Édouard Karemera, Callixte 
Nzabonimana, André Rwamakuba, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera, Félicien Kabuga, Juvénal 
Kajelijeli, (ICTR-98-44-I), Confirmation and Non Disclosure of the Indictment, 29 August 1998. 
Karemera TC Decision: The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-I),  
Kayishema TC Decision: Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, (ICTR-95-1) Trial Chamber, May 
21, 1999. 
Musema TC Decision: The Prosecutor v Alfred Musema, (ICTR-96-13-T) Trial Chamber Judgment, 27 
January 2000. 
Musema Appeals Decision: The Prosecutor v Alfred Musema, (ICTR-96-13-A) Appeals Chamber 
Decision of 16 November 2001. 
Nahimana TC Judgment: The Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan 
Ngeze, (ICTR-99-52-T) Trial Chamber decision 3 December 2003. 
Nahimana Appeals Judgment: The Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and 
Hassan Ngeze, (ICTR-99-52-A) Appeals judgment of 28 November 2007. 
Rutaganda TC Decision: The Prosecutor v Georges Rutaganda, (ICTR-96-3-T) Trial Chamber decision 
6 December 1999. 
Serugendo Decision: The Prosecutor v Serugendo, (ICTR-2005-84-I) Judgment 12 June 2006. 
ICTR Website: Accused at large, ICTR website, 
http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/77/default.aspx?id=12&mnid=12. 
 
International Criminal Court 
Lubanga Charges Decision: Prosecutor v Lubanga (ICC 01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision 
on Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007. 
Ocampo Kenya Statement: OTP Press Conference on Kenya, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s Statement, 
1 April 2010.  
Kenya ICC Request: ICC-01/09-01/11-19 31-03-2011 1/30 CB PT. 
Prosecutor Organisation Indicators: Prosecution’s Response to Decision Requesting Clarification and 
Additional Information ICC-01/09-16 03-03-2010 5/19 CB PT, 3 March 2010, Excerpt Appendix F. 
Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant: Prosecutor v Al Bashir Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest) Unreported March 4, 2009 (ICC);  
Katanga Charges Decision: Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC 01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008. 
ICC Ituri PR: ICC Press Release: “The Prosecutor on the cooperation with Congo and other States 
regarding the situation in Ituri, DRC”, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-OTP020030926-37 of 26 
September 2003. 
ICC Ituri Communications PR: ICC Press Release: Communications received by the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICC” ICC-OTP-20030716-27 of 16 July 2003. 
ICC website: Situations, The Democratic Republic of Congo: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/  
 
Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Taylor 2003 Indictment: The Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, also known as Charles Ghankay 
MacArthur Dapkpana Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I dated 3 March 2003. 
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Taylor 2006 Indictment: The Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, also known as Dakpannah Charles 
Ghankay Taylor, also known as Dakpannah Charles Ghankay MacArthur Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-
01-I Amended indictment dated 17 March 2006. 
Taylor 2007 Indictment: The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT Prosecution’s 
second amended indictment, dated 29 May 2007. 
Sesay Appeals Decision: Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon, Gbao (SCSL-04-15-A) Appeals Chamber 
Judgment 26 October 2009. 
 
US Military Court Cases and proceedings 
United States v. Karl Brandt et al (Medical Case) U.S. Military tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 20 
August 1947, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, Vol. II, pp. 171 et seq. 
United States v. Josef Altstoetter et al (Justice Case) U.S. Military tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 20 
August 1947, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, Vol. III, pp 945 et seq. 
United States v. Oswald Pohl et al (Pohl Case) U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 20 
August 1947, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, Vol. V, pp. 958 et seq. 
United States v. Otto Ohlendorf et al (Einsatzgruppen Case) U.S. Military tribunal Nuremberg, 
judgment of 20 August 1947, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under 
Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. IV, pp. 411 et seq. 
United States v. Carl Krauch et al (Farben Case) U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 20 
August 1947, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, Vol. Viii, pp. 1081 et seq. 
United States v. Friedrich Flick et al (Flick Case) U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 20 
August 1947, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, Vol. VI, pp. 1187 et seq. 
United States v Alfried Krupp et al. (Krupp Case) U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 20 
August 1947, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, Vol. IX, pp. 1230 et seq. 
United States v. Ernst Weizsaecker et al (Ministries or Wilhelmstrasse Case) U.S. Military Tribunal 
Nuremberg, judgment of 20 August 1947, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. XIV, pp. 308 et seq. 
United States v. List (Hostage Case), U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 20 August 1947, 
in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, 
Vol. XI, pp. 1230 et seq. 
Mauthausen Concentration Camp Case: Trial Of Martin Gottfried Weiss And Thirty-Nine Others, Case 
No. 60 The Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, General Military Government Court Of The United 
States Zone, Dachau, Germany, 15th November-I3th December, 1945 Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals, The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Volume XI, London, HMSO, 1949. 
Yamashita Case: 4 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1 
(1948), Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. 
Hebert dissent: Draft of Judge Hebert’s dissent on the aggressive war charge in IG Farben 
http://louisdl.louislibraries.org/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/HNF&CISOPTR=56&REC=1 
British Military Court Cases 
In re Tesch & Others (Zyklon B Case) (British Mil. Ct. 1946), in 1 U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals 93 (1947); National Archives WO208/2169; 309/625; WO309/625; 
WO3091602; WO309/1603; WO235/83; WO235/641 
Death Warrant Bruno Tesch: 16 May 1946, National Archives, File Nos. WO311/423.   
Wittig File: Wittig et al. National Archives file no. WO 235/283; FO1060/509 (unsorted documents). 
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Mitsugu File: Mitsugu Toda et al. Case No. 65223; National Archives file no. WO235/1028. 
 
Soviet Military Court Cases 
Töpf Documents: Der Spiegel, 1993 Vol. 47 Issue 40, p. 151-162. Protokolle des Todes, 
Verhörprotokolle der Auschwitz-Ingenieure Prüfer, Sander und Schultze, 
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13679718.html and http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-
13679727.html  
Prozeßmaterialien: Prozeßmaterialien in der Strafsache gegen ehemalige angehörige der Japanischen 
Armee wegen Vorbereitung und Anwendung der Bakterienwaffe, Verlag für Fremdsprachige Literatur 
Moskau 1950; Materials on the trial of former servicemen of the Japanese Army charged with 
manufacturing and employing bacteriological weapons, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1950. 
French Military Court Cases 
The Government Commissioner of the General Tribunal of the Military Government of the French Zone 
of Occupation in Germany v Hermann Roechling, Ernst Roechling, Hans Lothar von Gemmingen-
Hornberg, Albert Maier, Wilhelm Rodenhauser, Directors of the Roechling Enterprises (“Roechling 
Case”). Indictment dated 25 November 1947; Judgment dated 30 June 1948; Judgment on appeal dated 
25 January 1949 (German National Archive at Koblenz). 
Dutch Military Court Cases 
Awochi Case 13 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 122 
(1949). 
Documents of the Allied Occupation of Germany 
Control Council Proclamation No. 1: Control Council Proclamation No. 1Berlin 30 August 1945, in 
Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee, Applied Control 
Authority, Germany, 1945, Vol. 1, p. 44. 
CCL10: Control Council Law No. 10, 20 December 1945, in Enactments and Approved Papers of the 
Control Council and Coordinating Committee, Applied Control Authority, Germany, 1945, Vol. 1, p. 
306. 
JCS 1067: Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the 
Military Government of Germany; April 1945. 
U.S. Archives at http://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-aid/military/rg-260.html#OMGUS 
. 
Documents of the US Occupation of Japan 
US Initial Post-Defeat Policy: Japanese National Diet Library, United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy 
Relating to Japan (SWNCC150), 11 June 1945. 
US Initial Post-Surrender Policy: Japanese National Diet Library U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for 
Japan (SWNCC150/4/A), 21 September 1945. 
IMTFE Proclamation: Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of 19 
January 1946, superseded by General Order No. 20, 20 April 1946, available 
http://137.248.11.66/fileadmin/media/IMTFE_April_1946.pdf 
IMTFE Charter: Charter of the (Tokyo) International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1946, TIAS No. 
1589. 
FRUS: United States Department of State/Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 
1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East   Volume VI (1945), at 
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1945v06  
FRUS 922: 7 September 1945 John McCloy Asst. Secretary of War memo to the Acting Secretary of 
State Acheson 
FRUS 926: discussion of the US Policy on the Apprehension and punishment of war criminals in the Far 
East 12 September 1945. 
FRUS 942: Memo by Atcheson to SCAP 8 October 1945. 
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FRUS 952: Atcheson “Top Secret” memo to SCAP dated 6 November 1945. 
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